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1852.

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THE

METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1852.

ART. I.—FAITH AND SCIENCE—COMTE'S POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Cours de Philosophie Positive. Par M. Auguste Comte, Ancien Elève de l'Ecole Polytechnique; Répétiteur d'Analyse Transcendentale, et de Mécanique Rationnelle à la dite Ecole. Paris: Bachelier. 1830–1842. 6 tomes, 8vo.

TWELVE long years elapsed during the slow publication of the successive volumes of M. Comte's Cours de Philosophie Positive, and nearly ten more have passed away since it was submitted in its complete form to the tribunal of public opinion. The writings of Mr. Lewes, M. Littré, and M. Pinel, and also those of Prof. Whewell and Mr. Mill, forbid our supposing that M. Comte's views have been wholly without influence; yet, during the whole period of these twenty-one years, in which this system of Positive Philosophy has attained its legal majority, it has been but twice noticed, as far as we are aware, in the periodical criticism of Europe,* and never in that of America;† and even the name of its illustrious author would have remained a *nomen ignotum* to the large majority of the literary world, but for a cursory and unsatisfactory critique upon the work in Mr. Morell's Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century, and a less meagre but scarcely more adequate examination of his doctrines in Mr. Blakey's History of the Philosophy of Mind. From these scanty sources, but especially from Mr. Morell's very limited and borrowed criticism, have been derived the few passing observations upon M. Comte's philosophy, which have been occasionally hazarded in the ephemeral publications of the day. The comparatively recent

* Sir David Brewster, in the Edinburgh Review, July, 1838, No. clxxxvi, art. i; and Prof. Emile Saisset in the Revue des deux Mondes. This "strange silence" is noticed by M. Comte himself.—Tome vi, Préface, p. xxi.

† Since this was written an excellent article on the subject has appeared in a contemporary journal.

production of the political and social doctrine to which the speculative system of Positivism serves as a propædeutic, has recalled our attention to that elaborate scheme which constitutes its basis. We would have enlarged our rubric and our text by the addition of the "*République Occidentale*," but the fallacies of the latter can be duly appreciated only after a candid estimate of the merits and defects of the great preliminary work. Moreover, we are not disposed to increase the magnitude and diversity of a subject already too ample and complex, by connecting with its examination an inquiry into another topic which more appropriately demands independent treatment, and may receive it at our hands on some future occasion. We shall find it necessary to trim down even the contents of the volumes which form our text into manageable size and shape, by the exclusion of almost everything which is not immediately connected with M. Comte's philosophic method; and while yielding to this necessity, we cannot be guilty of the inconsistency of augmenting the range of view on another side, by bringing within the sweep of our horizon another work which can well await a separate consideration. We are anxious, *pro virili parte*, to atone for the neglect with which M. Comte's labours have been hitherto visited, and to present a sufficient and impartial estimate of that philosophic system, which forms in itself a complete and symmetrical method, and one which is assimilated so closely in many respects to the intellectual instincts and appetites of the day, that its secret influence will be almost exactly proportionate to the degree of public disregard with which it may be visited. In that struggle between religion and science, between philosophy and faith, which has already commenced, and which must play so important a part in the intellectual history of the remainder of the century, a large, ingenious, and learned party must recognise Comte as their apostle, and the Positive Philosophy as their creed; nor can the votaries of the Christian faith be prepared to resist the rising deluge of error, unless they have first patiently weighed and dispassionately appreciated the current forms of metaphysical or speculative delusion—and Positivism among the rest. For these reasons, late though it may appear to be, we propose at this time to exhibit the doctrines of M. Comte, to examine their validity, to acknowledge their occasional and limited truth, and, so far as we may be able to do so, to expose their fallacies, and refute the principles from which we conceive that their errors proceed.

In the solitary review of the work, which has hitherto appeared in the English journals, only the first two volumes were considered by Sir David Brewster. In these the philosophy of Comte was barely indicated, but by no means developed; and what was impor-

tant or original even in the fragment reviewed, was unappreciated or misunderstood in the feeble essay of the reviewer. We can scarcely conceive anything more unfortunately inapposite and irrelevant to the intellectual characteristics of the author reviewed, than the smooth, elegant, and plausible remarks with which Sir David commences his criticism. Yet, notwithstanding his limited comprehension, or, rather, total misapprehension, of the scope and nature of the treatise of M. Comte, he commends it as "a work of profound science, marked with great acuteness of reasoning, and conspicuous for the highest attributes of intellectual power." Equally strong and flattering is the testimony to its merits offered by the few other writers in England who have spoken of it. Morell admits "the admiration excited by the author's brilliant scientific genius."* Blakey's eulogy is to the like effect. Mill, who is so largely indebted to it for much that is most valuable in his own celebrated treatise on logic, frankly acknowledges his indebtedness, and constantly bestows upon Comte cordial and generous commendation. "Within a few years," says he, "three writers, profoundly versed in physical science, and not unaccustomed to carry their speculations into higher regions of knowledge, have made attempts of unequal, but all of very great merit, towards the creation of a philosophy of induction: Sir John Herschel, in his Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy; Mr. Whewell, in his History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences; and, greatest of all, M. Auguste Comte, in his Cours de Philosophie Positive, a work which only requires to be better known to place its author in the first class of European thinkers."† Prof. Whewell, in the works to which Mr. Mill refers, has paid the Positive Philosophy of M. Comte the very significant compliment of borrowing from it to a vast extent, without making any acknowledgment whatever. These works of Dr. Whewell's were evidently suggested to him by Sir John Herschel's Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy.‡ The leading idea in the plan of the history is due partly to Victor Cousin, and partly to Comte;§ and the larger portion of the philosophy which has any appearance of novelty or depth may be traced to the more or less distinct intima-

* Morell's knowledge of Comte seems to have been taken at second-hand from the essays of Brewster and Saisset.

† Mill's Logic, b. iii, ch. i. See also his estimate more explicitly recorded b. iii, ch. v, ch. xxiv; b. vi, ch. x.

‡ The germs of these works may be found in a review of Sir John Herschel's Discourse, evidently written by Prof. Whewell, in the London Quarterly Review for July, 1831.

§ This fact, with respect to Victor Cousin, appears sufficiently established in the Southern Quarterly Review for July, 1842.

tions of Kant and Comte.* Yet his very great obligations to these authors are nowhere acknowledged further than by a rare and reluctant reference to their writings.† Mr. Mill proclaims liberally, and in strong terms, the aid which he derived in the composition of his system of logic from the above-mentioned works of Dr. Whewell; but, with the exception of a few happily invented technical phrases, all the assistance which was obtained from those sources might have been more efficiently obtained from the Cours de Philosophie Positive, either by the direct adoption or the suggested refutation of the conclusions of M. Comte.

When such high encomiums have been bestowed upon the elaborate treatise of M. Comte by the concurrent testimony of the few distinguished writers who have studied its contents and availed themselves of its results, it may appear singular that it has never, in the course of the nine years which have elapsed since its completion, been brought to the test of full and intelligent criticism in Europe or America. This may in some measure be accounted for by the immense range of varied erudition exhibited in it, which seems to require an analogous, though not necessarily equivalent, πολυμαθία, in any one who should undertake to give a complete analysis or refutation of its conclusions. Moreover, the originality and abstruseness of many of the speculations, which rest on the vast scaffolding of the author's acquired knowledge, can only be apprehended in their full significance, and weighed in a just balance, by a mind more untrammelled by ordinary prejudices, and less wedded to received formulas, than can be readily found in the present day. In addition to all this, the boldness, the novelty, the exhaustless variety, the copiousness, the logical coherence, and the remarkable extent of the work, combine to render a thorough examination and appreciation of its doctrines eminently difficult. It may appear paradoxical to mention its rigid logical connexion among the obstacles tending to prevent an earlier criticism of the work; but the perfect harmony and mutual dependence of all its parts necessitate the clear apprehension of the system as a whole, before any satisfactory judgment on it can be rendered.‡ And the difficulty, as

* We do not mean to accuse Whewell of downright plagiarism, though this charge might be justified by some incidents in his literary career, but only of such indebtedness as ought to have been acknowledged. His appropriations reappear as identical arguments and conclusions, as modified doctrines, or as contradictory views, all, however, evidently suggested by the writers mentioned above.

† If we remember correctly, there are two references to Comte in Mr. Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences.

‡ "Sans doute la nature de ce cours ne saurait être complètement appréciée, de manière à pouvoir s'en former une opinion définitive, que lorsque les diverses

well as rarity, of such apprehension may be easily estimated by any one who has noted the singular incapacity of the contemporaneous generation for enlarged and connected speculation,* and who is aware of the deficiency of modern thinkers and writers in everything appertaining to strict logical investigation and extended logical concatenation. Every one who has studied the works of Leibnitz must have observed how utterly ridiculous and anomalous his peculiar doctrines appear, when severed from that grand but fallacious scheme of which they constitute such essential details.† Eminently plausible when considered in their native setting and harmonious correlation, they excite only a smile when exhibited in naked isolation. In the same way, to understand the separate dogmas of Comte, we must contemplate them in their symmetrical correspondence with, and dependence on, that vast redintegration and expansion of the whole body of the sciences, which he has so ably endeavoured to constitute. But in order to do this effectually, we must wander through the maze of all known or conjectural science, and digest the immense mass of important doctrine which is thickly spread over the five thousand pages of the Cours de Philosophie Positive. If we judge from the long silence of the critics, this is a task almost beyond the capacity of human performance—it is certainly not achieved by Prof. Saisset—it is one which, if satisfactorily executed, would require, according to the mode of its accomplishment, either nearly equal or else greater genius and learning than have been displayed by M. Comte in the construction of this mighty monument of intellectual power. It is not always, but it certainly is sometimes true, that the correction of speculative errors and aberrations requires greater abilities and attainments than their creation. We have no hesitation in declaring that such will be the case whenever M. Comte's system of philosophy may

parties en auront été successivement développées."—*Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos.*, tome i, p. 1. The composition of a work so extensive and so closely articulated as Comte's is a remarkable anomaly in this age, and justifies his own remark: "A une époque de divagation intellectuelle, et de versatilité politique, toute longue persévérance dans une direction rigoureusement invariable, peut, sans doute, être justement signaleé au public, comme une solide garantie de leur (les nouveaux principes) consistance, et même de leur opportunité," &c.—Tome vi, p. iv.

* The contracted and limited horizon with which men of science bound their views in our day is constantly noted and reprehended by Comte. Cours de Phil. Pos., tome i, p. 29; vi, pp. xxii, 15, 23, 289–292, 340, 643, 675.

† The mutual interdependence of the doctrines of Leibnitz is traced with some ability by Morell, Crit. Hist. Phil., &c.; and better in Brucker's able summary, Hist. Crit. Phil., tome v, pp. 397–446; but can be fully appreciated only from the direct study of the works of Leibnitz himself.

meet with a full, adequate, and dispassionate refutation, coextensive with the range of the heresy, equally comprehensive in its general principles, and equally complete in its details.

We have perhaps already given an ample excuse to exonerate the periodical criticism of Europe and America from any very harsh censure for its long neglect of M. Comte; and we have assuredly said enough to manifest our full sense of our own inefficiency for the adequate performance of the task. But while the bow of Ulysses stands idle in the hall, and the twenty years of hopeless wandering and anxious expectation have been consumed before the master's hand has been extended to draw it, we may perhaps be pardoned if, as no Ulysses appears, we adapt the bow to our strength and endeavour to wield it, without laying claim to any permanent acquisition of it; for, until the bow be bent and the arrow sped to the mark, it will be the source of evils innumerable to men, instead of defending them against the calamities which it might be potent to avert.

> Πολλοὺς γὰρ τόδε τόξον ἀριστῆας κεκαδήσει
> Θυμοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς.

We shall not attempt to review the whole ground over which the labours of M. Comte extend—a task for which we candidly confess our own incompetency, and which, even if not beyond our ability, would be precluded by the necessary limits of this article. Neglecting for the time his skilful elaboration of a new classification of the sciences,* and the valuable strictures on the several departments of human knowledge with which he has enriched his work, we will confine our attention to the examination of that system of Positive Philosophy, of which he so loftily and constantly claims to be the founder,† and whose definite establishment he boldly proclaims in his *République Occidentale*. In thus separating the leading element from the rest of these important labours, and concentrating our regards upon it, we deem that we shall be rendering better service to our readers than we should have done, had either ability or inclination permitted us to enter upon that full examination of the complete work which we recognise as beyond our strength; for thus we should only have dissipated the force of our remarks over an infinite multiplicity and diversity of details. M. Comte's contributions to the philosophy of the inductive sciences have been already in part appropriated by Dr. Whe-

* Of this Mr. Mill speaks in these terms: "M. Comte, whose view of the philosophy of classification, in the third volume of his great work, is the most complete with which I am acquainted," &c.—*Logic*, b. iv, ch. vii.

† "Le Fondateur d'une nouvelle philosophie."—*Cours de Phil. Pos.*, tome vi, préf., p. vi. "Fondateur d'une nouvelle philosophie générale, à la fois historique et dogmatique."—Tome vi, p. xxviii, cf. p. 288, and numerous other passages.

well, and, in some measure, criticised and appreciated by Mr. Mill. His systematic classification of the sciences, or, as he terms it himself, "la vraie hiérarchie encyclopédique," "cette hiérarchie fondamentale des sciences positives,"* can be more profitably estimated in connexion with the elaborate but somewhat grotesque scheme of M. Ampère,† who has been largely, but perhaps unconsciously, aided by his predecessor; and his criticisms on the separate sciences may be judiciously referred, on his own principles,‡ to the special examination of the cultivators of the several sciences respectively. His Philosophy of History, which is eminently ingenious, and in many respects profound, and which has been unjustly neglected by Ferrari,§ may occasionally furnish us with some necessary illustrations, but cannot be permitted to break the unity of our aims; while his creation of Social Philosophy, so loudly and so rightfully claimed by him as exclusively his own, is well entitled, by its extent and importance, to an independent discussion, without which its merits and its defects cannot be fairly tested. By this division of labour alone is there any prospect of the formation of a just estimate of the value and the results of M. Comte's labours; and in this way, what might be beyond the separate ability of one to accomplish, may be separately achieved by the distinct but concurring exertions of many. We have divided our strand from the cord as appropriate to the time, the occasion, and our own ability; we have taken for our text what may seem the least part of M. Comte's work, but it is the leaven which leaveneth the whole lump; and if we refute his philosophy, his errors are crushed in the germ. We shall therefore limit our view almost exclusively to the nature, value, and tendencies of M. Comte's system of Positive Philosophy. We shall, however, remember, and our readers should remember also, that M. Comte's intellectual rank is to be judged by no such partial criterion, but from the aggregate of his labours, and from the extent, compactness, profundity, and universality of his researches. Perhaps, when all that he has done is taken into sober consideration, it may be thought that he stands next to Bacon among modern philosophers—*proximus, sed longo intervallo.* He is superior to the sage of Verulam in everything but sobriety of judgment, poetic richness of imagination, and

* Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos., tome vi, préface, p. vii; tome i, p. 98.

† Essai de Philosophie: ou Exposition Analytique d'une Classification Naturelle de toutes les connaissances humaines. Par André Marie Ampère. 2 vols., 8vo. Paris: 1838–1843.

‡ Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon lvii.

§ Ferrari, Essai sur le Principe et les Limites de la Philosophie de l'Histoire. Paris: 1843.

that first and loftiest of all gifts of genius, justice of conception. But whatever may be thought of him in comparison with the founder of modern science—and he himself pretends to no equality—he is certainly entitled to rank with, if not above, Hobbes, Descartes, and Leibnitz—perhaps we might add Kant.

Before entering, however, upon the analysis of the Positive Philosophy, some previous notice of the author, of his motives in writing this work, of the circumstances under which it was composed, and of its general character, may be acceptable to our readers, particularly as both the book and the author are so little known among us. A few brief remarks upon these topics are all that we can venture to indulge in before entering upon the character and tendencies of the Positive Philosophy.

M. Comte states, in his personal preface to the sixth volume of his work, that he was sprung from a Catholic and royalist family in the south of France, and brought up in the midst of royalist and Catholic influences. He appears, nevertheless, to have thrown himself at a very early age into the current of revolutionary feeling. From his birth and education he may have imbibed that bitter detestation of the name and fame of Napoleon which is so frequently and so singularly exemplified in his works. Educated at the Polytechnic School, he was early initiated into that mathematical and scientific discipline which he makes the basis, and we might almost say the sum, of all valuable learning. Regarding the instruction obtained at this celebrated institute as incomplete and insufficient, he prepared himself for his already contemplated renovation of sciences and societies, by sedulous application to the more recondite study of the phenomena of social existence and the phases of humanity in past ages. He was thus led to the discovery in 1812, at the age of twenty-four, of what he calls "the true encyclopædical hierarchy of the sciences," and of the complete harmony and mutual interdependence of his intellectual and political speculations. But not content with the mere repetition and extension of the accredited doctrines handed down by others, nor even with the vague fancies of possible regeneration which floated dimly before his eyes, he plunged boldly into the vortex of those wilder speculations which were broached obscurely in his youth, and he appears to have been one of the first, as he certainly was the most distinguished, of the acolytes of Saint-Simon. In that scanty band of enthusiasts and fanatics, whose reveries were barely redeemed from insanity by the high and solemn, though impracticable, nature of their aims, he seems to have rendered himself equally notorious by his talents and by his cold and sweeping infidelity. So fixed, so calm, so cold, indeed, was this infi-

delity, that it was rebuked even by Saint-Simon on his death-bed. From the ranks of the Saint-Simonians, however, M. Comte withdrew after a short period of service; and he now looks back with repentance, regret, and no slight scorn, to his former connexion with the singular founder of that singular sect.* But, notwithstanding this secession, and the bitterness which it has left behind, he has carried with him into the wider sphere of his own original speculations, the same feelings, the same objects, and frequently the same doctrines as were entertained by the grotesque and erratic hierarch whose ministry he had abjured. Certain it is that the impress of Saint-Simon is often to be detected in the most characteristic positions of the Philosophie Positive. It was while yet numbered among the Saint-Simonians that M. Comte gave the first distinct intimations of that colossal scheme which he has since accomplished. He had been destined for the great work of the renovation of the sciences and the regeneration of society by Saint-Simon himself; he had been by him designated as a fitting Elisha on whom the mantle of Elijah should descend; and he laid the foundation-stone of the contemplated edifice by the publication of his Système de Politique Positive in 1822. Perhaps dissatisfied with the mysticism which encircled the hard and practical, though fantastic, realities of Saint-Simonism; perhaps unwilling to remain trammelled by adherence to a system which, notwithstanding its tendencies to libertinism, was yet reluctant to renounce wholly the recognition of a Deity, or the necessity of religion;† M. Comte withdrew from the communion of that sect, which was ready to honour him as the anointed successor to their founder, and boldly undertook the construction of an independent system for himself.

He had scarcely, however, entered upon the oral exposition of those new doctrines which are embodied in his Cours de Philosophie Positive, when his labours were interrupted by an attack of mental derangement, which he has characterized as "une crise cérébrale," and attributed to the combined influence of great distress and excessive labour. When medicine and science despaired of a cure, nature was left to her own unrestricted energies; and, indeed, by judicious nursing, "the inherent strength of his constitution triumphed over his disease, and even over the doctor's prescriptions."‡ M. Comte, after his recovery, immediately resumed the thread of his specula-

* See what he says of his Saint-Simonian fever. Cours de Phil. Pos., tome vi, pp. vii, viii.

† This seems to have been the principal cause of the schism. Cours de Phil. Pos., tome vi, p. ix, note.

‡ Cours de Phil. Pos., tome vi, p. x, note.

tions, and concluded, in 1829, the oral elaboration of his views, which had been broken off by his mental alienation three years before. He boasts that this terrible episode in his career in no respect affected the perfect continuity of his intellectual development; but those who are disposed to criticise his philosophy harshly, may suspect that some traces of insanity may yet be detected in some of the extravagant propositions of the Positive Philosophy, and especially in its sweeping and impassive atheism.

M. Comte informs us that he has, during his whole life, been wholly dependent on his own exertions for support; that he was entirely without private fortune at the commencement of his career; that from the age of eighteen he has been teaching mathematics from six to eight hours a day;* that it was not until 1832 that he was admitted into the faculty of the Polytechnic School, and then only as a tutor of the lowest grade; that at the age of forty-five, when he completed the publication of the Cours de Philosophie Positive, his means were still uncertain and limited; and that he was without any assured provision for his old age, though he expresses an entire confidence in the generous support of his countrymen, and appeals, for the estimation of his labours, from the neglect and injustice of his compeers, to the bar of the public opinion of France and Europe. Of the weight to be attached to his criminations of the Polytechnic School, of the Institute, of the Government, and of the mathematicians of France,—though, in regard to the last, they have been repeated by Hoéné Wrouski,—we cannot and need not judge;† but we cannot refrain from expressing our admiration of the high sentiments which are conveyed, and the lofty spirit of philosophic independence which is breathed by the language of his appeal.‡

Another appeal to the "Occidental Public," which is appended as a post-scriptum to the "République Occidentale," enables us to bring down M. Comte's personal history to the middle of the year 1848. It reveals a more melancholy condition than its predecessor. He says that his persecutions have extended even beyond his previous apprehensions. In the July of 1844 he was summarily ejected from his office in the Polytechnic School by the machinations and

* In singular contradiction to Comte's own declarations, Morell says: "Up to the year 1816 he was a teacher in the Polytechnic School at Paris."—*Crit. Hist. Phil. XIX. Century*, p. 354.

† Tome vi, pp. x–xxxiv. After the revolution of February, however, M. Comte retracted his language with respect to M. Arago, whom he had termed "fidèle organe spontané des passions et des aberrations propres à la classe qu'il domine aujourd'hui si déplorablement."—Tome vi, p. xvi, note. The retraction is repeated in the preface to the République Occidentale, pp. xi, xii.

‡ Cours de Phil. Pos., tome vi, pp. xxxii–xxxiv.

injustice of his scientific enemies. He has had to return to the occupation of private instruction, and "commenced his second half-century by resuming for life the humble and laborious profession which seemed appropriate only to his more youthful years."*

Notwithstanding the noble appeal of M. Comte to the public opinion of Europe, his labours remain to this day unappreciated. By some few thinkers his conclusions have been rashly adopted with indiscriminate admiration; by a few others they have been reprobated with undistinguishing acrimony; and by Mr. Mill, as far as they ran parallel with his own studies, they have been cordially appreciated: but no suitable response has been given to the manly appeal of their author. Yet, when we examine his work, it is difficult to determine whether we ought to admire most the constant industry and the unswerving perseverance of twenty years devoted to its composition, or the genius, profundity, boldness, originality, and learning displayed on every page. These characteristics are entitled to our earnest approbation, whether M. Comte's conclusions be considered accurate or not. Indeed, no more memorable instance has fallen under our cognizance of patient, continued, and logical investigation, and of unflinching perseverance in defiance of all obstacles, than is displayed in the volumes under review. In spite of his constant and common-place avocations; of the difficulties and trials of his private life; of the jealousy or animosity of men distinguished equally by their talents, their reputation, and their influence; of the interruptions of sickness, the seductions of deceptive theories, and the scantiness of leisure hours—in spite of all these things, and, worse than all, of the grinding oppression of poverty, M. Comte has pressed steadily onwards, from his youth to the turn of mature life, towards the final accomplishment of his early meditated designs, and has ultimately succeeded in completing the immense elaboration of his vast system in the Cours de Philosophie Positive. Considering this, however, as merely the necessary introduction to more immediately practical labours, he closes his long work with the promise and the delineation of those ulterior speculations, for which all that he has already accomplished is regarded merely as the indispensable preparation. It would be difficult, if not impossible, in the present age to find a parallel for the immense learning and labour of the Cours de Philosophie Positive; it would be questionable whether in any age an analogous case could be discovered, in which such labours had been contemplated by their author as merely the scaffolding for higher and more important constructions, designed and to be erected by himself. These are con-

* République Occidentale, p. 898.

siderations which entitle M. Comte to our admiration, wholly irrespective of the error or the truth of his conclusions, or of the beneficial or pernicious tendency of his writings.

One of the most remarkable peculiarities connected with the composition of this work, is the singularly brief time in which its different parts were written. In the midst of all other engagements and distractions, these five thousand pages were composed in twenty-two months of actual labour, as appears from the data communicated by M. Comte in the general table of contents appended to the sixth volume. The publication, owing to a variety of delays, was prolonged through the tedious term of twelve years; but the treatise was written by scraps at different times, which in the aggregate amount to only the above-mentioned period of twenty-two months. It is true that long previous meditation had already developed in his mind the connected scheme of the Positive Philosophy, and his public lectures had in a great measure settled the form and systematized the order of its exposition; still, when we consider the range, the variety, and the learning of the work, the extreme rapidity of its composition must be regarded as not the least remarkable of its characteristics. It adds to our admiration also, that, though this hasty execution has occasioned prolixity and needless repetition, it has in no wise impaired the strict logical concatenation, the close interdependence, or the symmetry of its respective parts.

Before concluding this rapid notice of the critical merits of M. Comte, we must commend the perspicuity and translucent clearness of his style, the quaint but vigorous originality of his expressions, and the happy grace of his forcible mode of argumentation. His literary excellences are by no means inferior either to his philosophical profundity or his scientific attainments.

The motives which inspired the composition of this great philosophical system may be in some measure inferred from our previous remarks; but they are so closely connected with the satisfaction of the wants, and with the realization of the most active appetencies of the age—and, furthermore, they shed so much light upon the character of the system itself, that if we had the space, we would scarcely deem it irrelevant to accord to them a more extended examination here. Moreover, we regard the feeling which prompted M. Comte's vast exertions, guided his investigations, and determined his utterance, as being that feeling which it is most important to awaken in the minds of the passing generation; for, whatever may be our estimate of the method or of the results of the Positive Philosophy, there is no room for doubting the urgent necessity for a general intellectual regeneration, though we would have it irradiated by a very different

spirit from that which breathes through the creed of M. Comte. Nevertheless, the full and clear-sighted recognition of such a necessity has furnished the main-spring of his labours, and the desire of suitably supplying the want has given birth to his great treatise. He says of himself:—

"When I had barely attained the age of fourteen, I had already, of my own accord, run over all the essential degrees of the revolutionary spirit, and experienced the fundamental necessity of a universal regeneration, at once political and philosophical, under the active energy of that salutary crisis, whose principal phase had preceded my birth."

M. Comte may, perhaps, have deceived himself in tracing to so early a period the origin of his particular philosophy, from the desire to assimilate his own intellectual development to that of Lord Bacon, whom he regards, most erroneously, as the apostle of Positivism;* but the anxiety to prepare the way, and, if possible, to determine the form for this second instauration of the sciences has undoubtedly been the actuating principle of his philosophical life. Our estimate of the results and aims of his philosophy will accordingly depend to no slight extent upon our agreement or disagreement with his conclusions in regard to the social, political, and intellectual condition of modern civilization.

For ourselves, we have no hesitation in declaring that we assent most cordially to nearly all of M. Comte's strictures on the present age. With him we recognise its total want of consistent principles, and the entire absence of anything like logical or philosophical sequence in its schemes, its practices, and its reasonings. We perceive most clearly the universal spirit of resistance to all authority, resulting in anarchy intellectual, political, social, and religious; the substitution of false and petty aims in life for the noble sentiments of right and duty; the degradation of all science into the mere instrument of pecuniary advancement, and the concomitant decline of science itself. Like him, we admit and lament the mammonization of all the springs, processes, and results of human action, whether collective or individual; and we regard these evils as being pre-eminently the characteristics of this self-glorifying, self-stultifying age of intellect. To these things, as not very remote causes, we trace the social and political calamities and revolutions which have illustrated the history of the recent years; and we can conceive of no remedy for the present condition of the European world, and possibly for the impending fate of America, which does not commence with a

* "Les deux éternels législateurs primitifs de la philosophie positive, Bacon et Descartes."—*Cours de Phil. Pos.*, tome vi, p. 455; v, pp. 695, 756, 784, 886.

complete reformation and reorganization of our philosophy. Thus our opinions are in perfect unison with those of M. Comte as to the task which is proposed to the present generation, and the nature of the medium in which it is to be accomplished; and, however widely we may differ from him in our choice of the modes of procedure to be adopted, and dissent from the fundamental principles of the required philosophy proposed by him, we acknowledge the valuable services which he has rendered by precisely stating the conditions of the problem, and offer the cordial tribute of our admiration to the singular genius, learning, and sagacity with which they have been settled, proved, and illustrated.

A vague and latent feeling of these pernicious characteristics of the times, with their dependent consequences, led to the premature, fantastic, and irrational reveries of Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen. But, however chimerical we may deem their views, and however delusive or demoralizing we may consider their projects, these writers are entitled to our conscientious regard for the promptitude with which they detected the obscure nature of the disease, the boldness with which they attempted to expose it, and the faithful diligence with which they endeavoured to discover and apply a remedy; for these growing evils were then imminent, and they are still impending fatally over the human race—more fatally for the recent explosion in Europe—and they demand a prompt, a clear, and a sufficient solution.

It was the common recognition of the same phenomena and the same necessities, which led M. Comte to associate himself with Saint-Simon: they were inspired with the same hopes, and actuated by the same spirit. They both saw the urgency of a complete intellectual regeneration, which might revivify every department of human speculation and practice, and might effectually reorganize the various systems of social co-ordination. M. Saint-Simon was an enthusiast, a fanatic, and the constant dupe of his own vanity: he was uneducated, and his mind was undisciplined, and consequently his refuge and his creed was mysticism. M. Comte is more learned, more sober, more practical, and more profound; but both aimed at the same end, and hoped for its achievement by analogous means. If the one degraded and the other denied religion, they both did so under the delusion that Christianity was effete or false, and proved to be so by the utter decay of its influence over the lives and actions of men, and by its apparent inefficacy to remedy those social disorders which they did not perceive had sprung from infidelity of heart, and from practical disregard of its precepts and solemn ordinances.

Out of the ranks of the Saint-Simonians, as in them, M. Comte still kept the same high objects in view. He thought, he studied, he lectured, he taught, and he wrote, to call the attention of mankind to their condition and their wants; to awaken them to the recognition of the necessity of an instant and thorough intellectual regeneration; to urge them to the laborious accomplishment of the great task; and to offer them what seemed to himself a sufficient, and the only sufficient guide for their labours, and remedy for their distempers. Whether, in this estimate, he has not deceived himself, we shall hereafter inquire: but it is to the constant stimulus of such views and feelings that we owe the composition of the Cours de Philosophie Positive; and we freely acknowledge our deep gratitude for the gift. We shall censure as strongly as any one the fallacies and sophistries of its infidelity, and the errors which we deem its author to have committed; but, on the whole, we regard it as the great and most valuable legacy which the first half of the nineteenth century has bequeathed to posterity. M. Comte recognises, illustrates, and probes, with a delicate and faithful hand, the nature and sources of that universal distemperature of the times, which threatens to convert the human family into a pandemonium upon earth, and to render all human achievement, all human civilization, and all human science, the instruments of the most complete and wide-spreading debasement of society. He points out the gross intellectual aberrations into which this enlightened age has fallen; the deep-seated intellectual anarchy and licentiousness which prevail, to the discomfiture of science, philosophy, and social organization: to these sources he traces the revolutionary character of the day, the wants and miseries of the masses, and the advancing disintegration of all intellectual systems. But, not content with merely calling attention to the existence of evil—a mission which Carlyle has performed with the ignorance, but also with the frenzied inspiration of a priestess of Delphi or Dodona—he endeavours to characterize its nature and discover its origin; and unsatisfied even with this, he suggests remedies, and offers what he deems a panacea in a new method of science, a new instauration of learning, a new philosophy without a creed, and a concomitant and accordant reorganization of society. Such is the purpose of the Cours de Philosophie Positive.

Referring the social difficulties and disorders of the times to the unsoundness of our intellectual principles, to the vague and fluctuating nature of all our speculations about men and states, and to the logical fallacies involved in all our scientific processes, M. Comte deems it necessary to constitute the general science of societies (Sociology) before proceeding to examine questions of politics

proper, or of political economy. But, in order duly to create this social science, he examines the grounds and truth of all other human sciences, regarding them as the necessary preliminaries to the examination of the phenomena of social existence. These propædeutic studies, each of which has its own independent value, can, however, be neither criticised nor examined, except in their mutual relations and interdependence; nor can they be reformed or corrected without a constant reference to some fixed scientific method. Hence the necessity of commencing these labours by a formal classification of the sciences; and hence also the necessity of making such classification dependent upon a clearly defined method. This method must of course be determined by the nature of the faculties of the human mind, by the degree of certainty conceived to appertain to human knowledge, and by the character which belongs to all human reasoning. All methods agree in seeking their determination from these sources, and the diversities by which they may be separated from each other thus spring entirely from the different modes in which these problems are interpreted by different minds.

Under the influence of these considerations, M. Comte determines the character, conditions, and limitations of human knowledge, and the method of scientific inquiry to be pursued in accordance with such restrictions, which method he terms the Positive Philosophy. He then proceeds, by the application and development of this method, to build up the several sciences in regular order and due sequence, raising them stage by stage above each other in beautiful and harmonious co-ordination, thus constructing his new classification of the sciences, or Hiérarchie des Sciences Positives. As he advances, he points out the peculiarities, the excellences, and the defects of the several sciences—he determines what conclusions are solid, what doubtful, and what fallacious—develops the positive method concurrently with his criticism—and thus passes through all the subordinate and interdependent degrees to those biological studies which, though not cultivated philosophically as yet, nevertheless form the indispensable link of transition to the study of the actions of masses of men, the doctrine of communities, or what he has named Social or Sociological science.

This orderly and logical mode of procedure suggests to us the course to be adopted in our examination of M. Comte's system of philosophy. Leaving out of view the application of his doctrines to the separate sciences, and neglecting his scheme of classification, as not specially belonging to the present inquiry, we shall first consider briefly his views of the nature and limitations of human knowledge; then proceed to an examination of his Method; next investigate the

character and efficiency of the Positive Philosophy; and conclude with an estimate of the validity, the tendencies, and the defects of this recent counterpart to the *Instauratio Magna* of Lord Bacon. Throughout this examination, we shall find at every step new cause for admiration, in the work, though we may ultimately conclude that the views therein set forth are imperfect, impracticable, or fallacious; and may find that the writer has overlooked many of the most vital phenomena and most important characteristics of human life and knowledge; and may even discover that the new method, as understood by its promulgator, involves such fallacies and inconsistencies as defeat its satisfactory application to the solution of the social and intellectual difficulties of the present age. Such is the mode of procedure which we shall adopt, in order to afford a critical and impartial estimate of the Positive Philosophy of M. Comte.

In a former essay we discussed the general question of the certainty and limitations of human knowledge,* and indicated the position assumed by the Positive Philosophy in regard to this fundamental point. On the present occasion, accordingly, we need only repeat briefly what we then exhibited more fully, and notice the fatal and all-pervading errors which have sprung from fallacious views on this subject.

The human mind, according to the doctrine of M. Comte, recognises the impossibility of attaining to absolute knowledge, renounces all inquiry into the origin and destination of the universe and into the intimate causes of phenomena, and seeks only to discover, by a happy combination of reasoning and observation, the laws of their action; that is to say, their uniform relations of succession and resemblance. The explanation of facts, thus reduced to precise terms, becomes thenceforward the established connexion between the diverse particular phenomena and certain general facts, whose numbers diminish with the progress of science.† The statement of these general facts, in scientific language constitutes what is habitually understood by the laws of nature.

We deem M. Comte, as we said on the previous occasion, to have taken a correct view of the nature of strict science, in considering its laws as merely the theoretical colligation of phenomena, and as possessing no demonstrative truth beyond their correspondence with the facts obtained by observation, and their conformity with the consequences developed by accurate reasoning therefrom; but he errs in ignoring and cashiering everything which

* April, 1851. Art. I., Philosophy and Faith.

† Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon i, tome i, pp. 4, 5.

does not fall within the range of strict scientific demonstration. The limitation proposed by M. Comte only distinguishes scientific from unscientific knowledge; it explodes neither the existence nor the practical utility, under certain conditions, of the latter. All science, indeed, in its earlier stages had belonged to this same category of vague, undefined, unsystematized knowledge; and if the rule of the Positive Philosophy is of universal application, the existence of the grain of truth in former speculation, which has fructified into our modern science, is denied by the same negation which in our time affects to repudiate everything but that small portion of human knowledge which admits of scientific co-ordination. Every round in the long ladder of human progress by which our present advancement has been attained, would be thus proved to have been utterly rotten and nugatory, and unavailing even for those purposes which it had subserved. Yet, despite of this, we would continue to claim as valid the position to which we had ultimately arrived by their assistance. M. Comte asserts, and most justly, that the only true method of philosophical exposition must be principally historical,* and must explain, absorb, and harmonize all the previous stages of progress; but certainly the leading dogma of Positivism in regard to the conditions of human knowledge is strangely at variance with this doctrine of an historical mode of philosophy. Nevertheless, this inconsistency is by no means the sole or the principal objection to the application of M. Comte's theory to the extent contemplated by him. Its great fallacy is, that it excludes from even practical validity that great portion of human knowledge and opinion which, though not systematized into science, furnishes the sufficient and only attainable rules of our ordinary life and action, continues to supply, as it has hitherto supplied, the material for the further advancement of science itself, and affords a substitute for scientific direction in anticipation of the time when the development of science enables it to furnish more satisfactory and demonstrative prescriptions. Our life and intellect are submitted to the harmonious guidance of a self-expanding, self-expounding science, and an undefined arbiter, half-reason, half-instinct, which supplies the deficiencies of the former. This unsystematized reason is the sole guide of the untutored ages of humanity. With the advance of civilization it concedes daily more and more of its once exclusive authority to the hands of its younger, but more showy and disciplined sister; but it never entirely resigns the reins of human conduct, nor can discord be introduced between the two, or a usurped and exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the puisné sovereign, without endangering the founda-

* Cours de Phil. Pos., lecon lviii, tome vi, p. 658.

tions of all reason, and introducing fatal schisms and inconsistencies into our whole reasoning and practice.

The ostentatious profundity of modern times, which derides as superstition all that admits not of explication by the formalism of its scientific processes, has narrowed and cramped the range of the human intellect, and palsied the play of human feeling. It has cut us off from all recognition of those vague impulses, those mystical aspirations, those prophetic instincts, and hallowed fancies, which, yielding not to the trammels of science, are sublimated by the alembic or eliminated by the calculus, but which nevertheless are calculated to sanctify and adorn our daily life and conversation, and to shed the brilliancy of a heavenly origin around the cold formalities of the world. All that is essential to redeem science from its hard and impassive narrowness—to counteract its dangerous seductions—lies beyond its horizon. Every appeal to the imagination, the affections, and the nobler principles of our being, is drawn from springs deeper than the finite plummet of human intellect has ever sounded. There can be no sympathetic comprehension of the wide universe in which we are placed, no quickening recognition of our manifold relations to it, unless we breathe a more empyrean air than that which can be compressed by the force-pump of scientific demonstration. Nay, we must travel beyond the sphere of human systems, before we can discover those eternal founts of light, which are requisite for the irradiation, the enlargement, and the elevation of science itself. How unwise then, how unworthy of our boasted intelligence, to dwarf the undefined world of human apprehension to the straitened compass of scientific truths!

We are no advocates for the wild and feverish delusions of theoretic fantasy; no rebels against the wholesome restrictions of sober reason; no architects of unsubstantial systems framed by reasoning *à priori*. All that we maintain is, that a broad line of distinction—wide as the chasm which separates Dives and Lazarus—exists, and should be recognised, between scientific conclusions and unscientific knowledge. We agree most entirely and cordially with M. Comte in our estimate of the character of the former, but we are unwilling with him to blind ourselves to the existence and importance of the latter. We would cheerfully render unto Cæsar the things that be Cæsar's; but we think that the most essential part of the tribute remains unpaid until we render unto God the things which are God's, without attempting to absolve the human intellect from its highest and noblest functions.

It would not be difficult to show that M. Comte's position, so far as it is true—that is to say, when confined to the characterization of

scientific knowledge—had been in some degree anticipated by Lord Bacon himself, and indicated by him in a remarkable passage of his works, which probably suggested to our author the designation of the Positive Philosophy.* His great predecessor has, however, with his wonted comprehensive grasp of intellect, recognised also that distinction between knowledge capable of systematization and knowledge incapable of it, on which we have insisted; though he has left his views undeveloped. Perhaps we might go back three centuries in time, and find M. Comte's theory obscurely intimated in the great precursor and namesake of the sage of Verulam:—"Tota philosophiæ intentio non est nisi rerum naturas et proprietates evolvere."† If by "the nature of things," Roger Bacon contemplated only their phenomenal nature, this passage might have formed a suitable motto to the Cours de Philosophie Positive. And that such was his intention might perhaps be safely inferred from other remarks contained in the Opus Majus, especially from that profound observation in which he anticipates the wisdom of Lord Bacon already referred to:—

"Sed tamen omne id super quod potest intellectus noster, ut intelligat et sciat, oportet quod sit indignum respectu eorum, ad quæ in principio credenda sua debilitate obligetur, sicut sunt divinæ veritates et multa secreta naturæ et artis complentis naturam, de quibus nulla ratio humana dari potest in principio; sed oportet quod per experientiam illuminationis interioris a Deo recipiat intellectum, viz., in sacris veritatibus gratiæ et gloriæ, et per experientiam sensibilem in arcanis naturæ et artis expergefactus inveniat rationem."‡

But whether it be true or not that the position of Comte was indistinctly perceived by friar Bacon, under its due limitations, there can be no doubt that he has supplied a valid criticism on its exclusive application:—

"Non est homini gloriandum de sapientia, nec debet aliquis magnificare et extollere quæ scit. Pauca enim sunt et vilia respectu eorum, quæ non intelligit sed credit, et longe pauciora respectu eorum quæ ignorat."§

We do not mean to strip M. Comte of his laurels. He looks up to Lord Bacon as the prophet, and almost as the founder of the Positive Philosophy; and whatever may have been the views of either Bacon on this subject, they certainly never designed them to be accepted in the sense in which they have been expounded by

* * * "ut doctrinam quandam positivam, et tanquam fide experimentali." * * Fab. Cupid., Bacon's works, vol. xi, p. 99, ed. Montagu. The whole passage is cited Meth. Qu. Rev., vol. xxxiii, p. 198.

† Opus Majus, ps. ii, c. viii, p. 21, ed. Venet.

‡ Opus Majus, ps. i, c. x, p. 11.

§ Opus Majus, ps. i, c. x, p. 11.

Comte, nor did they anticipate him in the elaboration of an entire scheme of philosophy on this basis. Moreover, Lord Bacon, with his "natura naturans," his "latens schematismus," and such technical phrases of an antiquated metaphysical system, was far from attaining the perspicuity, the accuracy, and the precision with which this great doctrine has been enunciated by M. Comte, whose sole error consists in rendering it exclusive.

But besides the general objections, which have been just stated, there are others, springing immediately from this erroneous estimate of the nature and limitations of human knowledge, which peculiarly infect the whole scheme of the Positive Philosophy. Such, for example, is the entire negation of logic and metaphysics; such is also the absolute repudiation of all religious belief, and the substitution of the adoration of a typical humanity for all forms of divine worship. These errors flow legitimately and necessarily from the fundamental fallacy which we have noticed: the latter will be more appropriately treated when we come to speak of the tendencies of M. Comte's system; the former we will discuss in connexion with the positive *method*, which we proceed at once to consider.

If science (as indeed is true) be necessarily founded upon observation and induction, and if all reliable knowledge (which, however, is not true) be that which admits of a scientific character, then all knowledge which does not possess the characteristics specified by M. Comte as essential to its validity, must be utterly unworthy of the recognition of a disciplined philosopher, and may accordingly be cashiered by him as altogether nugatory. Such an undigested body of knowledge may indeed have formed the avenue along which the human mind has advanced to the apprehension of positive truth; it may have been the sole and indispensable support of previous ages of ignorance; but its mission is wholly ended on the appearance of the new dispensation. We may, indeed, assign to it an historical and factitious value, as indicating the line of march and the stages of advancement by which the world has arrived at its present purified intelligence; we may regard it with interest and respect as the chrysalis in which the vital germ of our present glorious science lay buried until the appointed time of its manifestation: but independently of these considerations, and considerations which spring from these, it can have no claim upon our veneration, as it has none upon our credence. In characterizing the gradual progress of human intelligence, as in estimating the value of contemporary philosophy, and determining the method to be pursued, the simple thread to guide us through the labyrinth will be found in the relation which different systems bear to the fundamental principle of the Positive

Philosophy. As this aspires only to the discovery of phenomenal laws, and proceeds entirely by sensible observation and reasoning therefrom; so that doctrine which derives its facts from an unquestioning belief in the evidence of sense and feeling, draws its certitude from an unreasoning conviction, and builds its conclusions by deduction from loosely assumed premises, is most widely antagonistic to it, and belongs to the early ages of humanity, and the ruder periods of human reason. Midway between these opposing systems is a method which cautiously examines into the premises which it receives, curiously detects and exposes the weak points of the system of faith, and then diligently attempts to close up the wounds which it has made, by instituting a theoretic reconstruction of the whole fabric of human life and knowledge, which is supposed to be valid if it does not offend against any of the theories which have been established as the *abracadabra* of the creed. This manner of reasoning is the intermediate link between the other two, and furnishes the means of transition from the blind credulity of the one to the equally blind scepticism of the other. The three systems, when arranged in their logical and chronological order, have been designated by M. Comte the theological, the metaphysical or critical, and the positive methods. The first maintains a belief in supernatural agency, seeks into the hidden nature of being, and endeavours to discover efficient and final causes; the second is only a modification of the first, and consists in substituting ideal entities for the supernatural agencies of its predecessor; and the third is such as we have already described it.*

In the above remarks we have attempted to exhibit the chain of reasoning by which M. Comte appears to have been led to the specification and adoption of the positive method. It will be observed, that the application of the names or epithets to the three successive systems is a piece of philosophical legerdemain, designed to excite prejudices for an ulterior purpose; and that the links of the deduction are by no means free from flaw; while the whole chain is dependent upon an hypothetical premiss which we have shown to be fallacious.

But further: although the reasonings of the human mind may be justly distinguished into these three classes, the distinction is valid only in regard to its progress in particular and often fragmentary branches of inquiry. In the individual intellect, as in the history of humanity, all three modes exist concurrently together, and are concurrently applied to different subjects, or different members of the same subject. We do not drive the sciences abreast—such an

* Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon i, tome i, pp. 2, 3.

idea is admissible only in the magnificent hyperbole of Fontenelle;* but the sciences themselves, and their different subdivisions, always exhibit diverse degrees of advancement, and a coexistent subordination to all of these methods. It is true, indeed, that the employment of the one or the other may so far preponderate as to give a prevailing tinge to the procedure of a system, the philosophy of a period, or the reasonings of a man. Still, such prevalence by no means indicates the exclusion of the other modes; nor is it in contravention of their validity within their own appropriate range. In the darkest infancy of civilization, so far as history or tradition can inform us, some rude arts were possessed, and consequently there must have been some exercise of positive reasoning. In the enlightenment of modern times, some entities and some supernatural powers are still recognised, although M. Comte and M. Strauss would explode them by the establishment of their own foregone conclusions. M. Comte perceives that the contemporary character of different sciences is analogous to the historical development of a particular one—that all three modes of philosophy coexist in the different conditions of distinct bodies of contemporary learning, as they have succeeded each other in the evolution of a special department of knowledge. Indeed, much of the positive method, and the whole "Hiérarchie fondamentale des Sciences Positives," spring from this basis. Yet, apprehending this truth, he fails to see how fatally it is at variance with the supposition of the exclusive validity of any one method. The truth is, that the various modes do not succeed each other in their systematic integrity: such succession reveals merely the course pursued in the attainment of each separate acquisition. The tendency of the human intellect is undoubtedly to render scientific all the conquests of reason which can be co-ordinated under general laws; that is to say, to bring all its information under the category of positive philosophy. In its advances towards this goal, it passes through the two other previous stages; and so far the positions of Comte are correct. The positive method is correct and exclusive so far as it is applicable, but it is not of universal application; for much of our knowledge still remains in the transition state, and may never pass beyond it, though the domain of this intermediate system must shrink up with the progress of science. But that large portion of human knowledge or conviction which, as friar Bacon says, we believe but do not understand, may continue in the unresolved nebulous form of its primitive condition,

* "Pareil en quelque sort aux anciens qui avaient l'adresse de mener jusqu'à huit chevaux attelés de front, il mena de front toutes les sciences."—*Fontenelle Eloge de Leibnitz.* Leibn. Œuvres, vol. ii, p. 1.

and may admit of but partial conversion into either of the other states, although one has attempted to absorb and transmute it, and the other to supplant or deny it. Supposing that the scientific progress of man was complete—as complete as human faculties and a finite intelligence would permit—all knowledge would not even then be scientific or positive, but much would still remain in that vague and indistinct state, out of which all our science had been tediously evolved. Even then we should not be justified in abusing the authority of science to abjure that whole body of knowledge, without which science itself could never have been. In such an event, the intermediate philosophy might relapse into its earlier condition in part, and in the main become blended into science, and so vanish; but then, as now, our life would be regulated and illumined by the two great lights of heaven—the sun of faith to rule by day over our earthly duties and heavenward aspirations, and the moon of science to rule by night over the darkness of human reason and human achievement.

It is a vain effort to endeavour to reduce all knowledge to a single precise and unvarying form. As it is in its nature relative, both in its subjective and objective respects, both with respect to the mind which knows and the thing which is known, it must of consequence vary in a manner corresponding with the different relations which subsist between both. Hence our convictions are founded upon different kinds and degrees of evidence, which must produce a characteristic difference in the nature of the conviction itself. The principle of belief may be the same, but the certainty exists under a difference of form. The ancients, and the earlier philosophers of modern times, in their recognition of distinct species of intellectual apprehension, were wiser in the vagueness and uncertainty of their language, than the great reasoners of our own day in that attempted perspicuity which is attainable only by the sacrifice of some of the most important forms of truth. Valid objections may, indeed, be raised to the various modes in which it has been proposed to distribute human knowledge into its species. With the scholiast David, we may admit five powers or faculties of knowledge—perception, conjecture, opinion, understanding, and pure reason;* or, with Olympiodorus,† we may prefer a novenary, or with Aristotle,‡ a septenary, or with Spinoza,§ a quaternary, or with Hobbes,‖ a binary

* *πολλοῖς ἀναβαθμοῖς κέχρηταί τις ἵνα γνῷ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν· θέλει γὰρ γινώσκειν τὰς πέντε γνωστικὰς δυνάμεις· εἰσὶ δὲ αὗται αἴσθησις, φαντασία, δόξα, διάνοια, καὶ νοῦς.* David Prolegomena Philosophiæ, ap. Schol. Aristot., p. 14, b. 30.

† David, ibid., b. 33. ‡ Eth. Nicomach, lib. vi, c. iii, p. 1139.

§ De la Réforme de l'Entendement. Œuvres, ed. Saisset, vol. ii, pp. 280, 281.

‖ Ap. Morell, Crit. Hist. Phil., &c., p. 73.

division of knowledge: but whichever mode we adopt, we cannot, unless blinded by the partiality of system, fail to recognise that no single form will embrace all the specific characteristics of knowledge. To attempt, then, to restrict the sphere of human belief, and to limit the circle of valid knowledge merely to that which has attained, or is capable of attaining, a scientific or positive form, is the fallacy of mistaking a part for the whole, and is equally erroneous as to suppose, because some truths must be received by faith and are incapable of demonstration, that therefore all must be so. Both errors spring from the same defective view: the former is the error of M. Comte; the latter, that of the narrow-minded theology which generates an hostility between science and religion, by utterly denying the independent validity of scientific reasoning, and has led, as a consequence of the same fundamental sophism, to Comte's utter negation of religion itself, and his repetition of the assumption of his adversaries, that science and religion are incompatible with each other.

May it be permitted us here to remark in all humility, and without pretending to except ourselves from the censure, that these errors, and nearly all others connected with the abstruse questions regarding the foundations and characteristics of knowledge, arise from the almost hopeless incapacity of the human mind to contemplate in their coexistence and interdependence the complex multiplicity of natural phenomena, whence men are driven to seek for a delusive simplicity by a necessary exclusion of those data which refuse to be systematized, and to forget in the pride of their own labours that such exclusion has prevented the results obtained from being anything more than a partial representation and explication of the facts, and thus to mistake their imperfect systems for a complete, all-comprehending exposition. This is the great danger of scientific systems—a danger which justifies, if it did not suggest, Lord Bacon's reprehension of systematic science.

Having shown, by these general considerations, the invalidity of the exclusive claims of the Positive Philosophy, as a complete system or method of universal application, we proceed to examine more closely the characteristics of the Positive *Method* itself. The development of each individual mind being analogous to the progressive development of humanity, or the human mind in its totality,—a doctrine borrowed from Hegel, and true under certain limitations,—and the logical construction of science corresponding with its chronological improvement, a correct philosophy must rest upon a wide induction from the phenomena of human progress. Those stages, then, through which the intellect of humanity has passed, may be regarded as the

landmarks for determining the facts, and, consequently, the *positive* laws of philosophic advancement; and the goal towards which this progress tends, will exhibit the essential condition of a valid philosophy. In this manner M. Comte is led to the institution of the Historical Method of Philosophy, as it has been well termed by Mr. Mill; and from this method springs, by an easy and legitimate descent, that beautiful and admirable classification of the sciences, which even Mr. Morell acknowledges to be "unquestionably a masterpiece of scientific thinking, as simple as it is comprehensive."*

But the question next arises, What are the stages of historical progress? or under what general and characteristic heads may the successive conditions of the human mind, in its onward march, be appropriately classified? They are, according to M. Comte, those already discussed, and termed by him the *theological*, the *metaphysical*, and the *positive*. The whole of the fifth and nearly half of the sixth volume of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* are devoted to the proof of the justice of this division, which is there endeavoured to be deduced from an examination of the whole stream of human story. With this Philosophy of History, admirable as it is in many respects, singularly acute, ingenious, and sagacious as it nearly always is, we shall not concern ourselves in the present essay, as it would require too much space, and too seriously interrupt the continuity of our exposition of the system. But in the classification which it is intended to support, there is so much truth mixed up with a fatal leaven of error, that, even at the risk of some delay, we must stop to estimate its value. We might object that the terms employed are metaphysical in their application; that they extend to a whole period that which is but partially characteristic of it; that they are indistinct, uncertain, and inapposite; and that they rather convey such meaning, and just so much, as the loose imaginations or the prejudices of the reader may be disposed to attribute to them, than any determinate idea. But, though much might be appropriately said upon these points, we are not disposed to avail ourselves of any arguments having the semblance of a quibble in the discussion of so important and vital a feature of the Positive Philosophy, or in the confutation of an author for whose sincerity and profundity we entertain so high an admiration as we feel for M. Comte's. We shall, therefore, endeavour to estimate the value of the ideas rather than of the terms; to show in what respect they are vague and shadowy, even as conceived by the great founder of the system; and to detect the germ of subsequent and consequential fallacies in this very obscurity.

* Crit. Hist. Phil., &c., p. 356.

M. Comte says,* that the attraction of an unlimited empire over the external world, considered as designed for man's use, and linked to his existence by intimate and continual ties; that the chimerical hopes and exaggerated ideas of the importance of man, which are incident to the earliest ages of society, give birth to theology and the theological character of all knowledge or speculation in those ages. We would deny the existence of the causes alleged, and the connexion between the assumed causes and the supposed effects. M. Comte has represented the retrospective judgment of the philosopher, looking back from the vantage ground of modern science, on the primitive condition of society, rather than the feelings of the society itself: he has learned the destiny from the event, and attributed the same knowledge as an anticipation present to those who commenced its fulfilment. The history of the early ages of humanity, and the early condition of societies, represents them as possessed by sentiments utterly at variance with these views. A crushing, despondent subjection to the unseen powers of nature; an unquestioning belief in a supernatural decree; an indisposition to look into the future, and a reckless contentment with the present; a belief in the almost hopeless inutility of human effort, and the absolute dependence of man on supernatural authority; a humiliating sense of individual insignificance—such are the characteristics of the earliest centuries of humanity of which tradition or history gives us an account. We can readily conceive how such feelings as these might generate a blind, unreasoning theology, with which they would certainly be in harmony; but we cannot, in the slightest degree, comprehend how the theological character of early times could arise out of the causes supposed by M. Comte. We admit this theological character, though we think it requires to be guarded with precision; but we think it is due to the simplicity of the rude and uninformed mind, susceptible to all the terrors and impressions of the natural world, and the unstilled murmurs of the mystic voice within, still unweaned from its divine original, which gives birth to the religious character of these times. It is the vague, undefined mystery of confused feelings, struggling to realize and embody itself in the world without, which gives rise to that low type of religion which M. Comte not inappropriately terms fetichism; for, in such ages, man humbles himself before the god whose presence he beholds in the cloud, the sunshine, or the shower, and whose anger he hears in the thunder and the tempest. The great secret, however, is that then the mind of man, and his wild untutored nature, yield themselves facile to his instinctive impulses, which have not yet learned

* Cours de Phil. Pos., tome i, p. 11.

to analyze themselves, or to clothe themselves in the barren precision of metaphysical expressions. Under these circumstances, all the relations of life, all the phenomena of nature, are supposed to be under the immediate governance or agency of supernatural powers. The human mind has not yet claimed its due participation in the changes which take place around it; and every action, even the simplest, becomes connected more or less with religious observances. Religion—a blind superstition, in great measure it may be, but hardly a theology—religion thus engrosses all of human life, claiming not merely what is its due, but what awaits the development of the human mind to become legitimately dependent upon other control. When this period arrives, religion is only relieved of the superintendence of a domain which did not rightfully belong to her,—not exiled from her own: her eternal rights remain unimpaired, though some temporary usurpations she may abandon.

It will thus be observed, that what M. Comte terms the theological state, or the theological period, is that in which an unreasoning superstition absorbs the whole domain of human intelligence, and perceives the imminent agency of the divinity in every phenomenon of nature. That there is such a condition, both in the progress of society and in the development of the human mind, is indisputable; but the abuse of the religious feeling is not religion, and a blind superstition is not theology, no matter how closely or how frequently it may appear to be connected with it. Let us add here also, *en parenthèse*, that theology presupposes metaphysics,* as it is the union of religion and metaphysics, the systematization of religious creeds and doctrines by metaphysical reasoning. The important truth contained in M. Comte's view is, that the faith which is essential to religion exists in excess in that particular state or era, and is equally characteristic of all belief; and that an immediate divine agency is then employed to explain everything, even those things which in more enlightened ages are justly referred to the operation of natural laws. The vital fallacies consist in confounding religion with its aberrations; in failing to perceive that religion, in a narrower or wider sense, is characteristic of all ages, and cannot therefore be assumed as the specific difference of one; and in supposing that its restriction within due limits is a virtual demonstration of its absolute falsehood and inefficacies.

We may make nearly the same observations in regard to M. Comte's conception of the *metaphysical era*, for the fallacies

* So recognised apparently by Aristotle and the ancients. Arist. Metaph., v. i, p. 1026, a. 24, and Schol. Alex. Aphrod. ad loc.

involved are similar. The cultivation of the reasoning faculties of man soon brings him to the recognition of intermediate links of causation; and the difficulty of grappling with the shadowy forms of undefined causes, induces him to give a name and an independent existence to these causes. Thus arises the doctrine of entities, and the whole framework of the Realistic philosophy. The habit of mind producing these results, when it pursues its logical evolution to extremes, undermines the foundations on which religious belief is supported, by hypostatizing all things, and reducing all entities, even the being of God, to the mere creations of the human intellect. Thus it constitutes the transition stage to the entire negation of all religion. But observe, that these entities do not necessarily appertain to metaphysics, but are characteristic of only one form of metaphysical philosophy—Realism. It is true, that it is with great difficulty that the passage from Realism to Conceptualism or Nominalism is effected. It is equally true, though we need not dwell upon it here, that these other forms of ontology lead, in like manner, to scepticism, when developed to their ultimate consequences. But the point to be noted is, that the characteristics which M. Comte assigns generally to metaphysics are incident to merely one form of it, and cannot therefore be assumed as the properties of the science itself. It must be further remembered, that before religion is systematized into theology, it must be moulded into that form by union with metaphysics; and it might be shown, though we may not have the time to do it on the present occasion, that even science must be fallacious unless it rests upon a correct basis of metaphysics, and recognises its dependence thereon, so that even in the Positive state the concurrent existence of metaphysics is required.

We might again repeat nearly the same observations in passing to the consideration of the Positive state; but as the Positive Philosophy is the subject of this essay, their repetition is unnecessary, and we may safely leave them to be more particularly gathered from our general criticism, which must be deferred to the next issue of this journal.

Art. II.—LATIN LEXICOGRAPHY.

A Copious and Critical Latin-English Lexicon, founded on the larger Latin-German Lexicon of Dr. William Freund: with Additions and Corrections from the Lexicons of Gesner, Facciolati, Scheller, Georges, etc. By E. A. Andrews, LL. D. Pp. 1663. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1851.

Lexicography is a branch of literature of comparatively modern origin. Neither the Greeks nor the Romans had anything like dictionaries. Indeed, the terms *lexicon* and *dictionarium* are not found in the classic period of their literature. The *De Lingua Latina* of Varro, who bore the title of the "most learned of the Romans," (Cic. Acad, i, 2, 3,) is the nearest approach to a dictionary that we find. This originally consisted of twenty-four books, only six of which are extant, and these are imperfect, and injured in their value by numerous corruptions. Still the remains of this treatise are of much importance; for many terms and forms which would otherwise have been lost or have remained unintelligible are here preserved and explained. The subject of the first seven books was the origin of words and the application of terms. The plan which Varro adopted, of referring Latin words, as far as possible, to the old Italian dialects, instead of the Greek, was correct, and as applied by modern philologists has led to some very satisfactory results. But in carrying out his plan he seems to be guided by no philosophical rules, and falls into many absurd derivations. For example: *canis* is from *cano*, because dogs give signals by barking at night and in the chase, as trumpets give signals (*canunt*) in battle; and *agnus* (a lamb) is so called because it is *agnatus*, connected by birth with the sheep. Similar examples may be found on almost every page. Indeed, the Latin authors who venture into the province of etymology often suggest very improbable derivations.*

The first that can properly be called a dictionary of the Latin language was the Catholicon of John Balbus, of Genoa, who died 1298. This contained between seven and eight hundred folio pages, and was first printed at Mentz, 1460, by Gutenberg. Several editions of this work were published. Though it was very imperfect, and contained many errors, yet it was not without merit, especially in terms relating to theology.

Calepin, an Italian monk, prepared a Latin dictionary, which was first published at Reggio, in 1502. This edition was so full of errors as to be of comparatively little value. It passed through quite a

* Thus Cicero connects *fides* with *fio*. (De Officiis, I. 7, 23.)

number of editions, and was so much improved as to become almost a new work. We have a copy of the edition printed at Basle, 1584, before us. It is a polyglot in eight languages. The first Aldine edition of Calepin bears the date of 1542.

The *Thesaurus Linguæ Latinæ* of Robert Stephens, the celebrated scholar and printer, was published in 1531. It was a work of great value. Two editions were subsequently published by the author, and in 1735 a corrected and enlarged edition was issued at London.

Facciolati, of the University of Padua, assisted by Egedio Forcellini, prepared an edition of Calepin, which was published in 1731. It was while engaged in this work that Forcellini projected a Latin lexicon on an entirely new plan; and to the preparation of the work, which bears his name in connexion with Facciolati, under whose direction it is probable that he acted in a great measure, he devoted the best energies of his life. He writes that he spent three years and a half on the letter A; and on the whole work he spent forty years. At the close of the preface he says: "By God's permission I have brought this book to an end; and now, if my life is granted to me, I shall re-read and then deliver it to another to copy." He read it a second time in two years. The copying occupied eight. Forcellini did not live to see it completed. Both the plan and execution of this work are admirable: its vocabulary is full, and it well deserves the name it bears, *Totius Latinitatis Lexicon.* The definitions are precise, their classification systematic and philosophical, the citations of authorities are abundant, and arranged in chronological order.

Very soon after the revival of learning, the German scholars gave their attention to Latin lexicography. In 1571 Faber's *Thesaurus Linguæ Scholasticæ* was published at Leipsic. This was a work of much learning, and valuable for the time of its publication. It entered largely into geography, history, and mythology, as well as peculiar idioms and unusual constructions. Gesner published an edition of this work in 1726. About twenty years later, Gesner, taking the Thesaurus of Robert Stephens, correcting its errors, and making many additions, produced a lexicon of great value to the student and to subsequent lexicographers. His definitions are accurate, and his authorities abundant. The vocabulary is fuller than that of Forcellini. This *Thesaurus Linguæ Latinæ* of Gesner was published at Leipsic, 1749, in four vols. folio. Scheller's Lexicon, which was published in 1783, was better adapted to the wants of students. The alphabetical arrangement is employed instead of the etymological. The whole work is carried out with

more than ordinary completeness of detail. It was for a long time in general use in the schools of Germany. A valuable Manual Lexicon was prepared mainly from this by Lünemann.

As we do not intend to write the history of Latin lexicography, we have omitted all notice of the labours of the English classical scholars in this department. Not that their labours were without some valuable results, but we only design in this sketch to refer to the lexicons that have furnished materials for those hitherto in use among us. Leverett's Lexicon, which has been in general use in our schools for the past fifteen years, was based on Forcellini, with additions from Scheller and Lünemann.

The publication of Freund's *Wörterbuch der Lateinischen Sprache*, marked a new era in Latin lexicography. This work is in four volumes, the first of which appeared in 1834, and the last in 1845. As it forms the basis of the lexicon we have placed at the head of this article, we shall notice somewhat at length the plan of the work, and the general principles upon which the author proceeded in its preparation.

No one seems to have had a better idea of what a Latin lexicon should be, in the advances philology had made, than Freund; and we may safely say that no previous lexicographer possessed superior fitness for the work, or had such abundant means for carrying out his plan. Other lexicographers had gathered materials, and some had systematically arranged them; but many new facts had been developed, and the general impulse given to philological pursuits in the early part of the present century, had brought about results that demanded, to some extent, new methods in lexicography.

A complete lexicon of the language, no longer spoken, of an intellectual and highly cultivated people, must be the product of the scholarship of different ages and different nations: for the lexicographer who designs to give the full history of every word of a language, will find it demands a range of inquiry for which human life seems too short, and that it requires a combination of qualities rarely seen in any one man. To define accurately the words of any language in the terms of another, requires not only extensive reading to be able to seize the exact force of the word, but also nice discrimination to express its meaning. Often it is not possible to find terms exactly equivalent in signification: and this difficulty is felt not only in those expressions which are idiomatic, but also in such as mark the peculiar mental character of a nation. Take the word *honestum*, for example. It often has a signification that can be expressed by no one English word: for *honourableness*, *honesty*, and *virtue* are defective renderings, not giving the full meaning. It

rather denotes whatever is becoming to a man, or moral excellence. It is said, that while the Greek viewed moral excellence under the aspect of beauty, τὸ καλόν, as was natural to their taste, the more grave Roman looked at it as connected with dignity and propriety.

Freund lays down in his preface the general principles of his work. He gives his views, 1, of the *idea* and *elements* of Latin lexicography; 2, the compass of his dictionary; 3, the method of handling the several articles; and, 4, the arrangement of the articles.

The object of the lexicographer is to give the history of every word of the language. "The history of a word consists in unfolding its outer nature, that is, its form, class, syntactical connexions, and the like, together with its inner nature or meaning." Since in all cultivated languages every word has not a form peculiar to itself, but belongs to a class of words presenting similar meanings and undergoing like changes; and as it is the province of grammar to classify the forms of words and mark their changes, the lexicographer is only required to designate the class to which a word belongs. Thus, when he adds *ae* to *mensa*, he uses a convenient abbreviation which renders it unnecessary to mention the other inflections. However, when a word deviates from the regular form, that should be noticed, otherwise the external history would be incomplete. This is called the *grammatical element of lexicography*. The word *capio* will illustrate the author's method of treating this element. Thus:—"capio, cepi, captum, 3. (a very old form of the *fut. exact.* capso, Plaut. Bac. 4, 4, 61: capsit, id. Pseud. 4, 3, 6; Att. in Non. 483, 12; cf. Fest. p. 44: capsimus, Plaut. Rud. 2, 1, 15: CAPSIS, acc. to Cic. Or. 45, 154, erroneously treated by him as if contracted from cape si vis; Quint. 1, 5, 66 Spald.—Old orthog. of the *perf.* CEPET=cepit, like EXEMET, DEDET, *etc.*, Columna Rostrata.)"

As languages of much cultivation are made up of derivatives, it belongs to the external history of the word to show from what root it is derived. This is the *etymological element*. It is no easy matter for the lexicographer to treat this element satisfactorily. Compound words, and derivatives from simpler forms of the language, are readily disposed of. But scientific etymology aims to discover the origin of these simple forms. It becomes, then, a question of great practical importance to the lexicographer, how far he shall attempt to develop this element. The early etymologists seem to have no definite rules of procedure, and refer the words of one language to another most arbitrarily, from some resemblance in sound and signification.* But a more philosophical spirit pervades

* In Minshen's "Guide to the Tongues," ed. 1617, tallow is derived from *tollo*, to take away, because it is taken away from the flesh!

the new system; and the philologist, instead of accumulating hundreds of vocabularies to compare together, sits down to investigate thoroughly the whole structure of a single family of languages.

It was once common to refer, as far as possible, all Latin forms to the Greek. But later and more extensive researches showed that the Sanscrit was a language of high antiquity, and capable of explaining many Latin forms far better than the Greek. And yet the question of the Sanscrit origin of the Latin is by no means settled, for there are advocates for its Teutonic or German origin. Hence Freund thought he might be "called over-hasty if he allowed the Sanscrit or the German element to have the predominance." The course he adopts seems to be the only practical one.

The internal history of a word consists in giving its meaning. This is the *exegetical*, and the most important element of lexicography. Freund lays it down as a settled principle, that among the several meanings of a word, the one which has been obtained from its etymology should be assumed as the original. This has not, however, been generally acted upon by Latin lexicographers; for they prepared their lexicons generally for the study of works of a particular period of the language, and therefore gave prominence to that signification of a word in which it was most frequently used. They paid hardly any attention to the remains of old Latin—to the fragments of the Twelve Tables, the remains of Ennius, Pacuvius, and Cato; and comparatively little to the Latinity of Plautus, Terence, Lucretius, and Varro. Their sources of authority for the significations of words went back only to Cicero and Cæsar. Freund, on the contrary, introduces the oldest remains of Latin literature from the Leges Regiæ, the Laws of the Twelve Tables, down to Lucretius and Varro.

A second principle adopted is, that in the order of meanings the proper meaning, as the original, should precede the tropical, as the derived. In order to make clear distinctions it is also necessary to make subdivisions of the tropical meanings. An example will most readily illustrate this. *Arena* is used in four different senses in the following passages:—(1.) Magnus congestus arenæ, Lucr. 6, 724; (2.) Missum in arenam aprum jaculis desuper petiit, Suet. Tib., 72; (3.) Vectio Prisco, quantum plurimum potuero, præstabo præsertim in arena mea, hoc est apud Centumviros, Plin. Ep. 6, 12, 2; (4.) Quid facies, Oenone? Quid arenæ semina mandas? Ov. Her. 5, 115. In the first passage it means *sand*, in the second the *amphitheatre*, in the third the *sphere of one's calling*, and in the fourth is a proverbial expression for something *unfruitful*. If these meanings were classed under the head of literal and tropical,

as the terms have hitherto been applied by lexicographers, we should have one literal and three tropical, thus: (1.) lit., *sand;* (2.) trop., (a) the amphitheatre, (b) the sphere of one's calling, (c) proverb., for something unfruitful.

Such an arrangement is clearly unphilosophical: for the meaning, *the sphere of one's calling,* is evidently derived from that of the *amphitheatre;* hence it is not co-ordinate with it, but subordinate, constituting a trope within a trope. In the second place, the derived meaning *amphitheatre* "has quite another relation to the simple one *sand,* from that of *one's sphere* to *amphitheatre.*" In the first instance, the general notion, sand, is individualized into a certain sandy place, sandy path, &c.; but it is not taken out of the class of concretes. In the second instance, the concrete notion of *amphitheatre* is changed to the abstract one of a place of contest or exercise, sphere of vocation. This distinction between individualizing a general notion and spiritualizing a physical one, Freund considered to be of too much importance to be lost sight of in lexicography. He has therefore given to the signification arising in the former way the name of metonymic; to the latter that of tropical. With this distinction the first three senses of *arena* may be classed thus: (1.) lit., sand; (2.) metonym., the place of contest in the amphitheatre bestrewed with sand. Therefore (b) tropic., every place of contest, place of exhibiting any kind of activity, place of exercise, &c. And so *arbor,* used for *navis,* is a metonymy, since the physical meaning is individualized; while *calor* for *amor* is a trope, since the physical meaning passes into an abstract and spiritual one. The proverbial use of words is placed under the literal signification, for in classifying proverbial expressions lexicography and rhetoric must be guided by different rules. As the rhetorician takes into view the sense of the whole expression, he classes it with the tropical use of language. On the other hand, the lexicographer, having to deal with the single word, finds nothing in it to remove it from the sphere of the literal. Thus *arena,* in the proverbial expression *arenæ semina mandare,* has received no signification foreign to its literal meaning, as it has in the phrase *præstabo in mea arena.* In the latter instance *mea arena* cannot mean my sand, while *arenæ semina mandare* always means to commit seed to the sand.

In order to make the origin of some significations clear, Freund compares the usage of other languages. This is a department of lexicography that requires to be most judiciously handled; and in different methods in different languages. In a language whose literary monuments are few, some words may occur so seldom that the lexicographer cannot satisfy himself as to their true import without

reference to cognate languages. Gesenius, in his Hebrew Thesaurus, has pursued this course with most satisfactory results. We do not now allude to the comparison of corresponding forms, but to the illustration of words by the analogy of signification. This comparison is not to be confined to cognate dialects, for languages of a different class often furnish striking analogies. Thus אִישׁוֹן, diminutive of אִישׁ (man), is used with עַיִן (eye), to denote the pupil, the apple of the eye, literally *the little man of the eye*. The Arabic, the Persian, and several other languages use equivalent terms. And somewhat analogous is the Latin *pupilla*, a diminutive of pupa, (a girl,) in its literal sense used to denote an orphan girl or ward, in its transferred, the pupil of the eye. Freund does not give this illustration, but he has a number like it. Thus Calendae, (from *calo*, to call,) in the sense of proclamation-day, is compared with the Hebrew usage of מִקְרָא ; and the syntactical construction of *cavere*, even to the unusual form *cavere cum aliquo*, is illustrated by the analogous use of the Niphal of שָׁמַר.

In some instances erroneous explanations have been corrected as the result of such comparisons. For example: *bidens*, as applied to a sheep fit for sacrifice, has been referred to *bis* and *annus*. Thus Facciolati, under this word, says: "Primo bidennis, *d* littera immissa quasi biennis a *bis* et *annus*." He also gives another view of its derivation, as if from *bis* and *dens*, and sustains its application to a sheep fit for sacrifice, by a passage from Higinus in Aulus Gellius (16, 6): "*Bidentes* hostiæ quæ per ætatem duos dentes altiores habent." Freund, however, says it is more correct to understand by *bidens* an animal for offering, whose *two rows* of teeth are complete, as שֵׁן, *tooth*, in the dual denotes the two rows of teeth. Many other analogies are noticed which are interesting to the scholar, not as pointing to a common origin of languages, but as showing that the human intellect, in unfolding identical notions, falls into parallel expressions, even in languages most diverse in their structure. If the student will compare the various meanings of *cornu* with קֶרֶן, *vertex*, (from verto,) as applied to the top or crown of the head, with קָדְקֹד, (from קָדַד,) and the expression *ferire* fœdus with כָּרַת בְּרִית, he will be struck with the fact, that in the diversity of language there is a certain unity in the operations of the human mind.

We consider the special attention which Freund bestows upon the historical development of the Latin language as one of the prominent excellencies of his lexicon. The Latin was not gradually and systematically unfolded from a single germ, as seems to have been the history of the Greek. The different tribes of Italy originally

used dialects doubtless having a common origin: and as Rome successively conquered these different Italian tribes, there would naturally be a gradual combination of these elements, the various dialects modifying the common language of Rome. After the Roman conquests in Southern Italy had made them acquainted with the Grecian arts and literature, the language received still greater modifications. Not only may we suppose that many words were borrowed from the Greek, but a new impulse being given to the cultivation of letters, the Latin tongue began to develop more symmetrically, and to be more carefully guarded from corruption. The results of this were not few nor unimportant. The language of the capital became the standard, to which every educated man must refer. The general principles of the language became settled, anomalies were no longer prevalent, and the foreign elements were united into a consistent whole.

In the time of Cicero the Latin language had reached a high state of cultivation: and to Cicero, more than to any other one writer, it is indebted for its copiousness. He brought into use many words of the old poets, that had become almost obsolete, and coined new words after the analogy of the Greek. Yet, while he increased the vocabulary of the language by a number of abstract and philosophical terms, he jealously guarded its idiomatic structure and opposed unnecessary innovations. Though in his philosophical works he was often obliged to have recourse to the Greek, from the paucity of abstract terms in his own tongue, yet the construction of his sentences is purely idiomatic, and very few Græcisms occur in his writings. His style is remarkable for its clearness; and in his effort to secure this there is often a redundancy of expression, very different from the studied conciseness and pregnant brevity of Tacitus. But we ought to bear in mind that Cicero was writing upon philosophical subjects that were comparatively new to his countrymen, and that his perspicuity was carefully studied to avoid obscurity. He found that many of the views of the Greek philosophers could be expressed only by circumlocutions—that his own tongue was poor in philosophical and scientific terms. Even a century later, after the Romans had given more attention to philosophy, Seneca says, "I have never felt more sensibly than now the great indigence, or rather the abject poverty of our language. When we speak of the doctrines of Plato, a thousand ideas present themselves for which we have no name." So that what has been called the diffuseness or too extended amplification of Cicero's style, was a necessary result of the character of the language, and of the state of philosophical studies among his countrymen.

We attach much importance to the influence of Cicero in developing the resources and perfecting the structure of his native tongue, but we must consider it as reaching its highest point of cultivation in the reign of Augustus. The civil commotions that had preceded this period were far from being favourable to the general cultivation of letters. The camp and the forum were the fields that called for the efforts of the noblest intellects. But a change in the structure of the government produced great effects in literature. After the downfall of the republic, the administration of public affairs being entirely in the hands of the emperor and his creatures, men of genius, whose ambition in preceding times would have led them to seek for the high offices of state, devoted themselves to the pursuit of letters. This was the age of the first among the Latin poets, Horace and Virgil, when purity of diction and elegance of expression were especially sought for, and the Latin tongue, while it was free from the rigidity of its early forms, had not yet degenerated into the turgid and declamatory style prevalent in its decay.

Freund arranges the Latin authors into the following periods:—1. Ante-classical, extending from the oldest fragments to Lucretius and Varro. 2. Classical, from Cicero and Cæsar to Tacitus, Suetonius, and the younger Pliny, inclusive. 3. Post-classical, embracing the writers from the last period to the fifth century. Classical Latinity is also subdivided into (a) the Ciceronian, (b) the Augustan, and (c) the post-Augustan. The post-classical, notwithstanding the length of its period and the difference of its character during the progress of the decay of the language, is not subdivided. Only the term, "late Latin," is given to the language of the fourth and fifth centuries. According to this arrangement, every word—and, if its different meanings belong to different periods, each meaning—has appended to it the general remark *in all periods*, or the special one, *ante-classical, Ciceronian, Augustan, post-Augustan, post-classical, late Latin.* As it sometimes happens that words and significations current in one period have been disused in the next, and then employed again in the succeeding,* the terms ante and post-classical, ante-classical and post-Augustan, are attached to the signification of a word. An examination of almost any word will show with what fidelity and patience Freund has developed this element of lexicography.

And equally careful attention is bestowed upon the *rhetorical element.* The kind of composition in which a word is used is stated, whether in prose and poetry, only in prose or poetical, in the poets or in the higher kinds of prose, peculiar to the comic poets or

* Multa renascentur quæ jam cecidere, cadentque
Quæ nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus.—Hor. Ars. Poet.

to the epistolary style. In no other lexicon have the technical terms of the language been so clearly marked. And this is a matter of especial importance in the Latin, for one of its most striking peculiarities is the prevailing use of concrete forms. The Roman mind was eminently practical, and the Latin is better adapted to represent objects of perception than impressions and emotions. As we have already said, there are but few abstract terms. Seneca complains that he can find no equivalent in Latin for the τὸ ὄν of the Greeks.

In the best productions of Roman literature we find many terms of art taken from the temple, the tribunal, and the camp, which have transferred their significations to other relations of life. As Freund says, "Many Latin words take a circular path in the historical progress of their meanings. From common, every-day life, they pass over into a definite practical sphere, and after almost losing their identity by means of the secondary notions attached to them, are taken up again by common life, and employed in quite another than their original import. Thus the word *arbiter* denotes, etymologically, an eye-witness. Together with this signification, which was in use in all periods and in all kinds of style, it obtained in the language of the law, even as early as the Twelve Tables, that of an *umpire:* from this legal sphere the poetry of the Augustan age adopted it in the sense of a *commander* or *master*, and imparted it in this sense to the post-Augustan prose."

The frequency or rareness of the use of a word is denoted by the terms, "*very frequent*," "*frequent*," "*rare*." This, which Freund calls the *statistic* element, can of course only reach approximate certainty; but in such words as we have had occasion to examine with this in view, we have been struck with the discriminating accuracy of the author. Words which occur only once, or which are used only once in a particular signification, or by a particular author, are specially designated. Of course it is hardly possible to decide in every instance with confidence.

In the arrangement of the articles of a lexicon different methods are pursued: some lexicographers, as Gesner and Stephens, adopting the etymological, and others the alphabetical. Freund follows the latter method, with only such deviations as the grammatical and exegetical element demand.

It only remains for us to notice how far the work we have placed at the head of this article, which purports to be "founded on the Larger Latin-German Lexicon of Freund," represents the results of his labours. At first sight it seems hardly possible that all of real value to the student in the four volumes of Freund, con-

taining about four thousand five hundred pages, could be comprised in the single octavo of the American edition. The real difference in amount of matter is not so great as the apparent, the German being printed in a very open type. Nor is there any systematic deviation from Freund's method. Indeed, in some particulars his plan is more fully carried out. All the definitions and philological remarks are retained, together with the references to Latin authors. The examples cited are retrenched by dispensing with such parts as did not tend to illustrate the particular signification for which the citation was introduced. Some citations of minor importance are wholly omitted. But in every case, both of omission and retrenchment, the full reference to the original Latin author has been retained; so that the student can readily refer to the author for the particular use of the word, and for the connexion in which it occurs.

It seems to have been the design of the translators not merely to give an English rendering of the German definitions, but to adapt them to the peculiar genius of our language, so as to furnish the student with idiomatic renderings of the Latin terms. One who is constantly using this lexicon will see how successfully this has been accomplished. In accuracy of definition and clearness in expressing the nice shades of meaning, which are among the peculiar excellencies of Freund, the American edition can be favourably compared with the original. In the treatment of the particles, Freund is confessedly superior to any preceding lexicographer. He most fully elucidates their various shades of meaning, and especially notes the force of the prepositions that enter into the composition of words. And these excellencies we find reproduced in the work before us.

But Freund is not faultless. He retains, in some instances, old and erroneous definitions, and in others admits new and incorrect ones—the result of too hasty conclusions. The editors have aimed to correct such defects, and have, we believe, generally succeeded. To do this it was found necessary, in some instances, to entirely remodel an article. We should have been glad if they had allowed themselves more latitude in supplying deficiencies in the original work. We have found some judicious additions, and we think the number might have been increased. Thus, among the *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα* might be placed *lureo*, a conjectural reading of Heinsius, in Hercules Furens of Seneca.* This reading is adopted by Bothe and also by Beck. That such a verb as *lureo* was once in use, seems probable from analogy. The adjective *luridus*, and the noun *luror*, appear, which could be referred to *lureo*, just as *lucidus*, *liquidus*, *lividus*, *timidus*

* Concavæ *lurent* genæ, 767 v. The common reading is *lucent*.

have the verbal roots, *luceo, liqueo, liveo, timeo.* That it is found only in this instance, need not be a reason for rejecting it. According to Dillenburger, there are seventeen ἅπαξ λεγόμενα in Horace. We do not find *reliceor*, although it occurs in one MS. copy of De Officiis (3, 15): *contra reliceatur.* As this reading is adopted by Zumpt and Bonnel, it is entitled to some consideration. Under *profugio*, the signification, *to flee from* or *before, to flee, to fly from* anything, is marked *post-Augustan.* But Cicero, in his oration Pro Sextio, (22, 50,) has *vim profugisset.* It is also said that *timeo* is not used with an object-clause by Cicero; but in his oration Pro Roscio (1, 4) we find *quo nomen referre in tabulis timeat.** There are some other articles that are not as full in their treatment as we could wish: among them are *albico, copulatus exculco,* and *refragor.* But in a work of such a character, embracing so many thousand articles, we must expect to find some omissions.

As we have made almost daily use of this work since its publication, we are prepared to appreciate its excellencies. The thanks of scholars are due to the pains-taking editors who have so faithfully reproduced the merits of the German edition, and to the publishers who have issued the work in a form at once elegant and substantial.

Art. III.—DANTE.

1. *La Divina Commedia di Dante Alighieri con Spiegazioni tratte dai Migliori Commentarii e colla Vita di Dante.* Da Giovanni Boccacio. Paris: Firmin Didot Frères. 1844.
2. *The Vision; or, Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise of Dante Alighieri.* Translated by Rev. Henry Francis Cary. Illustrated by designs by John Flaxman, R. A. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845.

Seldom has a work gone through more editions in its native tongue than Dante's *Divina Commedia;* and our French publishers have, from the best of these—viz., the La Minerva, (Padua, 1822;) that of Ciardetti, (Florence, 1830;) and that of Nicolini and Bezzuoli, (Florence, 1840)—produced, by critical collation, an edition superior to any of them,—certainly the best specimen of the Italian classics within the range of our acquaintance.

Two translations of the Commedia have appeared in English. One, by J. A. Carlyle, a brother of the well-known essayist and historian, has been put forth in England, and immediately republished in this country. It is a respectable work, and had no other been

* Dr. Siedhof, Bib. Sac., Aug., 1847.

known, or had an inferior one preceded it, doubtless it would have received a high place among our translations of foreign authors. But it does not give us DANTE, and on this ground we lay it aside.

Cary's translation has been the work of his life. In 1797 he was at his task, and seventeen years rolled away before he completed it. The edition then published was small, and its readers were few. Some of them, with Coleridge at their head, called for another edition, which appeared in 1819; a third was issued in 1831; and in 1844 the present one was published. The translator, now grown gray in service at the library of the British Museum, has enriched this edition with the fruits of a life of study. Aided by such men as Thomas Carlyle and Darley, he has criticised his own suggestions, and reviewed and passed mature sentence on his former opinions. He evidently looks to this work as the monument of his reputation: and not without reason. The student, however versed in modern Italian, finds it no easy task to render Dante even in tolerable English prose; but Cary has executed the work in blank verse with a vigour and fidelity to which no other version in a modern tongue can pretend. The labour has, indeed, been to him a continual feast. "He has felt his individual recollections suspended, and, as it were, lulled to sleep amid the music of nobler thoughts." Conscious of his proud office in introducing to his countrymen the great Italian epic, he looks for his own reward in being named when Dante shall be admired by Englishmen. And such a reward he has most unquestionably earned.

No book, since the revival of letters, has received more attention than the "Vision" of Dante. It is indeed no wonder that the world pays good heed to its epics, for they form the noblest department of its literature. Of all artists in other forms—orators, moralists, historians, nay, even of poets, lyric, tragic, or miscellaneous—we may say, to use Dante's own expression, that they are all in the outer circles of art. The inner parts are more thinly peopled, candidates for entrance there being rare as the slowly-recurring epochs of entire social revolutions. We count but four as having, in the course of literature, risen to the first class of epic poets—Homer, Virgil, Dante, and Milton. Nor are we too exclusive. It is impossible for us here to discuss the individual pretensions of the crowds of fine poets who may apply for admission. Klopstock is a candidate for the place; but, besides that the detail of the "Messiah" is too tedious for any but German patience, the very conception of it is faulty. The story of the cross admits no burnishing from art, nor can men of letters improve what inspiration has pronounced sufficient. Camoens, with his many beauties, is too often servile. Such power as appears in many parts

of the Lusiad should never have been bent to minister to the crude taste of Portuguese or even of European society of his time. The true epic poet feels himself secure of approbation, because he has reached its permanent source in the depths of human nature. Confident that hence a stream of praise must sooner or later flow, he awaits quietly his time, seeking no adventitious fame, nor condescending to pander for present popularity. For his failure here, we condemn the author of the Lusiad. Ariosto is perpetually trifling; Tasso is deficient in character.

In the true epic rank, then, we place but four. The Iliad, the Æneid, the Vision, and Paradise Lost, exhaust our catalogue. And this scarcity is unavoidable. To the epic poet must belong a mind of such endowments as are not often allotted to man, and the spirit of the age must be fitted to stimulate such a mind to its utmost. When these conditions exist together, there may be an epic: the former without the latter may produce excellent poetry, indeed, but not of this highest rank. Homer's inspiration was the universal idea of his age—gods and demi-gods mingling with men in human form, and with household language; Virgil was moved to song by the sublime spectacle of the world resting in solemn slumber on the arm of a Cæsar; Dante touched his harp when life and order were emerging from the social chaos of deluged Christendom; and Milton arose when liberty was gilding earth's hilltops with its newborn radiance. Each found inspiration in his time.

The epic, therefore, becomes a key to its age. In modern science, the comparative anatomist takes from the rock a fossil, and determines the frame of which it is a relic. He goes farther, and from this as a type, he depicts the forms and habits of contemporary monsters, peopling with corresponding natures the primeval landscape. So from the true epic the critic reads the entire character of society at the time when it was produced—its laws and institutions, its progress in refinement, the manners and thoughts of public and private life. What copious schemes of history have been filled out to fit the framework of Homer's historical allusions! True, we may, through his medium, sometimes see things obscurely—"men as trees walking"—but without him all the period now partially enlivened, would be an unpeopled desert, wrapped in a gloom as profound as covers the kings before Agamemnon.

Epic poetry has another characteristic. It combines nearly every other style of composition. Other poetry exhibits one form, this all the forms of feeling. The epic poet must glow in description, must melt in love, must sting in sarcasm. He must reason, declaim, and criticise. Other writings may give a single picture of life—the epic

must furnish a gallery. Is it strange that such talent as it requires is rare—that to the honours of its first rank but four are really admitted?

In turning our attention especially to the great author before us, we must first glance at the spirit and history of his time.

When the northern deluge prostrated and overwhelmed the Roman Empire in the West, one part of it, the municipal towns, appeared to offer substantial resistance to its fury. The hordes might sweep and pillage them, but their pent-up walls offered to barbarians no inducement to a permanent residence. They had too recently been the denizens of wide plains and forests, to relish the confinement or the pursuits of the towns. If, then, these were plundered, the frightened inhabitants soon returned, and their industry repaired the devastation. Clustering around the ruins, they plied the arts or practised commerce, until, by degrees, their streets were rebuilt, their walls restored, their prosperity re-established. But these towns gradually became not only the seats of opulence, but of patriotism and refinement, and the meanest burgher felt something of the aggregate dignity of his city. A spirit of life and enterprise, which afterwards led to voyages of distant commerce and discovery, pervaded all ranks.

It was beyond their limits that the *dark ages* were in reality found. There the feudal landholders, the descendants of the conquerors, lived in gloomy seclusion within their fortresses. At the foot of the castles were the villages of the serfs, the humble tillers of the soil; and often in the same picture might be seen some convent, to which the chieftain gave patronage, in return for the keeping of his conscience, and the absolution of his sins. These barons were absolute despots, and their power was supreme up to the limits of the towns. Clad in steel, they could ride with impunity over the ranks of the burghers; holding the soil, they could cut off their supplies, and keep them hemmed within their gates. The towns, at first, as might be expected of a weaker party, sought alliances with the landed nobility.

In the progress of events, however, the scale began to turn. Commercial wealth outweighed lands and castles, and freemen proved superior to vassals. If the cities furnished no lances of their own, adventurers from the north were glad to enter their service. Situated happily for trade, they accumulated what has been, in every age, "the sinews of war." Now the nobility became the party out of power, the ones to sue for alliances, and offer concessions; and so plain was this, that at one time, in the middle of the eleventh century, there could be found, of the Italian nobility, only the Marquis of Montferrat, who had not submitted to some town, his rival.

The inhabitants of these cities had liberal views of the arts, and honoured the success of artists. They were vigilant, enterprising, skilful in business, patrons of letters, lovers of liberty, and jealous of its infringement. Here their good qualities terminate, and the reverse of the picture is gloomy. The student will recognise, in the history of these cities, that of Greece previous to Philip; for, though the lapse of centuries and the waves of the Adriatic separate the theatres, and the Italian actors are less illustrious than the Grecian, yet the tragedy throughout is the same. Hatred, jealousy, and atrocious revenge, are the ingredients of every character. Feuds, springing often from false or trifling causes, revolve within feuds, and faction subdivides factions, the small and great being alike implacable. Does one city triumph over its weaker neighbour? The latter is perhaps razed, and its inhabitants reduced to a state little short of helotism. So Milan treated Lodi in 1111. Does a sedition prevail in a city? Its adversaries are put to death or banished—having lost their property—to nurse their wrath and await their time of vengeance. Are the parties of equal strength? They waste each other in a struggle of irreconcilable animosity.

Such was the state of Italy from the tenth to the fourteenth century. The great parties were the Guelphs and Ghibellines—the adherents, respectively, of the Church and the Emperor. The Guelphs were the natural Italian party; but many opposed the claims of the pope, and many more loved the protection of the German crown. From these causes, the Ghibellines gained adherents in every city—in some, even the majority. The Guelphs were torn with dissensions, and the enmity of the black and white Guelphs was as merciless as that between both and the Ghibellines.

Before leaving the politics of Italy, which we have traced thus far, in order to make Dante's fortunes intelligible, we may glance at the peculiar character of the Italian patriotism. Each man gave his whole heart to his city, while, perhaps, half of its people were his deadly enemies. The sound of its name awoke in him, at once, the keenest emotions of tenderness and vengeance. Thus Dante sheds a patriot's tear at the sound of "la bella Firenze," while vengeance clouds his spirit, even in the depths of eternal light, as his thoughts rest for a moment on her citizens. We may see, too, why this land is,

> "Conquered or conquering, still alike a slave."

And, indeed, if Italy is, in our day, to be free from both the triple and the iron crown, she must first become—what for more than a thousand years she has not been—a unit.

The last scholar of the ancient world was Boethius. At his death, beneath the relentless hand of Theodoric, though he were not to be ranked with those who had preceded him, we date the extinction of literature; for henceforth the language of Cicero and of classical learning were silenced. The northern hordes despised what they had neither leisure nor inclination to acquire. The clergy, by their prejudice against profane literature, completed its overthrow; the monks alone, with humble industry, collected and hoarded its ruins. Learning had sunk to reappear; but what prophet could have foretold the place of its rising? Not on Greece or Italy, but on the Ultima Thule of its former territory, did it throw the early beams of its second dawn.

The monasteries of Ireland, even before the end of the sixth century, drew students from the continent, and sent teachers thither. Under the care of Theodore, the first primate of England, learning flourished. Bede and Alcuin soon after did it essential service: the latter, passing over to the continent, contributed effectually to its establishment in the empire of Charlemagne. Aristotle and the scholastic philosophy gradually gained the attention of ecclesiastics. Meanwhile, from the fertilizing dust of perished literature, there was springing in the south a new species of composition. Provence led the way in developing the poetical capacities of a native dialect; France, Castile, and Italy followed.

This employment of vernaculars is an era in literary annals. The Provençal dates from William Duke of Brienne, in 1096; the Spanish, from the Cid, in 1150; the Italian, from Dante, in 1304. These are the leading dialects of the Latin, derived from it mainly by marking oblique cases with particles rather than endings, by modifying *ille* and *unus* into articles, and by dropping or making silent the verbal terminations. Two of these dialects, it will be noticed, containing as yet no literature but poetry, had appeared when Dante arose. Even he, at first, reluctantly attempted the creation of a language for his use, since few Tuscans had thought of such a thing as possible. Happily, however, he laid on a master's hand, and fixed the sweetly noble dialect of Florence. His workmanship was often rough, and many of his words have since been discarded from the language; but it was effective, and its best monument is the lingua Toscana.

Much obscurity hangs over the life of our poet. Boccaccio, who lived near his time, is the worst of biographers; giving rhapsodies for facts, and for incidents, epigrammatical comments on his own conceits. Other writers, Aretino and Vollutello, have done better.

There was a brave knight of Florence, who fought under Conrad III., and perished in the holy wars. This knight, Cacciaguida, hav-

ing married one of the noble family of the Alighieri, his descendants adopted their maternal as their family name. The name Dante, generally supposed to be an abbreviation of Durante, Boccaccio claims to have been conferred by a special providence; inasmuch as its possessor was to be "di maravigliosa dottrina *datore*"—a punning fancy that fairly represents its author. Dante was born in Florence, in May, 1265. Every burgher of the Italian cities was a soldier, and Dante was early inured with his fellows to every military exercise. His first literary preceptor, Brunetto Latini, was a man of reputation and of real acquirements for his time. By him Dante was initiated into all the learning then in vogue. Brunetto was a "greedy-tempered" man, for which he was afterwards assigned by his scholar to a place in hell, whence he dispenses to his pupil, *en passant*, much wholesome advice, which his own example pointedly enforces.

Very little is definitely known of our poet's history until after his twenty-fourth year. He appears to have studied with great credit in some of the universities of Italy; and it is claimed that he visited Paris, and even Oxford. One thing all allow, that he lost his juvenile heart at the tender age of nine years. His Beatrice, afterwards his guide through Paradise, was the daughter of Folco Portinari, a respectable citizen of Florence, and at the time of her conquest had not passed her own eighth year. Dante, as might be expected, now grew poetical. Boccaccio says that no one ever enacted the part of a lover better than he. His canzonets were touching and appropriate; his raptures at her smiles, his tearful sighings at her cloudiness or absence, were "onestissimi." But, alas! the halcyon days of human life are ever few! As our poet approached his twenty-fourth year, his "donna eccellentissima" died. Copious was his grief, and even his life was endangered by its depth and continuance. This sad event coloured the whole subsequent career of Dante. His dreams for this life were ended; the susceptible boy and ardent lover is known henceforth as the deep-feeling, melancholy, unforgiving man.

He next appears as a soldier. At the battle of Campaldino, where the Guelphs with the Florentines, defeated the Ghibellines with the Aretini, he took a fearless part. In the next year he was with his countrymen in an engagement near Pisa, when they took from the Pisans the castle of Caprona.

Grief for Beatrice still weighing heavily upon him, his friends urged a marriage with a member of a family who were afterwards his most bitter political opponents. It was a matter of expediency; the lady of their choice had no place in Dante's heart. Some, at a loss to account for this, have tried to paint her as a Xanthippe.

This is wrong. She did not—probably no one could have done it—fill the place of the lost Beatrice; but she was a tender, faithful wife. She withstood the influence of her family, and was true to her husband in all his fortunes. She managed to rear, and even educate respectably, her children on the most limited means. Must so devoted a woman be accounted a savage in temper, to explain why her husband felt not for her the ardour of *first* love? If there be fault anywhere, it is his. What he says of her is, indeed, equivocal; yet, for a hundred years after, no one speaks of her as harsh or violent.

In 1300, Dante was made chief of the Priors, then the ruling party at Florence. The black Guelphs having triumphed over the white, who were, in secret, Ghibellines, the latter, with Dante, who had been suspected of favouring them in his administration, were banished from the city. From this hour he was a man of sorrows, an exile, and a wanderer. An attempt, on the part of the exiles, to restore themselves by force, failed, and Dante went to Verona, where he spent some years under the protection of the munificent Can Grande. Dependence was a cruel thing to his spirit. It mortified him to "climb the stairs of other men;" their "salt" was "bitter" to his taste. He strove again to obtain by entreaty what he could not get by force; and even took the desperate resolution of renouncing the Guelphs, and joining the Ghibellines under Henry of Luxembourgh, hoping thereby to return to Florence. Every effort was vain. On leaving Verona, he wandered from one city to another, until a proposal for return was made to him by the Florentines, on the condition of a confession of ignominy and the payment of a heavy fine. Any offer, on such terms, he proudly rejected. He saw his rising fame. He declared that he would one day return

> "In other guise, and standing up
> At his baptismal font, should claim the wreath
> Due to the poet's temples."

Bright visions of his future reputation now reconciled him to even an exile's lot. His last sojourn with Guido Novella di Polenta was his happiest one; for his patron was himself a poet, and could sympathize with another.

But his career drew to a close; and in July, 1321, the sorrows of his exile, and the gratulations of his fame, were hushed in death. Guido honoured his remains with a magnificent funeral. And now the Athenians of Florence awoke to the value of what they had so wantonly lost. More than once have their posterity petitioned for the ashes of their banished poet; but these, for more than five hundred years, have rested in their costly sepulchre at Ravenna, while

a cenotaph is the boast of ungrateful, too late repentant Florence.

In the summer of 1840, as workmen were removing a part of the ancient chapel of the Podesta, now long used by the Florentines as their city prison, a portrait was discovered in the plaster, purporting to be that of Dante. It might have been identified from Boccaccio's description. It represents a man of middle stature and solemn deportment; the eyes large and dark, the cheek bones prominent, and the beard black and curly. The original of the portrait was a man of few words, of inelastic temper, given less to mirth than to melancholy, often sarcastic, but always plain and prudent.

In reviewing the intellectual character of Dante, we cannot but wonder at his immense erudition. The treasures of classical learning, the philosophy of Aristotle and the schools, and the literature of the Church, were his own property. Towards whatever point he directs his attention, the resources of his mind, well marshalled and brought to bear, make his sweep irresistible. From the dim illumination which truth cast upon his age, it was not to be expected that he would always shun errors; and to judge him by the light of *our* day, would be uncandid. Suffice it that he was very far in advance of his contemporaries, as well as of his predecessors. His delighted countrymen almost regarded him as one of the "old prophets risen again;" and his titles, "Il Divino," "Il Teologo," testify their reverence. "It was as if, at one of the ancient games, a stranger had appeared upon the plain, and thrown his quoit among the marks of former casts, which tradition had ascribed to the demi-gods."

His moral character, also, must be judged with charitable reference to his time. He was a Catholic, and saw in the Church, which, with all its errors, then commanded almost universal acquiescence, the direct institution of Christ and his apostles. He believed that the spiritual authority of fathers and councils gave to its figments the sanction of inspiration. Deeply impressed that much in the Church was utterly wrong, he, with a true Romish discrimination, absolves *her*, and arraigns her administrators. He distributes popes and prelates freely along the gulfs and sounds of perdition, and inveighs against them with all the truthfulness and intense energy of a reformer; but spares the most abusive, as well as the most trivial, usages of the Church. Yet such has been the inconsistency of many good and earnest men, and such was for a while that of Luther. We may regret that such power as Dante displays was not exerted against the whole scheme of papal error; while we must grant that he did well, where he had no predecessor, in rebuking what he judged to be within the scope of human disapproval.

In private life his manners were pure, and, if we except his unforgiving sternness, in harmony with religion. How much of this single unpleasing trait must be pardoned, in view of an inveterate national constitution and habit, and how much may be resolved into a reasonable resentment, we dare not say. We can find but one act of his life,—his adoption of the Ghibellines,—over which it was suffered to cast a shade of dishonour. In his great work, he appears not more a poet than a teacher of sound theoretical and practical moralty.

Besides his epic, he was the author of several prose works, famous in their time. Of these, a Treatise on Monarchy, and two books on the Common Use of Language, are in harsh Latin. The former is now of questionable value; the latter give a philosophical and comprehensive view of the rise of the vernacular literature. His best prose works are in Tuscan. One, the Vita Nuova, is a history of his love for Beatrice, containing many valuable things, particularly a plaintive and beautiful sonnet, written after her death. The Convito is principally devoted to a justification of his employment of the Tuscan, rather than of the Latin or Provençal; an excuse for which may to us appear needless, but the Tuscan, until he adopted it, had neither dignity nor compass. Of his lyric poems, some are sportive, but the greater part solemn and earnest. Their diction is often purer than that of the Commedia.

On this last production, however, rests Dante's fame. The criticism of ages has approved it, and it has given character to the poetry of modern Europe. The plan is that of an allegory, which often admits of both an historical and moral interpretation; and is often confessedly obscure, as, indeed, are all allegories, except the matchless Pilgrim's Progress. In the opening, the poet is lost in a wood, —Bunyan's "wilderness of this world,"—where, coming to a mountain, he is prevented from ascending by a beautiful leopard, symbolical of pleasure:—

> "The hour was morning's prime; and on his way
> Aloft the sun ascended, with those stars
> That with him rose when Love Divine first moved
> Those its fair works: so that with joyous hope
> All things conspired to fill me—the gay skin
> Of that swift animal, the matin dawn,
> And the sweet season."

Other terrors awaited him: a lion, ambition, came against him so fearfully that

> "All the air was fear-struck;"

and a she-wolf, avarice, appearing in his way, he sinks back in despair, when

> "The sun in silence rests"—

a metaphor for darkness, which occurs again in the poem, and is copied in Milton's Samson Agonistes. The historical interpretation makes the three animals here introduced represent, successively, Florence, the king of France, and the court of Rome; but as this involution of allegories is dependent on the ingenuity of commentators, and is often fanciful, the reader of Dante need pay it no attention.

Virgil, commissioned by Beatrice, who is sent for this purpose by Divine mercy and a heavenly dignity, sympathizes with him, and offers to guide him from the wild by a path which shall lead through the abode of those who "invoke a second death," and of those who "dwell content" for their allotted time, "in fire." Hell and purgatory passed, he will resign his charge to a "worthier spirit," the description of whom is truly beautiful, who shall be his guide through paradise. The tuneful pair pass the gate of hell, the last line of whose inscription chills Dante's heart:—

> "All hope abandon, ye who enter here."

They are met by

> "Outcries of woe,
> Accents of anger, voices deep and hoarse;"

which, with

> "Palms together smote, that swell'd the sounds,
> Made up a tumult that forever whirls
> Round through that air, with solid darkness stain'd."

The dwellers here were

> "Too bad for a blessing, too good for a curse;"

and while

> "Fame of them the world has none,"

they never pass the border of hell, lest the "accursed tribe" should glory at receiving men of a respectable negative goodness to their company. Here they live, while

> "Mercy and justice scorn them both."

Farther onward they find a crowd, among whom is Pope Celestine V., awaiting their passage across "the woful tide of Acheron," one of the few borrowed ingredients of the poem.

Beyond this are the spirits of those who have died "subject to the wrath of God," dwelling in the *regio propria* of hell. This is divided into twenty-three distinct compartments, comprised in nine

regions or circles. It may be presumed to require no small effort of genius to maintain even a tolerable interest throughout so attenuated and detailed a scheme; but in reading the Inferno the attention never lags. Every grade of guilt, from lack of baptism to treason towards benefactors, here receives its demerit; and offenders of every rank and time, from Sinon of Troy to Mohammed and Nicholas V., from the age of Homer to that of Dante, undergo the penalties of their crimes. Every variety of punishment—despair, remorse, "fierce heat and ice"—is employed in the different circles. The imagery employed has no parallel. The classical *hades*, the revelations of Scripture, and the boundless fancy of the poet, are all laid under contribution. At every step we are melted in pity or chilled with terror.

It may be a fault of the Inferno, that the writer, in order to people with different characters his numerous scenes, is occasionally forced to employ a minuteness of description almost grotesque. Usually, however, no writer uses fewer strokes than Dante. His Ugolino and Francesca cannot possibly be abridged, yet their portraiture is perfect.

The immediate and amazing popularity of this part of the work is attributable to a cause independent of its real worth. Italians of the thirteenth century figure in it. The Florentines saw their late rulers,—their characters vividly drawn, and their eternal state powerfully defined. The scholar beheld characters of his day, grouped with those from early and even fabulous history, according to general standards of merit. This interest, which pervaded Dante's contemporaries, is lost to us; but there is enough in his masterly use of language, his life-like portraits, and his condensed sublimity of rhetoric, to interest and repay the reader of every age.

A noble company majestically moved through Limbo, composed of the classic heroes, the good Saladin, and all the unbaptized noble ones, who, dwelling in calm indifference,

> "Spake
> Seldom, but all their words were tuneful sweet."

In the second circle he meets Francesca. She was the daughter of Guido of Ravenna, and was given in marriage to the lord of Rimini; but, charmed by the superior accomplishments of his brother, proved faithless, and being taken in adultery, was slain, together with her paramour, by her enraged husband. On being interrogated by the poet, she proceeds,

> "As one who weeps and tells his tale. One day,
> For our delight, we read of Lancelot—

How him love thrall'd. Alone we were, and no
Suspicion near us. Ofttimes, by that reading
Our eyes were drawn together, and the hue
Fled from our alter'd cheek. But at one point
Alone we fell. When of that smile we read,
The wished smile, so rapturously kiss'd
By one so deep in love—then he who ne'er
From me shall separate, at once my lips
All trembling kiss'd. The book and writer both
Were love's purveyors. In its leaves, that day,
We read no more."

Who does not detect in the abashed and delicate language of this episode the gem of Leigh Hunt's Rimini?

Passing through the various regions of hell, he finds the ninth circle to be its frozen zone—ice here replacing the fire of other circles. Among the traitors to whom this is appropriated, there is one worthy of special notice. Count Ugolino had betrayed a faction of the Guelphs in Pisa, but himself, in reverse of fortune, had fallen into the hands of Archbishop Ruggieri, who, though a Ghibelline leader, was the Count's personal enemy. Being given back by him to the Pisans whom he had betrayed, he, with two sons and two grandsons, was starved to glut their vengeance. He ceases from the ghastly retribution which he is inflicting on his foe, now his eternal companion, to tell a tale of horror unrivalled in any language. After their confinement, he says:—

"I wept not, so all stone I felt within.
They wept; and one, my little Anselm, cried:
'Thou lookest so, father, what ails thee?' Yet
I shed no tear, nor answer'd all that day,
Nor the next night, until another sun
Came out upon the world. When a faint beam
Had to our doleful prison made its way,
And in four countenances I descried
The image of my own, on either hand
Through agony I bit; and they who thought
I did it through desire of feeding, rose
O' the sudden, and cried: 'Father, we should grieve
Far less if thou wouldst eat of us: thou gav'st
These weeds of miserable flesh we wear,
And do thou strip them off from us again!'
Then, not to make them sadder, I kept down
My spirit in stillness. That day and the next
We all were silent. Ah, obdurate earth!
Why open'dst not upon us? When we came
To the fourth day, then Gaddo at my feet
Outstretch'd did fling him, crying, 'Hast no help
For me, my father?' There he died; and e'en

> Plainly as thou seest me, saw I the three
> Fall one by one, 'twixt the fifth day and sixth.
> Whence I betook me, now grown blind, to grope
> Over them all, and for three days aloud
> Called on them, who were dead. Then fasting
> Got the mastery of grief."

The poet utters a terrible invective on the cruel Pisans, and passes on.

We feel a relief, as we arrive with him before dawn among the fresh breezes that play about the isle of Purgatory. A strain, too, of more cheerful verse, welcomes us to the region,

> "In which the human soul, from sinful blot
> Is purged, and for ascent to heaven prepared."

The inmates of purgatory suffer indeed, but "dwell content in fire;" for hope, assurance, beams in every heart. They know that they shall issue forth to eternal life; they feel that each pang purifies, each toil brings them towards their goal. They live quite like Protestant saints on earth, rejoicing that

> "Their suffering time will soon be o'er;"

or, perhaps, like the elect of a certain creed, fail they cannot, prevail, at some time, they surely will; therefore they make tolerable shift for the present. A very fair place is purgatory; and one of its inmates, Casella, an old friend of the poet, would entertain him by singing one of his own canzoni,—

> "Love that discourses in my thoughts."

But here stern Cato of Utica, who, though unbaptized, is here, by special commission, to introduce our wayfarers, bids him better mind the dignity of the place. Occasionally an impatient soul importunes Dante to procure additional prayers and pious acts from its friends on earth, in order to hasten the time of its release.

A greeting given to Virgil by a fellow Mantuan, goes to the heart of the poet, as it reminds him bitterly of his own state, an exile, driven from his home by his own citizens. He breaks out against the ruinous factions of Italy and Florence, comparing the latter to a poor wretch who

> "Finds no rest upon her couch, but oft
> Shifting her side, short respite seeks from pain."

As they proceed, the discourse turns on the different modes of violating the laws of Christian morality, pointed illustrations of which are constantly occurring, while characters illustrious for the opposite of such vices, are mentioned by way of praise. Kings and

hermits, the great and the humble, appear here as their respective moral characters require them to be placed. The poet summons them with earthly differences laid aside, and nods them with unfailing discernment to their appropriate stations, forming of them a splendid historical gallery. Warmth and glow increase in the poem, as we draw near the terrestrial paradise. Objects of lustre gleam in the growing light, fair young forms appear, and strains of melody float on the fragrance of zephyrs. The terrestrial paradise is not unlike the land of Beulah.

Virgil now resigns his charge to another being, Matilda, who guides the poet through scenes that we will not mutilate, until he finds Beatrice. The sight of her awoke his "ancient love." The long-restrained influence that had thrilled his boyish heart in the halls of Portinari, streamed anew on his spirit. His vision faltered, and he would have hid himself; but Beatrice chided and encouraged him—still he could not lift up his eyes. A choir of virgins carol out a prayer:—

> "'Turn, Beatrice,' was their song; 'O, turn
> Thy saintly sight on this thy faithful one,
> Who, to behold thee, many a weary pace
> Hath measured. Gracious at our prayer vouchsafe,
> Unveil to him thy cheeks, that he may mark
> Thy second beauty, now conceal'd.'"

A draught from a heavenly stream gives him power sufficient "for mounting to the stars."

The Paradise is the feeblest of the divisions of the Comedy. We think the reason lies in the subject, rather than in the poet. It is a law of nature that sweet things pall the sense. A succession of terrors keeps us awake, while we grow weary of the unalloyed beautiful. The sweet draught must be relieved by an ingredient of bitter, or it loses its relish. To maintain a high interest throughout a poem of thirty-five cantos, filled with forms of unmixed happiness, is beyond the capacity of any human genius. The Inferno seizes on the heart by the two great emotions of pity and terror. It brings at every step some new and startling object of sympathy. There is no repetition, there is no stagnation: it is the master-piece. The Purgatorio sends forth the cheerful influence of hope. We see pain alleviated by the certainty that each moment diminishes its duration. Amid the groans of toil, we fancy that we hear the infant accents of praise. Over the gloom of sins unforgiven, we see the dawn of peace, of pardon, and of heaven. But in the Paradiso we are affected by contentment alone. The pleasurable emotions which arise at seeing felicity made perfect, admit of few varieties. We gaze,

we are pleased; but our complacency becomes fatiguing,—we are restless, and wish to avert our vision. Dante has exhausted his subject. Nothing could have been done, which he has left undone; yet, before we finish reading it, a sense of satiety comes over us. Still, had Dante written nothing else, the Paradiso would have established for him no common fame. The first seven cantos are a constant flow of soft and brilliant poetry. No language can furnish their superior. They are gentle without being sluggish, and tender without being feeble.

As he proceeds on his way, the saints whom he meets explain to him the rites of the Church and the mysteries of faith and providence. Cacciaguida, the knight already named, recounts to his descendant his own history and that of his native city, and advises his future course. Firenze, that loved, yet hateful name, comes in once more, while stern remembrances darken the exile's heart, even in the glories of the heavenly vision. His spirit nowhere forgets its burning wrongs. Still he ascends, and the Church triumphant bursts upon his view; its glorified Lord pouring the full beatitude of his presence upon the faithful, toilworn host. Farther on, St. Peter catechises him on faith, St. James on hope, and St. John on charity. They are satisfied with his answers, at which he takes courage to hope that he shall one day prevail over the cruelty

> "That bars him forth
> Of the fair sheepfold where, a sleeping lamb,
> The wolves set on, and fain had worried him."

St. Peter adds the weight of his own authority to what saints of less degree have already abundantly said; inveighing against the prevailing wickedness of prelates and priests, from his own representative in the Vatican down to the humblest curate.

Beatrice finally takes him into the empyrean, and shows him, at one grand view, the blessedness of angels and perfected saints; then she resigns him to St. Bernard, who inducts him into the climacteric of mysteries, that of the Holy Trinity:—

> "Here vigour fail'd the towering fantasy,
> But yet the *will* rolled onward like a wheel,
> In even motion, by that love impell'd
> Which moves the sun in heaven and all the stars."

The Vision is concluded. We may be pardoned for passing the other works of Dante with no other criticism than has already been given.

His claim to originality deserves more notice, inasmuch as it has been often and closely questioned. That he has borrowed much

from Virgil, is not denied. The fate of his suicides, for instance, is clearly taken from the Polydorus of the Æneid. Some other features of the scenery of Inferno are also borrowed. Much of the Vision has been attributed to the Somnium Scipionis of Cicero. But by far the greater part has been credited to the Vision of Alberico, a monk who, two hundred years before, had seemed to behold the mysteries of the future worlds.

We do not claim that Dante employed an entirely new method of communication, or ventured upon wholly untried subjects, or introduced perfectly unique conveyances of thought. We claim, however, that if the conception be not novel, yet the grand and magnificent outline, the tremendous and unparalleled framework, the unwearied train of appalling or lovely, terrific or tender images and incidents that fill it up, the prodigious and comprehensive erudition that displays itself on every page—these are Dante's own; and they constitute him an original poet. They who expect more than *these* from an author, before they consent to rank him among creative minds, expect what Shakspeare, perhaps even Homer, cannot furnish. They seem to seek, without knowing it, an intellectual monster, not a man.

It is no small proof of Dante's merit, that he has filled so large a place in the world of letters. We have remarked his influence on his native language. Soon after his death, Florence established a professorship to expound his poem; and Boccaccio, the first poet of his age, was proud to occupy the chair. We think that no Italian poet can be found who does not exhibit traces of Dante—some marks to show whom he regards as his master. No writer has so affected English literature, as has Dante that of Italy. Nor was his influence confined to the south of Europe: Milton and Chaucer worshipped at this shrine, and culled many a gem from the writer

"Whose rhetoric so sweet enlumined Italy."

Later still, German research has found a rich field for its toil in the Florentine's pages. Such influence must have a source adequate to its issue, and that source is the work

"With which all Europe rang from side to side."

In every part of the work appears the author—in hell, in purgatory, and in paradise—the same searching student, the same tender, melancholy, unforgiving man. A person of different temperament would never have written the Vision. To compare him with Milton, is a work to which the accurate judgment of Macaulay has been incidentally directed. The decision of the English critic is brief,

and it seems to us unfair. He had Milton in his vernacular. Dante, if we may judge by a quotation in his essay on Milton, he seems to have known, either by an imperfect acquaintance with Tuscan, or by a bungling prose translation. Now there are two methods by which the sublimity of Dante may be reached. One is, to think and feel with him as Milton did, in his own rich tongue—a work for which few have leisure or inclination; the other is, to read Cary's translation, the fruit of a long life's toil, and of a genial sympathy with the poet and his times. We cannot see that Macaulay has employed either mode. In the true sublime, Dante is inferior to Milton. He has nothing equal to Milton's Satan. Yet he falls short only a little; the Inferno is full of a well-sustained sublimity. The sublime in Milton is often like the deafening peal, which ceases, and we breathe again; in Dante, it is like a heavy roar, varying its tone, but never parting with its strength. If Milton is more impressive, Dante is more copious; if the former has a loftier, the latter has a stronger and more even flight. The fertility of the one could not sustain the Paradise Regained, the latter keeps up an equal interest through nearly a hundred cantos of his poem. On the whole, we think that in originality and fertility of mind, Dante is superior to Milton; while in true sublimity and poetic power, he is below him.

Among the ranks of feeble men that filled the earth in the thirteenth century, one reared himself like the forms of earlier times, and Homer and Virgil had a companion. Farther down, Milton arose, a companion to the three. When shall we see the fifth? We shall see men of science, of art, and eloquence; we shall see bards of honourable fame; but we may wait long, yet never see another of the great creative minds—the true epic poets.

Art. IV.—METHODIST PREACHING.

We sit down, in a somewhat desultory mood, to pen some thoughts for the leisure reading of our Methodist patrons, and our ministerial brethren in particular, on the subject presented in the above title. We consider the peculiarities of Methodist preaching as not a little distinctive of our history—as important denominational characteristics. Their very importance, however—the boldness of their relief—has rendered them obvious and familiar; while, then, we offer our readers other articles sufficiently elaborate, we may in this indulge, perhaps not without advantage to them and ourselves, in the freedom of spontaneous reflections—reflections which, though

cursorily uttered from the heart, may not be without their lesson.

The old Methodist preaching! We do honestly confess a sort of pride for its noble naturalness, its moral power, and the grandeur of its results, and somewhat of a tinge of denominational bigotry in favour of the unadulterated preservation of its essential qualities. If that apparatus is best which best accomplishes its ends, who will say that Methodist preaching has not been the best preaching extant in our world for a hundred years? Denominations which had been in the American field a hundred years and more before Methodism had an adherent; denominations having the essential truth, and an educated ministry, and traditional prestige, and the influence of popular respectability, have been left a century in the rear of Methodism; and some of the single annual additions of the latter have equalled the whole numerical strength of the former. This is a point to be touched delicately, we know; but we would here hold in abeyance our aforesaid bigotry, if possible, and present the striking fact as full of significance, not to gratify our denominational vanity, but to teach us an admonitory lesson; for let us be assured, that the *preaching of the word is the great means of evangelization in the earth*, and that the peculiarities which have given pre-eminent success to our preaching should be held with an unyielding grasp.

Doubtless our denominational progress is attributable to a great many conditions, but our preaching has been the chief one; it has been related to, and has empowered all others. Suppose we had had our itinerancy, and even our wholesome doctrines, but a stereotyped, lifeless, however refined, preaching—a ministry with even the culture of education, but heartlessly lisping manuscript essays from appointment to appointment—would our cause have broken out on the right and on the left, overwhelming the land, as it has through the labours of the men who have made it a glory in the world? And does any one doubt, that if all the Christian preaching of the earth were conducted in the same style of directness, energy, and unction that these men used, the gospel would overflow the world, as Methodism has so rapidly its own immediate fields in Great Britain and the United States? Notwithstanding all the drawbacks which the sectarian delicacy of such illustrations must present, even to many not over-fastidious Methodist readers, yet the actual force of them is felt immediately and conclusively. Turn all the pulpits of Christendom into such batteries as were the original pulpits of Methodism, and the evangelic combat would soon resound through the world. Hesitate as we may at the apparent boastfulness

of the remark, we Methodists who have known that ministry, feel "the full assurance of faith" in its truthfulness.

From the very nature of the subject, it is impossible for us to speak of it justly, without this apparent sectarian egotism. We must be permitted, therefore, to make another laudatory assertion respecting this ministry, namely, that it not only excelled in the legitimate results of the office, but has been marked by an unusual amount of genuine talent, using this word in its popular acceptation.

Taken as a whole, the English Wesleyan ministry is not only the most effective, but the most able body of men in Great Britain, and if we were to express fully our own personal opinion, we should add, in the world. They are the best sermonizers, and the best pulpit speakers (being, besides the Roman priests, the only extemporizers) in the United Kingdom; and if once in an age the Kirk presents a pulpit prodigy like Chalmers, or the Baptists a Hall, cases which admit of no denominational comparisons, yet English Methodism, in the number, if not in the genius of its "first-rate" men, has stood pre-eminent. More masterly minds have not been connected with the religious affairs of modern England than the Watsons, Buntings, Newtons, Jacksons, Dixons, Hannahs, and others who have managed the interests of Wesleyan Methodism during the last fifty years.

In this country, our ministry has never been destitute of masterly intellects. Asbury will yet be placed, if not at the head, yet among the foremost ecclesiastical characters in American history. Our early bishops, M'Kendree, George, Roberts, Soule, Hedding, have been men of the highest pulpit power—such power as results not merely from the moral peculiarities of Methodist preaching, but from commanding faculties and great personal characteristics. Meanwhile, there have ever and anon appeared in our pulpits rare lights, which have hardly found contemporary rivals elsewhere, such as Summerfield, Ross, Bascom, Ruter, Emory, Fisk, Olin, and not a few others dead or alive. It is our sober opinion, that if we take the aggregate of "first-rate" pulpit men of all American Christian sects, Methodism would be found to have decidedly the largest proportion. We speak not now of learning, but of great pulpit ability, and great personal traits.

It has not been for want of superior men that Methodism has not commanded more public respect; it has been chiefly because of its rigorous peculiarities, which have repelled the world, and adventitious circumstances connected with the social sphere, to which it has chiefly directed its labours.

The mass of the Methodist ministry has not been able to compare

with that of other sects in education; but this is the only point (and we acknowledge it to have been a very material one) in which the comparison is disparaging to it. In natural talent, in sound Scriptural knowledge, in all the great traits of individual character, what body of men has ever surpassed them? "Their works do follow them;" and these are the best criterion of their capacity.

While, however, we unreservedly contend for thus much, we do not hesitate to admit that our claim may not have been equally high in respect to the lowest rank of the American ministries. With the exception of one or two other denominations, education has been a general prerequisite for the pulpit among American sects. This condition alone would be sufficient to preclude from them almost entirely a certain class of labourers, of which Methodism has availed itself with great advantage among the popular masses. While this class has perhaps been the occasion of a lower estimate of our ministry generally, it has really been no ground of comparison with other sects, as it constitutes a peculiar rank, almost entirely exceptional in their ministries. The question, as we have been reviewing it, is not whether taken aggregately, but taken proportionally, Methodism has had as competent a ministry, or, if you please, a more competent ministry, than other sects.

It would not be just for us to leave this admission respecting the very lowest rank of the ministry, without a qualification. We would not disparage it by saying that (with one or two exceptions) it is peculiar to ourselves. This is a fact, but it is no disparaging fact; on the contrary, were it demanded of us to say which class of our labourers has actually most extended Methodism in the land, and most peopled heaven with its converts, we should hesitate to award the honour to any other than this very class. Our world has need of such a class of evangelical workmen, and it will always have this need; and God grant that Methodism may always perceive the fact, and provide for it! We are known to all our readers as the advocate of education and ministerial improvement, but we should consider it most consummate impolicy—an act of ecclesiastical *felo de se*—for Methodism to adopt any exclusive standard of ministerial qualification. Let it have its standard, and a good one, and constrain all to it whom it can; but keep also that discretionary liberty of judgment, by which Wesley founded the modern lay ministry, and without which Methodism would probably have been unknown as a distinct body at this day.

Now, what is the purport of all these remarks, trenching so much as they of necessity have had to, on the modesty with which collective, as well as individual men should speak of themselves? Have

they been written for self-gratulation, for invidious disparagement of sister Churches? Verily not; we have set out to present some views on the peculiarities of *Methodist Preaching*—peculiarities which we fear need to be somewhat renewed and vindicated among us; and we hope our readers will, with ourselves, deem these introductory observations on the character and usefulness of our denominational ministry, not irrelevant to the design. Let us now look at some of these characteristic peculiarities.

One of them, and doubtless the most important one, was the fact that the *saving elementary truths of the gospel were continually reiterated.* Our primitive preachers were great readers of the Scriptures, and of their own theological standards; their range of study was limited, but it was fertile. It afforded them resources for varied preaching, and they did preach variously; they had also provocatives enough to lead them into polemical discussions; but, whether preaching polemics or didactics, or pouring forth their favourite, general, and rousing exhortations, they had the happy art of mingling the essential doctrines of grace with all. Seldom did the man who was inquiring "What shall I do to be saved?" hear a Methodist preacher, without bearing away with him the precise answer. The lost condition of the soul by nature, repentance towards God, faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ, justification, sanctification, the witness of the Spirit—such truths seemed to make up the alphabet out of which the very syllabification of their discourses was formed; so that it may be said, with but little qualification, that whosoever heard an ordinary Methodist sermon, however casually, thenceforward knew most, if not all, of the doctrines of grace.

This very excellence may not have been without a fault—the excess of a good thing; but if faulty, its error was on the safe side. Considering, however, the circumstances of those times, the necessity of direct saving preaching, amidst the universal declension of piety, it may well be doubted whether this general uniformity was in any wise a defect.

There was a generousness, a sort of evangelical liberalism, about the subject-matter of the old Methodist preaching, which could not but inspire both the preacher and his hearers. It repelled everywhere the dogmatic restrictions which the prevalent creed had put upon the promises of the gospel. God had concluded all men in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all, was its affirmation, in the face of all teaching to the contrary. Where sin abounds, grace much more abounds, it asserted. Universal redemption, the universal help of the Holy Spirit, free, present, perfect, and eternal salvation for all men who would accept it—this was its

grand predication; and men bearing such a message could not but proclaim it as with the sound of trumpets.

There were, doubtless, many other elements of moral force in the preaching of our fathers, some of which we shall proceed to mention; but we cannot refrain from pausing here to put unwonted emphasis on the one specified. The saving truths of revelation are the great elements of moral power in the world. God's word is "God's almightiness" among men; and he that invests himself with its great essential energies, is the mighty man in the moral world. Michael or Gabriel wielded no mightier sword in the wars of the angels. If nine-tenths of all the dogmatic theology extant were at once extinguished from the earth, and the doctrines immediately related to conversion and sanctification were brought forth in our pulpits and religious literature with proportionately more fulness and frequency, who doubts that all the energies of Christianity would be redoubled? The early Methodist preachers, being mostly men who were powerfully converted from down-right sinfulness, went forth with their souls imbued and flaming with these powerful truths, and, with whatever inability otherwise, preached them in demonstration of the Spirit and power. The hardened multitude hailed them with shouts of derision; but listening, wept, fell often like dead men to the earth, and went to their homes praying, and exclaiming "These are the men who show us the way of salvation!"

As we prize our ministerial vocation, let us study well this example of our fathers, and learn well its lesson. Woe to us when the generalities or moralities of religion, however glorious, shall take the place of those direct, soul-quickening doctrines which were the chief themes of our first ministry.

So much for the main themes of Methodist preaching. We do not affirm that these were peculiar to it, but that this habitual reiteration of them was. Other ministries preached them; but it is, we suppose, quite generally acknowledged, that when Methodism went forth through the land, the stated ministries of the country dealt mostly in the general didactics of religion. When Jesse Lee entered New-England, a half century had passed since the last extensive revival—that of Edwards's day.

But not in its themes only was Methodist preaching peculiar: it was notably so in its *style*. Our fathers, more than any other modern ministry, preached *ad populum*. They came out from the people, and knew how to address the people; and the popular effects of their preaching, the great massive ingatherings of the people into their communion, are a demonstration of their power nothing short of magnificent—proof of character and capacity, above all polemic

tomes or literary demonstrations which ever proceeded from clerical heads. In referring to their *style* of preaching, we speak comprehensively, meaning not only their *verbal* style, but their mode of illustrating the truth, and their style of elocution; and in all these respects we have the presumption to say that, take them as a whole, they had more manly genuineness, more practical adaptedness, and therefore more effectiveness, than any other ministry since the days of the apostles. The sectarian egotism of this remark *must* be excused, for the fact is, to our vision, an outstanding one, and may be seen and read of all men, in the results of their labours.

In regard to their verbal style, we are prepared to admit the charge that they were generally unlettered, and therefore unprepared to present their public instructions with those traits of literary purity and elevation which education alone can confer, and which we acknowledge to be desirable in public religious teachers, both as befitting the exalted character of moral truth, and as an auxiliary means of the elevation of the popular taste. We would not, in the least, depreciate any genuine accomplishment which can be brought to the aid of religion. With the lack of literary polish, however, our early ministry had those advantages of the simple, direct, and often strenuous speech of the people, which educated men are too apt to lose, but ought not to lose in their professional diction. The true purity of Saxon consists not merely in its simple words, but also in a sort of colloquial facility and aptness of phrases, of sentences. Addison's contrast with Johnson is not in words only, but in their collocation. Now, what we would remark is, that the untutored style of our early ministry had this great excellence—this *colloquial directness and force.* And this is an inestimable excellence in popular address. It brought the truth not only to the hearing of the people, but to their comprehension; and not only to their comprehension, but to their interest. Men will readily fall asleep under the literary style of a manuscript sermon, but an earnest conversational style keeps the attention; it leads the mind of the hearer into a sort of interlocution with the speaker, and thus the truth insinuates itself into the conscience and the heart. This was the style of the Great Teacher himself.

Their mode of *illustrating* the truth was of similar character. Similitudes drawn, like Christ's, from familiar life, allusions to local or passing events, the thrilling anecdote—these were the staple of their expositions. We do not deny that in individual cases they were excessive, and became too characteristic, so as to change the preacher somewhat into the anecdote-monger; but such were exceptional to the general character of the ministry. While the great

mass of the itinerancy avoided this abuse, they traversed the land, wielding, in their homely, earnest speech and popular illustrations, a power over the common mind, compared with which the customary and more refined prelections of the pulpits of the day were only as the music of the piper compared with the wind abroad in its strength —the "mighty rushing wind."

One of their characteristics, seemingly at first view a fault, but really a great excellence, ought to be more particularly noticed; we mean the almost general habit of giving *experimental illustrations* from their own personal religious history. The egotism which would seem to accompany this course under more stately circumstances, could hardly suggest itself to them or their hearers in the simplicity of their primitive assemblies—held often in barns, kitchens, school-houses, or under the trees of the forest. Studying the truth in their Bibles, these laborious men found its appropriate comments written by the Holy Spirit, as in lines of fire, upon their own souls; and when these comments were read aloud, with tears and sobbing adoration, the effect was resistless. How often, when the rest of the discourse has apparently failed of impression, have we seen the multitudes melt with emotion when these experimental attestations have been adduced! Such references to their own history, could not fail to kindle their religious feelings, and to spread an intense sympathetic emotion through their assemblies.

As to the oratorical style of the early Methodist preachers, much might be said, though we doubt not the phrase is looked upon at this moment, by some of our readers, with quite equivocal thoughts. None, however, share such thoughts who lived in their day and heard them often; we doubt, indeed, whether any such one now reads these lines who is not ready to affirm, that, whatever literary improvement may have since been made by our ministry, in genuine oratory it cannot now pretend to rival its earlier periods. We speak of the average ministry—there are exceptional cases of pre-eminence now, and there were then; but we doubt much whether the mass of the ministry now equals in genuine pulpit eloquence our preachers of thirty or forty years ago.

There was an unusual proportion of strong, stout-bodied men among them; their itinerant habits gave them robust frames, and trumpet-like voices; and their popular mode of addressing the masses, gave them the right command of their vocal powers, the right modulation and the right gesticulation. What preachers now extant among us surpass, in personal dignity and vocal power, Jesse Lee, Bostwick, Ruter, Beauchamp, Roszel, Merwin, Brodhead? Not only the dignified mien, but the sonorous and eloquent

tones of these men are remembered throughout the Church. The last of them, especially, was a noble specimen of manhood and oratory; he often preached on the final judgment, and usually with a dignity of bearing and a sublimity of voice which comported even with that lofty theme. Those who heard him could hardly have been more awe-smitten if they had seen the heavens fleeing away at the approach of the Judge; and often scores fell to the earth, and lay as dead men, while "the trumpet waxed louder and louder."

The naturalness, the colloquial facility of which we have spoken, were adapted to true oratory. Introducing their discourses thus, our old preachers usually rose with the subject to higher strains, until the sublimest declamation was often reached, and the awe-struck people wept or groaned aloud. There were doubtless faults about them, excesses of good qualities; but these defects were but exceptional, and were always preferable to the opposite ones.

The traits already enumerated tended to produce another characteristic, namely, *direct results*. Our fathers expected to see men awakened and converted under their sermons, and the expectation led to an adaptation of their discourses to this end. A sermon that had not some visible effect was hardly satisfactory, whatever might be the hope of its future results. It was usual with them to end the discourse with a home-directed and overwhelming application, and often to follow it immediately with exercises of prayer, that they might gather up the shaken fruit on the spot. Hence revivals flamed along their extended circuits. They were *workmen*, and workmen that needed not to be ashamed.

This aim at direct results was the secret of one half the success of Methodism—it is the explanation of most of our history. Men actuated and thrilled by such a purpose—how could they be otherwise than eloquent and demonstrative? It would make ordinary talents extraordinary, and convert weakness itself into strength.

Now take a corps of robust men, possessed of good strong sense, the vigorous vernacular of the people, staunch sonorous voices, and sanctified hearts, and inspirit them with the purpose and expectation of *immediate results* from their labours, and you will have a specimen of the old Methodist ministry. How, we again ask, could such men be otherwise than eloquent and genuinely great? As a man thinketh, says Solomon, so is he; much more may it be said, as a man purposeth, so is he. Of the truly great men of the world we suppose it can be proved, that more owed their success to energetic purpose than to great faculties. One thing, at least, seems certain, namely, that good ordinary faculties being given, and a determined purpose added, success is certain, except where some adven-

titious obstacle, beyond all human control, intervenes. The will is a presiding, a pervading faculty. The other powers are individually independent, to a great extent. A man may have a strong imagination, and be an intellectual coxcomb; or a strong memory, and be a blockhead; or a cautious judgment, and be a granite post, at once as insusceptible and as immovable: but an energetic will seems related to all the other faculties, and energizes them all. There are exceptions, to be sure: the ass may sometimes be determined, but the hero is always so.

Bring a man, in we care not what position, whether a mechanic at his bench or a captain at the head of hosts, to concentrate his endeavours on one absorbing purpose, and you add to all his resources for that purpose an energy, which, if history is not wholly a lie, is more important than they all; and which, in some cases, when the destinies of states have impended, and all other resources have been confounded, has seemed like God's own fiat, to evoke a universe of means out of nothing. He *must* be the great man who manfully and persistently keeps his soul up to a great purpose. If even uncontrollable circumstances interdict to him great achievements, still his soul will be great within him.

Our fathers, like the apostles, had the sublimest aim possible to man—the eternal redemption of human souls. They made this an *immediate* work, and directed every energy to it. A sermon with them was not an entertaining exposition, to be heard by a self-complacent audience through a leisure hour, nor an expert polemical dissection, nor a didactic example of clerical scholarship: others could so preach, for they had qualified themselves for it; but the untutored, earnest-hearted Methodist ministry would have converted itself into a herd of ecclesiastical apes, by attempting to assume such a character. Preaching, on the contrary, was with them "sounding the alarm" through the land. They were as men standing on the heights of the shore, and crying out and pointing out to wrecked mariners the way to the land, amidst the tumults of the storm. What, under such circumstances, could they do with rhetorical expletives, with circumlocutory descriptions, or finical gesticulations? They would point immediately and energetically to the place of safety—they must speak in the directest and most urgent terms.

Now, though there is some qualification to be given to this description, though there were occasionally circumstances in which a different style of discourse was adopted and was suitable, yet we contend that this was the usual character of the old Methodist preaching, and also that it is the legitimate style of the ambassador

of God—that it is not only what the moral wants of the world demand, but that, more than any other mode of preaching, it naturally tends to true eloquence—not only the eloquence of earnest thought and feeling, but to that simple, direct, urgent style which always accompanies the highest order of oratory, and to that natural but energetic manner which secures the right modulation, both of voice and gesture.

The subject suggests a practical remark which we cannot forbear uttering. This energetic *directness of aim* furnishes a rule of success almost infallible, and one that is *practicable to all men.* No ambassador of Christ should be content to be an ordinary man. He professes to believe himself armed with a preternatural authority, and supplied with preternatural endowments. These, if nothing else, should give him an extraordinary character, based upon an extraordinary, a pure and sublime self-consciousness of his official position. Yet how often do we find in the sacred office men who pass through year after year of sheer ineffectiveness, uniform only in their lack of positive traits, or positive results. This should *never* be the case. We care not what want of marked ability, or what inopportune circumstances there may be, a man of piety and of but ordinary faculties, should, in such an extraordinary function, be an extraordinary man; and he needs but one additional quality, and that, as we have said, a universally practicable one, to make him so—he needs but this resolute directness of purpose. Let the unsuccessful young man, that now, perchance, sits in his study reading these lines, and desponding, it may be, over the failure of his course, the declension of his congregation, the absence of conversions, the dispirited temper of his official supporters—let him, upon his knees, vow that he will now, by the help of God, begin his work anew, with an energetic aim at appreciable and immediate results; and what, if he persists in his resolution, will follow? Why, immediately this new purpose will change his own mood quite visibly—he will become inspirited,—and soon all around him will catch the salutary contagion of his example. His subjects will now be chosen with more reference to their direct impression; his illustrations, his whole train of thought, his very words, will take somewhat of a new character, from the energetic purpose which sways him—a purpose which he recognised always, to be sure, but which has now become ignited and luminous in his soul. Thus, resolutely reaching beyond all factitious or secondary appliances, and bearing down with all his might on the one design before him, he will assuredly become a mightier man. If he is so naturally destitute of talent, as not, even under such an impulse, to be able to develop any new or higher ability than before, yet

will his small talents, more earnestly used, become more interesting to his hearers. They will feel the power of his heart, if not of his head. An earnest character in a good cause can never fail to command the sympathy of the great popular heart. Put such a man anywhere, and he will carry with him the popular respect, if not the popular applause,—nay, he will, sooner or later, compel along with him, to no small extent, the popular co-operation. Can we not recall facts in proof of these remarks? How often have we known preachers who, with very ordinary abilities, were, nevertheless, always received well, and who have sometimes been in general demand? And why? The only answer is, they were earnest, hard-working men, good visitors among the people, assiduous in the Sunday-school interest, energetic in social meetings, sympathetic with the sick and poor—men, in a word, who are intent on their one work—the rescue of souls.

Whatever then may be your talent, rouse yourself, O man of God, to a renewed and soul-stirring consciousness of your high calling! If you have brilliant endowments, remember that their direct appropriation to the single ultimate purpose of your office will only exalt and improve them. If your gifts are small, remember your graces and energy need not be so. Open your Bible and select subjects which will lead men directly to God. Go into the pulpit expecting, intensely praying that souls may be rescued under the discourse of the hour; go into the prayer-meeting urging the people unto the cross; go forth into the streets, not to idle away time with colloquial common-places, or twaddling jokes, but, like Paul, to "warn" the people "from house to house with tears." Act thus, and heaven and earth shall pass away rather than the word of God fail in your hands, or you be an ineffective man.

But is there no considerable qualification to be admitted here? Is it the case, that the Christian teacher does not need the more indirect and collateral modes of labour as well as this energetic course? The fallacy of the question consists in the tacit assumption that the earnest, direct aim we contend for, cannot apply to such collateral modes; and what is most deplorable is, that this assumption is generally practical, as well as tacit. How common is it that doctrinal or ethical preachers assume a distinctive character as such, sacrificing to their elaborateness or their apathy the force that awakens souls and quickens the Church! We must indeed preach doctrines, and morals, and the generalities of religion, and we may do this, too, with all intellectual and literary appliances; but a direct and even intense aim at what we have called the "single ultimate purpose" of our office, may modify and thrill with power all such

topics and appliances. This is what we contend for; and we contend that the characteristic effectiveness of our early preaching consisted in this; and that the great reason of the comparative ineffectiveness of the pulpit, throughout the world, arises from the want of it.*

Another characteristic quite peculiar to the early Methodist preaching, in this country at least, and an almost necessary counterpart of the excellencies we have described, was its *extemporaneous delivery.* We are inclined to speak with some emphasis, and yet with care, on this subject. The tendency to a contrary mode of preaching, which is incipiently developing itself among us, we deem not so much a fatal, practical heresy as an unwise policy. Some very excellent and influential brethren encourage it by their example, at least; we would not give them provocation by unnecessary severity. We propose to offer a few reflections on the subject, which may commend themselves to their candid consideration.

Extemporaneous preaching was, until lately, the universal usage of our ministry. It was more than this,—it was, as we have intimated, a *necessary* characteristic of the kind of preaching we have attributed to them. We cannot, indeed, *conceive* of the preaching we have described as other than extemporaneous. Reading never could be preaching, in this sense, any more than the letters of the one word spell the other. How those heroic men could have gone thundering through the land, prostrating multitudes to the earth, or melting them to tears, by the reading of manuscripts, is a problem which certainly no experiment ever solved, and no logic can show. It is, in fact, quite clear, *a priori*, that they would have been an entirely different class of men, and Methodism a quite different affair, if they had been readers instead of what they pre-eminently were—preachers.

Not only is extemporaneous preaching adapted to the *themes*, the *style*, and the *immediate* effect which we have attributed to our primitive preaching, but we contend that it is consistent with the best style of public discourse—with just thought, accurate instruction, and a sufficiently accurate verbal style. These latter excellencies, of course, depend largely upon previous training, and the preparation of the discourse; but it must be remembered also, that this is the case in regard to written sermons,—a speaker, without previous education and immediate study of the discourse in hand, would hardly succeed better in reciting it, than in delivering it extempore.

* The late lamented President Olin, was a notable example of such a union of effective directness with all the traits and topics of an educated preacher. He could preach on no subject without immediate and profound effect; and had his health permitted, he would have stood forth before the American public a national model of pulpit effectiveness.

He that would be a successful extemporizer should have a well-stored mind, and should thoroughly meditate his subjects—so thoroughly, indeed, that the whole perspective of the main ideas of his discourse, from the exordium to the peroration, shall be clearly open before his mental vision when he rises in the pulpit. This is requisite, for two reasons: first, that he may have something to say; and secondly, that he may have the confidence which will enable him to say it with self-possession and force. Self-possession, based upon a sufficient preparation, is the whole secret of success in extemporaneous speaking. A speaker thus sustained can hardly fail to have, spontaneously, the right language and due emotion; he has incomparably more facilities for them than the manuscript preacher. We say *right* language; and that is right which is appropriate to the occasion. It may not be as precise as the pen would afford,—but ought it always to be so? Would it be desirable, that the free, irregular but idiomatic facility of ordinary conversation should be superseded at our hearths by the prim precision and literary nicety of book-makers? There is a style for books, a style for conversation, and a style for the rostra or the pulpit. He who rises in the latter, with his mind fraught with the ideas of his subject, and his heart inspired with its spirit, will, in most cases, spontaneously utter himself aright. If he is occasionally diffuse or repetitious, yet it may be legitimate to the occasion or the subject that he should be so. If his style may not *read* as well as it was heard, yet even this may be because of its peculiar adaptation to be heard rather than read.

We affirm further, that both the design and history of preaching are in favour of extempore delivery. The earnestness and directness for which we have contended may consist, as we have shown, with all varieties of talents and topics, but it is hardly compatible with pulpit *reading*. Very rarely indeed does a powerful reader, like Chalmers, appear in the pulpit. We know not another case like his in the history of the Christian ministry. Chalmers tried the experiment of extemporizing in his country parish, but prematurely abandoned it; yet when in his full splendour at Glasgow, his biographer says, that his occasional extempore discourses, in the private houses of his poor parishioners, teemed with more glorious eloquence than ever dazzled the crowded congregation of the Tron kirk.

The two greatest preachers of modern times, Whitefield and Robert Hall, were extemporizers—their written sermons were composed after delivery. We have said that the Wesleyan preachers of England are, as a body, the best sermonizers, and the most successful speakers, in the United Kingdom; and they are the only extempo-

rizers in it, except the Roman Catholics. Such a thing as a manuscript sermon is never seen in the pulpits of the continent, except when American or English clergymen happen to ascend them. If the European clergy, Catholic or Protestant, write their discourses, they have, nevertheless, the good sense to deliver them *memoriter*, and thereby save them from the dulness of reading. In like manner did the old and unrivalled pulpit orators of France, Massillon, Bossuet, Bourdaloue, Fletcher, Fenelon, eschew the manuscript. The latter, in his "Dialogues on Eloquence," contends for extempore speaking; he argues that even the classic orators were mostly extemporizers.*

The Anglo-Saxon pulpit, against all the predilections of that race, is, in fine, the only place where reading is tolerated, as a mode of popular address. The member of parliament, or of congress, who should attempt to read his speech, would almost inevitably break down. The advocate at the bar, contending for the life of his client, would be considered recreant to all the urgency of the occasion were he to stand up before the jury to read his plea. The popular orator who should attempt to *read* the masses into enthusiasm, on some high occasion of national exigency, would be dubbed a jackass. Why can manly and powerful eloquence be successful everywhere else but in the pulpit? The pulpit is its most legitimate arena. The themes and aims of the pulpit are all adapted to it. The religious congregation is the true popular assembly, and there, if anywhere, ought eloquence to appear in all its liberties and powers.

So almost intuitive is our perception of the inappropriateness of manuscript preaching to the popular religious assembly, that we cannot conceive of Christ *reading* his discourses to the multitudes of Judea, or St. Paul preaching on Mars Hill from a scroll. We *know* this could not have been, not from any historical testimony, but from the manifest absurdity of the supposition. For the same reason we cannot associate it with the old powerful Methodist preaching, nor, indeed, with any really popular and demonstrative preaching.

We cannot conclude these remarks without deprecating most earnestly any considerable deviation from this excellent custom of our fathers. Be assured, that he who can preach at all, can preach extemporaneously, if he will but persevere in the experiment. The young man of good education, who, from his academic habits or natural diffidence, or any other cause, is now addicting himself to pul-

* There is much to be said on both sides of this question. The most probable supposition is, that the classic orators wrote their discourses, memorizing their substance, but delivering them without much regard to the written language. See Fenelon.

pit reading, is putting his whole professional life under a servile restraint, which will not only consume unnecessarily large amounts of his time, but trammel the development of all his pulpit powers. Let him study thoroughly his subjects; but let him devote to the storing of his mind the time now spent in mere verbal preparation for the desk; let him resolutely stumble along through whatever embarrassments till he acquires the confidence which habit will surely produce; let him understand well that what he wants for the pulpit is thought and sentiment, and that these secured, direct unpretending utterance, right home to the souls of the people, is the only true style for him—the noblest eloquence. If, in the experiment, he sometimes falls below the tame mediocrity of his former manuscript efforts, yet will he oftener rise transcendently above it, in the exulting freedom of an inspired and untrammelled mind.

One fact let him be assured of, namely, that whatever uniform and respectable character his manuscript preaching may have, the *maximum* power of preaching can never be attained by the sermon reader. He sacrifices all hope of this; and no young man should ever make this sacrifice. With God's commission upon him, with the Holy Spirit within him, with all the assistance of books and nature about him, with the solemnities of eternity before him, let him throw himself with all directness and energy into his work, speaking to the people in their own strong and simple speech, seeking not to ape the rhetorician, but to save souls, "pulling them out of the fire:" he will then speak from his heart with infinitely more eloquence than he could utter from his manuscript.

We contend then for the old Methodist school of preaching—not because it is *old*—traditional authority weighs little with us; but traditional success does weigh with us; and our whole denominational history is a demonstration of the utility of extempore preaching.

Such were some of the characteristic traits of the preaching which has made Methodism what it is in this land. We have not referred to the peculiar piety, the special anointing, which some of us claim for our early ministry; this, if not taken for granted, might be deemed invidious. With this, however, the traits enumerated were, in our estimation, their marked distinctions—the right *themes*, the right *style*, energetic *aim at direct results*, and popular or *extemporaneous* addresses. We have not said how far these characteristics are yet retained by our ministry; this has not, thus far, been relevant to our purpose. We may hereafter give a frank opinion on the subject in an article on what modifications of the primitive school of Methodist preaching may be rendered desirable by the progress of the times.

ART. V.—TENDENCY OF CURRENT EVENTS IN THE MORAL AND MATERIAL WORLD.

DR. CHALMERS, in his work on the Romans, says: "There is a sort of vague, undefinable impression, we think, upon all spirits, of some great evolution of the present system under which we live —some looking towards, as well as longing after, immortality— some mysterious but yet powerful sense within every heart, of the present, as a state of confinement and thraldom; and that yet a day of light, and largeness, and liberty is coming. We cannot imagine of unbelievers, that they have any precise or perhaps confident anticipation on the subject, any more than the world at large had of the advent of our Messiah—though a very general expectation was abroad of the approaching arrival of some great personage upon earth. And, in like manner, there is abroad even now the dim and the distant vision of another advent of a brighter and blander period, that is now obscurely seen or guessed at through the gloom by which humanity is encompassed—a kind of floating anticipation, suggested, perhaps, by the experimental feeling that there is now the straitness of an oppressed and limited condition, and that still we are among the toils, and the difficulties, and the struggles of an embryo state of existence. It is altogether worthy of remark, that in like manner as through the various countries of the world there is a very wide impression of a primeval condition of virtue and blessedness from which we have fallen, so there seems a very wide expectation of the species being at length restored to the same health, and harmony, and loveliness as before. The vision of a golden age at some remote period of antiquity is not unaccompanied with the vision of a yet splendid and general revival of all things. Even apart from revelation there floats before the world's eye the brilliant perspective of this earth being yet covered with a righteous and a regenerated family. This is a topic on which even philosophy has its fascinating dreams; and there are philanthropists in our day who disown Christianity, and yet are urged forward to enterprise by the power and the pleasure of an anticipation so beautiful. They do not think of death; they only think of the moral and political glories of a renovated world, and of these glories as unfading. It is an immortality, after all, that they are picturing. While they look on that gospel which brought life and immortality to light as a fable, still they find that the whole capacity of their spirits is not filled unless they can regale them with the prospect of an immortality of

their own. Nothing short of this will satisfy them; and whether you look at those who speculate on the perfectibility of mankind, or those who think, in economic theories, that they are laying the basis on which might be reared the permanent happiness of nations, you see but the creature spurning at the narrowness of its present condition, and waiting in earnest expectancy for the manifestation of the sons of God."

These words speak for themselves. They are introduced as well for the high authority of the sentiments they contain as for their eloquence and beauty; and as opening an attractive vista to the thoughts and events to which the reader's attention is invited.

Hope, that passion of the human heart, or power of the mind, or both united, so indispensable to our every-day comfort, so needful to make our toils and struggles endurable, is ever urging us to look forward to the future. It either paints for the fascination of the mind's eye, with prismatic hues, the scenes which revelation has opened to our view, or in the wide blank of uncertain futurity it creates lovely scenes of its own. St. Paul asserts, that "we are saved by hope." Whether we shall ever enjoy, as precise realities, the splendid visions it unfolds in perspective, or shall find on a nearer view the gilded spots of the landscape, as we pass along, dimmed of their lustre, the influence of hope on our spirits is yet the same. It bears us patiently, or vigorously, or cheerfully onward, to the discharge of new duties; to the enjoyment of new privileges; to the endurance of new toils; to the encounter of new perils. The present only contents us for the passing moment; the future is made tolerable or pleasant by hope. Or, if the present, by unwelcome vexations, may with difficulty be borne, it is a merciful arrangement of a benevolent Providence, by which the mind turns with confidence to the future to rid it of its ills.

To a mind accustomed to close examination of evidence, and earnest in the pursuit of truth, the comfort derived from the expectations of futurity is in proportion to the reasonable probability on which such expectations rest. If promises of reward or of gratuity are held forth, the encouraging trust of realizing a fulfilment in due time depends on the proof which is obtained of the integrity and power of the source from which they emanate. Fancies, it may be, no less bright to the vision, often play before other minds, neither used to careful investigation nor anxious to ascertain what will be like to take place. There are myriads of men whose talents are buried in the earth; whose walk is not on the highway of honest and sober reflection; who are taking no pains so to improve the present that they may enhance the value of the future; who, nevertheless,

in the indolence of an intellectual sleep, dream golden dreams, which they hope to enjoy as waking realities, after the existing contest with evil shall end. It is true the feeling is a vague one, whether it relate to the anticipation of individual joys, or to the expectation of more general good to the race at large. But Christians—they who have adopted as their guide the word of authenticated revelation—have a better defined field of observation before them. They are not left to the ambiguity of impulsive and extravagant imagination, as the sole monitor of things to come, while threading their way through the straits and windings of this mortal career. A messenger, invested with the authority of a higher and diviner world, has been amongst them. "God manifested in the flesh" has tabernacled on earth, and spoken, "as never man spake." Besides accomplishing by the united agency of divine and human nature, in the joint person of the God-man, the glorious work of atonement, through which God can be just and yet the justifier of all who believe in Jesus, he has given lessons of profound wisdom to direct the movements of humanity through the intricacies of an evil state, and uttered predictions of events yet to come, with which the most splendid achievements of human sagacity, and the happiest condition "mortal ever dreamed of," may not compare. Besides the fresh predictions of future glory which Messiah announced during his earthly sojourn, he confirmed, by his reverent allusions, the divine authority with which Moses and the Jewish prophets wrote; thus making *their* promises his own, and stamping, with the indubitable seal of divinity, those visions of more than poetic beauty and bliss, which Isaiah and his inspired fellows had held up to awaken the hopes of mankind. From the time Jesus said, "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead,"—if there had been any lack of evidence *before* to give a divine sanction to their words, which there had not been,—from that time the pictures which they alleged had been drawn by a divine hand upon the canvass of the world's future history, rely, for their truth and exactness, upon the authority of Jesus himself. And the same divine authority affixes its seal to the predictions which were *afterwards* uttered by the apostles—those holy men, upon whom he breathed, and to whom he said, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost." We are permitted, then, in the spirit of humble and docile disciples, to avail ourselves, for brightening our hopes, of all that prophetic illumination which centres in the Son of God, and radiates through those inspired men, both before and after his advent, who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.

While "the times and the seasons," as well as the *precise* form of the fulfilment of the grand events to which they awaken our atten-

tion, are concealed from our view, a conspicuous outline of the general character of these events is yet given. It may be for the purpose of heightening the value of those circumstances with which the divine goodness designs to surround our ransomed race in the fulness of time, that this partial obscurity is kept up. If all the particulars of this map of approaching blessedness were minutely traced out, it would be invested with such an air of familiarity as would strip us of that wonder, and curiosity, and longing desire for the unenjoyed good, which yields us now so many a pleasant emotion, and which, giving place to the freshness of novelty, will add so much to the rapture of enjoyment. "It doth not yet appear *what* we shall be; but we know that when He shall appear, we shall be *like him*, for we shall see him as he is." Amid the ambiguity of our anticipations, enough of certainty is afforded us to animate our hopes, and make us willing to substitute the renovated condition which is promised for the mixed state of good and evil which is endured. But on this side of the consummation of the promises of Christianity, *before* the unchangeable and immortal state shall be entered upon, there are predictions of a vast and glorious change in the aspect of society. A great enlargement of knowledge and piety is to take place on the earth. The time is coming when neighbour shall not say to neighbour, Knowest thou the Lord? but all shall know him, from the least unto the greatest. Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased. Righteousness shall cover the earth, as the waters cover the place of the great deep. Abundant prosperity shall attend the labours of the husbandman; and with gladness and gratitude shall men eat the fruits of the earth. The wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad; and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose. They shall rejoice with joy and singing; the glory of Lebanon shall be given to it—the excellency of Carmel and Sharon. The obscure and long-neglected regions of the globe shall be sought out, and exchange the grossness of barbarity for the refinement of civilization. The humane precepts of Christian kindness and forbearance shall enlighten the dark places of the earth which have been the habitations of cruelty. And instead of lust, and wars, and rumours of wars, love and peace shall prevail among individuals and nations; and they shall learn war no more.

Let us now look abroad at what is doing in the world. Let us see whether "the signs of the times" are favourable to the approach of that meliorated state of human history which we have been led to anticipate,—whether the tendency of current events in the moral and material world really opens to our view the prospect of the improved and elevated condition of mankind, indicated, as well by the

vague impressions and desultory fancies of the thoughtless and unconcerned, as by the more definite hopes of the serious and considerate.

That survey of the condition and prospects of human society is too limited which looks only at existing evils, and at the possibility of future relief. The whole ground of a probability of improvement cannot be taken into the estimate without comprehending a far wider field. In order to ascertain with what likelihood the expectation of removing present ills may be entertained, we must glance at the numerous ills of a by-gone age, and the vigour and success with which they have been encountered and overcome. The observing eye must fix itself upon the struggles and victories of successive generations in the past, in order to collect the data for a nice calculation of the future. If, indeed, the first half of the present century, which has just expired, has been crowded with startling facts, no less important than unexpected, so as almost to bewilder the imagination of living observers; we and our successors may draw a fair inference therefrom, that surprising, nay, overwhelming disclosures, changing in equal proportion the drift of human thoughts and habits, and quickening the speed of human operations, must not be regarded as impossible. Meantime such exhibitions of ingenuity as have already happened, and as are likely, in a ratio of geometrical progression, yet to happen, may be regarded rather as developing the power of man to carry forward the purposes of his being and destination, than as affecting the fundamental principles of his nature, or the desires of his heart. So that no new discoveries of the hitherto latent springs of physical force will, in any degree, lessen the wish and aptitude of the human species for increasing moral melioration and greater material comfort.

The world (including that part of mankind who have and profess neither love to Christ nor fear of God) and the Church (including all the other part) occupy peculiar relative positions, either to the other. While the two may be regarded as antagonist forces—as arrayed on opposite sides of the greatest practical question in morals, whether it is right and expedient to regard the Divine will as the highest rule of life or not—neither is ever insensible of a powerful influence which is wielded by the other. Few things are ever undertaken by the one, or by any of its individual members, without a considerable solicitude to know in what estimation these things are held by the other. Nor does this anxiety imply a renunciation of integrity of principle—an abandonment of allegiance to authority already acknowledged and submitted to, for allegiance to a hostile authority. It implies merely that outside of the by-laws and tech-

nical regulations by which either, for itself, holds itself to be bound; there are many *things lovely and of good report* which may not, without harm, be overlooked; and that none are so apt to detect a deficiency of accomplishment in these things as those whose attitude of hostility naturally hinders lenity and forbearance. The first of these parties aims solely at the well-being or enjoyment of the present life; the other connects the transient enjoyment of the present life with the ever-during enjoyment of a future, and is careful to make no sacrifices to the demands of passion here, which might mar the prospect of greater good hereafter.

Our Saviour has not left his disciples without the sanction of his divine wisdom, in looking to the successful achievements of the children of the world in their own sphere of operations, as a stimulus to greater diligence and activity. And we should lose much of the force of this lesson if we failed to calculate the impulse which mere worldly enterprise has given, and which it is destined yet to give, to the kindly aggressive movements of the Church, in performing its mission of mercy. In this way may the spirit of rivalry, so natural to the heart of man, so difficult, perhaps impossible, to be wholly eradicated from it, find an ample and glorious field for the exercise of its largest powers. To a no less important use are the labours of *the world* to be turned by the vigilance of *the Church*, in the grand project of abating the evils, both moral and physical, which lie in its path. It so happens, that many of the enterprises which are undertaken for the purpose of abetting the convenience and the comfort of mankind, are not so exclusively confined to the acknowledged domains of either of these great parties, as to deprive the other of a share both of the labour and the benefit. And while it must be admitted that the vicious spirit of the former, invariably tends to corrupt whatever it touches or has to do with, it must also be conceded, that the pure influence of the latter exerts a restorative power upon every person and society in the range of its operations. Which of the two counteracting forces is destined ultimately to predominate over the affections and habits of the race, and conquer the globe as a field of undisputed occupation, is the very theme of our present inquiry. To those of us whose hopes are strong in the gracious promises of revelation, the risks of the remaining conflict present no appalling aspect. With the utmost composure can we survey the positions and outposts of the embattled legions, and form our conclusions as to the issue of the struggle; and this, too, with so much the more freedom from anxiety, as designs of good to the vanquished are so deeply lodged in the bosom of the Church.

Among the things of which the people of the world take an im-

portant part, and which are made auxiliary to the furtherance of the gospel, *commerce* and its great ally, *facility of travel*, are to be taken largely into the account. In respect to both of these, the improvements of the present century have been immense. Since its commencement the circle of commercial reciprocity has been vastly enlarged, and the rate of locomotion has been almost miraculously increased. The primitive branch of the Anglo-Saxon family, so long the commercial mistress of the world, has kept its place in advance of old, and new, and zealous competition. Our own branch of the same family, partaking the spirit and activity of the original stock, though still somewhat in the rear of British enterprise, bids fair to lead the way in this busy rivalry. Most of the inferior commercial States, allured by our splendid success, are bestirring themselves with redoubled diligence. Russia, the Dutch, France, Turkey, and China, are expanding the markets of the world by new and more energetic movements. And the eyes of the curious and the enterprising are intent upon the discovery of the secrets of science and wealth hidden in distant regions long unexplored. The unworked and undug treasures of Africa and Australia are already beginning to swell the list of the great prospective assessment which is to be levied for the comfort and the luxury of the four quarters of the globe. New and ingenious machinery is, time after time, improving the quality and value of old fabrics, and multiplying, to an almost incredible degree, the elements of trade. And, such is the cupidity of man, the demands for other means of indulging his desires and supplying his wants increase in exact proportion to the frequency of their gratification. The necessities of commerce, as well as the desires of mankind to widen their sphere of observation and intercourse, are constantly suggesting new and swifter methods of locomotion. It is barely requisite to refer to this great fact, so distinguishing to the character of the present generation, in order to bring into view all its magnitude and importance. Such have already been the mighty results of mechanical genius applying itself to this branch of labour, that journeys of thousands of miles are now performed in less time than a century ago would have been taken to travel as many hundreds. And the electric speed with which news is transmitted between any given points, however distant, which are connected merely by a metal string, is awaking the inquiry in the active minds of the day, whether masses of matter may not be propelled with a somewhat similar rapidity; whether a costly freight, with its attendant supercargo, may not be despatched to the market, where it is already sold, at nearly, if not quite the same rate at which an etherial agent went to make the

bargain. In very deed, the men who are favoured with a birth in this *golden* age are witnesses to the fulfilment of Shakspeare's prophetic words,

> "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
> Than are dreamt of in *your* philosophy."

How long the secret of air-navigation—a secret in possession of millions of the feathered tribe during thousands of years—shall keep itself hid from the scrutiny of an age which has invaded the lightning's sanctuary, and led captive the *primum mobile* of material nature, the future will unfold. The power of elevating and sustaining aloft, for considerable periods of time, vessels of imposing dimensions has been long known and practised. The facility of steering and moving these vessels at the joint will of a helmsman and engineer, awaits only the unlocking of a few more modes of motive power. The power already is proven to exist. To get it within the grasp of human ingenuity is the only part of the problem remaining to be solved, before fleets laden with cargoes and men shall plunge into the hazardous element above us and outstrip the tardy motions of steam, which are now frisking so merrily across the briny deep, as far as the flight of "the falcon, towering in his pride of place," exceeds the trot of the elephant or the gallop of the steed. We do not utter this as prophecy; but such further practical demonstration of the forces lodged in the arcana of tangible nature around us will not be a whit more astounding to us or our successors, than the present operations of steam and electricity would have been to our progenitors of the eighteenth century. Scores of comforts and conveniences have ever lain unenjoyed within the reach of mankind. Difficulties, it is true, have generally hedged them about; but these difficulties have yielded their long-forbidden treasures to the ardent desire and determined will and earnest efforts of man awakened to a knowledge of his power, and athirst for nobler enjoyment.

Achievements in physics, as well as in morals, seem to lie within certain spheres prescribed by the creative hand. Faith, or confidence of the possibility of success, is a necessary preliminary and adjunct to successful labour in either. It is very true, indeed, that impracticable schemes in both, without any other foundation than the visions of overheated imagination, have been attempted and have failed. And the past would cease to afford any index to the future, if in the time to come similar experiments should never be made. It would, however, be bad philosophy and economy too, to suffer these "baseless fabrics of a vision" to deter sober minds from those grand exploits which are likely to illustrate yet further the power of genius

and of faith. Without controversy we must expect, as a matter of entire probability, that the goodly price which recent success has paid to the confident and active labours of ingenious mechanism, will offer a boon which cannot fail to stimulate to the highest degree of intensity the intelligent and resolute workers of the present and a coming age. And with the most reverent use of the words of Holy Writ, are we warranted, by what has already occurred, in believing that "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things" which are yet to be discovered and enjoyed in the possibilities of surrounding nature.

Not to anticipate too eagerly the competition of the balloon with the eagle in graceful and rapid flight through the azure firmament, let us admit into our meditations the projects of merchants, statesmen, and topographers, for the enlargement of human happiness—projects which are based upon the certain ground of successful experiment—projects which are only the repeated continuous application of mechanical organization already in use.

It is now in contemplation by many of the leading spirits of this republic to traverse the wide plains between the Mississippi and the Pacific by a highway and railroad. Nothing stands in the way of reducing this splendid idea to reality but a national resolve *to do it*, or to confer a charter of permission, with a slip of vacant land, upon an enterprising citizen. Ocean steamers are paddling regularly every week between Europe and our eastern shores. Similar vehicles of rapid transmission are connecting the Sandwich Isles with our western shores. Commerce is already calling for an extension of this route from the Sandwich Islands to China. It is hardly probable that twelve months twice told will pass before these packets will be plying between the bay of Canton and the bay of Francisco. A railway or ship-canal across the isthmus of Suez—a project already in earnest contemplation in Europe—is all that will be wanting to complete a belt of steam travel, not very far from being a direct line around the globe. A *perfectly* direct line of highway, crossing the continent of Asia from east to west, will be regarded as a commercial desideratum not long to be postponed.

Happy for the spiritual prospects of our species it is, that all these gigantic conveniences of intercommunication between tribes and nations, created for the purpose of exchanging material commodities, and thus ministering to the gratification of luxury, or to the relief of pressing want—that all these gigantic conveniences of intercommunication should bring the Bible, and the Sabbath, and the preaching of the gospel, into the dark regions of heathenism and idolatry—that the flash of the engine's fires, and the roar of its impetuous

speed shall bear along with them the heavenly light of truth, and the loud and distinct call, "Come, and be ye saved, all ye ends of the earth." Faith cometh by *hearing*, and hearing by *the word* of God. To come in contact with the heralds and ambassadors who are commissioned to utter it, is needful, in order to the production of its appropriate fruits. For centuries insuperable obstacles have interposed between those who have possessed the advantage of the oracles of God and those who have been perishing for lack of knowledge. The concealed and cruel devices of the prince of this world have long hedged in the habitations of his too willing subjects with barriers which have too effectually obstructed all intercourse with others favoured with more light and liberty. It is lamentable, indeed, that so much of the earth's surface should, through such a series of ages, have been subjugated and oppressed by this gloomy despotism. But the time for a general revolt—for an universal uprising against that dark and cruel sceptre—would seem to be not far off; avenues of communication and approach are steadily and rapidly opening into the heart of heathen territory, through which are to issue hosts of Christian warriors, strong in the strength of their invincible Captain, and fraught with every implement to aid the oppressed millions to throw off their yoke, and assert the rights and privileges of redeemed men.

In the work of diffusing evangelical knowledge and its regenerating influence throughout the wide regions of idolatry, in different quarters of the world, it would be contradicting well-established facts to deny that great conquests have yet to be achieved. With many encouraging exceptions skirting the coast of Africa, vast portions of its sun-burnt territory are still blackened by a far more desolating barbarism. And over the outstretching plains of Asia—the *officina virorum* of the human race—the oriental garden, perfumed with fragrant spices—the site at once of man's earliest being and of his earliest sin, the spirit of disaffection to the sovereignty of almighty grace still wields a potent sceptre. But there, too, many a strong post has been carried by the arms of the cross, and over many of its most fertile fields the Christian banner spreads its ample folds.

Counting the number of years that Christianity has been "afield" against its numerous and resolute foes, and comparing the conquests of territory gained with those which are yet to be gained ere every antagonist "principality and power" shall be subdued to the truth, it would be both a dull and unscientific calculation to suppose that a *proportionate length of time* must still elapse, before all the people, and the nations, and the kingdoms of the earth shall be subjected to the dominion of the Saviour. To dispel the illusion of so common

but erroneous an estimate, we must take into the account, as overbalancing the opposite probabilities, the immense experience which the tedious toils and desperate struggles on the enemy's ground have added to the strength of our ranks. It must also be borne in mind, that in the invasion of an enemy's territory every success inspirits the aggressor, and proportionately disheartens the foe; and that when a firm foothold has been obtained, furnishing a radiating centre for convenient hostile excursions; and much more, when such radiating centres are so multiplied as to alarm the apprehension and distract the attention of the force which at first concentrated its efforts and vaunted in the confidence of an easy triumph, the work of finishing the aggressive onset, or of completing the victory, is comparatively light. This is precisely the relative situation of Christianity in view of the hostile moral forces of the world which remain to be subdued.

Christianity has fought its way from the smallest and most discouraging outset to large conquests and very commanding positions. It numbers among its votaries the mightiest and most civilized nations of the earth. The people who, at this day, are most renowned for arts and arms, whose explorations in science and enterprises in commerce have surpassed the energies and the skill of every competitor, unfold to the admiring gaze of millions of spectators as the most auspicious insignia of their escutcheon, the LION and the CROSS; at the same time, that they are the most busy, and the most successful in conveying to distant realms the precious realities of which those insignia are the symbols. And while England, the presiding genius of the *eastern* hemisphere, whose dominions, domestic and colonial, extend so far that the sun never sets upon them, and whose political influence is as dominant as its commercial, is alike active in diffusing Christian principles at home and abroad, America, the junior branch of the same great family, holding the same position of relative importance in the *western* hemisphere, is active too, according to the ratio of its advancement in the qualities which adorn and the virtues which strengthen the civilized state: at the same time, the feebler and less enterprising, but yet the mighty and the enterprising secondary powers of Europe, except a single state, and all the states on our side of the Atlantic, except the vagrant aboriginal tribes, whose very being is held by a precarious tenure, boast of their right to the Christian name. Such is the ascendency of Christian nations at this very day, that their united voice on any question affecting the political welfare of the world would hush into silence every pagan murmur of dissent. With this reckoning on the balance sheet of the probable future, the hopes which revelation inspires may well be cheerful.

There are two prominent historical events pertaining to our age and country, very different, indeed, in the sensations which they have excited, yet bearing with great weight upon the destinies of the two continents, Asia and Africa, which supply the largest fields for the further extension of civilization and Christianity. The first of these events is the perplexed and perplexing question of negro slavery existing in the southern part of the United States. The second is, the hitherto unheard-of rapidity with which a long hidden and lately developed source of wealth has brought into existence a new and important State on our Pacific coast, giving, at the same time, by its vicinity, a fresh impulse to the energies of the Oregon settlements, which are probably destined to take rank in future political and commercial usefulness with California itself. As already intimated, this occupation of the extreme western limits of our extended territory, which is now busily arranging a swift transit across the entire breadth of the continent, is pointing to a frequent and steady communication between the United States and China—a great Christian and a great pagan nation—a communication which is indispensable to that interchange of commodities which the increasing wants of mankind, in an era of progressive civilization, imperiously demand.

Difficult as is the solution of the problem which the first of these prominent events holds forth, yet we think the principle of its solution is not wholly obscured from our view when looked at through the medium of those declarations and promises of the mighty Arbiter of nations which He has vouchsafed to open to us in the inspired record of his will. We are there informed that it is in just such perplexities as this, whether in individual or national history,—when the boasted wisdom of man is at a stand; when the web of his ingenuity is hopelessly tangled; when, whether his pride will acknowledge it or not, it is apparent to all observers, that he knows not what to do,—it is just then that the Father of mercies stoops to aid his impotence and clear away the obstructions from his path.

At a time when the bosom of the nation is still heaving with emotion from the excitement of an intense strife between conflicting parties on a kindred topic, or rather on a certain aspect of this very topic, instead of any *proposition* which might tend to renew the strife and keep up the excitement, it may not be amiss to take a hasty glance at a few of the leading facts which the topic includes, and to see whether some hopeful inference may not fall within the range of vision likely to augment our confidence in His overruling wisdom, and goodness, and power, who "makes the wrath of man to praise him, and restrains the remainder of it."

There are now under the civil and religious influence of this

Christian nation between two and three millions of the descendants of African parents. Without stopping to take into view the mixed feelings of avarice and recklessness of human suffering which had to do with the forcible abduction of the ancestors of these millions from kindred, and home, and country, with all the pleasant associations which the most degrading barbarism cannot destroy, and with their subjection to severe and unaccustomed labour in a foreign land, under the rigid discipline of the planters on our Atlantic coast, it is not to be denied that, to the extent of these two or three millions, there are so many of the sons and daughters of Africa rescued from the hideous barbarity and shameless idolatry of their fatherland. It is not to be denied, that this great multitude of men, and women, and children, (inferior as is their social condition to the European descendants around them,) have, to quite a respectable extent, been polished by contact and intercourse with superior manners and enlightened piety. It is not to be denied that the Americanized African finds the climate and the soil of his ancestral home an abode congenial to his nature and his wants,—that under the warmer suns of the country of Ham, where the white man faints and dies, the American negro lives and thrives. It is matter of history, that under the patronage of a benevolent association in America a promising republic of colonized negroes has within a few years sprung up on the shores of Africa—that with more than the wonted success which has accompanied the growth of states having a colonial origin, the new Americo-African empire is increasing in importance, in all the modes of political prosperity, in agricultural industry and production, in commerce, in piety, in literature, and in the culture of peaceful relations with the neighbouring tribes, and offering to them the benefit of its power to improve and elevate their condition. It is alike beyond dispute, that it has advanced with vastly greater celerity in all these respects than did the first British colonies in America, the forerunners of our great republic, within the same space of time.

With strong hopes and unshaken confidence in the perpetuated union of these States as at once an asylum for the oppressed and a beacon for the guidance of the world, and as yet in the dark as to the methods to which political wisdom will resort to give back to a benighted quarter of the earth its exiled sons, and however patiently the desires of the philanthropist may have to wait amid sectional jealousies and acrimonious struggles ere it witness this "consummation, so devoutly to be wished," we cannot but anticipate its occurrence, as most likely to be suggested to our rulers, as the best arrangement for both the dominant and the subjugated race. We

cannot but look for the deepening conviction, as events glide along, that the crippled energies and depressed prosperity of the sections where the proprietors of the soil rely upon the labours of those whose bondage is an inevitable clog to forethought, and industry, and enterprise, can find no relief so effectual as loosening the bonds and letting the oppressed go free to the home of their fathers and their brethren. Contrary, too, to much narrow-minded prejudice, and to many short-sighted calculations of interest, it is gratifying to believe that this view of probable events is beginning to be entertained by leading American statesmen and patriots; and that the project before congress, of a line of ocean steamers to ply between Liberia and this country, will be an important step toward the accomplishment of this grand design. And to do away, as far as possible, with an unwelcome use of power in compelling the gradual emigration of so many people from our shores, the prospects are daily brightening that the fertile soil of Ethiopia will furnish as many attractions to the oppressed in the United States, as our own rich plains and valleys furnish to the oppressed in continental Europe, and in Great Britain and Ireland. So that, after all, the beneficent wisdom of Him who educes "good from evil," is likely in the issue to pour into a benighted land a stream of civil and religious influence of great power, which a protracted bondage in a distant realm had been preparing for the work. How rejoicing to every humble believer's heart the persuasion, that the centrifugal force of our Southern slavery, no less than the centripetal force of Californian gold, is appropriately working in the system of moral harmonies, and tending to the more rapid and certain triumph of Christianity over the whole earth!

There are many relevant facts of recent date and continuous existence which might well be interwoven in an essay on the tendency of current events in the moral and material world. Among these might be enumerated the Evangelical Alliance—a great convention of Protestant Christians, held in London, in 1846, for the arrangement of a better understanding between the various branches of the Church; and a correlative project in political circles, receiving, we would fain trust, more and more consideration year after year, for the institution of a common centre of arbitration between the different nations, by which a peaceful instead of a military adjustment of all national disputes may be made. These, and a multitude of inferior, though important topics of meditation might be well introduced; and they may yet be the basis of another and similar argument. At present we forbear taxing further the patience of our readers.

ART. VI.—RECENT EDITIONS OF THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOKLES.

[FIRST PAPER.]

1. *Sophoclis Antigona Codicum MSS. omniumque Exemplarium scripturæ discrepantia enotata integra, cum Scholiis vetustis, Virorumque doctorum curis presse subnotatis, emendatior atque explicatior edita a* FR. CAROLO WEX. 2 vols., 8vo. Lipsiæ. 1829, 1831.
2. *Ad Sophoclis Tragœdias Annotationes* GULIELMI DINDORFII. 8vo. Oxonii: e Typographeo Clarendoniano. 1836.
3. *Des Sophokles Antigone, Griechisch und Deutsch, herausgegeben von* AUGUST BOECKH. 8vo. Berlin. 1843.
4. *Sophoclis Tragœdiæ.* Recensuit et explanavit EDUARDUS WUNDERUS. Vol. I., Sect. IV. Continens Antigonam. Editio tertia multis locis emendata. Gothæ et Erfordiæ. 1846.
5. *Sophoclis Tragœdiæ superstites ex recensione* G. DINDORFII. Editio secunda emendatior. Oxonii. 1849.
6. *The Antigone of Sophokles, in Greek and English.* With an Introduction and Notes by J. W. DONALDSON, B. D. London. 1848.
7. *Adolphi Emperii Opuscula Philologica et Historica amicorum studio collecta edidit* F. G. SCHNEIDEWIN. Gottingæ. 1847.
8. *The Antigone of Sophocles.* With Notes, for the use of colleges in the United States, by T. D. WOOLSEY, President of Yale College. Boston. 1852.

So MUCH during the last twenty years has been effected for the literature of the Antigone of Sophokles, that we consider no apology due to our readers for calling attention to a brief critical investigation of those more important and valuable editions which are placed at the head of this article. We have no hesitation in confessing at the outset that our principal aim will be to defend, as far as we are able, the traditionary and manuscript readings from being entirely overwhelmed by that rage for conjectural criticism which we shall find, as we proceed, too frequent occasion to notice and rebuke. Whilst condemning, however, the licentious extravagance of those commentators whose design apparently is to shine as authors rather than as editors, we frankly concede that the established proprieties of form, sense, syntax, and metre must not be surrendered too hastily to the fluctuating authority of manuscripts so mutilated and corrupt as those of Æschylos and Sophokles; and that, in instances too numerous to mention, the whole learned world has had abundant reason to rejoice in the beneficial results which have followed acute and rightly regulated criticism. Still we believe that, other things being equal, the tenacity with which the best manuscript authority is adhered to, the ability with which the accuracy of the old readings is vindicated and upheld, the success with which intentional ob-

scurity, scholastic subtlety of allusion, and bold strokes of diction or metaphor are elucidated and confirmed, will furnish us with the best criteria we can hope to attain of the precise merits of each book we are now about to review. We assume it to be undisputed by all who are competent to form an opinion on the subject, that there are but three sources to which a discreet editor of any classical author can resort for the restoration of a corrupt or imperfect text:—the MSS. copies, citations in the old lexicographers and grammarians, and the commentaries of the scholiasts. How slight an influence the remembrance of a fact, whose truth is apparent on the surface, has exerted upon the minds of recent critics, must have attracted the notice and stirred the indignation of all who are familiar with their labours. To state that many of them employ the text of the classics as a mere "paxillus" on which to suspend some "novam hæresim," in the shape of the so-called "higher criticism," or lengthened disquisitions upon laws, customs, arts, domestic life, philosophy, in a word, upon everything that is foreign to their own proper task of throwing light upon the *language* of the Greeks, (by far the most important occupation of the scholar,) is to affirm what is true of almost every commentary that in these later days has reached our hands. To assert, again, that many evince as much anxiety to illustrate their own skill in that which has been termed the "much neglected art of emendation," and busy themselves in attempting, with a measure of success that corresponds but poorly with their energy and zeal, to prove their own judgment, taste, and mastery of the language to be infinitely superior to those of their author, is to advance an accusation which they would hardly care to repel, *οὐκ ἔχοντός πω αἰσχύνην τούτου τοῦ ἔργου, φέροντος δέ τι καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον*. In these respects, as in many others, the work which we have placed *last* upon our list deserves our marked and especial commendation; and we most heartily wish that all succeeding editors, who have profited by the former labors of Prof. Woolsey to a much greater extent than the learned public are aware, had imitated the caution and conscientiousness with which he invariably treats all suggestions of alteration. We have neither space nor inclination to display to our readers how greatly such criticisms as "locus valde corruptus," "aliquid turbatum," "hoc vocabulum pro additamento imperiti librarii habendum," "error librarii," and the like, have multiplied since the publication, at Oxford, in 1826, of Elmsley's collation of the readings and scholia of the best Sophoklean MS. (we mean that generally known as the Codex Laurentianus A);—every such observation being, of course, the precursor of some fresh "attempt at emendation." Nor does this folly seem likely to

suffer an immediate abatement: for the wisdom of the course pursued by Mr. Bedham in his recent edition of the *Helena* and *Iphigeneia in Tauri* has been endorsed in high places; and in the last edition of our play, that of Mr. Donaldson, no less than a hundred and thirteen alterations, of which more than thirty are his own, have been inserted in the text. We by no means seek unjustly to detract from the general value of his book. Some of his translations are ingenious; many of his criticisms, although somewhat too much in the "Sir Oracle" style, both useful and profound; and we have ample reason to believe his own assurance in the preface:

> "'T is not the hasty product of a day,
> But the well-ripen'd fruit of wise delay."

The text of Mr. Dindorf, whose edition can alone claim the distinction of being a new recension of the text of Sophokles, besides retaining a great number of unnecessary conjectures of Brunck, is distinguished, beyond all others, by its perpetual and profligate deviations from the authorized readings; whilst his commentary, which does little or nothing in the way of enlightened criticism or explanation of his author, abounds in still more numerous proposals of emendation—many of them so hastily conceived as to furnish convincing proof that he is far more ready to assume the existence of interpolation, than to ascertain, by careful comparison and investigation, the exact value and authority of manuscript evidence. The edition of Mr. Wex, undoubtedly the most complete, is highly valuable, not only as containing the results of all that has been done for the elucidation of our play up to the time of its publication, but for some original and very meritorious criticism of his own. Its greatest error is, perhaps, the diffuseness of its commentary; in reply to which it may reasonably be urged, that it has been prepared as a manual for the scholar rather than the student, and that fulness is, in this view, preferable to obscure brevity. We are disposed to pronounce the edition of Mr. Wunder as likely to prove, next to that of Prof. Woolsey, the most serviceable and acceptable to the bulk of our students. It affords us indeed the highest pleasure to offer our testimony to the very great obligations under which he has placed every lover of Sophokles by the preparation of his edition, not only of this, but also of all the remaining plays of our poet; and we rejoice that the rapid succession of new editions, and their very extensive circulation both in England and Germany, supply signal and conclusive proof of the high appreciation with which his labours are regarded. We must notice in terms of especial approbation the compression of his notes. It is their distinguishing excellence to

have hit the right mean between too much and too little, contrasting, in this respect, very favourably with the reputation which English annotation has acquired for prolixity, and which, judging from the book of Mr. Donaldson, it seems determined to retain. We cannot, on the other hand, refrain from observing, that a more precise rendering of the words of the poet would sometimes be preferable to the periphrasis of his thought which is given in its place; and that many verbal interpretations, which can readily be obtained from any good lexicon, might be advantageously omitted. There is also too much translation, if we may be permitted to regard his book as designed chiefly for the upper classes of the school-room. We indeed agree most thoroughly in opinion with Mr. Donaldson, that nothing is wanted by the tyro who enjoys the advantage of oral instruction from a competent teacher, except a good text of the author he is reading; but as the majority of those who profess to teach Greek are themselves unfortunately destitute of the requisite appliances for communicating a thorough knowledge of this most difficult poet, we are unfeignedly rejoiced that their pupils may obtain, at an extremely moderate cost, the results of long and careful study by a scholar who is, to say the least, both learned and accurate. The value of the book would have been materially enhanced by the addition of a brief development of the idea which lies at the foundation of the tragedy, and of which it is to be considered the artistic realization. It is no small recommendation of the work of Prof. Woolsey,

—*μικρὸς μὲν ἐὼν δέμας ἀλλὰ μαχητής,*

that it is adorned with a concise and carefully written analysis, not merely of the *οἰκονομία* of the play, but also of the impressions created by its perusal, and the important advantage of a distinct and luminous apprehension of their origin and character insured to his readers.

Before addressing ourselves to the task more immediately before us, a few observations upon the subject to which we have just alluded, and upon some other considerations in connexion with this drama, will not, we trust, be wholly unacceptable to our readers. Without denying the right of every individual to express his own subjective opinion upon the ethical ground-work of this tragedy, unquestionably not far removed from that which still keenly agitates the breasts of mankind,—we mean the antagonism between the duty of obedience to the positive ordinances of the constituted authority of a State, and the duty of obedience to that still higher law of religious and family piety, whose seat is not in the written parchment, but in the consciences of men,—we must still caution the student

that all such opinions must not usurp the name of real criticism, or be regarded as of universally acknowledged and binding authority. And it is from this circumstance that we derive our justification in venturing to express, with that degree of self-distrust which is becoming, our dissent from the view of those eminent scholars, who seem inclined to favour the notion that the self-sacrificing death of Antigone, purely on account of her sublime intrepidity in standing forth, like some early Christian martyr, as the defendant of the higher law, and the punishment of her murderer for his cruel and contemptuous disregard of all that Greece and humanity held holy, is the fundamental thought which was present to the mind of the poet, and evoked the sympathies of his Athenian audience. We need scarcely remind our readers that the burial of the dead, although imperatively required at the hands of surviving relatives and friends, in order that the soul of the departed might obtain a peaceful entrance to the mansions of Hades, was, nevertheless, in the heroic age frequently forbidden by the conqueror, in wars especially that were attended with unusual exasperation of feeling, or were undertaken for purposes of vengeance. Taking, then, our standpoint from the period referred to, can it be denied that, in conformity with Greek usage, no less than with that principle of Greek ethics which enjoined unfaltering vengeance upon the enemy of the State, Kreon was abundantly justified in promulgating his edict that the remains of the man who had led the Argive array against Thebes should be deprived of the honours of a tomb? So far there can be no doubt that his conduct was consistent with precedent and the authority he held. His *fault* consists in his forgetfulness of the fact that Polyneikes was, after all, his near kinsman,—in the intemperate passion with which a one-sided view of his duty as a ruler hurries him onward to a complete disregard of far higher and holier behests,—in the immovable and obdurate rejection of the subdued and respectful warnings of the chorus, the impressive and sublime justification of Antigone, the calm and dignified intercession of Hæmon, as the exponent of the unanimous opinions of the citizens,—in the mental blindness engendered by his dogmatism, and the absurd persuasion that those who differ from his opinions must necessarily be hypocrites or traitors,—in the fierce and unmeasured denunciations he heaps upon the watchmen, the murmuring citizens, the guileless Ismene,—in his unnatural treatment of Hæmon, and frantic invectives against Teiresias, the representative of the gods. It is, in fact, the self-will and unmeasured passion with which Kreon strives to maintain and enforce an edict not tyrannical or illegal in itself, that overwhelms him in ruin.

The same faults, although less in degree, are also perceptible in the conduct of Antigone. Animated by the most pure and sisterly affection for the deceased Polyneikes, and strong in the consciousness that she is intent upon a deed whose fulfilment is a duty alike to the departed and to the infernal gods, she wholly overlooks the fact that the counter-resolution of Kreon admits in its turn of reciprocal justification. Taking at the outset an attitude of uncompromising antagonism to the ruler of Thebes, she denounces him as a foe and a tyrant; in all he does, discerns evidence only of cruel and rancorous hostility; disdains the suggestions of milder counsels, of leaving the burial of her brother to the care of the gods; rushes into the opposite extreme, (ἐπ' ἔσχατον θράσους,) and repels with words of haughty loathing the affectionate pleadings of her sister, that she would remember the ancient evils of her house, the prescribed limits of her station and sex, the duty of obedience. With unmaidenly violence and impetuosity she glories in the manifestation of her opposition to Kreon, exasperates him still more by her scorn, courts death without one thought of her sister, her lover, or her own real inferiority to that "goddess-born" stranger, with whose most piteous death she identifies her own. From these, and numerous other facts which we forbear to specify, the inference seems to us unavoidable, that no Athenian hearer could have supposed it the intention of the poet to represent Antigone, who, in speaking of her own deed, calls it "a pious *crime*," as entirely free from guilt; but rather, that in her case, no less than in that of Kreon, the φρενῶν δυσφρόνων ἁμαρτήματα were the direct and real cause of her destruction.

In the same way, moreover, the death of Hæmon, in a large degree attributable to the violence and scorn of his father, is nevertheless exhibited as really his own act, and deserving reprehension. With admirable moderation and self-control, and from wise prudential and political considerations, he had opposed the destruction, without bringing prominently into view his own love for Antigone; but failing of success, with dark, vague threatenings, which excite anew the furious resolutions of the monarch, he hurries away, and avenges his disappointment by the fatal ἀφροσύνη of a suicidal death.

From these considerations, then, we think it will be hardly doubted by our readers that the tragic pivot in the Antigone is not so much the strife of the principles of government and duty abstractedly considered, as the collision of divine with human law in the motives which impelled the conduct of two persons of self-willed and passionate natures.

So far, then, with respect to the ethical basis of this tragedy.

Let us now direct our attention to the external and political influences, which, at the period of its production, must have produced no small impression upon the mind of its author, and are, as we believe, the subject of constant and multiplied reference in the plot no less than in the diction and sentiments of the play. From the testimony of Strabo, Suidas, Aristophanes of Byzantium, and other sources of information, there seems no reason to question the statement that the Antigone was exhibited shortly before the outbreak of the Samian war; and that the public enthusiasm with which it was received, led to the nomination of Sophokles as one of the ten generals appointed to conduct hostilities against that island. Hence the important inquiry, What could have procured for Sophokles a reward so different from that usually paid to the successful competitor in a mere dramatic contest? Can we suppose that this was due solely and entirely to the poetical superiority of his drama, or shall we not find, upon a closer investigation of the circumstances of the times, that reasons of a far different nature must have inspired the minds of his countrymen when they conferred upon him so extraordinary a distinction?

The early youth of Sophokles (born about B. C. 496) was spent in that exciting and buoyant period when Athens passed so resplendently through the fiery ordeal of the first and second Persian invasions; and when upon its young democracy had first dawned that idea of a higher and nobler destiny, which, coinciding with the sudden expansion of their maritime activity and the overthrow of the Peisistratidæ, was to open up a new career for themselves and their country. His later youth and ripening manhood belonged to those stormy times in which Athens, fully aroused to the consciousness of its strength, broke down the supremacy of the long dominant Sparta, pursued its victories abroad with untiring energy, converted the Ægean into an Attic lake, and acquired supreme dominion over numerous cities on the coasts of Thrace and Asia Minor. This extraordinary development of its foreign power, with which we must closely associate the no less surprising progress of liberal opinions at home, the consolidation of the power of the democracy, and the general diffusion of comfort, intellectual culture and art, was effected in spite of the most bitter party conflicts and opposition of almost every description. At the head of the movement or progress-party stood Themistokles, the victor of Salamis, whose intuitive sagacity and far-sighted views of foreign policy led him to press the adoption of every means which could insure for Athens ascendency at sea, obtain her recognition as head and protectress of the Greeks of the islands and Asiatic cities, and by fleets and colonies secure for her citizens at home a life radiant with delights and replete with every

earthly enjoyment. His opponents, on the other hand, that grand conservative party, whose leader was Aristeides, and whose inspired priest-poet was the tragedian Æschylos, viewed with strong disapprobation all these and similar projects, declaimed earnestly against the supposed necessity of augmenting their naval force, and sought rather to convert their country into a strong land-power, which, standing aloof from the perils and vicissitudes necessarily attached to schemes of more extended dominion, should remain peacefully contented with the acquisitions it had already won. The conflict was maintained with varying success until Themistokles succumbed to the oligarchical party, who were mainly indebted for their triumph to the military exploits, splendid liberality, and personal popularity of Kimon. The victory thus attained was, however, of short duration; for as Kimon had overthrown Themistokles so he and his party were, in their turn, compelled to submit to the rising influence of Perikles, who, equally great as statesman, orator, and commander, acquired and exercised power solely through and for the benefit of the people. In the year 440, in the early spring of which Sophokles produced the Antigone, Perikles, by devoting his eloquence to the promotion of the general good, by a munificent but judicious expenditure of the surplus revenues in the fortification and sculptural and architectural embellishments of the city, by the celebration of magnificent games and religious festivals, by his brilliantly successful labours for the enlargement of the political influence of Athens, his thoughtful and disinterested care for the liberties and material well-being of all classes of the citizens, had just succeeded in breaking down that great and firmly united aristocratical party which, under Thukydides, son of Melesias, had so long opposed and embarrassed his movements. How decisive was his victory is shown, not merely by the circumstance that we hear, during the remaining career of Perikles, of no other individual really formidable as a leader of opposition, but also by the fact that the great statesman suffered his fallen adversary to be recalled, and to be subsequently sent with two colleagues to his assistance in the war against Samos.

We have thus attempted to present to our readers some of the more salient and general features of the times of the Antigone, and, in especial, to indicate the profound influence which the immense expansion of trade and navigation, the rapid succession of dazzling conquests abroad, the triumphs and constitutional consolidation of the power of the democracy at home, the embellishment of public and private life with every adornment of art, luxury, and learning, and the splendour of that patriotic oratory which created and sustained the widely-diffused and magnificent public spirit of the Periklean

age, must have exerted upon the mind of every imaginative and cultivated Athenian. Alas! that amidst all the grandeur and glory of the scene, his countrymen's injustice and tyranny abroad, their insatiable ambition and inordinate love of enjoyment at home, their ungrateful depreciation of the disinterested purity of the great statesman, whose eloquence, sagacity, and victories had contributed so largely to the ascendency of their city, should reveal to his gaze the first germs of decay.

In the sixth year of the thirty years' truce, (B. C. 440–439,) the Milesians, having been vanquished by the Samians in a contest respecting the possession of the little town of Priene, implored help of Athens, among whose tributary allies they had been previously enrolled. Their prayer was seconded by some Samian democrats, who had been banished from their homes by the power of the oligarchical faction then dominant in that island. Samos was, at this epoch, next to Athens, the most important naval power in the Ægean, and threatened, by a slight extension of its fleet, to become a dangerous and formidable opponent of Athenian ascendency. The Athenians required the contending parties to refer their dispute to arbitration at Athens—a behest with which Samos refused to comply. In this dilemma Perikles was compelled to choose between the immediate humiliation of Samos, and the abandonment of the policy which Athens had hitherto invariably pursued with respect to her allies. His decision could not be doubtful; war against Samos was felt to be an imperious necessity, and an armament decreed to be despatched to the island. Among the opponents of his administration, however, men were not wanting who attributed the war to a wholly different motive, with which Perikles was directly and personally interested. That gifted and accomplished female, whose name is still recognised as the ideal of all that is externally lovely and graceful in woman, Aspasia, the friend and counsellor of Perikles, was a native of Miletos. Who could doubt that she had exerted the whole weight of her personal influence over the mind and heart of the great Athenian in favour of her countrymen? How plausible the assumption, that no motives of political foresight or anxiety for the interests of the State, but love and compliance with the prayers of so beautiful a petitioner, had drawn upon the Samians the hostile fleet of the Athenians! The specious but unfounded calumny was publicly uttered and extensively circulated; vainly, as it seemed, for the war was commenced, and Perikles, with the poet of the Antigone, nominated as commanders.

If we consider this tragedy with relation to the circumstances thus briefly recounted, and to the growing conviction of the more sober

and patriotic party represented by Perikles, that a curb must be put upon the extravagant lust of a large number of the Athenians for new, distant, and uncertain conquests—that a period had arrived when the ambition of the people must be repressed rather than encouraged, we cannot fail to discern a multitude of allusions which prove that Sophokles was, to say the least, as keenly interested in the politics of the day as Æschylos, when he sought in his *Eumenides* to defend the Areopagos from the attacks of those who were labouring to weaken its aristocratic character and influence. The constant reiteration of its fundamental maxim, that reason and moderation are the highest good, passion, pride, and excess, the greatest evil to a people, must have been well understood by the audience to whom it was addressed, in its direct and practical bearing upon the views that were rife in regard to the extension of Athenian empire, and the treatment of the *debris* of that great aristocratical party which had so long sought the restriction of their rights. The language of the chorus in the second stasimon (vv. 617–625, ed. Woolsey) must have been received as a marked and palpable hit, by those among the audience who, unsatisfied with the thousand tributary cities which bowed to the yoke of their city, were still busied with projects of more unlimited aggrandizement. And what Athenian could have heard the first stasimon sung by the chorus, (vv. 332–375,) without the instantaneous conviction that the almost miraculous growth of his native Athens, her mastery at sea, and the beneficence of Demeter, who at Eleusis had first bestowed upon mortals the fruits of the field, were immediately present to the thought of the poet? Who could have been so blind as not to perceive in the same choral song the numerous references to the party strifes of the day, to the relative situations of the rival leaders, Thukydides and Perikles, (vv. 367–375,) and to the inventive genius of Artemon, that Lacedæmonian mechanician, whose military engines were soon to lay in ruins the proud walls of Samos?

Again: there can be little difficulty in recognising the political predilections of the poet, his ardent admiration and warm attachment to Perikles, in the opening address of Kreon to the chorus. The sentiments there enunciated are far less suited to the character of a tyrant than to the FIRST CITIZEN (Thuk. 2, 65) of a free State; whilst all that Kreon utters respecting the duty of the ruler, the necessity under which he lies to sacrifice personal interests and private friendships to considerations of public welfare and advantage, is precisely in harmony with the actions, no less than the opinions, of Perikles. So, too, the lofty and unsurpassed disinterestedness of Perikles, his magnanimous contempt of all opportunities to enrich himself or his

friends at the expense of the national treasury, or from the profits of office, must have been the subject of the poet's reference in the noble words:—

> "For there is nothing
> Of all the coinage current in the world
> So base as silver. This it is, naught else,
> That sacks the city; this it is, naught else,
> That parts the goodman from his hearth and home;
> This too unteaches and perverts the minds
> Of upright mortals, till they take their post
> Upon the side of ignominious actions;
> This points the way of knavery to mankind,
> And finds a school for every deed of sin."

The statement of Hæmon, that the eye of the ruler alone restrained the utterances of disaffection, (vv. 690, 691, cf. Ai. 167, seqq.,) must have been coupled by every Athenian auditor with the majestic form of the great orator, of whom it is recorded, as a special characteristic, that he disdained to flatter the people, but maintained a proud and cold demeanour to the masses; and who, to quote the language of Thukydides, "whenever he perceived them insolently and unseasonably confident, so shaped his speeches as to alarm and beat them down." The reiterated assertion of Kreon, abundantly verified by his action and conduct, that he would never submit to the influence of a woman, and the no less emphatic assurances of Hæmon, that love to Antigone was in no respect the mainspring of his opposition to his father's decree, could not be viewed as anything else than an unmistakable allusion to the relations existing between Perikles and Aspasia, and the rumors in circulation with respect to the action of the latter in supporting the cause of Miletos against its opponents. In the same way, the following words in the choral invocation to Eros,—

> *νικᾷ δ' ἐναργὴς βλεφάρων ἵμερος εὐλέκτρου*
> *νύμφας, τῶν μεγάλων πάρεδρος ἐν ἀρχαῖς*
> *θεσμῶν. ἄμαχος γὰρ ἐμπαί-*
> *ζει θεὸς Ἀφροδίτα,—*

must have been understood to point clearly to the not unserviceable or feeble influence of the beautiful and accomplished Milesian upon the great legislator of the day. Lastly, the words of Kreon: "There is no greater ill than disobedience," (v. 672, seqq.,) have a direct and obvious allusion to the obedience which Perikles so rigidly enforced at home, and to the strict subordination which he exacted from the tributary dependencies abroad.

We have said, we trust, enough to demonstrate how simply and naturally the political ethics of the Antigone may be explained by a reference to immediately antecedent and contemporaneous events, and to explain the connexion between the publication of the play and the appointment of its author as one of the ten *strategoi* in the Samian war. Here, then, we would rest, merely guarding ourselves from misapprehension, by disavowing all sympathy with the notion that Sophokles has sought simply to unfold his political preferences under dramatic drapery in the tragedy before us, that we are to regard Kreon in his pride of power as Perikles in his unbounded influence over the minds of the Athenians, and to see in the care of Antigone for the burial of her brother, nothing more than the earnest interference of Aspasia in support of the prayer of her fellow-countrymen, the Milesian envoys.

We now proceed to the more immediate object of this paper, and respectfully invite the attention of our readers whilst we journey onwards through the "critica dumeta salebrasque grammaticas," which spread themselves before us.

V. 2. *ἀρ' οἰσθ' ὅτι Ζεὺς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν*
ὁποῖον οὐχὶ νῶν ἔτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ;

Such is the reading which, after Hermann, all recent editors have adopted, and which Mr. Donaldson pronounces to be "now established in the favour of the critics." Mr. Wunder explains the construction by asserting that *τί οὐχί* might have been substituted, without essential difference of meaning, for *ὁποῖον οὐχί*, and that the language of the poet is simply a "more vivid" form of expression for *πάντα τὰ κακὰ τελεῖ*. In this opinion he was formerly supported by Lobeck, who, in his note on *Ai.* 1416, maintains that *ὅ,τι* and *ὁποῖον* are of almost identical signification, and that *ὁποῖον οὔ* follows *ὅ,τι* in the sense of *πᾶν ὁτιοῦν*. Upon this "somewhat fragile foundation," as Emper rightly terms it, he proceeds to compare our passage with those of which *Œd. Kol.* 1135, Eur. *Phœn.* 892, and other examples cited from Demosthenes by Boeckh, are appropriate specimens. The only really analogous example is that long ago quoted by Hermann from the *Œdipus Rex: ἆρα μου μέμνησθ' ὅτι, οἷ' ἔργα δράσας ὑμῖν εἶτα δεῦρ' ἰὼν ὁποῖ' ἔπρασσον αὖθις.* The validity of any inference from this isolated passage (in itself somewhat doubtful) is greatly shaken by the fact, pointed out by Emper, that it may be explained as an asyndeton. The common reading (*ὅ,τι*) must indeed be abandoned, if explicable only as a double interrogation with the omission of *καί*, like the Homeric *τίς πόθεν ἐσσί*. To this explanation the wide separation of the two interrogative

pronouns, no less than the absence of any just ground of comparison between the stereotype formula alluded to and an artistically elaborated construction like our own, present formidable, if not insuperable opposition. Prof. Woolsey explains upon the supposition that Sophokles forgot the commencement of his sentence while inditing the end, as in those numerous instances, both in poetry and prose, in which the causal particles ὅτι and ὡς are joined by a blending of two constructions, with the infinitive: e. g., Νομίζω ὅτι ὅστις ἐν πολέμῳ ὢν στασιάζει πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα, τοῦτον πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίαν στασιάζειν. As we are reluctant, however, to admit two anacolutha (for another is assumed at v. 4, below) in the very commencement of a tragedy so austere and finished as the play before us, and as the sentence apparently owes no small portion of its significance to the very peculiarity of its construction, we prefer, with the same scholar in his *second* edition, to retain the vulgate. Antigone opens her communication with the passionate inquiry whether Zeus is not accomplishing in the life-time of herself and Ismene, *every* evil which can happen from their relationship to Œdipus; a thought which, had nothing more been intended, might have been expressed without the introduction of ὁποῖον: — ἆρ' οἶσθ' ὅ,τι Ζεὺς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν —— οὐχί νῶν ἔτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ. But, in addition to the statement that no one of these evils fails to reach them, she expresses, by the insertion of ὁποῖον, the further notion that in point of *kind* or specific character, no less than in point of number, these misfortunes are in course of fulfilment. Both these ideas are carefully reiterated in the lines which immediately follow,—"*for* there is no single circumstance of wretchedness or ruin, of inward degradation or external dishonour, *of such sort*, that in thy and my misfortunes I have not seen it manifest,"—where ὁποῖον is repeated. In support of this view we may quote the words of Hermann: "ὅ,τι *ad summam malorum*, ὁποῖον *ad genus refertur, in quibus non magis quidpiam vitiose dictum, quam si cui omnia omnis generis mala evenisse dicatur.*" The well-known canon of Dawes, that ὁποῖος cannot be used as an interrogative, is refuted by several passages in the Attic poets. Cf. Eur. *Rhes.* 702: τίς, πόθεν ἢ ποίας πάτρας; ὁποῖον εὔχεται τὸν ὕπατον θεόν; upon which passage Lobeck, on Phryn., p. 57, remarks: "*Neminem hodie viventium relativum* (ὁποῖον) *offendet in directa interrogatione positum*, v. Brunck ad Ar. *Plut.* 392, *qui quod dicit* ὁποῖος, ὅπως, ὡς, ὅστις *centies apud Atticos poetas occurrere in interrogatione, idem valet de scriptoribus cujusvis generis et in relativis omnibus.*" So Heliod. 7, 14: ὁποίοις συντευξόμεθα; Plat. *Rep.* III., p. 414, D: οὐκ οἶδα ὁποίᾳ τόλμῃ ἢ ποίοις λόγοις χρώμενος.

4, 5. The commentators are justly offended with the form no less than the sense of the words ἄτης ἄτερ. Wunder, Schæfer, and Emper approve the emendation of Coray. Mr. Donaldson edits from his own conjecture ἄτην ἄγον, *tending to calamity*, which we deny to be Greek. Porson surmised that ἄτερ originated in the gloss ἀτηρ" for ἀτηρόν, written over the words of the text as explanatory of some periphrase with ἄτη, and hence proposed ἄτης ἔχον, whilst Brunck conjectures ἀτήριον,—unfortunately a "vox ignota" to the Greeks. In his second edition Prof. Woolsey followed Boeckh and Wex in considering the clause parenthetic, and in giving ἄτερ the same force as ἄνευ and χωρίς in similar collocations frequent in Plato and the orators. Now he observes that "the sense thus elicited is not good. Why should not Antigone speak of the ἄτη of her race? Perhaps it is hardly necessary to add Dindorf's explanation: '*id est* οὔτ' οὐκ ἄτης ἄτερ, *negatione ex præcedente* οὐδέν *repetenda.*'" As we do not understand how the intolerable construction (or to use the more euphemistic expression of Dindorf, the "negligentior orationis conformatio") of the verse as it stands, can be excused by the "tanta *perspicuitas* sententiæ," we believe the reading to be corrupt, and admit that the learned have here legitimate grounds for illustrating their skill in emendation. It is to be regretted that the metre will not allow us to read ἀτίετον, as in Æsch. *Eum.* 385: ἄ τ ι μ' ἀ τ ί ε τ α διόμεναι λάχῃ.

19. Mr. Donaldson, referring to his New Cratylus, p. 358, has edited εἵνεκα. We are aware that it has been proposed by several scholars to write εἵνεκα, wherever οὕνεκα is used as a preposition, and that this suggestion has in one or two cases, e. g. Æsch. *Suppl.* 185, the consent of the MSS. [In Thuk. 6, 56, Demosth. p. 1358, 11, Krüger properly restores ἕνεκα.] Since, however, Sophokles may be said, from the unanimous testimony of the codices, never to have employed either ἕνεκα or εἵνεκα, whilst he is in the frequent habit of constructing οὕνεκα with the genitive, (in precisely the same way as Herodotos joins that case with the words μέχρις οὗ,) we need hardly express our disapproval of any change in the common reading of this verse.

20. Emper observes correctly that ἔπος καλχαίνειν does *not* mean *propter aliquod dictum perturbatum esse.* Equally inaccurate is the supposition of Wex that ἔπος signifies *aliquid* or *res.* On the contrary it refers plainly to some communication Antigone is about to make to Ismene, and must be rendered *propter aliquid quod dictura es.*

21. We differ from Mr. Wunder in referring τάφου to προτίσας, and from Mr. Donaldson in considering it a genitive of relation

dependent upon both participles. The connexion of ideas has been excellently pointed out by Emper. "The primary thought, on which all the emphasis lies, is clearly the non-burial of Polyneikes; and the secondary or subordinate thought, subserving merely the purpose of heightening the outrage enjoined to be practised against *his* remains, the sepultural honours of Eteokles. This is shown by the very form of the expression; for *τὸν μὲν προτίσας* is evidently inserted parenthetically, or *extra constructionem*." Hence *τάφου* must be joined with *ἀτιμάσας*, as a genitive of privation.

24. *χρησθείς*. "Supply *αὐτῷ*. *Treating him according to righteous justice and law*." Hermann, on the other hand, properly remarks that *χρησθείς* cannot be taken for *χρησάμενος*. The objections to his own emendation are well stated in the note of Mr. Donaldson, who, comparing *El.* 933, where *προσθεῖναι* is used of additional honours, paid to the tomb of Agamemnon, substitutes in its place the words *προσθεὶς δίκαια*. Mr. Wunder gets over all difficulty by omitting the verse, and is followed by Dindorf, who contents himself with a mere reference to the authority of his predecessor. Such a proceeding in opposition to the testimony of the MSS., all of which exhibit this line without the slightest variation, cannot be too severely censured. To Mr. Wunder's assertion that the conjunction of *δίκαιος* with the substantive *δίκη* is wholly inadmissible, we oppose the more accurate remark of Prof. Woolsey that this epithet is added "because the decree against Polyneikes might be called *δίκη*, but was yet very far from being *δικαία*, (*δίκαιον* scil. *κήρυγμα*? cf. v. 8,) while it was according to law and justice for Kreon to inter the deceased as next of kin." It is, moreover, in entire accordance with such combinations as *γάμος ἄγαμος*, *πόνος ἄπονος*, and the Latin *jus justum* and *jus injustum*. All necessity for alteration in the common reading is superseded by regarding *χρησθείς* as passive, not only in form, but also in sense, as in Dem. *Mid.* 16, Herod. 7, 144. Referred to Kreon, it would, according to Prof. Klotz, signify den, der gebraucht wird, in a meaning equivalent to the German expression, der sich so brauchen, der sich so finden liess, and the Latin *usi eo sumus*, *habuimus eum*. Such a rendering *dum se justa cum justitia ac lege exhibet*, harmonizes very well with the "faint praise," which, even in the matter of Eteokles' burial, we may suppose that Antigone would be disposed to assign to Kreon.

40. We are happy to find that Porson's elegant emendation *λύουσ' ἂν εἰθ' ἅπτουσα* ——, which best preserves the symmetry of form characteristic of proverbial expressions, has been preferred by Wex to *λύουσ' ἂν ἢ 'φάπτουσα*, as edited by all the rest. That

εἴτε may stand in place of *ἤ*, is clear from *Ai.* 178, *Œd. Tyr.* 517, Æsch. *Ag.* 1404.

48. Mr. Dindorf edits *μ' εἴργειν μέτα*, with Brunck. Unnecessarily, for the personal pronoun, omitted in all the MSS., is fully implied in the construction,—the genitive *τῶν ἐμῶν* being unquestionably masculine.

57. The expression *μόρον ἐργάζεσθαι ἐπὶ ἀλλήλοιν*, and the position occupied by *χεροῖν* have proved great stumbling-blocks to the commentators. To remove the first, Hermann proposed *ἐπαλλήλοιν*, which adjective, although used exclusively by later writers, and only in the sense *one upon another, continuous*, (Polyb. 2, 11, 7; Diod. 3, 35; Herodian 2, 7, 6,) is nevertheless received by Dindorf and Donaldson. Cf. Klotz in Jahn's Jahrb. f. Phil. B. 21. S. 162 fg. Mr. Wunder proposes the transposition of the words *μόρον* and *χεροῖν*, which few, we imagine, will approve. The datives *χερί, χεροῖν χερσίν* are frequently so placed in the tragedies, (cf. 1281, *Ai.* 1047,) and were used in a quasi-adverbial sense, almost = *βιαίως*. Boissonade conjectures *ὑπ' ἀλλήλοιν*, Emper *ὑπ' ἀλλήλων*, for reasons which, he says, may be seen in the context. With Prof. Woolsey we see no necessity for change. Emper objects to the construction *μήδεσθαί τι ἐπί τινι*, quoted by Wunder in support of the expression *μόρον κατεργάζεσθαι ἐπί τινι*, that in *μήδεσθαι* the notion of purpose or intention (*consulere in aliquem*) is mainly, if not exclusively, conveyed. A reference, however, to Hom. *Il.* 10, 52, 22, 395, *Od.* 24, 426 will satisfactorily show that *κακὰ μήδεσθαί τινα* is certainly equivalent to *κακὰ δρᾶν τινα*. So, too, in Æsch. *Choëph.* 991 with *ἐπὶ* and the dative. We think, therefore, that the illustration is in point; but should it still be objected to, the employment of the preposition may be justified by numerous other passages, such as *Philokt.* 197, 1138, Eur. *Med.* 1262, *Phen.* 629, where see Porson. If, lastly, Hermann's correction should be preferred, it will be better to take it in its usual meaning, *continuis cædibus* (in reference to the outrage just before stated to have been committed by Œdipus, and to the suicide of Iokasta), than in the sense of *ἀλληλοφονοῖν*.

63, 64. Mr. Donaldson explains the construction: *ἀλλ' ἐννοεῖν χρὴ τοῦτο μὲν ὅτι ἔφυμεν γυναῖκε, ὡς ——, ἔπειτα δὲ οὕνεκα ἀρχόμεσθα* [*ὥστε*] *ἀκούειν*. In this way *οὕνεκα*, as at *Philokt.* 232, is a simple synonym for *ὅτι*. Assuming this to be correct we still think Prof. Woolsey's explanation, that the employment of the infinitive is due to a construction *κατὰ σύνεσιν* (the verb *ἀρχόμεσθα* involving here the notion usually expressed by *ἀναγκαζόμεθα*), in every way preferable to the supposition of an ellipse of *ὥστε*. We would

however, understand *οὕνεκα* in its causative sense, *quia*, and supply *χρή* to *ἀκούειν*, as suggested by Jakobs.

70. Prof. Woolsey properly supplies *ἐμοί* from *ἐμοῦ* with *ἡδέως*, the adverb being referred in a general way to the subject of the principal clause. Mr. Wunder periphrases: *οὐκ ἂν εἴη μοι ἡδύ, εἰ μετ' ἐμοῦ δρῴης*. Quite right, says Emper, as respects the sense, but whence the necessity for the periphrase? To the precisely analogous illustration cited from Eur. *Bacch.* 796, add Plat. *Theæt.* p. 161, C: *τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἡδέως εἴρηκεν*, and v. 486, below. Mr. Dindorf, while censuring Brunck's version *lubens te utar adjutrice*, has shown, by his absurd rendering *lubens mecum facies*, that he has himself wholly misconceived the meaning of the poet.

71. Wunder and Donaldson follow Hermann in reading *ὁποίᾳ*. Mr. Dindorf edits *ἀλλ' ἴσθ' ὁποία*, which coincides with the scholion: *τοιαύτη γένου, ὁποία καὶ βούλει*. But as the preponderance of authority is in favour of *ἴσθ' ὁποῖά σοι δοκεῖ*, and this yields an excellent sense, we cannot see that any change is required. *Ἴσθ'* is the imperative of *οἶδα, but decide on such things as* ——.

83. Mr. Dindorf retains the common reading *μή μου*, but the antithesis requires *μὴ 'μοῦ*.

88. We prefer Erfurdt's explanation to that of Hermann. Ismene is transported by the taunt of her sister beyond her accustomed gentleness, and indulges in something like sarcasm at the passionate impetuosity of Antigone. The phraseology is doubtless proverbial, for the Greeks called that which was vain and unprofitable *ψυχρόν*. See Eur. *Alkest.* 363, a passage best explained by *Hel.* 35. The sense of our verse will therefore be: *thou art fervid and rash in a matter which can come to no profitable end.*

93. Mr. Donaldson has admitted a conjecture attributed by Emper to Prof. Lehrs, according to which *ἐχθρᾷ* (*sic scriptum*) is joined with *δίκῃ*, his reason being that *δίκῃ* without any epithet is an "awkward and languid" termination to the line. "*Ἐχθρὰ δίκη* is *jus inimicorum*, and the meaning thus imparted to our passage is *jure inimicorum apud mortuum eris.*" These are the words of Emper. The common reading gives, nevertheless, as good, if not a better sense, whilst the emendation and its interpretation appear to us equally destitute of credit. The dative *δίκῃ* has here an adverbial force, as at *El.* 70, 561, 1212, 1255, where it occurs, as in our own line, without a preposition. Its position in the verse is justified by the emphasis attached to its notion. Very *dissimilar*, therefore, is the Æschylean expression: *δίκη δ' ὁμαίμων κάρτα νιν προστέλλεται.*

100. Mr. Dindorf reads with two manuscripts *ἀκτὶς ἀελίοιο*, omitting the article before *κάλλιστον*. The common reading *ἀκτὶς ἀελίου τὸ κάλλιστον* is defended not merely by the majority of the codices, but by the scholiast and Eustathius. Cf. Pind. *fragm.* p. 231, ed. Dissen, Eur. *Med.* 1218. The article, so far from being "*inepte additum*," is required to isolate and heighten the force of the superlative. —— The construction of a partitive genitive, involving the notion of *time antecedent*, with superlatives whose subject is referred retrospectively to the whole circle of objects denoted by the former, is frequent in poetry and prose. The tyro may compare the following examples from Thukydides and Xenophon: *πόλεμος ἀξιολογώτατος τῶν προγεγημένων, ἱεροπρεπέστατος δοκεῖς εἶναι τῶν προγεγενημένων, Ἀθηναῖοι ἀρχὴν τὴν ἤδη μεγίστην τῶν τε πρὶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν νῦν κέκτηνται.*

106. Mr. Dindorf completes the measure by reading with Hermann *Ἄργοθεν ἐκ* (scil. *ἐκβάντα*). We prefer Boeckh's correction *Ἀργεῖον*. The same diæresis occurs in vv. 971, 984, 1115.

108. *ὀξυτέρῳ κινήσασα χαλινῷ*. Mr. Wunder approves Musgrave's explanation *celerior reditus fuit quam accessus*, a harsh and unsatisfactory mode of accounting for the employment of the comparative. Mr. Donaldson asserts that Emper alone has seen its full significance. "The defeated Argives marched away during the night. The beams of the rising sun, which the chorus here addresses, impel them to a swifter flight, i. e. swifter than their retreat during the darkness, for with the advance of day the peril of pursuit became more threatening." That Mr. Donaldson, who confidently affirms that certain works in a list subjoined to his introduction supply "either at first or at second hand every original observation respecting the Antigone which has hitherto been given to the world," should be ignorant that precisely the same explanation, by far the best that can be given of *ὀξυτέρῳ*, had been brought forward long previously to the publication of Emper's criticisms by Prof. Woolsey, is in no degree surprising. We are, however, disposed to prefer *ὀξυτόρῳ*, the reading of the three best manuscripts, explained by Welcker as equivalent to the *fræna lupata* of Horace and Virgil. Hermann *ἔχων τούτων θυμὸν ἱππογνώμονα*, urges in opposition to this view that *fræna lupata* are better adapted to restrain than to accelerate the speed of a flying horse, and that the contrary notion *frænis remissis* would be far more suitable to the routed Argives.

110. That the common reading is corrupt is shown by both syntax and metre. The accusative *ὄν* has no verb to which it can be referred, and a dipodia is wanting in the anapæstic system.

Mr. Dindorf thinks that the first difficulty is due to an anacoluthon. The poet having written the accusative as if ἦγαγε was to follow, has substituted in place of the finite verb the fuller description: ἀρθεὶς ——— *aletὸς ἐς γᾶν ὑπερέπτα.* Kühner considers ὃν to depend upon κλάζων, as in Æsch. *Ag.* 48: κλάζοντες Ἄρῃ,—but this explanation will hardly meet acceptance. Mr. Wunder, followed by Prof. Woolsey in his second edition, pays little heed to the metrical difficulty, and edits with Brunck ὃς——Πολυνείκους. Conceding to these scholars that anapæstic verses, when introduced between the strophe and antistrophe, do not always correspond very precisely either in number or composition, we, nevertheless, believe with Mr. Wex that the equilibrium of the anapæstic system in this Parodos must be strictly maintained. We are strengthened in this conviction from observing the close connexion both in sense and construction between these verses, the close of the strophe, and the anapæstic antisystema. If it is correct we must then admit a lacuna, and restore the construction by supplying a finite verb. For although the participles συναγείρας and ἀγαγών would meet the want of the syntax, they would make Polyneikes the principal subject, whereas it is clear that the metaphor of the white-winged eagle is intended for the Argives, whose white shields are most assuredly the ground of the comparison. The deficiency in the text will for these reasons be best supplied in the way proposed by Mr. Wex:—

[ἦγειρεν· ὁ δ'] *aletὸς εἰς γᾶν ὡς*
ὀξέα κλάζων ὑπερέπτα.

This highly ingenious emendation is derived from the words of the scholiast: ὄντινα στρατὸν Ἀργείων ἐξ ἀμφιλόγων νεικέων ἀρθεὶς ἦγαγεν ὁ Πολυνείκης, where the word Ἀργείων is probably a corruption of ἀγείρων, so that the scholiast was explaining the ἦγειρεν of his text by the periphrase ἀγείρων ἦγαγε. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 4, 377, *Œd. Kol.* 1306.

117. Prof. Woolsey has received Boeckh's emendation φονώσαισιν. This is unquestionably correct, and may be inferred from the annotation of the scholiast to have stood in his copy. The common reading is opposed to both the sense and the metre.

130. All the MSS. exhibit ὑπεροπτίας, a "vox nihili," as Ellendt rightly terms it. Mr. Wunder assumes from the words of the scholiast that Sophokles wrote some such word as ὑπεροπτοτέρους in this sense: ὑπεροπτοτέρους ἢ κατὰ καναχήν, *insolentiores quam pro fragore*, for this is the meaning of ἢ κατὰ καναχήν after the comparative. Mr. Wunder would probably object to this explanation, and direct us to understand χρυσοῦ καναχῆς not in a general sense.

but of the rattling of the Argive arms: *their arrogance surpassed the (proud) rattling of their golden weapons.* But this thought seems too recondite and far-fetched. Emper, from whose note we have taken the preceding observations, suggests *ὑπεροπλῆντας*, a contracted form of *ὑπεροπλήεντας*. Mr. Donaldson reads *χρυσοῦ καναχῇ θ' ὑπερόπλους*: but however admirable the sense yielded by his suggestion, its lack of authority ought to have forbidden its insertion in the text. We prefer with Mr. Dindorf to adopt the word *ὑπερόπτας*, which is written between the lines in the Cod. Laur. d, and in one of the Parisian MSS., is supported by the explanation of the scholiast, and is well adapted to the sense and the metre. The authority of Thukydides is against the supposition of Wex, who infers from *Œd. Tyr.* 883 that this word may be constructed with the dative. As we can find no support for a collocation so harsh as *ῥεῦμα καναχῆς*, we would connect *χρυσοῦ* with *ῥεύματι*, and from the words of the scholiast, *μετὰ χρυσοῦ καὶ καναχῆς*, feel no hesitation as to the propriety of inserting *τε* after the second genitive. Read, therefore: *χρυσοῦ καναχῆς θ' ὑπερόπτας*.

133. *ὁρμῶντα*. Mr. Donaldson is, doubtless, correct in condemning Wunder's translation, *eum, qui parabat*, but goes greatly too far in receiving a mere inadvertence, for so we must regard it, as one of the "numberless instances of inaccurate syntactical knowledge on the part of professed scholars in Germany." The Latin *is, qui* is, it is true, generally expressed in Greek by the participle with the article, but there are many exceptions both in poetry and prose. Eur. *Phœn.* 270: *ἅπαντα γὰρ τολμῶσι δεῖνα φαίνεται.* Plat. *Gorg.* p. 498, A: *νοῦν ἔχοντα (οὔπω εἰδες) λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα.* Id. *Legg.* p. 795, E: *διαφέρει δὲ παμπολὺ μαθὼν μὴ μαθόντος καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γεγυμνασμένου.*

138–140. The common reading *τὰ μέν, ἄλλᾳ τὰ δέ*, is evidently corrupt. Boeckh emends *τὰ μέν, ἄλλα δ'*, and this correction has been received by all subsequent editors. Mr. Wunder explains: *vertit autem aliorsum hæc, alia vero mala aliis inferebat Mars*, i. e., Ares averted mischief from the Thebans by turning aside the danger threatened by Kapaneus, and overwhelmed the Argives with destruction in other parts of the field. Against this emendation, as Emper says, a two-fold objection may be urged. "The first is that the metre requires a long syllable instead of *μέν* at the end of the verse; the second, that the removal of the danger menaced by Kapaneus cannot possibly have been attributed to Ares, since the preceding verses expressly represent his overthrow to have been effected by the thunderbolt of Zeus." To translate *εἶχε δ' ἄλλᾳ τὰ μέν*, with Mr. Donaldson, *some things happened in one way*, i. e.,

Kapaneus was destroyed by Zeus in the manner just mentioned, removes certainly the second objection, but seems to us very frigid. We believe that the poet wrote as follows: *εἶχε δ' ἄλλα μὲν ἄλλ'· ‖ ἄλλα δ' ἐπ' ἄλλοις κ. τ. λ.* The corruption of the vulgate arose, doubtless, from the circumstance that some interpreter having appended *τὰ μὲν —— τὰ δέ* as a marginal explanation of *ἄλλα μὲν—— ἄλλα δέ*, this gloss crept subsequently into the text. The *ἄλλ'* (i. e. *ἄλλα*) at the conclusion of the first line is for *ἄλλως*, as at Æsch. *Eum.* 533: *ἄλλα δ' ἀλλ' ἐφορεύει*, and the sense is: *some things Ares restrained in one way*, or *differently; but upon others bestowed other things.*

156. Mr. Dindorf edits from his own conjecture *νεοχμοῖσι* for *νεοχμὸς νεαραῖσι*, and is, as usual, followed by Wunder. On the other hand we believe, if the common reading is inaccurate, the corruption is not to be sought in the thoroughly tragic collocation suspected by Mr. Dindorf. The majority of modern critics, considering the verses antistrophic, suppose that some words have perished from the text, and hence Boeckh introduces the words *νέον ἐλληχὼς ἀρχήν* between *Μενοικέως* and *νεοχμὸς νεαραῖσι*,—a supplement which Mr. Donaldson has printed in his text. The supposition of a lacuna is highly probable, but we have no hesitation respecting the propriety of retaining *νεοχμὸς νεαραῖσι*, which the scholiast found in his copy. In favour of Boeckh's emendation it may certainly be urged that it leaves the reading of the MSS. unaltered, supplies a sense which harmonizes excellently with the evident intention of the poet to portray strongly the novelty of the circumstances under which Kreon is just about to make his appearance, and derives some little countenance from the language of the scholiast, which, as Erfurdt pointed out, warrants the inference that he found a participle in his text.

158. Hermann's emendation *τίνα δή* is preferable to the reading *τινὰ δή* of the common copies. It is supported by two manuscripts, one of which exhibits *ποίαν* as a gloss. The vulgate represents the chorus as saying: I conclude from the convocation of the Gerusia that Kreon has *some plan* or *a plan.* This is opposed by the position of the particle *δή*, which, when used with indefinite pronouns or with *ποτε* to increase the notion of indefiniteness, is always placed first: *δή τις, quidam nescio quis*; *δή ποτε, quondam nescio quando.* According to Hermann's alteration the chorus expresses a desire to learn *what plan* he entertains; and this accords with its almost constant habit of questioning every new-comer, in order that certain necessary information as to the subsequent action may be imparted to the spectators. This inquiry meets a direct response in the words

of the monarch, and it is no trifling argument in favour of the interrogative pronoun that it establishes a direct relation between the antecedent and subsequent language.

186. From the use of *ἀντί* in comparisons arises its notion of *substitution* or of *value*. Render, *at the cost of my own safety*; for there is here an antithesis between the individual *σωτηρία* and the public *ἄτη*.

203. Most editors adopt Musgrave's reading *ἐκκεκήρυκται* in place of the common *ἐκκεκηρῦχθαι*. Some critics assume an anacoluthon, and refer the infinitive to *κηρύξας ἔχω*. Thus Prof. Woolsey observes that "such tautology can only be accounted for by the poet's having forgotten the structure and supplied *λέγω* before the infinitive." We think that Erfurdt and Wyttenbach are right in maintaining that an absolute ellipse of such a verb, which, by the way, is inconsistent with the notion of the poet's having *forgotten* the construction, is wholly unsupported by authority, and believe that the infinitive is here used for the imperative: *hunc ne quis sepeliat jussum esto*,—in which view, the employment of the perfect is very appropriate.

211. Mr. Dindorf emends *κἀς τὸν εὐμενῆ πόλει*, the common reading being *καὶ τὸν εὔμ. πόλει*. The preposition is inserted to connect the line with the clause *σοὶ ταῦτ' ἀρέσκει* in the preceding verse. But this, to say nothing of the omission of the preposition before *τὸν*—*δύςνουν* and the very doubtful construction *ἀρέσκει τινί τι εἰς τινα*, is inferior in emphasis to the MSS. reading, and more difficult to be understood. The dissatisfaction of the chorus is apparent from the studied brevity of the language.

213. The vulgate *παντί πού τ'* is given up by all the critics, except Klotz, who thinks that *πού τ'* is for *καὶ ὀπουοῦν*. In this view the *plena locutio* would be: *νόμῳ δὲ χρῆσθαι ὁποίῳ θέλεις ἔνεστί σοι*. Mr. Dindorf edits *παντί που πάρεστι*, Hermann *πάντι πάντ'*, and Donaldson *πανταχοῦ πάρεστι*: but these suggestions are exceedingly harsh, and diverge too widely from the reading of the MSS. We believe with Boeckh that Erfurdt's conjecture *παντί πού γ'*, although denied by Hermann to be a Greek collocation, is a genuine restoration of the original writing; and that the omission of *που* or *γε* would be altogether destructive of the ethos of the passage. The words of the chorus imply dissatisfaction with the mandate of Kreon in conjunction with a carefully subdued and almost imperceptible irony. We must protest against the statement that this reply of the chorus is to be understood as the expression of its servile and unconditional acquiescence in all that had just fallen from the lips of the king. Submission to authority is, indeed, expressed, in accordance with the

lesson universally inculcated in the days preceding Sophokles, that deference to the ruling powers was the highest virtue. For Greek philosophy and Greek ethics viewed men principally as constituent parts of a πόλις, considering this to be the real end for which all should live, and in which alone the individual could attain his highest and most complete development. Hence there is no just cause for offence in finding the chorus, with a proper appreciation of its own personality and subordination to the leading personages of the play, always disposed to uphold, or at least not openly to contravene, the authority of Kreon. At the same time the Sophoklean εἰρωνεία, as the critics have observed, is palpable and clear. The words of the chorus neither unreservedly approve nor openly contradict the γνώμη of its ruler, but refer everything and all responsibility to his own will and pleasure.

215. We are surprised, with Mr. Donaldson, at the favour shown by better men to Dindorf's conjecture, πῶς ἂν σκόποι νῦν εἶτε. The chorus had just professed its submission to Kreon and his edict. The king replies to the protestation, the ironical character of which he doubtless detects: What your opinion upon the subject of my authority may be, I neither know nor care; think upon that matter as pleases yourselves, *dummodo nunc custodes sitis eorum quæ edixi.* See the scholiast and Elmsley on *Œd. Kol.* 156. The conjunctive with ὡς ἄν has, in this passage, a quasi-imperatival force; or, to speak with greater accuracy, an antecedent clause is implied in the very nature of the construction.

218. The reading ἄλλῳ, which has the support of the best MSS., is rejected by Donaldson in his text, but preserved in his translation: *What further office hast thou for another?*

220. Prof. Woolsey's note upon the construction is as follows: "Ὅς sometimes follows οὕτως instead of the usual ὥστε. Comp. Matthiae's Gr. Gr. 478, Obs. 1." If the student has the authority referred to, he will find the same fact pointed out in almost the same phraseology. Our objection to this kind of annotation is, that it teaches the student nothing more than he has already learned, from a mere perusal of the passage before him. If comment is necessary, the principle by which the Greeks (chiefly with a negation or in an interrogative sentence) substituted a relative clause with ὅς or more usually ὅστις in place of ὥστε after οὕτως, should be stated and enforced. "In the same way," says Krüger, "as they said μῶρος ὃς θανεῖν ἐρᾷ, so also, omitting the demonstrative or some antecedent general notion, did they say: (οὐδεὶς) τίς οὕτω μῶρος ὃς θανεῖν ἐρᾷ." Examples abound in Demosthenes and Xenophon.

(Conclusion in the April Number.)

Art. VII.—WILLIAM PENN.

1. *William Penn: an Historical Biography, from New Sources, with an extra Chapter on the "Macaulay Charges."* By William Hepworth Dixon. 12mo., pp. 353. Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea. 1851.
2. *The History of England from the Accession of James II.* By Thomas Babington Macaulay. Vol. I., Chap. IV., 8vo. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

In 1644, according to Mr. Dixon, there were two great events in England: the first was the birth of Quakerism; the second, the birth of William Penn. The first happened after this wise. Three Leicestershire rustics, one of whom was a rude and saturnine lad of nineteen, met at a fair, and resolved to have a stoup of ale together. After exhausting the first supply, two of the bumpkins feeling somewhat mellow called for more, and vowed that he who would not drink should pay the score. The other, who neither relished deep draughts himself nor paying for them for others, demurred, and taking a groat from his pocket laid it on the table, and said, "If it be so, I will leave you,"—which he did, and went home filled with strange and gloomy thoughts. "This simple village ale-house incident," says Mr. Dixon, "was one of the most important events which had yet happened in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race; for out of it was to come Quakerism, the writings and teachings of Penn and Barclay, the colony and constitution of Pennsylvania, the republics of the west, and, in no very remote degree, the vast movement of liberal ideas in Great Britain and America in more modern times." Now we mean no disrespect to Mr. Dixon when we say that we do not believe a word of all this twaddle. We believe that both Quakerism and modern liberty in England and America had a much deeper and more dignified origin than the empty breeches-pocket of George Fox. The burning of the Ephesian temple may have caused the fiery energy of the Macedonian madman, the silence of the Delphic oracle may have been occasioned by the yet greater birth to which it is sometimes referred; but the day for such marvels is passed, or at least, with our knowledge of the facts, we cannot compress all the great events to which Mr. Dixon alludes into these empty ale-pots of the Leicestershire fair. We believe Quakerism to have been a phenomenon of not only interest but importance in the world's history, whether we look at its religious or political results; and we believe its actual origin to have occurred in the labours of George Fox; but we can neither regard the fountain to be so small, nor the stream so large, as represented by the enthusiastic biographer of Howard and Penn.

Quakerism is simply one of the manifestations which the human mind will put forth, under the influence of Christianity, in an age of religious earnestness. There are three prominent forms in which the religious element of the race is prone to manifest itself, all of which are exaggerations of a portion of truth. These forms are scepticism, formalism, and mysticism: the first an extravagant assertion of the rational or logical powers; the second, of the sensibilities, which demand something tangible and visible for their excitement; and the third, of the moral or spiritual powers, which isolate the soul, and link it directly to God. These typal forms we have in the Sadducee, who believed too little; the Pharisee, who believed too much; and the Essene, who did not believe at all, so much as feel, and in whom the intense action of the moral element subordinated both the natural reason and the natural emotions in one eager desire after a species of absorption in the divine essence. Now, of the three we are free to confess that our sympathies are mainly with the last. If we must have an exaggeration at all, we think that of the mystic decidedly to be preferred to that of the sceptic or formalist, as it rests on a higher and nobler element of our nature than either of the others. It is not, therefore, with any depreciating estimate of Quakerism, that we rank it among the manifestations of mysticism in Christianity. The essential principle of mysticism is a belief in, and a reliance upon, subjective rather than objective manifestations of God; and a consequent tendency to regard as at least of co-ordinate, if not of paramount authority to the written revelation of the Scriptures, the revelation that is made by God in the soul. Believing in a direct communication of the divine nature to the human, it makes these inward revelations the standard by which to interpret and decide upon the outward, rather than the outward to be the rule by which to try them. It is to this general principle that we must refer the Quaker doctrine of an inward light, as far as it is peculiar to their creed. As sometimes explained, it is difficult to discriminate between it and the common doctrines of union with Christ, the inhabitation of the Spirit in the soul, and the universal grace of the Remonstrants. But as held by those most deeply imbued with the essential principles of the system, it really embodies all that is peculiar to mysticism, as a distinctive manifestation of the religious element in our nature. Hence the written revelation is neither called the word of God, nor is it regarded as the sole and supreme rule of faith and practice. The Scriptures, being themselves only the records of that portion of the divine light that was imparted to their writers, whilst they are regarded with reverence as the testimony which these men gave to the nature and reality of this inward shin-

ing of the Godhead, are yet deemed only as co-ordinate manifestations of this light, which is given to each man to profit withal. There is a more sure word of prophecy, to which all must give earnest heed, as to a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawn and the Day-star arise in their hearts. This is the real light to our feet and lamp to our path which is given to guide us on our pilgrimage through life. Hence we are urged by Quakerism to look at the light within, rather than at that without; to seek the Christ revealed in the soul, rather than the Christ revealed in the Scriptures. This we believe to be the fundamental principle of Quakerism, and to be essentially identical with that of mysticism as we find it existing under the action of Christianity.

It is curious to see the affiliation between apparently remote forms of thought. It requires but a few steps of logical induction to develop from this principle all the creed of modern scepticism, which admits an inspiration and a revelation, but affirms that they are not peculiar to the writers of the Scriptures; that they did not reach their highest or most authoritative form in them; and that they cannot be ascribed to a writing at all; and, therefore, that no writing can claim from the human mind that submission which we are bound to give to a clear revelation of God. Now, so far as Quakerism has given currency to these principles, its influence as a theological element has been of the highest importance. The mythical theory of Strauss has been anticipated by some of the early Friends; and it is worthy of inquiry whether the system of Schleiermacher, which is now working its way so widely in the new school of theological thinkers, had not its origin in the mystical leaven that was instilled into or evolved from his mind by his early Moravian training.

The causes that gave occasion and success to this movement are not obscure. It was an age of deep religious earnestness, and men were asking, with a real and profound anxiety, "What shall I do to be saved?" The establishment of the great doctrine of justification by faith through the Reformation had disfranchised the Church of that plenipotentiary power which she once wielded in the matter of salvation, and made it an individual transaction between the soul and God. But such was the deadness and corruption of the Reformed Church of England, that the gospel itself had lost its vitality and heart, and become a mere system of formalism. Now there were two possible directions which an awakened religious earnestness might take,—the one an objective, which would strive to breathe into the Church and the Bible their ancient and real significance, and make the dead letter of each a living word; the other a subjective, which, by a more intense development of that earnestness itself,

should evolve somewhat that should in a measure take the place of both, and be a birth of the new rather than a resuscitation of the old. The first direction was taken by Puritanism, the second by Quakerism. The first made Cromwell, Owen, Baxter, Hampden, and the stern colonists of the Mayflower; the second produced Fox, Barclay, Keith, Penn, and the quiet settlers of the fertile fields of Pennsylvania. The first, from its very objectivity, and consequent necessity of being embodied in fixed forms, had an element of hardness, which was also an element of firmness and permanence; the second, from its subjective character, and its existence as a life rather than as a system, was more vague and indeterminate in its manifestations, and had less enduring activity in the original forms in which it was embodied. The first was the system from which William Penn received the early mould and impulse of his character, the second the result to which the peculiarities of his individual nature led him in the circumstances in which he was placed.

There are three aspects in which Penn presents himself to us, which, although not the successive phases of his character in exact chronological order, yet in the main appear in the three great divisions of his life. These aspects are, as *a courtier, a Christian, and a colonist.* We propose to consider him briefly in each of these characters, in the first of which he was the representative of the state of things from which Quakerism had its origin, its necessity, and its conditions of success; in the second, the type of Quakerism as a religious life; and in the third, the embodiment of Quakerism as a political system, or at least as an element in civil life. We shall probably discover that all these combined influences are perceptible in the resultant of the forces exhibited in his life; and that whilst he did not cease to be a Christian when he became a colonist, neither did he entirely cease to be a courtier when he became a Christian. The best influences of both his courtliness and his Christianity appear mingled in the policy and tone of his colonial life.

To those who have formed their notions of Penn from that fat old gentleman with a broad-brimmed beaver and all the orthodox habiliments of Quakerism, who flourishes in West's painting and the various engravings of the Shakamaxon treaty, it may seem almost an irreverent abuse of terms to speak of William Penn the courtier. And yet it is nevertheless true that, whilst not open to the charges that have been made against him of the courtly vices as well as the courtly graces, he was for a considerable period of his life, and that not the least important in its influence on his subsequent history, a courtier.

His father, Admiral Penn, was one of the most sagacious and suc-

cessful of that long line of heroes that adorn the naval history of England, although in his loyalty he was a sort of quarter-deck Vicar of Bray. The successor of Blake and the conqueror of Van Tromp, he excites our admiration by his prowess and abilities; but the proffered betrayer of Cromwell, who was willing to be the Arnold of the great rebellion, and the secret correspondent of Charles whilst he ate the bread of the Commonwealth, he calls forth our commiseration and contempt. But as treachery to the Protectorate was construed to be fidelity to the Restoration, the return of the profligate Charles brought the admiral again in connexion with the court, and opened dreams of ambition for his family, that he might make it one of the patrician races of England. To attain this end, it was necessary that his eldest son should be brought under such training as would fit him to maintain the honours of his father's house. For this purpose a university course was essential, and he was accordingly sent to Oxford, at the age of fifteen. Unfortunately for the admiral's purpose, there sat in the dean's chair the form of John Owen, whose high-hearted Puritanism was too earnest and real a thing not to prove contagious to sympathetic natures. Penn, having but a few years before been led by his father's imprisonment under Cromwell to serious reflections, and even to a supposed vision, soon became deeply susceptible to the Puritan influence, and plunged profoundly into the great theological controversies of the day. Hence, when Owen was displaced by the Restoration parliament, the sympathies of Penn and others were all arrayed strongly and indignantly against the new *régime*. At this critical juncture there appeared at Oxford a Thomas Loe, who came to proclaim the new doctrines of George Fox, and who found in the excited minds of these recusant adherents of Owen a ready sympathy with his own protest against prevalent spiritual wickedness in high places. A furious crusade of the enthusiastic reformers against the unscriptural abomination of gowns, very naturally procured their expulsion from the university. The ambitious admiral was horror-struck at the thought of the heir and hope of his house becoming a ranting fanatic, and received him with cold and angry contempt. But finding this course unavailing, he determined to try what has cured so many of all taint of seriousness or sobriety—a tour of continental travel, which should expose him to the brilliant seductions of courtly life in Paris and elsewhere in Europe. The plan was so far successful that the silent and almost saturnine boy became somewhat of a polished man of the world, adopting the dress and manners of the fine gentleman, disarming his antagonist in a street duel with rapiers, and able to utter those soft and elegant nothings that formed the staple of fashionable conversa-

tion in that frivolous age. But there were two circumstances that deposited counteracting influences in his mind, the effects of which were long afterwards developed. The first was a course of theological study under the direction of the celebrated Amyrault, of Saumur, whose name is so prominent in the controversies of the Reformed Church of France. Those who have looked into these controversies, will not wonder that, under the guidance of this subtle and powerful intellect, materials should have been accumulated in the mind of Penn which afterwards were used with such force upon Hicks, Kiffin, Baxter, and others whom he met in his countless controversies. The second circumstance was the acquaintance of Algernon Sidney, from whom he imbibed notions that were afterwards attempted to be realized in "the holy experiment" that was made on the fertile banks of the Delaware. But in spite of the theological and political elements that were then infused into his mind, he returned to England, and made his appearance in the gay court of Charles, a finished cavalier. But again were his old Puritan longings awakened by that terrible visitation on London, the plague, in which the phantom of the pale horse and the thirsty dart made many a godless and thoughtless heart tremble; and again did the admiral interpose to save his heir apparent from fanaticism. He therefore sent him to Ireland, where the scheme seemed likely again to be crowned with complete success. The brilliant but virtuous court of Ormonde presented so many counteracting influences, that, having tasted the excitement of military life in an insurrection at Carrickfergus, he became anxious to enter the army, and actually had himself painted, the first and only time in his life, in the costume of a soldier. His father refused his consent to this scheme, supposing that all was going to his mind in regard to his son. But a seeming accident dashed all these expectations, and settled the destiny of Penn. Hearing, on a visit to Cork, that his quondam apostle, Thomas Loe, was to preach that night, he went to hear him, rather from curiosity than any deeper emotion. The fiery words of the earnest Quaker fell, like living coals, on the smouldering elements of religious fervour that yet slumbered in his heart; and inspired with a new purpose, he turned his back on the peerage and splendour intended for him by his father, and identified himself with the followers of George Fox. His father, hearing of it, sent for him, and being unutterably scandalized by his adherence to a sect that would not doff the hat, even in the presence of monarchy itself, the indignant old admiral turned him out of doors. Although readmitted to his father's house, an impassable gulf existed between the two, which continued to separate them, until the admiral was enabled to

judge of the wisdom of his son's choice in that solemn and searching light that falls on earthly things from a death-bed, when his heart relented, and he left his son his fortune and his blessing. Thus ended the courtier epoch of Penn's life; and though, like the rushing tide of the Missouri, after mingling with the placid Father of Waters, we may trace its turbid elements long afterwards in the flow of his life, yet at this point it loses its separate character, and is joined by another set of influences, which bring before us William Penn *the Christian*.

When we pronounce Penn to be a representative of Quakerism as a religious principle, we are not to be understood as affirming that he was a complete type of this movement. Indeed, there was something in the original bent of his mind that did not wholly symphonize with the essential character of Quakerism. Penn was by nature an enthusiast, but not a mystic, and it is in the combination of the two that we find the genuine representation of their religious movement. There were two facts in his nature that drew him toward Quakerism. The one was his Puritanism—the deep and solemn impression of spiritual things that possessed his soul, and prepared him to unite with any class of men, who could share these profound and powerful emotions. The other fact was, his English love of fair-play, and sympathy with the oppressed, who were aiming to establish some great principle. We firmly believe that had Cromwell lived, and given, as he desired, free toleration to all religious professions, —had Quakerism been allowed without opposition to lift up its voice against steeple-houses, mass-houses, taking off hats, and wearing Babylonish apparel, Penn never would have been a Quaker. There was in him, however, a John Bull honesty, with a spice of obstinacy and pugnacity which belongs to the same type of character, that drew him to the persecuted followers of Fox, with all the kindling sympathies of a noble nature hating unfairness and oppression of the weak. Hence his services to the cause were mainly of a polemic character, and he was rather the Ulrich von Hütten or the Theodore Agrippa D'Aubigné of this movement, than the type of its spiritual character. It is perfectly obvious that his sympathies were even stronger with such men as Sidney, Hampden, and Locke, than with Fox, Loe, or the noisy peripatetics who shocked drowsy hirelings in steeple-houses, or fulminated to gaping crowds in market-places, with their testimony against the evil of the times. There is no evidence that he was ever very fondly regarded by Fox, but rather the contrary, in the absence of all confiding and commendatory allusion to him in Fox's private journal, such as we should expect to find with regard to one who rendered the cause such good service. Nor is there any-

thing in this fact that is surprising. Quakerism, from its origin in such a man as Fox, was a protest against all that was esteemed conformity to the world in dress, deportment, and manner of living; and with that pertinacious magnifying of little things, which our nature is always prone to when we lose sight of sober reason and revelation as our guides, it became fiercely intolerant about trifles, whilst denouncing an intolerance about matters of greater importance. This strain of opposition was entirely in accordance with the tastes of many of the early converts, but could not be fully embodied in the son of Admiral Penn, and the friend of Rochester and the two monarchs of the Restoration. He always retained a weakness for the creature comforts and even the elegancies of life, that was sorely scandalizing to his more cynical brethren, and was made the ground of bitter accusations. It is very easy to see that other feelings besides those of a holy indignation against worldly conformity might arise in the lean and gaunt apostles of Fox, when they saw Penn decked out in periwigs of the finest curl and powder, against which they had borne special testimony, and, together with his family, indulging in the gaudy superfluities of silk, and gold, and silver in their apparel; living in a house whose furniture had an elegance that made it vie with a palace; and keeping up a table that not only groaned with the dainties and delicacies of the palate, but also glittered with the elegancies and splendours of the side-board. Mr. Dixon himself, whilst attempting to deny this want of sympathy with his brethren, furnishes unconsciously at once the proof and the explanation of the fact in his own statements. He tells us distinctly that the men who stood by him in his misfortunes were not his fellow-Quakers, but such men as Rochester, Ranelagh, Tillotson, and Locke. And it is only this fact that can redeem the whole sect from a verdict of the most infamous ingratitude in thus forsaking him after his eminent services and sufferings for them. Did we believe that he enjoyed their sympathies and confidence wholly, as one of them in every respect, we should denounce them with indignant severity for thus deserting him in his hour of need. Admitting the fact we allege, we have an explanation of their conduct, which, whilst it cannot justify its ingratitude, yet relieves it from the charge of monstrous and unmitigated baseness.

The service rendered by Penn to his sect was very considerable. With that restless activity and enterprise that belonged to his English nature, he went forth as a missionary to proclaim these new doctrines on the continent. Here he at once gave and received impulses that continued to act long after his missionary tour was ended. In visiting Holland, he came in contact with some of those exiles for

conscience' sake who were looking to the New World as the theatre for the establishment of their principles; and dreams of a holy commonwealth began to arise in his mind, which were afterwards to be embodied in the experiment of Pennsylvania. His labours also at home, in battling for the new faith with his tongue and pen, were by no means inconsiderable. His fluency and ready memory gave him great advantages in oral discussion, whilst a smooth, and at times somewhat energetic style of expression, in spite of his tendency to what Burnet calls "a tedious, luscious way of talking," gave fitting expression to his thoughts. Here also he used to great advantage the treasures that he had accumulated, and the polemic subtilty and skill he had acquired under Owen, at Oxford, and Amyrault, at Saumur; and the *Catenæ Patrum*, and *Loci Communes*, which now seem to us such stores of learned lumber, were wielded with no small effect in that age of theological dialectics.

But, perhaps, his greatest services were rendered in the social and civil relations of the new sect. The public adherence of such a man tended to redeem the new movement from the character of absolute vulgarity, and shield it from that utter contempt with which men generally would be disposed to regard it. But contempt was not the only influence to be dreaded. Hatred and open hostility, the more intense because of the mingling of political and religious feelings so closely in that day, were visited on the Quakers, not only in acts of popular violence, but also in the rigorous enforcement of laws, which, however at variance with English liberty in its essential principles, yet found their place on the English statute-book. And whilst we cannot, with Mr. Dixon, consider Penn as placing the rights of juries, and the guarantees of prisoners, in the commanding position which they now hold, by his own individual trial, yet we must admit that it was one of the battles that was fought for these great principles, and that in contesting the positions taken by the court, he did a valuable service not only to his sect, but also to his nation. And whilst we cannot fully reconcile his course with his principles of passive non-resistance, yet this is but in accordance with the general view we have taken of his Christian and Quaker character. That he was not bound by his principles to obey a bad law is true, but that this unresisting passivity, which his sect proclaimed as Christian meekness, was consistent with an attempt to induce, first the court, and then the jury, to set aside the law, and assume the power of annulling and virtually repealing it, whilst they had sworn to decide under and according to the law; and also with his influence in prevailing upon the imprisoned jurors to sue out a writ of *habeas corpus* for their discharge,—that such sturdy and man-

ful battling for victory, even in a good cause, was exactly Quakerish, is a fact which many will be slow to perceive. But the world owes many of its greatest blessings to the inconsistency of its benefactors, and will judge much more leniently of the man who is inconsistently right, than of him who is always consistently wrong. But, however we may decide the questions of casuistry that arise here, it is obvious that the bold and successful stand that was taken by Penn in regard to this species of legal persecution, was the means of saving his compeers from much petty annoyance and harassing difficulty.

The connexion of Penn with James II. presents nothing which, with our view of his Christian character, was inconsistent with his duties or relations. It is true, that had he been a disciple of the grain of blunt old Fox, there might have arisen between the Quaker and the Papist some exciting discussions about mass-houses, rag-religion, and unseemly vanities, if not on graver topics; but we regard the absence of these things in the connexion between the monarch and subject, as equally consistent with the good sense and good manners of both, and not inconsistent with the sincerity of each in his religious professions. The relations between James and Penn were produced by two causes, the first of which was highly honourable to both, and the second at least highly natural in view of the circumstances of the case. Admiral Penn was the friend of the Stuarts in their exile and misfortune, and descended even to treachery to advance their interests, and after their restoration to power continued their loyal and devoted subject in a department of service in which his eminent abilities were peculiarly valuable, and in which England had a special pride. It was, therefore, natural that he should be regarded with special favour, and that when, on his death-bed, he commended his son to the royal favour, James, then Duke of York, should undertake his guardianship out of affection to the dying hero. This guardianship he exercised before he ascended the throne, and before his patronage could be referred to any motives of state policy. This was the first and main cause of the intimacy thus so strangely existing between the republican Quaker and the despotic Papist. The second cause was one which cannot be regarded as seriously open to objection. Penn was contending as a Quaker for liberty of conscience, because he believed that it was sinful to repress the manifestations of the inward light, and unjust to deprive an Englishman of the power of doing what was not morally wrong. James was desirous of obtaining this liberty because he himself needed its protection, and because thus his designs in introducing Popery could the more effectually be promoted. Different, however, as were their motives, the

result aimed at was the same—the abolition of all penal restrictions on religious belief; and therefore it was not surprising that both, feeling themselves to be weak, should seek mutually to strengthen one another in attaining a common end. As Quaker and Papist were classed together in common hate and hostility, and oppressed by common disabilities of law, it is not matter of surprise that they should unite in striving to obtain common safety and protection. Such a union was, under the circumstances, natural in the highest degree.

Mr. Dixon devotes an extra chapter to "the Macaulay charges," which he denies, and tries to disprove with great spirit, and as to the most serious of them, with success. But with that proneness to hero-worship which seems to be strong in his nature, he thinks it needful to show that, because Macaulay is wrong about some things, he is wrong about everything, and that his hero is the very Bayard of the broad-brimmed chivalry. This claim, however, has certainly not been made out either by Dixon or Forster for William Penn.

Mr. Dixon reduces Macaulay's charges to five; the first of which is, that Penn's connexion with James in 1684, caused his own sect to look coldly upon him. Mr. D. replies to this, that "his only authority for this statement is Gerard Croese, a Dutchman, who was never in England in his life," and that the records of the society show that he was in good standing. Now it so happens that Mr. D. has wholly blundered in replying to this charge, missing its vulnerable point, replying to a charge which was not made, and asserting a fact which was not true. It is not only not true that Croese was never in England, but the evidence of this fact is found in the very passage quoted by Macaulay. And the fact exhibited from the Society Records does not bear on the charge, any more than the fact that Thomas Jefferson was elected to high office and never impeached proves that there was no suspicion and dislike felt toward him. The allegation is not of anything publicly and formally expressed, but of coldness and dislike, which would naturally take a less open form. The proof that this feeling exists is spread out on Dixon's own pages. The only point where the charge is really vulnerable is overlooked by Mr. Dixon. It is in assigning the cause of this want of cordiality solely to his connexion with James. It had other causes, as we have suggested, more creditable to Penn, and perhaps less creditable to his associates, although not involving anything in them at variance with the common laws of human nature.

The second charge, that Penn "extorted money" from the girls of Taunton for the maids of honour, is the most serious, and is fully

set aside by Mr. Dixon. He gives eight reasons against this charge, the first of which is, that the letter on which it was based was directed to George Penne, and not to William Penn. Now this is really all that is needed, and the other points raised are like the twelve reasons that were proffered for the absence of a juror, the first of which was that he was dead—a reason which was deemed wholly satisfactory by the Court, and the others were dispensed with. Mr. D. having clearly made out that it was Penne, not Penn, who was engaged in this mean business, the charge must be withdrawn, and we believe has been withdrawn by Macaulay himself. That it should ever have been made by one who had studied the high and honourable character of Penn in all pecuniary transactions, is certainly somewhat surprising.

In regard to the other charges, we believe that Mr. D. has adduced proof that satisfactorily establishes the substantial innocence of Penn, although in some cases he does not fairly meet the statements of Macaulay. In the transaction with Kiffin, all that Mr. D. adduces is negative, as far as respects the charge that James prevailed on Penn to use his influence with Kiffin to accept the aldermanship, and that this influence was ineffectual. It may be true that Penn did advise Kiffin to the step, and yet that his advice was not at first followed, whilst afterwards, when stronger influences were brought to bear, the office was accepted. But the charge itself really involves no guilt on the part of Penn, considering his relations with the king.

Mr. Dixon also indulges in the heroics somewhat, at the remark of Macaulay that Penn had become "a tool of the king and the Jesuits," and utters some very indignant bursts of eloquent interrogation concerning Penn's boldness and decided Protestantism. Now the remark of Macaulay contains no imputation on either, for his employment as a tool of Jesuitical intrigue was not with his complete knowledge of the extent of the designs which he was employed to further. He was an unconscious instrument, and unconscious because of the very unsuspecting nobleness of his nature, and the more effectual because of the simple integrity of purpose with which he acted. The crafty Jesuits used him as they have so often used noble natures, and are using them at this hour, by playing upon the very excellencies of their character, and enlisting them in their service. All that is proved there, by such a charge, is, that Penn was not as wily or profound a plotter as those with whom he was associated by circumstances; a fact which few persons will regard as much to his disadvantage.

As far, then, as these charges seriously affect the Christian char-

acter of Penn, we believe they have been successfully answered by his defenders; but as far as they show him to be a man of like weaknesses and foibles with his fellows, we regard the effort at vindication as at once unnecessary and unsuccessful. Penn, although a decided Quaker, was neither an ascetic nor a mystic, nor did he deem it necessary to become a bare-footed friar because he had become a Christian. His aim was not to go out of the world, but to be delivered from its evil; and whilst, according to the rules of St. Dominic, and, indeed, according to the rules of honest old George, as expounded by such teachers as Bugg, (the man with the unsavoury name, as Southey calls him,) he cannot be canonised as a saint, yet, according to the broad and liberal canons of the word of God, he can be welcomed and loved by us as a Christian.

The third aspect in which we see him is, as *a colonist*. This portion of his life is set forth in ample detail by Mr. Dixon, and the perusal of it will excite feelings of the liveliest admiration for the energy of the colonist, and of the profoundest melancholy in view of the obstinacy and ingratitude which he encountered in his great enterprise. His thoughts were directed to this work by his disappointments in England. An ardent friend of liberty, and trembling for its fate in the feeble hands of Charles II., he strained every nerve to have Algernon Sidney returned to parliament, and succeeded, but was disappointed by the treachery and intrigue of the royalists, who procured his rejection from the house, although twice legally elected. Disheartened by these iniquitous measures, he began to look around him for some more hopeful field for the culture of these great principles of liberty. His eyes were naturally directed to that land of hope, the New World, concerning which his youthful enthusiasm had been kindled by his father's stories of the tropical splendour of the West Indies, and his later expectations excited by the Holland emigrants, who sought on the shores of New-England "freedom to worship God." Fortunately circumstances opened up a way by which these longings could be gratified. His father had bequeathed to him claims on the government for money lent, and arrearages of pay, amounting to fifteen thousand pounds, equivalent to near fifty thousand in our day. The empty exchequer of Charles was of course unable to meet such a claim, after its lavish squanderings on scandalous and worthless favourites, and hence payment was from time to time postponed. Penn now proposed to take in satisfaction for his claim a portion of the crown lands in the New World. This claim was opposed by the royalists, because of the republican notions he meant to ingraft on the colony; and a thousand delays, and vexations, and disappointments were invented

to baffle and defeat the project. At length, however, he succeeded, and a charter was made out for a tract of land, which Penn wished to name New-Wales, or Sylvania, but Charles, in honour of his father, called Pennsylvania. Of the vast region thus deeded away, he was made absolute proprietor. His next step was to devise a plan of settlement and government for his new colony, which he did, with the aid of his friend Sidney; and although we cannot, with Mr. Dixon, find in this the germ of the United States and the fountain of American liberty, yet we can unite with him in regarding it as a remarkable proof of the sagacity and political wisdom of its framers. To which of them it owes most, we cannot now decide; but there is honour enough for both, thus to throw themselves so far in advance of the ideas of their generation, and embody so fully the great principles of civil and religious liberty. Having determined the plan, the next step was to obtain suitable emigrants, which, in that restless and dissatisfied age, was not a matter of much difficulty. When it was understood that the enthusiastic follower of Fox, and the high-hearted friend of Sidney, had matured the plan of "a holy experiment" on the virgin soil of the west, in which the dreams of Harrington, More, and Locke should be gloriously embodied, many were found ready to flock around his standard. Accordingly, expeditions were soon fitted out, and in due time the proprietor himself followed, and began his noble and arduous work. He organized the government, embodying in it his principles of peace and justice; laid out a great city; made treaties with the Indians, of which Voltaire sarcastically said, that they were the only ones never sworn to, and never broken; and founded his new republic on principles the most wise, equitable, and comprehensive. Having finished this work he returned to England.

Now, however, his days began to be darkened with thick and gloomy clouds. The scenes that followed the accession and expulsion of James, and the breaking out of the French war involved him in great trouble. Under pretext that his Quaker principles were incompatible with the safety of the colony, and the military defence of the country, he was deprived of its government by an order of council, which annexed it to that of New-York. The blow was a sudden and crushing one. His whole fortune had been expended on his colony, so that one hundred and twenty thousand pounds would not cover the loss. The cherished dreams of his life were embodied in this "holy experiment," which now seemed about to be wrested from his hand. His Irish estates were ruined by the war of the revolution. His English property was covered up with fraudulent claims by the villanous Fords, whom he had so confidingly trusted.

He was thus reduced to poverty from an unbounded affluence, menaced with disgrace, threatened with illegal prosecutions, harassed with perjurers and slanderers, robbed of his proprietary rights, and to crown the crushing weight of misfortune, his high and noble-hearted wife, the lovely Guli, died, and left him to struggle with the gathering sorrows that thickened around, in loneliness and bereavement. We know of few sadder sights in history than Penn at this midnight of his life. But the cup of his bitterness was not yet full. In consequence of the resistance offered by the colonial government to Col. Fletcher, the royal deputy, it was actually proposed to withdraw the charter, and thus rob him of his land. He was aroused from the depth of his grief by this new outrage, and desirous of going to America to adjust the difficulty. But he was actually too poor to pay the outfit. He bethought himself of his colonists on whom he had expended a princely fortune, and who were at that time owing him a large amount of quit-rents. He therefore wrote a letter, in which he touchingly laid bare his poverty, and asked those who were in his debt to loan him a few thousands, that he might come out and shield them from this threatened outrage. To their eternal disgrace, they refused the loan, and even made his misfortunes the occasion of trying to exact new privileges from his generous and yielding nature. We wonder not that this utter baseness called forth such indignant complaints from him, and disturbed the quiet placidity of his usual mildness. That the colonists should be ever grasping increased grants of power, disputing his authority over them, and striving to limit his prerogative was the natural result of the unnatural mixture of feudalism and democracy that existed in his constitution; but that they should refuse to pay their lawful dues, neglect him in his misfortune, decline even a loan in his poverty, when they had in their own hands security for repayment, and make his very weakness the pretext for fresh rapacity, shows a thorough meanness and ingratitude of nature that hold them up to execration and contempt.

But matters began soon to brighten somewhat, as this chequered life wore nearer to its sunset. His government was restored to him by an order in council, and the sunshine friends who forsook him in his adversity began to return as the clouds dispersed. But his troubles were still not ended. He returned to Pennsylvania, intending to spend the remainder of his life in elegant retirement at Pennsbury, on the Delaware. But before he had been long there, he was alarmed by hearing of a new attempt in England to wrest from him his charter, and thus rob him of his property. Calling the colonial assembly together he urged them to take such steps as would remove

all pretext for this high-handed outrage, promising them all aid in his power in placing the colony on a permanent basis. Instead of responding to his generous patriotism, they again attempted to wring out of his misfortune some gain for themselves, and presented him a long list of the most exorbitant and exacting demands, as insulting as they were unjust. Penn, however, calmly reasoned with them, until they became ashamed of their most rapacious demands, and were reduced to less outrageous terms; but to the last they refused to take on themselves the expenses of their own government, which he had all along borne from his private means, and forced him to the necessity of selling land to raise the means of returning to England. At length he returned; and although the project of wresting the charter from him was abandoned, other troubles met him. The Fords, his sly and villanous agents, trumped up an enormous account against him, which, proven as it was by perjury, was forced to extreme process, and the generous old man, by whose unsuspicious confidence they were enabled to defraud him so basely, was arrested in meeting, and in his old age thrown into prison, because of his inability to pay an unjust debt. At length this matter was adjusted; but new difficulties appeared in the colony. Penn desired to return, but could not because of his poverty. Again he asked them for aid, desiring only the settlement of a stated salary upon him as governor. But again, with consistent meanness, his brethren refused to grant his request. He then wrote them a calm and touching letter, reciting his sleepless anxieties, his sacrifices, and his poverty, all endured for their sakes, and then offered to transfer them to the crown, if they desired the change. His letter seems to have produced a good effect, and the next session of the assembly was more rational and grateful, so that the old man's heart was gladdened by the evidence of returning reason, before he passed away.

But before a second assembly could convene he was beyond the influence of earthly trouble. Repeated strokes of palsy reduced him to a second childhood, and although for five years he lingered on, enjoying comparatively good health, the free and manly intellect was gone. His sole employment was gambolling with the children, and gazing at the beautiful furniture of his mansion with infantile delight. The powers of speech and memory gradually left him; and although there lingered a sweet and holy radiance about his wrecked nature, like a twilight on the columns of the Parthenon, yet it only made the more touching and mournful the shattered nobleness that it illumined. At length, after the columns of his earthly tabernacle had been gently taken down one by one, the final summons came, and without a struggle, or a gleam of conscious recognition of the weeping ones

who hung above the shattered ruins of the weary and wayworn pilgrim, he fell asleep, as the first gray dapplings of the dawn were brightening in the sky, on the morning of July 30, 1718. His end at least was peace.

Such was William Penn, the courtier, the Christian, and the colonist, whose life, though stormy and eventful to a degree unusual even in an age of event and storm, yet may be said to have had two childhoods and two deaths. Without being intellectually great, he did that by the unity, energy, and directness of his purposes which greatness failed to accomplish; and without being that faultless monster which his eulogists endeavour to depict him, he was a high-souled, manly, and open-hearted Englishman, a friend who never shrank from avowing his affection, a patriot who scorned to conceal his sentiments, and a Christian who was never ashamed of his cross. Although we cannot, with Mr. Dixon, make him the Romulus or Lycurgus of American liberty, yet we recognise his wisdom, pacific policy, and liberal views as among the most important elements that go to form the inheritance we enjoy, and his embodied influence in the colony he founded as giving marked and decided tone to many of our institutions. Without being either a myth, a hero, or a martyr, his rare combination of excellencies has exalted him into a species of mythical apotheosis, his success has invested him with a halo of heroism, and his sufferings have imparted to his life some of the sublime interest of martyrdom. Inferior to many of his contemporaries in separate qualities, he yet combined the available in faculties with the advantageous in circumstances, so as to accomplish that which they attempted in vain. Of his biographer we have only space to say, that he has done a good service to the memory of his hero, although failing to accomplish much that he has attempted. But we are bound in justice to add, that this failure arises from the impossibility of the case rather than from the inability of the writer; and our only objection is that he has had the folly to attempt what was impossible, and thus to render a partial failure certain. If he has not made a hero out of a warm, noble-hearted, and active Englishman, he has at least shown us that, in the various aspects under which we see William Penn, he was a man to be admired, loved, and even revered, and one whose memory the world will not, soon or willingly, permit to die.

Art. VIII.—POSITIVE SCIENCE.

Vestiges of Civilization; or, the Aetiology of History, Religious, Aesthetical, Political and Philosophical. New-York: H. Bailliere. 1851.

The work before us is the first-fruit in this country of the *Positive Philosophy* of Auguste Comte, of which a survey is given in a former article in our present number. The author admits that he owes his "fundamental principle" to M. Comte, whom he styles the "greater Newton, succeeding the greater Kepler, of social and universal science." But the disciple is not only bold enough, like his master, to differ from all previous thinkers, but also to extend the views of the master himself, if not to forsake them in a most important application of the fundamental principle, as will further appear in our brief analysis of the work.

But before entering upon this analysis, we must characterize the work briefly, at least in some of its more prominent, though accidental, attributes. The task of the book is no less than to constitute a scientific theory (*the* scientific theory its author would say) of universal nature and universal knowledge, by which both are brought under *one and the same law* of *progressive evolution.* It is, in a word, the great project, so often essayed by philosophers, both ancient and modern, from Thales and Xenophanes down to Fichte and Hegel, of explaining and determining the *knowable.* And yet the author concludes, in his introduction, that "a theory, thus comprising all principles and comprised in all experience, may be made evident and irresistible to the plainest understanding;" and he hopes "to give the largest generality of readers a conception, clear and consecutive, of both the natural laws of civilization and the essential conditions of science!" A more conclusive proof could hardly be furnished that he belongs to the

Gens ratione ferox et mentem pasta chimæris.

And like all the rest of the tribe he dogmatizes throughout with the loftiest confidence that *his* theory is *the* theory—that the organism of the universe is in his hands, and that the law of development, for man and nature, after struggling through the darkness of ages, has at last found its expounder—not even in Auguste Comte, but in the author of the "Vestiges of Civilization!" To this complexion the thing comes at last, notwithstanding the author's disclaimer—repeated at intervals through the work when some new burst of his own arrogance or irreverence has awakened even his slumbering modesty—of individual claims to pre-eminence, except of position.

Quite consistent with this self-assumed superiority, as the oracle of the new and final *instauratio scientiarum*, is the writer's systematic depreciation of theology, of theologians, and of spiritual religion, throughout the work. No possible opportunity for a sneer is ever lost; and when the finer edge cannot be employed, the writer does not disdain to employ ribaldry as thorough, and, we regret to say, as vulgar, as that of Paine. The Hebrew Bible is for him "a crude miscellany," less ripe than the collections of Trismegistus—"a farrago of nursery tales, imagined two or three thousand years ago, by a handful of scrofulous barbarians." The "priesthood" were the "professional executioners of early days, and are, in *all* days, too full of the *afflatus* of divinity to have place for humanity in their hearts. It is upon society, alone, that the holy men in question feed, and feast, and fatten." The apologist for the Bible must either justify it on the ground of the infantile imbecility of the Jewish mind, or "excuse it for indecencies which would be thought too disgusting, by a voluptuary of any refinement, to insert in a book of obscenity." The writer who can thus insult the cherished convictions of millions of his fellows—nay, of the wisest and best among those millions—shows himself as destitute of discretion as he is of decency. His whole procedure in this regard seems to us to lack few of the elements of madness. Even the heathen oracles were too sane to disgust their auditors: this climax of folly remained to be achieved by the hierophant of the "Age of Science."

But the theologians may take comfort; the blows of our author's ponderous bludgeon fall as heavily upon all other classes of thinkers. According to him, the "historians" have never produced anything but "a jumble of opinions without consistency and of facts without cohesion;" Niebuhr is but a "reputed reformer," and Prescott writes history "with the philosophy of a fairy tale." The metaphysicians have produced nothing but "reveries;" Mr. Whewell sets up "the conceptive capacity of a clergyman as the model of all truth and the measure of all creation;" the sphere of philology "has never yet been penetrated by a steady ray of science." These are but slight indications of the spirit of the book throughout—a spirit unworthy of the genuinely scientific mind which the author of this book unquestionably possesses.

Another feature, so prominent as to force itself upon our attention everywhere, is the writer's almost servile deference to the French mind, and his consequent depreciation of the English and the German intellect. The Frenchman not only speaks "the most perfect, without a second, of human tongues," but is, *eo nomine*, a philosopher: while the English mind is essentially unscientific and unconstructive;

and the German "wallows in a chaos of crudities."* Injustice to the German mind is flagrant on almost every page of the work; and this, too, while the writer is obviously ignorant of a sentence of the language, and owes his half-knowledge of the theories he dismisses so summarily wholly to French or English translators or expositors! To this ignorance he is indebted for one of his "pregnant and pertinent proofs" that the French mind is now ripe for philosophical history:—"The word *historical*," he says, "is not used in French, as in our own and other idioms, to denote a mere matter of record, but is now become significant of matter of fact, in contradistinction to matter of fable!" How long the German language preceded the French in this use of the word we leave our author to find out; while we beg to assure him, that inaccuracies like this, so positively offered, go far to weaken our confidence in his verifications in general. And in quitting these general views upon his book, we tell him also that if we were disposed to retort upon him even the slightest measure of the sarcasm he so lavishes upon Christianity and Christian ministers, it would be the easiest thing in the world to draw from his own book materials enough so instinct with the *ridiculous*, that no skill of ours would be requisite to barb the arrow—no malignity to poison it. But

Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis

is the sacred cause of truth and of God to be defended. The author is a man of profoundly scientific mind—his work is one of the most logically concatenated treatises we have ever read—and we trust, spite of all the provocations he has given us, to treat both him and his book as they deserve to be treated—on scientific grounds. We proceed then to our summary analysis, only regretting that our limits bind us to the closest brevity of exposition.

The *object* of the work is, as we have stated, identical with that of those philosophers, in all times, who have sought to construct universal systems. But all previous systems, according to the Positive Philosophy, rested upon assumptions which were, moreover, metaphysical or negative phantasies, such as the Universal Unity, the Ego, the Absolute, the Forms of the Understanding, &c. And they were not only chimerical, but incomplete—leaving unbridged the gulf between Man and Nature. Thus Schelling's notion of the *Absolute* implies an opposition between Man and Nature not less than does the all-creative Ego of Fichte; for it, too, makes mind and man the measure of the universe. All these theories (hypothe-

* Strange that the French mind, all scientific as it is, should have paid so little heed to the new Apostle of Science, that M. Comte's great work on Sociology (his crowning task) cannot find a publisher in Paris!

ses, rather) are well compared by our author to "a squirrel in a revolving cage." Unlike these, or any other attempts of the kind, the work before us attempts to reduce the two elements of mind and nature to the same genetical laws, under a conception of real or *positive objectivity*—and this, too, the objectivity not of *entities*, material or mental, but of *relation*. And, what is still more strikingly characteristic of the work, it seeks to found this law upon *a pure induction of facts*, in all the sciences and to all the senses.

To *Sense* there are two facts indubitable and fundamental: 1. The existence of what we call *matter*, or, more strictly, its impression upon, or rather its *relation* to the percipient. 2. The *changes* of such relations, as continuous, or as recurring after intervals of disappearance. But these last form the group of conditions which we name *Motion*, *Space*, and *Time*. So certain are all and each of these, when properly viewed as *relations*, that it is absurd to deny and impossible to disbelieve them. Moreover, each member of this group implies the other; and while *they* presuppose no special object or phenomenon in the universe, there is no known or even imaginable object in which they are not presupposed. These three are the only postulates of the new theory; and it must be owned that few demonstrations could offer a more simple and reliable basis. So much for the facts of *sense*.

The facts of *Science* on which the theory is finally rested, are the same elementary facts of Sensation, generalized into the abstract conceptions termed Laws. In this maturer form, they are recognised in the triad of sciences called Mathematics—in the laws (or general relations) of Number, Extension, and Figure. The certainty of these is axiomatic and proverbial. And with these few and familiar elements the theory is ready to proceed on its adventurous way. Motion passing Matter by progressive preponderance from the primordial state of indefinite diffusion (Number) into a state of special direction, (Extension,) and bringing inevitably two or more such formations into opposition (Figure)—in other terms, Gravitation, Affinity, Polarity—this is the triad of forces by whose incessant revolution upon its previous results, accumulating through an eternity of ages, the theory before us pretends to evolve the whole fair universe, in all its past history and in all its present phases—*including* the Human Mind and the Social System, its highest development! It is the very Gospel of Materialism.

The writer puts the system to a crucial test in boldly applying it to the Social System, which is, as we have said, the last development of the human mind. The highest term of an organic series includes and images all the rest; and so the history of Humanity, in its aggre-

gate evolution, must reproduce, though of course on an enormously complicated scale, the successive triplicity of the three laws of *all* formation as above given. This three-fold division is supplied to the author in Comte's law of historical progression or of social evolution, viz., that the human mind, science, and society, pass through three successive stages, the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive.* The author divides his work, according to this law of evolution, into three cycles, which, by a modification of Comte's nomenclature, he calls the Mythological, the Metaphysical, and the Scientific. This modification, however, implies no substantial change; but in the use of the term Metaphysical our author somewhat differs from Comte, who characterizes the Metaphysical epoch as philosophizing upon "entities," whereas in the work before us these entities themselves are resolved into the type of Will. So, also, the "divinities" and "laws" of Comte's theological and positive eras respectively, are here resolved into the subjective principles of Sensation and Reason. But, as we remarked in the beginning, the writer essays a far bolder flight than even Comte, in the full establishment of his theory. The French philosopher discovered his law, and still maintains it, upon purely empirical grounds. He does not attempt to explain *how* things came to be as they are, but confines himself to their actual existence and operations. He formally disclaims all *genetic* causation—not that he denies it, but only insists that its mode and conditions are unattainable to the human faculties. This *petitio principii* is the fatal flaw in Comte's system; and our author attempts no less than to remedy it by *supplying* the genetic causation or explication, which he not only seeks to carry down through the mental elements and epochs of civilization, but also to extend back through all physical creation.

The three-fold arrangement of the work is, according to our author, "a compound and necessary result (1) of the logical organization of the mind conceiving, (2) of the cosmical order among the things to be conceived, and (3) of the consequent Modes of the Conception." These three factors are explained in a preliminary Part, which treats, in three chapters, I. of the Human Mind, II. of Cosmical Nature, III. of Method. All these are treated *analytically;* and herein the author differs from most system-makers, who generally, after fixing their principles, proceed dogmatically upon them. Nay more, as if in bravado of confidence in his theory, he gives his analysis in the order above stated, though, according to the law of evolution, he should have begun with the World instead of the Mind. His first attempt then is to detect the normal triplicity of his general law in the recognised attributes of the mind, which he resolves into the one

* See page 30 of this Review.

single faculty of Perception, developing itself progressively under nine processes in passing through the triple formulas as repeated in the three cycles. These processes are

1st. Cycle . . . . . Sensation, Memory, Imagination,
2d. do. . . . . Reflection, Abstraction, Generalization,
3d. do. . . . . Reasoning, Comparison, Method.

To complete the furniture of the mature intellect, you must add the *generic* or conceptive principles of which these triads are species; and these prove to be the types of the three cycles, viz., Sensation, (or Life,) Will, and Reason. To corroborate these analytic results the author goes into a wide induction of facts, from Mathematics even up to Theology; for the theory, be it remembered, is to *solve all questions within the sphere of the human intellect.* The mathematical corroboration is drawn from Plato's doctrine of the triangle: the moral, from the stages of individual growth, viz., Infancy, Adolescence, and Maturity, (animal, moral, rational:) the physiological, from the three centres of vital organism—the stomach, the heart, and the brain: the historical, from the traditional attribution of the mental functions to each of these organs: the theological from the trinities of all duly developed religions. We need hardly recall Schelling to the minds of our philosophical readers while they survey this universal evolution of triplicity. Schelling proved it as well from his stand-point of objective idealism, as our author from his bold materialism. But in point of logical skill, the latter is certainly equal to the former. The second chapter of this first part treats, as we have said, of the Constitution of Nature, and the third, of Universal Method. The double mode of procedure before indicated is carried through both these chapters; but our space forbids us to enter upon their details. The result of the second chapter is a resolution of the external world into the sole agency of Motion, disposing matter under three progressive combinations of attributes, and composing each upon three subordinate but similar forms of existences—both resulting in three predicables and nine categories, as follows:—

Predicables.	Categories.
Co-existence, ...	Number, Quantity, Figure,
Co-occurrence, ...	Force, Mixture, Structure,
Co-operation, ...	Growth, Life, Mind.

In the third chapter Method is defined to be "the means of placing the perceiving mind upon the track of creative nature." Its type or fundamental form is found in Induction. Here, again, unable to follow the steps of the analysis, we can only state its results, viz., that "the universal method of Induction, in leading the human mind throughout the labyrinth of nature," accomplishes the route by three

systematic surveys, with three similar and subordinate stages to each as follows, viz. :—

Systems.	Methods.		
Logic . . .	Enumeration:	Analogy:	Syllogism:
Analytic . .	Observation:	Instrumentation:	Experimentation:
Synthetic . .	Deduction:	Classification:	Taxonomy.*

In the conclusion of the chapter the results are brought together and verified by a classification of the sciences, which consists, in fact, in little more than changing the terms employed in the different categories into technical forms, and subordinating them all, in strict accordance with all previous developments of the system, into a final formula, the science of humanity, viz., CIVILIZATION. And here he goes beyond Comte (who refers the moral and intellectual operations to the category of mere natural or physical man, but under the term *Social Physics*) in placing Humanity at the head of the scale as an organic unity,—"a *being* whose constituent elements are the mass of human individuals; whose distinguishing attributes are language, reflection, reason; and whose organic structure is composed of arts, institutions, and sciences."

The fourth chapter gives an analysis of Motive, which, quite consistently with the character of the whole system, makes Pain and Pleasure, in reference to individuals, Evil and Good with reference to society, the supreme, nay, the *sole* motives of the human mind.

After having thus constructed, and, as he supposes, established his system, our author proceeds in Part II. to apply it to the history of all arts, institutions, systems, and religions through what he calls the Mythological and the Metaphysical ages successively. As for the Scientific age, he only claims to be its herald, not its historian. His course is marked, throughout, by the same acuteness that we have so freely accorded to the former steps of the investigation. It is out of the question for us to attempt even a summary of the procedure. Our imperfect analysis of the work will suffice to show to all who are interested in such speculations, that no such comprehensive attempt at the construction of a scientific system has ever been made on American soil—nor, indeed, upon English. Purposing to return to the work, if possible, for a more full examination than is now possible, and for such a refutation of its errors, both of theory and of application, as we may be able to offer, we can only now make a remark or two upon its tendency.

The whole scheme, as we have seen, is materialistic to the highest

* For *taxonomy* we suppose the author meant to coin the word *taxinomy*. The book abounds in inaccuracies of typography, and in inaccuracies, besides, for which the author is responsible. For many of these the undue haste with which the book was written offers no apology. The book and the world could both have afforded to wait a little longer.

degree. On its basis the conception of Deity is a mere generalization of experience—and the last work of the human mind, in clearing its way to *science*, is to get rid of that conception entirely. The idea of a Divine Designer of the universe is but a relic of the superstitious infancy of the human race. Of course, the notion of final causes is absurd. The morality of the scheme is, as is quite necessary, the lowest and meanest sensualism. The freedom of the will is a chimæra—the will itself "is a mere effect." Human *rights* are "entified appetites." Romanism is the true type of Christianity; and the Jesuit maxim, that "the end sanctifies the means," has "never been refuted on Christian principles, and never can be."

Can that system be *philosophical*, which leads to these results? No—it is the negation of philosophy—it is, in fact, the assertion that philosophy is impossible, for it ignores all the *real* questions of philosophy as out of its sphere. It declares that *all* knowledge is limited to the recognition of phenomena, and to the explanation of merely phenomenal laws. The consequences of this position were fully set forth in the article on Philosophy and Faith in our number for April, 1851, and we need not repeat them here. The fundamental vice of the exclusive procedure of the Positive Philosophy is abundantly exposed in that article, and in the first of our present number; and to these, with the one to follow in our April number, we commend our readers for a full exhibition of the limits and the faults of that philosophy. We do not fear any harm to Christianity from the widest application of the Positive Method to the world of *phenomena*. But so miserable is the failure of the grand attempt before us, when the author seeks to apply it to subjects beyond its sphere, that a sentence or two will suffice to indicate it. The Bible, according to this writer, is a "farrago of nursery tales," originating in the "infantile imbecility" of the Jewish mind. Now *monotheism* is the turning point from the "Mythological" to the "Metaphysical" cycles, and the author himself employs the first chapter of Genesis to inaugurate the advent of his second epoch. The "infantile" mind of the race of "scrofulous barbarians" had anticipated the progress of the universal mind of the race by fifteen hundred years! How does our author account for this? Why, by the vague assertion that Moses "*might have imported a species of personal monotheism, then breaking upon the van of the Egyptian intellect!*" That the human mind has a range of thought *beyond* phenomena, and independent of them —so far as its sources are concerned—this is the indestructible position on which we rest: a position confirmed at once by the consciousness, and even by the experience of mankind, and verified by the failure of *every* system of metaphysics or of science which has sought or claimed to be universal.

Art. IX.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) It is seldom we have the gratification of calling the attention of our readers to so important and valuable a work as "*The New Testament Expounded and Illustrated, according to the usual Marginal References, in the very words of Holy Scripture, together with the Notes and Translations, and a complete Marginal Harmony of the Gospels*, by Clement Moody, M. A." (New-York: Lane & Scott, 1852; royal 8vo., pp. 655.) Every student of the Bible knows what floods of light the comparison of scripture with scripture throws upon the sacred text; the juxtaposition of parallel passages is often the best of commentaries. But the trouble and delay of making this comparison prevent ordinary readers from enjoying its benefits to the full extent; and besides, when one has turned to several passages, it is difficult to bear them all in mind at once. The work before us is designed to meet these difficulties, and does it most effectually, by *printing the parallel passages* in full, or so much of them as may be necessary to illustrate the text, at the foot of each page, in the form of a commentary. The sense of each reference is made complete in itself, so as to save all further search on the part of the reader, except only in those places where the text and the parallel are *identical* both in sentiment and language, where it would have been obviously useless to encumber the page with anything more than a reference. We shall be greatly mistaken if this does not turn out to be one of the most popular as well as most useful works ever issued from the Methodist Book Concern. It meets a want which is felt alike by the theologian, the ordinary reader of Scripture, and the Sabbath-school teacher—and we cordially commend it to *all* who really desire to "search the Scriptures."

(2.) We have called the attention of our readers from time to time to the successive issues of the "*Iconographic Encyclopædia of Science, Literature and Art*," (New-York: Rudolph Garrigue,) as they have issued from the press; but our notices, given in this way, have been necessarily fragmentary and imperfect. The complete work now lies before us, and we must give it a more extended survey, though we regret that our space will allow us, even now, to give a notice by no means commensurate, either in extent or minuteness, with the magnitude and importance of the work.

The work is founded upon the "Bilder Atlas zum Conversations-Lexicon," just published in Leipzig, and edited by J. G. Heck. The American edition, which is in many respects a modification of the original rather than a translation, comprises four large 8vo. volumes, containing over 3,200 pages of text, with five hundred steel plates in quarto, including 12,000 separate figures. The title is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the whole range of human knowledge, but Biography. Speculative Philosophy, and the Abstract Sciences in general, are expressly shut out; and even with this exclusion, it is obvious that the utmost power of compression must be employed to give even a sketch of the vast field of human knowledge in so compendious a form. Accordingly, the work is confined pretty strictly to a clear statement of the ascertained *facts*

of human knowledge, with the view of furnishing a book to which the general reader may safely apply for an explanation of the principal physical facts which come under his notice. The arrangement adopted is not alphabetical, but that of a systematic grouping of distinct treatises, according to their natural affinities. The work thus contains, in part, a series of text-books, many of which "are fuller in their details than most of the popular treatises of the day." Full tables of contents and indexes are given with each volume to facilitate occasional reference, giving the work all the advantage of the alphabetical arrangement.

The supervision of the whole work has been carried on by Professor S. F. BAIRD, formerly of Dickinson College, and now Assistant-Secretary of the Smithsonian Institute. We assured our readers, in our first announcement of the work, of Professor Baird's ample qualifications for the task of editing it, and we find all our promises more than confirmed by the result. Indeed, there has been no instance in this country in which a great literary task, involving the labour of many hands, and extending necessarily over a large space of time, has been so promptly completed according to its original promise, with so much credit both to editor and publisher, as the Iconographic Encyclopædia. The labour, in addition to actual translation, which has devolved upon the editor and his coadjutors, may be best learned by the following extract from the preface:—

"In undertaking an English version of the Iconographic Encyclopædia it was soon found that a literal translation of the original would not satisfy the wants of the American public. Written in and for Germany, the different subjects were treated of much more fully in relation to that country than to the rest of the world. In some articles, too, owing to the lapse of time or other causes, certain omissions of data occurred, which did not allow of their being considered as representing the present state of science, or as suiting the wants of the United States. This, therefore, has rendered it necessary to make copious additions, alterations, and abridgments in the respective translations; while, in some instances, it has been thought proper to rewrite entire articles. Several of these original papers have been prepared by the Editor, and the remainder kindly furnished by some of his friends. Some of these again have relieved him of the burden of translating, and have added much to the merit of their work by judicious alterations and additions; while others have revised his MSS. and enriched them with important suggestions. The authority and value of the assistance thus obtained will be sufficiently evident from the names of those who have so kindly rendered it. To all he here takes the opportunity of returning his warmest acknowledgments.

"The second volume, or the one containing Botany, Zoology, and Anthropology, has been entirely rewritten. The articles in it not prepared by the Editor are *Invertebrate Zoology*, by Prof. S. S. HALDEMAN; *Ornithology*, by JOHN CASSIN, Esq.; and *Mammalia*, by CHARLES GIRARD, Esq.

"The friends to whom he is indebted for careful revision of his MSS. are Prof. WOLCOTT GIBBS, (*Chemistry*;) Prof. J. D. DANA, (*Mineralogy*;) Prof. L. AGASSIZ, (*Geognosy and Geology*;) Dr. ASA GRAY, (*Botany*;) Dr. T. G. WORMLEY, (*Anatomy*;) and HERMAN LUDEWIG, Esq., (*Geography*.)

"Those who have assisted him by translating and editing entire articles are, WM. M. BAIRD, Esq., (*Ethnology of the Present Day*;) Major C. H. LARNED, U. S. Army, (*Military and Naval Sciences*;) F. A. PETERSEN, Esq., (*Architecture*;) Prof. CHAS. E. BLUMENTHAL, (*Mythology and Religious Rites*;) Prof. WM. TURNER, (*Fine Arts*;) and SAMUEL COOPER, Esq., (*Technology*.)"

It is not possible for us to go into a separate examination of the different divisions of the work. Suffice it to say, that while some are more carefully

elaborated than others, all are prepared with general fidelity and accuracy. The *plates* are far beyond anything heretofore given by way of graphic illustration to works of this class, and constitute, in part, a pictorial cyclopædia of human knowledge. We commend the work to all our readers who can command the money to buy it.

(3.) On no subject are instruction and reproof more needed by the American people—line upon line and precept upon precept—than on the training of children. We welcome every book resting upon sound principles that treats of the topic, and none has appeared in which the fundamental grounds are sounder, and the practical advice clearer than "*The Government of Children*, by John A. Gere, of the Baltimore Annual Conference." (New-York: Lane & Scott, 18mo., pp. 157.) If *one* lesson of this book,—viz., that the child's obedience must be secured in the first *months* of its conscious being,—were but sufficiently impressed upon the minds of parents, and wrought out in general practice, there would be more hope for the next generation. The work is divided into five chapters, of which the first treats of the government of habit, the second of government by the intonations of the voice, the third of government by authority, the fourth of government by reason and motives, while the fifth gives valuable miscellaneous advices. The book is a *practical* one, we have said; for Mr. Gere has himself done in his own household all that he advises others to do. We should rejoice to learn that the book had found its way into every Christian family in the land.

(4.) Mrs. Tuthill's story books are of a class that may in general be freely recommended. They all aim, if not to diffuse pure religion, at least to inculcate the virtues, and to impress them upon the minds of youth. Such a book is "*Braggadocio, a book for Boys and Girls.*" (New-York: Charles Scribner, 1851; 18mo., pp. 227.)

(5.) The tide of emigration to California has abated, but yet there are, doubtless, multitudes still eager to seek their fortunes amid her golden sands. All such aspirants would do well to read "*Sixteen Months at the Gold Diggings*, by Daniel B. Woods." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 199.) The book gives a graphic account of the labours and privations of the miner's life, and answers, quite satisfactorily, the practical question, "*Who should go to the mines?*"

(6.) "*Rambles in Europe; in a Series of Familiar Letters*, by Rev. M. Trafton, M. A." (Boston: C. H. Peirce & Co., 1852; 12mo., pp. 377.) The substance of this book appeared originally in "Zion's Herald" and the "Ladies' Repository." The letters were worth gathering into a volume, and we are glad to welcome it. Mr. Trafton observes well, and writes in an easy, spirited style, which always carries the reader along without weariness. The following is a specimen at once of the American "*go-aheadativeness*" of the writer, (to use his own phrase,) and of his style of writing:—

"I was very anxious to visit the House of Lords, as, indeed, all are who come to this city of wonders. But, then, you must know it is not an easy thing to get in; not that the entrance is so difficult, so narrow, or so steep, but the *rules*, my

friend, the *rules*. You do not expect to visit any *show*-place, or menagerie, without a permit, nor can you here. You must have a pass from a *peer*, or some grandee, or from your minister. And now, I had called on Mr. Lawrence, at 138 Piccadilly, but he was out of the city, and I had not the honour of an acquaintance, *then*, with any lord, and as Victoria and Albert were both out of the city, I was in a strait. But I must go in, for I could not return and be obliged to say I did not visit the House of Lords. My host sympathized with me, and so did my fellow-boarders. But, said I to them, I shall get into the House *to-day!* I feel thankful for that characteristic of the Yankees—*go-aheadativeness*.

"At twenty minutes to five I found myself opposite the Parliament House; a crowd was gathered to witness the gathering of the *lords*, temporal and spiritual, as they severally arrived and were set down at *their* door. Some in coach and outriders, some on horseback, attended by their grooms, some in a *dog-cart*: let not my readers imagine this a burlesque; a dog-cart is a most fashionable carriage, on two low wheels, with a box under the body for dogs, when going on shooting excursions.

"I directly saw the crowd running toward a particular point, and, turning my eyes in that direction, saw coming towards me an old gentleman on a bay horse, his knees drawn almost up to his saddle-bow, his chin dropped upon his breast, with an enormous excess of nose, projecting far ahead like the cut-water of a canal boat, his body, lank and lean, swaying right and left, a dull gray eye, and sunken cheeks, plainly dressed, with a silver star on his coat collar—and the *conqueror of Napoleon* rode past me! England's idol—the *iron duke*. Waterloo, with all its horrors, its thunder, its flames, its shouts, its furious charges, its shrieks, and groans, and agonies, its destinies, and results, all came floating past. How many wives has that feeble old man made widows—how many mothers childless! Look at him, as his well-trained horse walks slowly past; it was next to seeing Napoleon. You see only a man, and one of no remarkable talents; cool and self-possessed—his great quality obstinacy. You can almost hear *that*, as his head drops upon his breast at each step of his horse—'I wont.' I was glad to have seen this man on horseback for the first time; I saw him next in the House of Lords.

"It was now full five o'clock, and the House opens at this hour. But I am not yet in.

"I decided the matter at once. Taking one of my cards from my pocket, I hastily wrote under my name the magic words, 'Boston, United States;' then marching boldly up to the sentry at the outer door, I handed it to him, remarking, 'Send this card to Lord Brougham.' He passed it to another, and I followed it into the ante-room; in a few minutes out came the noble lord; I bowed—he seized my hand and shook it with great cordiality. 'I am happy to see you, sir; I will introduce you to the House, sir; come in, sir.' I followed him, of course, supposing he would give me in charge of some lacquey, who would conduct me to some quiet place in the gallery, where I could see without being seen; but ah,

'The plans of mice and men
Gang oft awry,'—

and I found myself on the floor of the *House of Lords*. I had more faith in *mysterious influences*, for it must be that seeing *Wellington* had inspired me; for never man attempted more rash things than that same duke, and he succeeded by *perseverance*. He conquered Napoleon—why should not a Yankee conquer that greater tyrant, *etiquette*?

"The rules require that you be 'in *full dress*.' Well, I was fully dressed. I had on a Quaker frock-coat, buttoned up to the chin, gray pants, black satin vest, black stock, with a *green cotton* umbrella under my arm!

"I marched in; the gallery was filled, but the House was thinly attended. Immediately Lord Brougham commenced making a speech of about twenty minutes, as I supposed for my especial benefit, as it related to nothing then before the House, but something he had done sometime before. Not more than twenty members were present, with but two bishops. Wellington was walking around, with his hands behind him, but in a few minutes he left. It is, I suppose, some time before they get fairly under way, and the session runs far into the night.

"One of the gentleman-*ushers* came and made himself sociable, pointing out to me the notable characters present. After standing until I was weary I sat down on the steps of the *throne*, a little elevated platform with crimson hangings, such as I *think* you often see, or *may* see, in Odd Fellows' halls.

"I was not struck with the appearance of 'the lords.' I have seen a gathering of country farmers, to discuss some agricultural project, whose appearance was quite as respectable and intelligent. Lounging on the benches, chatting about the recent races, or the coming shooting season, they seemed to take but little interest in what was going on.

"Brougham is the master-spirit, and the working man; busy, bustling, cross—he keeps something moving. Look at him, as he stands there by the *wool*-sack, addressing 'my lord,' the speaker. He is about five feet ten inches in height, spare, straight, and nervous. His head is not large, and covered with gray hair, which needs a brush. His forehead is low and narrow, his organs of perception large, and his firmness rises up like a small tower. His eyes, gray and twinkling, retiring far back into his head. His nose, small, thin, and turns up at the end, as though designed for rooting up *evils*. When he walks, his heels come down upon the floor earnestly, saying thereby, 'I am here.' He speaks quick, and his voice drives into your ear like a jet of water. You can see his wonderful powers of sarcasm all over his face; he looks as though he would *bite*. The members are afraid of him. He is a *great man*. I wished to hear him on some great question, but could not."

(7.) "*The Gospel Harmony Chronologically arranged in Separate Lessons, for Sunday Schools and Bible Classes*, by WALTER KING, A. M.," (New-York: M. W. Dodd, 18mo., pp. 235,) is, as it appears to us, a work judiciously prepared on an excellent principle. A digest of a Gospel harmony is given in lessons, with careful questions on each, carrying a class regularly on through the life of the Saviour and the record of his teachings. It is well adapted for use in families as well as in Sunday schools and Bible classes.

(8.) "*Hungary and Kossuth: or an American Exposition of the late Hungarian Revolution*, by REV. B. F. TEFFT, D. D." (Philadelphia and New-Orleans: John Ball, 1852; 12mo., pp. 378.) This book, timely as it is, is not the result of hasty preparation to meet Kossuth's arrival, but is the fruit of years of interest in the subject, and of earnest and faithful study. As a repertory of facts in the history and geography of Hungary, it has no rival among American publications. The first two chapters treat of the character of the country and the origin of the people; the third, of the religions of Hungary; the fourth, of the language and literature of the Magyars; the fifth, of the Hungarian Constitution. After this exposition of the internal state of the country, Dr. Tefft proceeds to set forth its external relations, and gives, in three closely written chapters, a clear history of the development of the Hungarian nationality, and of the various attempts to overthrow it before the recent revolution. The ninth chapter, under the title of the "Austrian Revolution," traces the recent movement from the seed sown by Luther up to the general movement of 1848. The remaining chapters give the history of the late Revolution and of its great hero, Kossuth, with great clearness, directness, and impartiality. The absurd statements of some American (!) writers, taken from Austrian and English sources, that this Magyar movement throughout has been an aristocratic one, and that its success would have been in fact the enslavement of the whole non-Magyar population of Hun-

gary, find ample refutation in these lucid and accurate pages. One can hardly avoid believing that the Austrian government, poor as it is, has found gold enough to set the pens of hireling writers at work in England, as well as on the continent of Europe, if not in America, to turn back, if possible, the tide of popular sympathy, which now, through all the free nations of the earth, runs so strongly in favour of Hungary and Kossuth. It is all in vain. The day hastens on—may God speed it!—when both England and America will rise to "the height of the great argument" embodied in the concluding words of Dr. Tefft's able and excellent work:—"Hungary has a future; and when her hour shall come, as surely it will come, the civilized world will have a duty to perform. By that time the free nations of the earth will have learned the rights and the wrongs of this race of self-sacrificing democrats. The American Republic will have learned them; and whatever it may be wise and prudent for the government to do, or not to do, when the next crisis comes, the people will not fail to show themselves the enemies of oppression and the friends of universal freedom."

(9.) "*Excerpta ex P. Ovidii Nasonis Carminibus*" (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea, 1851; 18mo., pp. 245) is another of Schmitz and Zumpt's classical series, edited in the same judicious spirit, and got up in the same neat and cheap style as the books of the same series heretofore noticed.

(10.) COLERIDGE tells us that he found no book so unfailing a source of enjoyment as Southey's Life of Wesley; and the interest of the story is, in fact, inexhaustible. It must and will be written, and rewritten, over and over again, to meet the wants of successive generations and of different classes of mankind. "*Wesley and his Coadjutors*, by Rev. W. C. LARRABEE, A. M.," (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Power, 2 vols., 12mo.,) is a series of graphic sketches of the prominent events in Wesley's wonderful career, with notices of the more remarkable of his co-labourers. Like everything else which Dr. Larrabee writes, it is clear, easy, and natural in style, while the writer's love for his theme warms his writing at times into a genial glow of eloquence. We bespeak for the work a wide circulation.

(11.) WORKS on Ecclesiastes have multiplied greatly of late, but they have been mostly critical and exegetical. We have now before us a practical one in "*The Royal Preacher: Lectures on Ecclesiastes*, by JAMES HAMILTON, D. D." (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1851; 12mo., pp. 353.) The style is animated and generally chaste, and the spirit of the work is excellent.

(12.) A FULL account of the doctrines and polity of Methodism in a compendious form has long been a desideratum. The want is now to a great extent supplied by "*A Compendium of Methodism*, by Rev. JAMES PORTER, A. M." (Boston: C. H. Peirce & Co., 1851; 12mo., pp. 501.) The work is divided into four parts, of which Part I. gives a *historical* sketch of Methodism from its rise to the present time, both in England and America. A large amount of information is here condensed into a comparatively small compass.

Part II. sets forth the *doctrinal* views of Methodists as distinguished from those of other denominations. Part III. treats of the *government* of the Church, with a preliminary exhibition of various systems of Church government, which is very well drawn up. Then follow a statement and defence of the peculiarities of our own system—especially of our Episcopacy. In Part IV. the *prudential* arrangements peculiar to the different sects of Wesleyans are set forth. Two of our most marked peculiarities—Itinerancy and Class-meetings—are exhibited and defended with skill and force. The work, throughout, is *not* a criticism on Methodist usages, but a statement and defence of them. As such we trust it will meet with the wide circulation it deserves, both in and out of the Church. We are sorry to see so good a book disfigured by so many typographical errors.

(13.) "*The Christian's Daily Treasury*, by EBENEZER TEMPLE," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1851; 12mo., pp. 431,) contains a religious exercise, in the form of a brief exposition of Scripture, for every day in the year. The utility of such manuals, for family worship as well as in private devotion, is unquestionable; and this one has the merits of brevity, simplicity, and directness. The work manifests neither remarkable power of interpretation, nor profoundness of thought; but it abounds in proofs of Christian feeling and of reverence for the oracles of God.

(14.) "*A Concise History of England, from the first Invasion by the Romans to the Accession of Queen Victoria*, by W. CLARK, Esq., edited, with additions, by J. C. MOFFATT, M. A., Professor of Latin Literature in Miami University." (Cincinnati: Moore & Anderson, 1851; 12mo., pp. 344.) This book answers a good purpose in presenting a continuous outline of English history in chronological order and in compact form. It was originally issued in England; and the American editor has made a number of useful and judicious additions. The book is well adapted for use in schools. It is strange, however, that neither the author nor the editor should have given us—what are indispensable appendages to such a work—a chronological table and an index.

(15.) "*Duties of Masters to Servants*" (Charleston, 1851; 18mo., pp. 151) contains three premium essays, by Rev. H. N. McTyeire, Rev. C. F. Sturgis, and Rev. A. T. Holmes, published under the auspices of the Southern Baptist Publication Society. The first essay is the best of the three. If slaves were to be treated universally as these writers recommend, slavery would soon come to an end.

(16.) ONLY within the last quarter have we received a copy of "*Lectures on the Scientific Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion*, by W. C. LARRABEE, A. M.," (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Power, pp. 395,) though the work was issued more than a year ago. It is an excellent summary of the argument from design, extended through a great variety of illustrations from the natural world. The style is easy and agreeable, and the book is one calculated to be very useful.

(17.) MESSRS. HARPER & BROTHERS have commenced a reprint of Jacob Abbott's series of books in practical religion, of which we have before us the first volume, viz., "*The Young Christian, very greatly improved and enlarged.*" (12mo., pp. 402.) The wide circulation of this book, not merely at home, but in almost every civilized country in the world, is one of the best proofs of its excellence; books of this class do not gain such circulation without, at least, the merit of adaptation to their end. The present edition is carefully revised, as the title-page states, and is, besides, illustrated by numerous engravings. Of all Mr. Abbott's writings these volumes will doubtless be those on which he will look back with most pleasure in old age, or from heaven: and their reissue, in their improved form, is for him, no doubt, a labour of love, as it is for others, most assuredly, a work of blessing.

(18.) "*The Epistle of Paul to the Philippians, practically explained,* by AUGUSTUS NEANDER, *translated* by Mrs. H. C. CONANT." (New-York: L. Colby & Co., 12mo., pp. 140.) A beautiful exhibition of Neander's great power of exegesis—not in the way of critical discussion, but of the profoundest sympathy with the spirit of the text and the fullest comprehension of its scope. This *practical* exposition rests upon a thoroughly scientific ground, but is free from any scholastic forms, and is adapted to the general reading of Christians. A few passages are not interpreted as we understand them—but that does not hinder us from commending the work to our readers as a precious one. The style of the translation is admirable.

(19.) "WE make too little of our HOMES; and one reason of this is that the Pulpit holds itself so much aloof from the common routine of domestic life." These truths led to the preparation of a course of lectures now embodied in "*The Bible in the Family, or Hints on Domestic Happiness,* by H. A. BOARDMAN, Pastor of the Tenth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia." (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo & Co., 1851; 12mo., pp. 341.) The lectures set forth, in a plain, sensible, and practical style, the scope of the family tie in all its ramifications, and the duties that spring from it, as taught in the Bible. It is worthy of general circulation.

(20.) COLLECTIONS of select poems have long been a favourite style of fancy books, and one that does not seem to go out of fashion. Among the most recent of these we have "*Blossoms of Childhood,*" just issued from the press of Carter & Brothers of this city, consisting of nearly two hundred short pieces relating to childhood and children. These poems are generally by modern authors of established reputation—many of them Americans. In style and literary character they are respectable, though not in all cases above criticism, or perfect models of their kind. The moral character of the pieces appears to be unexceptionable, and the book may be safely commended to public favour.

(21.) "*Christianity Tested by Eminent Men*" is a series of brief sketches of Christian Biography, originally made by the late Professor CALDWELL, of

Dickinson College, and edited, with an introduction, by Rev. S. M. VAIL, Professor at Concord. (New-York: Lane & Scott, 18mo., pp. 216.) It was a distinguishing trait of Professor Caldwell's eminently Christian character, that he was ready to work in *any* department of labour for the moral welfare of mankind, and especially of the young: and the volume before us is a specimen of how much good may be done, by a wise and thoughtful mind that will employ itself for a good purpose, even in an humble species of authorship. The work gives sketches of a number of the world's greatest men—such as Franklin, Davy, and others, in the sphere of science; Hale, Richelieu, Washington, and other statesmen and jurists—all testifying to the truth and power of Christianity. So far as the evidence from human authority can go, this volume is a valuable book of "Christian Evidences," and we trust it will be widely circulated.

(22.) "*The Merchant's Daughter, and other Narratives*, by Rev. J. T. BARR," (New-York: Lane & Scott, 1851; 18mo., pp. 228,) is a series of sketches for the young, illustrating the fatal consequences of sin and the happy effects of true piety even in this life. Extraordinary as some of the incidents related in this volume are, every one of them is a well authenticated fact. Truth is, indeed, stranger than fiction. The book proves a valuable addition to that array of good books for the young furnished by the Methodist Book Concern.

(23.) AMONG the most valuable issues in Bohn's Standard Library is "*Neander's History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Churches by the Apostles*, with his *Antignostikus*," (2 vols., 12mo.,) edited by Dr. J. E. RYLAND. In this new edition of the Planting and Training all Neander's corrections and additions to his third and fourth editions are given—not, however, wrought into the text, as we could have wished, but given as a pendant to the work. The *Antignostikus* appears for the first time in an English dress. Another of the recent issues is the first volume of "*Christian Iconography*, by M. DIDRON, translated by E. J. MILLINGTON," being an illustrated history of the image-system of the Roman Catholic Church in the middle age. These, with all the other valuable works of Bohn's series, are kept on sale by Messrs. Bangs, Brother & Co., New-York.

(24.) "*The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, from Marathon to Waterloo*, by E. S. CREASY, M. A." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; 12mo., pp. 364.) The *taking* title of this book, as well as its subject, was suggested to the author by a remark of Hallam's upon the battle of Tours—"It may justly be reckoned among those few battles of which a contrary event would have essentially varied the drama of the world in all its subsequent scenes." To determine what battles should fall into this decisive class is no easy task; indeed, hardly any two inquirers would be likely to coincide in a decision. Certainly we cannot agree that all or even the greater part of the battles cited by Mr. Creasy were of such moment to the world's history as he supposes. The battle of Marathon might have been decided in favour of the Persians without affecting the tenor of human events very greatly. The fate of Carthage was

sealed before the battle of the Metaurus. Blenheim signalized the shame of Louis rather than any vital change in the history of mankind. Had Burgoyne conquered at Saratoga, he would have united with Clinton in vain. Indeed, we cannot see that Mr. Creasy has been guided by any philosophical principle in his selection of decisive conflicts. But he has certainly chosen fifteen important battles, and described them with a good deal of graphic power. His style, however, is ambitious and inelegant—a bad imitation of a bad model, Alison.

(25.) We have received the second volume of "*Lives of the Queens of Scotland and English Princesses connected with the royal succession of Great Britain*, by Agnes Strickland." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; 12mo., pp. 402.) In this volume the sketch of Mary of Lorraine (second queen of James V.) is completed, and a pretty full biography is given of the Lady Margaret Douglass, Countess of Lenox.

(26.) "*Sketches of the Life and Labours of James Quinn*, by John F. Wright, of the Ohio Conference." (Cincinnati: 1851; 12mo., pp. 324.) Mr. Quinn was for nearly half a century a minister of the gospel in the Methodist Episcopal Church, and this book is a record of his labours, and at the same time a sketch of the growth of the West not only in Methodism but in population and power. The world has yet to learn what the early pioneers of Methodism on the American frontier have done, suffered, and achieved, in behalf of religion and civilization. To this band of heroes Mr. Quinn belonged, and it was fitting that this memorial of him should be preserved. The work is sold for the benefit of his aged widow; and on this account, as well as in view of its intrinsic merit, we commend it to our readers.

(27.) Bishop McIlvaine's "*Charge delivered to the Clergy of the Diocese of Ohio, in St. Paul's Church, Cleveland*, October 11, 1851," (New-York: Harper & Brothers, pp. 50,) is, in the main, a sensible protest against Romanizing views, in an exposition of the necessity, the nature, and the means of regeneration. While the good bishop's productions, in general, are not remarkable for scope or vigour of thought, and always show traces of a narrow theological training, they are yet so thoroughly imbued with Christian earnestness as to form valuable contributions to practical theology. The appendix contains a parallel between the *revival* measures adopted in some of the Protestant Churches, and the recent operations of the Redemptorists in the Roman Catholic Churches, which is a curious mixture of sense and prejudice, of discrimination and simplicity.

(28.) Almost simultaneously with Keys's "Class-Leader's Manual," of which we gave a notice some time since, there appeared in Cincinnati a "*Treatise on Class-Meetings*, by Rev. John Miley, A. M.," (18mo., pp. 224,) with an introduction by Bishop Morris, written in his usual style of clear and manly simplicity. The book treats, in order, of the social principle of class-meetings,

their design, and their obligation. The objections to such meetings are then considered, and their benefits set forth. The work concludes with a chapter upon the mode of conducting class-meetings, and upon the duties of leaders and members. All these topics are well and carefully worked out, and the book throughout is eminently adapted for usefulness.

(29.) "*Moby-Dick; or the Whale,*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; 12mo., pp. 634,) is the latest effusion of HERMAN MELVILLE'S versatile genius. It is a wonderful mixture of fact and fancy—of information about the whale and its habits, and of the wildest whimsies of a seething brain. The book displays the same power of dashing description, of vivid picture-painting, which characterizes all the other works of this writer. We are bound to say, however, that the book contains a number of flings at religion, and even of vulgar immoralities that render it unfit for general circulation. We regret that Mr. Melville should allow himself to sink so low.

(30.) THE question of the recognition of friends in the future life is one involving our human affections so deeply that hardly any discussion of it can fail to be interesting. Quite a copious treatise on the subject is given in "*The Heavenly Recognition; or, an Earnest and Scriptural Discussion of the Question, Will* (shall) *we know our friends in Heaven,* by Rev. HENRY HARBAUGH, A. M." (Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston; 12mo., pp. 288.) The writer first looks among the pagans for glimpses of the belief, not merely in a future state, but in the joys of friendship and love there. The question is then examined in the light of reason and history; and the final appeal is made to the teachings of Christ and the apostles. The views thus obtained are confirmed by the teachings (incidental rather than direct) of the Fathers of the Church, and of many eminent theologians of ancient and modern times. Finally, the common objections to the doctrine are cited and refuted at length. Mr. Harbaugh writes with a warm Christian feeling; and although his treatise is unnecessarily diffuse, it is, perhaps, the best extant upon the subject.

(31.) THE third volume of "*Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Thomas Chalmers,* by Rev. WILLIAM HANNA," (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; pp. 530,) brings the biography up to the year 1835. According to the original announcement the work was to have been completed in three volumes; but Dr. Hanna, it seems, miscalculated the amount of his material, and finds that he must issue a fourth as the final volume. A little more compression would not only have fulfilled the first intention of the writer, but have made the book a better and more useful one. There are many pages of matter in this volume quite as worthless as the following about a sloop that contained Dr. C.'s furniture:—

"*December 4th.*—This morning I was put into a sad alarm before breakfast by the information that a sloop had been stranded overnight, and was now among the rocks.

"*December 5th.*—I have been tantalized with two appearances to-day in the offing, neither of which turned out as I had hoped for; and as yet there is no-

thing within verge of the horizon that can be interpreted into our vessel. The weather, however, has become moderate, and the surf on the beach has abated greatly. The water looks quite calm in the bay; and should this fair and yet gentle breeze continue, it may cast up in the course of to-morrow. . . . . am in great peace and comfort. I am floundering on through my course of moral philosophy, and I think that I can see how, helter-skelter, I shall arrive at the termination of it.

"*December 8th.*—There was a vessel this day reported to have turned Fifeness, and which beat against the wind, as we all thought, for St. Andrews. It went by the name of Dr. Chalmer's sloop, and when on its last tack, as we thought, to the pier, a pilot-boat went out, on which she turned immediately for the West Sands, where she lies at anchor. The inference is, that she is a vessel which has just come in for shelter. The weather is more moderate to-night, and we shall be looking out to-morrow.

"*December 9th, Tuesday,—Five o'clock.*—No appearance yet of our vessel, I came up from the shore before dinner with the impression that it was really unaccountable now; but Mr. Duncan tells me that he held conversation with a fisherman about it, who said that, from the direction of the wind, there was still a difficulty in turning the point.

"*December 10th.*—I make no delay in informing you that the sloop arrived this morning, and is lying aground off the harbour. There will be no unpacking till to-morrow."

Think, too, of the folly of printing such "diary-work" as the following:—

"*Thursday.*—Got up between eight and nine. Family worship and breakfast. Have rather fallen behind in my pulpit preparations, but I hope to do something to-day. After breakfast I wrote a little. The chaise came to the door and took me and two of the Misses Oliphant to Freeland, where we called on Lady Ruthven. Lord R. was at Perth. Her ladyship is remarkably clever, and was remarkably kind. She has been much in Greece, and showed me many admirable drawings. Her mother, Mrs. Campbell of Shawfield, was there, who appears a remarkably wholesome and well-disposed person; but the most interesting of the whole was Miss Ruthven, a sister of his lordship, and a most saintly and admirable person. She lives in Perth, but was at Freeland for a day or two. Freeland is quite a paradise of beauty.

"*Friday.*—Got up at eight. Expounded at family worship for the first time. After breakfast two horses arrived at the door for an equestrian excursion between me and Mr. James. Previous to that, however, I composed somewhat, and had an interesting conversation with Mr. Oliphant, the invalid, more satisfactory than before. Were soon overtaken with rain, and so stopped in our excursion, but had a very good refuge in the manse of Mr. Young the clergyman, with whom we sat an hour. As the rain continued, we walked home with umbrellas, and sent a servant from the house for the horses."

The chapter on the Collegiate session of 1824–25 at St. Andrews is very good, affording additional illustration, if such were necessary, of Dr. Chalmers's immense capacity for work. The journal of 1825–26 is much more spiritual, and contains less twaddle than that of the preceding year. The volume increases in interest as it proceeds—but the general impression it makes is that of regret that Dr. Chalmers's papers have fallen into the hands of so incompetent a biographer.

(32.) JUDGE HALYBURTON has appeared in two new characters—of statesman and plagiarist—in "*Rule and Misrule of the English in America.*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 379.) The statesmanship is of a very humble sort—the plagiarism may stand in the front rank, according to Mr. Hildreth's showing.

(33.) "*Death-Bed Scenes; or, dying with and without Religion, designed to illustrate the truth and power of Christianity*, edited by DAVIS W. CLARK, D. D." (New-York: Lane & Scott, 12mo., pp. 569.) This book belongs to an unpretending but useful class of compilations. It is divided into two parts: I. *The Dying Christian*, containing a number of examples of the power of Christian faith in sustaining the soul of man in the dying hour: II. *Dying without Religion*, giving accounts of the death-beds of a number of persons of remarkable character but destitute of faith. The subordinate classification under each of these heads is clear and useful, and in this respect the work is better than any compilation of the kind that we have seen. The book combines attractive and useful qualities to a remarkable degree, and we trust it will have a large circulation.

(34.) No science has sprung more rapidly into notice and extent than Ethnology. Everywhere active minds are engaged upon it, and books about it, of more or less value, are issued constantly. Among the latest is "*The Natural History of the Human Species*, by Lieut. Col. C. H. SMITH," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1851; 12mo., pp. 423,) which we cannot recommend to any one who wishes to understand what he reads. A more clumsy and obscure book, in all respects, we have seldom seen. The introduction to the volume (by Dr. Kneeland, of Boston) is the only part of it worth reading; and its value consists in a tolerably distinct statement of the arguments, *pro* and *con.*, on the question of the unity of the human race. We are more and more disposed to wonder *why* it is that naturalists, in these days, cannot write intelligibly.

(35.) WE have before announced Mr. Putnam's contemplated series of encyclopædic volumes, each complete in itself, and designed to form compact manuals of the *most* useful knowledge. Two of the series are now before us, of which the first is the "*Hand-Book of Literature and the Fine Arts*, compiled and arranged by GEORGE RIPLEY and BAYARD TAYLOR." (12mo., pp. 647.) The work comprises "complete and accurate definitions of all terms employed in Belles-Lettres, Philosophy, Theology, Law, Mythology, Painting, Music, Sculpture, Architecture, and all kindred arts." Nor is this ample promise of the title-page belied in the book itself. So far as our brief examination enables us to judge, the work is as complete a vocabulary of art and science, brought up to the latest periods of knowledge, as could be furnished in so portable a shape, and should find a place on the table of every student and in every library. The other is a "*Hand-Book of Universal Biography*, by PARKE GODWIN." (12mo., pp. 821.) The book is prepared on the basis of Maunder's Biographical Treasury, but most of the articles have been rewritten, and a vast number of names have been added, especially in American biography, which is almost wholly neglected in Maunder, as indeed in all works of foreign origin. Such a book has long been needed, not only for the use of literary men, but of the general reading public, and the appearance of this is therefore most timely. If the other volumes of Mr. Putnam's series approach in excellence to those already issued, its success cannot be doubted.

(36.) The American press has seldom produced a more beautiful book, in all exterior qualities, than "*The Nile-Boat, or Glimpses of the Land of Egypt*, by W. H. Bartlett." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; 8vo., pp. 218.) The engravings are so abundant as to make the book a complete pictorial gallery of Egyptian scenes, and the text is a well-wrought and graphic commentary upon them. All the illustrations were drawn upon the spot by Mr. Bartlett, and afford a series of illustrated sketches of the monuments of Egypt as they are, and of the manners and customs of its present people, as well as of the characteristic scenery of their ancient ruins. No man exceeds Mr. Bartlett in the power of combining pen and pencil to produce distinct impressions of natural objects, and this work is quite as successful as his former ones. A more beautiful book for a present could not be found.

(37.) "*My Youthful Days; an authentic Narrative*, by Rev. George Coles." (New-York: Lane & Scott, 18mo., pp. 267.) The excellent author of this work is well known throughout the Church as a former Editor of the Christian Advocate and Journal, and as a writer of books specially adapted to the youthful mind. "That an account of the youthful days of such a man, written by his own hand, will be interesting and instructive to thousands, cannot be doubted." Mr. Coles was born in England, and his account of his early home, of the village sports of Old England, of the Church service, and of Methodism in England, is full of interest. The concluding chapters give a graphic account of his voyage of emigration and of his first impressions in America. We commend the book not only to the young, but to *all* readers, as an entertaining and instructive narrative.

(38.) "*The Life of a Vagrant*," (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1851; pp. 164,) is the simple story of a poor boy, brought up in an English workhouse, who led the life of a common tramper for years, and was finally brought to experience the truth and power of the gospel to reform and elevate even the lowest of mankind.

(39.) "*The Rainbow in the North*, by S. Tucker," (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 308,) is a brief account of the first establishment of Christianity in Rupert's Land by the Church Missionary Society. It is a very interesting narration of missionary labours, privations, and success. The book has several very fine illustrations.

(40.) Our missionaries in Germany continue their activity in printing as well as in preaching. We have just received a copy of our German Hymn Book, "*Sammlung von Geistlichen Liedern für Kirchlichen und Hauslichen Gottesdienst.*" (Bremen: J. G. Heyse, 1851; pp. 544.) It is neatly printed and bound, and sold at a very low price.

(41.) No purely American work of art, so far as we can remember, has equalled in magnificence "*The Home-Book of the Picturesque.*" (New-York: G. P. Put-

nam, 1852; 4to., pp. 188.) The book contains thirteen engravings on steel, from pictures by American artists, illustrating some of the finest and most picturesque spots in our wide land—so fertile in scenes of beauty. The engravings are all well done, and although, as remarked in the preface, they are perhaps of too moderate size to do justice to the original pictures, they are yet highly creditable specimens of that branch of art. The letter-press consists chiefly of descriptions of the scenes illustrated in the engravings, by such writers as Cooper, Irving, Bayard Taylor, Bryant, and Bethune. It is a good omen to see such noble works taking the place, as gift-books, of the empty "annuals" of former years.

(42.) MESSRS. R. CARTER & BROTHERS have just issued a new and neat edition of the well-known book "*Decision, or Religion must be all or is nothing*, by GRACE KENNEDY." (18mo., pp. 98.) Its dramatic form gives it great attraction for young readers.

(43.) "*Memorials of the Life and Trials of a Youthful Christian*" (New-York: C. Scribner, 1851; 12mo., pp. 355) is a touching tribute of fraternal affection, as well as a remarkable record of Christian resignation under long-continued disease. The subject of the memoir, Dr. Nathaniel Cheever, was an invalid almost from his birth, and his whole life was a continued struggle with persistent and painful infirmities. Under these trials his mind grew and his heart was disciplined: devout love to God, and a tender, submissive spirit, breathe through all the journals and letters of the youthful and suffering saint. The memoir is prefaced by Rev. H. T. Cheever, with an introduction by Dr. G. B. Cheever,—both brothers of the subject of the narrative.

(44.) "*The Sheaf*" (Boston: H. V. Degen, 18mo., pp. 155) is a highly-wrought account (written much in the mystical vein) of the religious experience of Mrs. Cordelia Thomas. Mrs. Thomas believed herself at one time to be the subject of "special spiritual manifestations," and, in reading an Adventist tract, "containing their arguments to prove that the Sabbath of the world was at hand," she "felt, from an inward experience of the Spirit, that it was even so." She soon commenced (if we correctly understand her somewhat vague and cloudy statements) proclaiming the second advent. That she was mistaken soon appeared—but she does not seem to have drawn from her experience its proper lesson. We cannot recommend the book, nor any book of its class, as tending to wholesome Christian culture.

(45.) THE fourth volume of "*Daily Bible Illustrations*, by JOHN KITTO, LL.D." (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1851; 12mo., pp. 438,) completes the series of illustrations founded upon the historical books of the Old Testament. We have before spoken of this excellent series of daily readings, in its special adaptation to use in the family—and we now renew our commendation of the work to all our readers.

(46.) "*Olive-Leaves*, by Mrs. SIGOURNEY," (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 18mo., pp. 301,) is a series of beautiful narratives, with a few poetical pieces, intended for the young. The name of Mrs. Sigourney is at once a pledge of their excellence, and a sure passport to public favour. The volume is beautifully illustrated.

(47.) OUR Sunday-School Press, under Dr. Kidder's energetic hand, has been prolific of good issues of late. Among the books laid on our table we find "*English Country Pictures*, by OLD HUMPHREY," (18mo., pp. 182,)—a series of sketches of home and country scenes in merry England by a well-known writer. "*Village Science*" (18mo., pp. 285) contains simple and familiar explanations of a number of physical laws, by the author of "Peeps of Nature." "*Memoir of Eliza M. Barker*, by A. C. ROSE," (18mo., pp. 108,) is designed to encourage parents to teach religion to their children when very young. But we think it no merit in the parents of the good child whose memoir is given in the book, that "at the early age of five years and ten months she had read her New Testament through," and this, too, while she was in very feeble health, and should, in fact, not have even learned to read at that age. "*Memory's Pictures*" (18mo., pp. 69) contains a number of pretty incidents. "*Good Health; the possibility, duty, and means of obtaining and keeping it*," (18mo., pp. 214) is an excellent little treatise on diet, regimen, &c., giving *principles* rather than precise rules of living. "*Female Dead*" (18mo., pp. 355) consists of short sketches of departed Christian females, and of their last hours upon earth. "*Sunday among the Puritans*" (18mo. pp. 95) is a record of how the Puritans spent their first twenty Sundays in New-England, with the just inference that the noble elements of Puritan character were not a little due to their Sabbath-keeping. "*Christian Love, contrasted with the Love of the World*," is a narrative in a series of letters, designed to illustrate the contrast stated in the title-page. "*Senior Classes in Sunday Schools*" contains Cooper's Prize Essay, and several other treatises, on the importance of such classes, and the best method of conducting them. "*Iona*" is a history of the famous Druids' Isle, and of the changes to which it has been subject in the course of years. The "*Sunday-School Anniversary Book*" gives much good advice with regard to Sunday-school celebrations, with copious exercises for such occasions.

Among smaller books we find the following neat issues in Library B., viz.: *Cecil, or the Boy that did not like Work*, the title of which indicates sufficiently the nature of its contents; *Up and be Doing*, and *Everything has its Price*—two nice little pictorial stories; *The Sun-beam*, translated from the French; *Simeon Green*, a man that cured his bad neighbours, by Rev. J. A. James; *Passing Clouds*, and other stories, by Old Humphrey; *Jennie Duncan, or the Young Dressmaker; Ingratitude*, being the story of Asa Trott, in verse; *Ishmael, the Abyssinian Boy*.

Art. X.—LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Theological.

EUROPEAN.

The death of Charles Gutzlaff should not pass without some notice in these pages, of a man whose name has been so long before the religious and literary world. As scholar, traveller, and missionary, he laboured long and faithfully, and though his career was marked by not a few indiscretions, we think that, now that he is dead, all men will unite in honouring him for what he intended, and, in some respects, for what he accomplished. Born at Stettin, in Pomerania, in 1802, he attracted attention at an early age by his zeal in study, and by the promise of activity which his youth afforded. The way was open for him to posts of usefulness at home, but "having resolved to devote himself to missionary labour in foreign parts, he volunteered to go to the Dutch settlements in the East, under the auspices of the Netherlands Missionary Society." Before proceeding thither he came to England, where he met Dr. Morrison, the eminent Chinese scholar and missionary, and received a strong bias toward China as his ultimate field of labour. In 1823 he proceeded to Singapore, and it is said that before he had been there two years, he was able to converse fluently in five Eastern languages, and to read and write as many more. In August, 1828, in company with Mr. Toulmin, Gutzlaff went to Siam, where he remained more than a year. In 1831 he went to China. Between 1831 and 1834 he made three voyages along the coast, and published a journal of his observations in 1834. He subsequently published a "History of China," and also "China Opened: an Account of the Topography, History, Laws, &c., of the Chinese Empire," (2 vols.) From 1834 to the time of his death he held office under the British government, as interpreter and secretary to the Minister. He died on the 9th of August, 1851. Of his way of life, the *Literary Gazette* gives the following account:—

"The whole of the early morning was devoted to the religious instruction of successive classes of Chinese who came to his house. From ten till four he was occupied with government duties. After a very brief interval, he went out for the rest of the evening, preaching in public places, or teaching from house to house. He also, from time to time, made excursions to different places, accompanied by native teachers. All this toil was voluntary and unremunerated, for, except when he first went out to the East, he was not connected with any missionary society. A few friends in New-York and London sent occasionally, we believe, some contributions for purchasing books and medicines, but the work was mainly carried on at his own cost. He was a man of generous, self-denying spirit, in zeal for every good work untiring, and in labour indefatigable. He early inured himself to hardships, and in his devotedness to his work of spreading Christian truth, he was regardless of privations and dangers. His medical skill and great learning often opened a way for him where few Europeans could have gained access, and wherever he was known he was beloved by the natives. They used to say sometimes that he must be a descendant of some Chinese family, who had emigrated to the Isles of the Western Ocean."

Of the results of Gutzlaff's labours we are not yet sufficiently informed to speak with any certainty; but his efforts for the cause of religion, and of Christian civilization in China, deserve to be held in the grateful remembrance of the Church.

The first volume of the Rev. Henry Alford's edition of the Greek Testament was severely reviewed last year in the *Christian Remembrancer*. The author has answered his critic in a very able and temperate pamphlet, entitled "*Audi Alteram Partem.*" The second volume of Mr. Alford's work is now announced as ready for publication.

The fourth and concluding volume of the Rev. Dr. Peile's Annotations on the New Testament is announced as in the press in London.

We see announced in London (Bagster & Sons) two elementary works which, if well executed, are likely to be useful, viz., "*Syriac Reading Lessons, with the elements of Syriac Grammar,*" and "*Childe Read-*

ing Lessons, consisting of the whole of the Biblical Chaldee, with a grammatical Praxis and an interlineary translation."

A NEW edition of Stier's *Reden des Herrn Jesu* (6 vols., 8vo.) is soon to be issued.

MR. NEWMAN (the pervert) labours at his unhappy work with indefatigable activity. He has lately issued a volume of "*Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England*," the scope of which may be estimated from the following summary of contents:—"Lecture I. Protestant View of the Catholic Church. II. Tradition the Sustaining Power of the Protestant View. III. Fable the Basis of the Protestant View. IV. True Testimony unequal to the Protestant View. V. Logical Inconsistency of the Protestant View. VI. Prejudice the Life of the Protestant View. VII. Assumed Principles the Intellectual Instrument of the Protestant View. VIII. Want of Intercourse with Catholics the Protection of the Protestant View. IX. Duties of Catholics towards the Protestant View."

WE see flattering mention made in English journals of "*The Bible Student's Guide* to the more correct understanding of the English Translation of the Old Testament, by reference to the original Hebrew. By the Rev. W. Wilson, D. D., Canon of Winchester," (demy 4to.: price, £2 2*s*.) "The object of this work is to furnish the accurate student of the Bible with an *immediate reference to the original of every word in our version of the Old Testament;* at the same time, an opportunity is afforded of comparing the original with all other words similarly rendered, and of so attaining a more distinct apprehension of words which appear to be synonymous. If the reader were guided in his understanding of a phrase simply by the idea conveyed by the one English word, he must necessarily fall short of an accurate knowledge of the inspired meaning, and probably may put an import on the word which is not warranted by the original language. The knowledge of the Hebrew language is not necessary to the profitable use of this work; and it is believed that many devout and accurate students of the Bible, entirely unacquainted with it, will derive great advantage from frequent reference to these pages."

IN the *Theologisches Literaturblatt zur Allgemeinen Kirchenzeitung* (No. 103, August, 1851) we find a highly laudatory review of a brief life of Wesley, published at Halle under the title "*Das Johann Wesley Leben und Wirken*, von K. C. S. Schmidt, Prof. in Naumburg." The reviewer remarks that "no phenomenon, since the Reformation, can compare in religious and ecclesiastical importance with Methodism." Of Wesley himself the reviewer says, in view of his immense activity in preaching, in writing, and in the superintendence of a great religious body, that "perhaps the world has never seen a more useful man."

THE name of Abelard, full of interest to all mankind from his guilt and his sorrows, as well as to the theologian and the philosopher, from his learning and his genius, has been brought before us anew of late years by M. Cousin's edition of his before inedited works. Among them was republished his collection of "Sentences," but the *editing* of the work was not satisfactorily done. A new and careful revision of the text has been made by two German theologians, and is now before us under the original title, "*Petri Abaelardi Sic et Non* — Primum integrum ediderunt E. L. D. Henke et G. S. Lindenkohl." (Marburg, 1851. 8vo. 440 pp.)

Die *Evangelische Lehre auf dem Grunde der Heiligen Schrift*, von W. Kritz, Pastor in Leipzig," (1851, 337 pp., 8vo.,) is an exhibition of Christian doctrines in their connexion, drawn from the Holy Scriptures, for the use of the laity. We need books of this class sadly in our own language.

A NEW version of the Bible (undertaken for the use of the British Jews) is now in progress. Part I. having appeared, under the title, "*Jewish School and Family Bible. Part First, containing the Pentateuch*, by Dr. D. A. BENISCH," (London.) The editor states that "while, in the ceremonial law, the translation is a faithful exposition of Jewish opinions, in every other respect it is a strictly impartial performance, embodying the results of long-continued studies and numerous patient researches, the labour of many years."

WE have received a copy of "*Neue Propheten — drei historisch-politische Kirchenbilder*, von Dr. Karl Hase." (Leipzig, 1851. 12mo., 367 pp.) The "three pictures" are The Maid of Orleans, Savonarola, and the Anabaptists. The text is marked by Hase's usual sarcastic keenness and beauty of style — and the notes are full of literary and historical information.

TOO late for any examination we have received a copy of "*Theologie*, von Dr. L.

J. Rückert, Erster Theil," (Leipsig, 1851. 8vo. pp. 378.): also of "*Dr. Claus Harm's Lebensbeschreibung, verfasset von ihm selber.*" (Kiel, 1851. 250 pp.): of a treatise, "*Ueber den Einfluss der Palästinischen Exegese auf die alexandrinische Hermeneutik*, von Dr. J. Fränkel (Leipsig, 1851. 8vo. 254 pp.): of "*Die Wissenschaftlichkeit der modernen speculativen Theologie in ihren Principien beleuchtet*, von C. A. Thilo." (Leipsig, 1851. 344 pp.)

We have noticed in this number of our journal the American translation of Neander's "Practical Exposition of the Philippians;" and we have since received the German edition of his exposition of 1 John, ("*Praktische Erläuterung des ersten Briefes des Johannes.*" Berlin, 1851. 258 pp.,) which is executed in the same spirit, and will, we hope, be translated by the same admirable hand.

The complete edition of Zwingle's works published by Schulthess, in Zürich, (edited by Schulthess & Schuler, 1828–1842,) can now be had for seven thalers.

We continue our summaries of the contents of the leading journals of Theology and Sacred Literature, and of those which represent special ecclesiastical interests.

The *Journal of Sacred Literature* (October) contains the following articles:—I. A new explanation of the Taxing in Luke II, 1–5: II. The Jesuits: III. The Sabbath day: IV. Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament: V. Wicliffe's Bible: VI. The septenary arrangement of Scripture: VII. The Rephaim, and their connexion with Egyptian history: VIII. Modern Judaism: IX. Scripture Parallelisms: X. Queried texts: XI. On the Evangelization of India: XII. Correspondence.

The *British Quarterly Review*, November:—I. Prussia and Austria, Monarchy v. Nationality: II. Willmott's Pleasures of Literature: III. Julius Müller—the Doctrine of Sin: IV. Early English Houses and Households: V. The Duke of Argyll on the Twofold Protest: VI. History by Modern Frenchmen: VII. Bushnell's Discourses: VIII. Geological Observations—Survey of Britain: IX. Martineau on Apostolic Christianity: X. England and Italy: XI. Popery—its Nature and Development: XII. Louis Kossuth and Lord Palmerston.

The *Christian Remembrancer*, (London,) October, contains the following articles:—I. Roman Law: II. Quakerism: III. Farini's Roman State: IV. The Sacramental System: V. The Synod of Exeter: VI. Notices.

The *North British Review*, November, contains:—I. The Peace Congress: II. Principles of Taxation: III. The Fine Arts in Edinburgh: IV. The Old Testament—Newman and Greg: V. Burns and his School: VI. John Owen: VII. Comparative Philology—Humboldt: VIII. The Frontier Wars of India: IX. Translations from the Classics—Æschylus: X. The Christian Struggle in Germany.

The contents of the *Theologische Studien u. Kritiken* for October, 1851, are as follows:—I. Observations on the Different Conceptions of Religion, with special reference to psychological questions, by Dr. Lechler, of Winnenden: II. Lucian and Christianity—a contribution to the Church History of the second century, by Rev. A. Planck, of Heidenheim: III. Additional observations on the authorship of the phrase *In necessariis unitas, in non necessariis libertas, in utrisque caritas*, by Dr. F. Lücke: IV. Review of Hahn's *Geschichte der Ketzer im Mittelalter*: V. Review of Hübsch's *Architektur und ihr Verhältniss zur heutigen Malerei und Sculptur*: VI. Kling on the *Evangelische Kirchenordnung* for Westphalia and the Rhine province.

The *Prospective Review* (November) contains the following articles:—I. Recent Translations of Classical Poets: II. Polemical Fiction: III. The American Fugitive Slave Act: IV. The Harmony of the Intuitional and Logical Elements in the ultimate grounds of Religious Belief.

Theological Critic, (edited by T. K. Arnold,) September:—I. Scipio de Ricci: II. The Ecclesiastical and Religious Condition of Geneva: III. The Beast from the Sea: IV. De Ecclesiasticæ Britonum Scotorumque Historiæ fontibus disseruit Carolus Gulielmus Schöll: V. Galatians iii, 4–6: VI. On the Authority of Plato and Aristotle in the Middle Ages: VII. Hebrew Metrology: VIII. John vi, 51, 58, 59, "Things New and Old."

Eclectic Review, September:—I. Prof. Maurice's Works: II. Companions of my Solitude: III. Shepherd's History of the Church of Rome: IV. Mrs. Browning's Casa Guidi Windows: V. Atkinson & Martineau on Man's Nature: VI. Scott's Lelio; a Vision of Reality: VII. The Spanish Protestants: VIII. Waring's Recollections of the Bard of Glamorgan: IX. Local Self-

government and Centralization. *October:*—I. Lamartine's Restoration of Monarchy in France: II. The Creed of Christendom: III. Mayhew's Revelations of London: IV. Sherman's Memoirs of William Allen: V. Recent Poetry: VI. Neapolitan Atrocities—Mr. Gladstone's Letters: VII. Episcopal Revenues. *November*:—I. British Anti-State Church Association: II. Arab Travels in Central Africa: III. Porter's Textual Criticism: IV. The Ballad Poetry of Scotland: V. Adventures of a Gold Seeker: VI. South African Missions—Freeman and Dr. Gray: VII. Religious Scandal—Story of My Life: VIII. Religious Aspects of the Exhibition. *December*:—I. New Reformation in Ireland—The Rival Successions: II. Colonel Dixon's Sketches of Mairwara: III. Warburton's Memoirs of Horace Walpole: IV. Halley's Congregational Lectures—Sacramental Theories: V. Carlyle's Life of Sterling: VI. The Flax Movement: VII. Marriage with the Sister of a Deceased Wife: VIII. Kossuth and the Hungarian Revolution.

Among the works in theology and kindred topics recently announced on the continent are:

Die Lehre der ältesten Kirche vom Opfer im Leben und Cultus der Christen, von J. W. F. Höfling. Erlangen, 1851. 236 pp.

Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, von Dr. S. C. Schirlitz. Giessen, 1851.

Golgatha. Seine Kirchen und Klöster. Nach Quellen und Anschau von Dr. Titus Tobler, prakt. Arzte in Horn am Bodensee. Mit Ansichten u. Plänen (auch inschriftl. Beilag.) St. Gallen u. Bern, 1851. 554 pp. 8vo.

Die Wissenschaftlichkeit der modernen speculativen Theologie in ihren Principien beleuchtet, von C. A. Thilo. Leipzig, 1851.

Die Glossolalie in der alten Kirche, in dem Zusammenhang der Geistesgaben und des Geisteslebens des alten Christenthums. Eine exegetisch-historische Untersuchung, von Ad. Hilgenfeld, Dr. phil., Lic. Theol., ord. Mitgl. d. hist.-theol. Gesellsch. zu Leipz. Leipzig, 1850. 152 pp. 8vo.

Predigten über die neuesten Zeitbewegungen, von Dr. A. Tholuck. 3. Heft: 10 kirchliche Zeitpredigten. Halle, 1851. 142 pp. 8vo.

Abhandlung über die Cosmogonie der heidnischen Völker vor der Zeit Jesu und der Apostel. Von Adolf Wutke, Privatdoc. d. Philos an d. Univ. Breslau. Haag, 1850. 130 pp. 8vo.

Essai sur l'esprit et l'influence de la réformation de Luther, par Charles de Villers. Cinquième édit., augmentée du précis historique de la vie de Martin Luther par Melanthon: revue et publiée avec une préface et des notes par A. Maeder. Paris, 1851. 346 pp. 12mo.

Corpus Apologetarum christianorum saeculi secundi. Edidit J. C. T. Otto. Vol. VI. Tatianus Assyrius. Jenae, 1851. pp. XL u. 192. 8vo.

Beiträge zu den theologischen Wissenschaften in Verbindung mit der theolog. Gesellschaft herausgeg. von Ed. Reuss und Dr. Ed. Cunitz. 2 Bdchen. Jena, 1851. 231 pp. 8vo.

La Bible. Traduction nouvelle, avec l'hebreu en regard, accompagné des points-voyelles et des accents toniques, avec des notes philologiques, géograph. et littéraires, et des variants de la version des septante et du texte samaritain. Par S. Cahen. Tom. XV. Les Hagiographes. Tom. III. (Jyob) Job. Accompagné d'une esquisse sur la philosophie du poëme de Job, par Js. Cahen. Paris, 1851. 8vo.

Bibliotheca judaica. Bibliographisches Handbuch der gesammten jüdischen Literatur mit Einschluss der Schriften über Juden u. Judenthum und einer Geschichte der jüdischen Bibliographie. Nach alfabet. Ordnung der Verfasser, bearb. von Dr. Jul. Fürst. 2. Thl. I—M. Leips., 1851. 409 pp. 8vo.

Among the works in Theology and kindred subjects recently announced in Great Britain are the following:—

Thoughts on the Land of the Morning; a Record of Two Visits to Palestine. By H. B. Whittaker Churton, M.A., crown 8vo.:—Lectures for the Use of Sick Persons, by the Rev. H. B. Bacon, fcp. 8vo.:—The Church of England and the Church of Rome; a Charge delivered to the Clergy of Chichester, by the Ven. James Garbett, M.A., Archdeacon of Chichester, 8vo.:—Sermons: Preached for the most part in a Village Church in the Diocese of Durham, by the Rev. John Edmunds, M.A., fcp. 8vo.:—A First Series of Practical Sermons, by the Rev. Frederic Jackson, fcp. 8vo.:—Sermons, by the Rev. Steuart Adolphus Pears, B.D., one of the Assistant Masters of Harrow School, 12mo.:—Hippolytus and his Age; or, Doctrine and Practice of the Church of Rome under Commodus and Alexander Severus. With an Appendix, containing J. Bernaysii Bonnensis Epistola Critica ad Bunsenium, by C. C. J. Bunsen,

D.C.L., 2 vols. post 8vo.:—The Popes: an Historical Summary, from Livius to Pius IX., by G. A. F. Wilks, M.D., 8vo.:—A History of Erastianism, by Archdeacon Wilberforce, post 8vo.:—An Inquiry into the Theology of the Anglican Reformers: with Extracts from their Writings on the Apostolical Succession, Baptism, the Holy Eucharist, Predestination, Faith, and Works. With a concluding Dissertation on their value and authority in illustrating the teaching of the Church of England, by a Priest of the Diocese of Exeter, 1 vol. post 8vo.:—Foreshadows; or, Lectures on our Lord's Miracles and Parables as Earnests of the Age to come, by Dr. Cummings, 2 vols.:—The Apocalypse Unveiled: an Analysis, a Harmony, a Brief Exposition, and a Practical Improvement of the Visions contained in the Book of the Revelation, by the Rev. Jas. Young, Vol. I., fcp. 8vo.:—The Nestorians and their Rituals, with the Narrative of a Mission to Mesopotamia and Coordistan in 1842–1844, and of a late visit to those Countries in 1850; also, Researches into the Present Condition of the Syrian Jacobites, Papal Syrians, and Chaldeans, and an Inquiry into the Religious Tenets of the Yezeedees, by the Rev. George Percy Badger, (Subscription price £2:)—A New Commentary on the Apocalypse, by the Rev. Isaac Williams, B. D., in Eight Vols.; in small 8vo.:—Letters to a Seceder from the Church of England to the Communion of Rome, by W. E. Scudamore, M.A., in post 8vo.:—A Harmony of the Apocalypse; in a Revised Translation, from the best MSS., by Christopher Wordsworth, D. D., Canon of Westminster:—Protestantism and Popery contrasted by the acknowledged and authentic Teaching of each Religion, edited by the Rev. John Edmund Cox, M.A., F.S.A., of All Souls' College, Oxford; 2 vols. 8vo.:—The Church of Christ, in its Idea, Attributes, and Ministry: with an especial reference to the Controversy on the Subject between Romanists and Protestants, by Edward Arthur Litton, M. A., late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, 8vo.:—A Practical Exposition of St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians, to Timothy, Titus, Philemon, and the Hebrews, in the Form of Lectures, intended to assist the Practice of Domestic Instruction and Devotion, by John Bird, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, in 8vo.:—Footsteps of our Lord and His Apostles: a Succession of Visits to the Sites and Scenes of New-Testament Narrative, by W. H. Bartlett, Author of "Walks about Jerusalem:"—The Wycliffe Versions—The Holy Bible, containing the Old and New Testaments, with the Apocryphal Books, in the earliest English Versions made from the Latin Vulgate, by John Wycliffe and his Followers; edited by the Rev. Josiah Forshall, F.R.S., late Fellow of Exeter College, and Sir Frederic Madden, K.H., F.R.S., Keeper of the MSS. in the British Museum, 4 vols. 4to.:—On the Unity and Order of the Epistles of St. Paul to the Churches, by the Rev. Alfred T. Paget, M.A., of Shrewsbury School, 8vo.:—Toleratio Intolerabilis; or, the free development of the Romish System proved, by copious reference to its Canon Law, Councils, &c., to be inconsistent with the Safety and Welfare of the State, by the Rev. Henry T. J. Bagge, B.A.:—Philip Doddridge: His Life and Labours; a Centenary Memorial, by John Stoughton, fcp. 8vo.:—First Lines of Christian Theology, in the Form of a Syllabus, prepared for the use of the Students in Homerton College, by the late Rev. J. Pye Smith, D.D., edited by Rev. W. Farrer, LL.B., Secretary and Librarian of New College, London:—The Inquisition Revealed, in its Cruelties and History; with Memoirs of its Victims in France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, England, India, and other Countries, by Rev. T. Timpson. Dedicated to Cardinal Wiseman, 12mo.:—Sketch of the Religious History of the Slavonic Nations; being a Second Edition of his Lectures on this Subject, revised and enlarged, by Count Valerian Krasinski:—Democratic Ecclesiasticism; an Inquiry into the Principles of Church Government, advocated in "A Manual of Congregational Principles, by G. Payne, LL.D.," and in a Treatise on "Congregational Independency, by R. Wardlaw, D.D." By G. Turner.

AMERICAN.

Proposals have been issued for the publication in Philadelphia of a new quarterly journal, to be called the "Presbyterian Quarterly Review," and to be "second to no Review in Europe or America." The names of the editors (Rev. Messrs. Wallace, Barnes, Brainard, Parker, and Gilbert) are a sufficient guarantee that the work will be undertaken with ability and spirit.

We understand that Dr. George Peck has in preparation a volume of "*Lectures to Young Men on the Formation of a Manly*

Character," which will be issued early in the spring. We can promise our readers, beforehand, a work at once resting upon a basis of sound religion and philosophy, and carefully working out the *one* main thought of "the formation of a manly character."

MOSHEIM'S "*Commentarii de rebus Christianorum ante Constantinum Magnum*," is now to be put before the public in an English dress. Vidal's translation of Vol. I has been revised and rearranged, and Vol. II has been translated by the venerable Dr. James Murdock, and published by Mr. Sherman Converse, in two elegant 8vo. volumes, under the title of "Historical Commentaries on the State of Christianity during the first three hundred and twenty-five years from the Christian Era."

IT will gratify our readers, and the religious world generally, to know that the Messrs. Harpers of this city have in press the writings of the late Dr. Olin. They will be comprised in four volumes, uniform in size with his Travels in Europe. The first volume will contain Sermons and Sketches of Sermons from his MSS., which have never yet appeared in print. The second volume will be made up of Addresses on various occasions, and miscellaneous articles from his powerful pen. His admirable Lectures to the Students of the University on the Theory and Practice of Scholastic Life, with his Baccalaurean Discourses, will make a third volume; and the fourth will comprise an extended and graphic account of Greece and Constantinople. The volumes may be expected early in the ensuing spring. They pass through the press under the supervision of Dr. Floy.

WE continue our summaries of the contents of the leading American Theological Journals:—

Christian Examiner, (Boston,) November:—I. Elias Hicks and the Hicksite Quakers: II. The German in America: III. Institution for Idiots in Berlin: IV. Stuart's Commentary on Daniel: V. Parkman's Conspiracy of Pontiac: VI. Animal Magnetism: VII. The Poet Rückert.

Mercersburg Review, November:—I. Early Christianity: II. Trapper's Life: III. Reverence and Religion: IV. Significance of the Christian Name: V. Christian Prayer.

New-Englander, (New-Haven,) November:—I. Physical Science and the Useful Arts in their relation to Christian Civilization: II. Dr. Isaac Barrow: III. Lord's Epoch of Creation: IV. Puritan Element of the American Character: V. Campbell's Age of Gospel Light: VI. Stephen's Farmers' Guide: VII. Wilson's Church Identified: VIII. Memoirs of Wordsworth.

Biblical Repertory, (Princeton,) October:—I. Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland: II. McCosh on the Method of Divine Government: III. Philosophy of Philo: IV. Relation of the Old to the New Dispensation: V. Schaff's Church History: VI. History of the Vaudois Church: VII. Review of Prof. Parke's last notice of the Repertory: VIII. Short notices of recent works, and Literary Intelligence.

Bibliotheca Sacra, (Andover,) October:—I. Life of Zuingli: II. Proofs of the Existence of God: III. Harrison's English Language: IV. Government and Popular Education: V. Latin Lexicography: VI. Nature and Kind of the Sounds of Speech: VII. Import of "They pierced my hands and feet," Psa. xxii, 17: VIII. Neander as a Church Historian: IX. Recent Works on Asia Minor.

Southern Presbyterian Review, (Columbia, S. C.,) October:—I. Validity of Popish Baptism: II. Chivalry and Civilization: III. Life of Thomas Paine: IV. Moral, Social, and Professional Duties of Attornies and Solicitors: V. Scripturalism and Rationalism: VI. Harmony of Revelation with Natural Science, with special reference to Geology. (Second article.)

Evangelical Review, (Gettysburg, Pa.,) October:—I. Memoir of H. H. Muhlenburg, D. D.: II. Lutheran Doctrine of the Lord's Supper: III. History of the Jews: IV. The Protestant Principle: V. Bibliography: VI. Hymns from the German.

Brownson's Quarterly, (Boston,) October:—I. Newman on the True Basis of Theology: II. St. Bonnet on Social Restoration: III. The Hungarian Nation: IV. The Edinburgh Review on Ultramontane Doubts.

Church Review, (New-Haven,) October:—I. Jubilee Year, or God in History; II. Canadian Clergy Reserves: III. Sermons for Servants: IV. Obedience to Law and Private Judgment: V. Divine Rule of the Church's Legislation: VI. Jephthah's Vow: VII. Wilberforce's Theory and Pantheism.

Christian Review, (New-York,) October:—I. Grote's Greece: II. Dr. Woods on Infant Baptism: III. Beneficence the Noblest Aim: IV. Objections to this Life as the

only period of Probation, considered: V. Annexation of Louisiana: VI. Ultimate Supremacy of the Kingdom of Redemption: VII. Temporal Power of the Popes.

Theological and Literary Journal, (New-York,) October:—I. Brown on Christ's Second Coming: II. Designation of the Figures in Isaiah xiv, xv, xvi, xvii: III. Foreign Missions and Millenarianism: IV. The Holy Ghost the Author of the only Advancement of Mankind: V. Todd on the Prophecies: VI. Ferguson's Eastern Architecture.

Southern Methodist Quarterly, October:—I. Footprints of the Creator: II. Relation of Infidelity to Civil Government: III. Analysis and Review of the first eight chapters of Romans: IV. Poems by Matilda: V. Chalmers and Sydney Smith on Methodism: VI. The Methodist Episcopal Church, South.

Classical and Miscellaneous.

EUROPEAN.

The University of Berlin had, during the summer semester of 1851, 1329 students, of whom there were studying Theology 184, Law 558, Medicine 232, Philosophy and Philology 354. The Theological Faculty contains 5 Professors *ordinarii*, 5 *extraordinarii*, and 4 *privat-docenten*. The Philosophical Faculty numbers 30 Professors *ordinarii*, 27 *extraordinarii*, and 32 *privat-docenten*. The University of Bonn numbered for the same half year, 1000 students, of whom 196 belonged to the Catholic Theological department and 77 to the Protestant. The Juristical department numbered 374, the Medical 125, and the Philosophical 228. At Erlangen there are 401 students, 170 in Theology, 150 in Law, 53 in Medicine, and 22 in Philosophy and Philology. At Freiburg there were 355, of whom 169 studied Theology, 65 Law, 73 Medicine, and 48 Philosophy and Philology. At Giessen there were 409 students, of whom 70 studied Theology. At Heidelberg there were 603 students, of whom 47 were Theological. The University of Jena numbered 621 students, of whom 85 were Theological. At Leipsic there were 846, of whom 168 were Theological students; at Tübingen 768, of whom 299 studied Theology.

Jelf's Greek Grammar has passed to a second edition, 2 vols. 8vo, which is said to be corrected and enlarged.

A copious review of all recent works of value in Latin Grammar is given by Weissenborn in the *neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pædagogik* for July and August, 1851.

The *Introductory Lectures* delivered by the Professors at the opening of the New College, (Congregational,) St. John's Wood, are announced as in press. The subjects of the lectures are as follows, viz.:—I. The Inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures. By Rev. John Harris, D.D., Principal, and Professor of Systematic and Pastoral Theology: II. Earliest Form of Christianity. By Rev. J. H. Godwin, Professor of New-Testament Exegesis, and Mental and Moral Philosophy: III. The Study of the Natural-History Sciences. By Edwin Lankester, Esq., M.D., F. R. S., Professor of the Natural-History Sciences: IV. The Study of Mathematics. By Rev. P. Smith, B. A., Professor of Pure and Mixed Mathematics: V. Old-Testament Exegesis. By Rev. Maurice Nenner, Professor of Hebrew and the Oriental Languages, and of Old-Testament Exegesis: VI. The History of Classical Learning. By William Smith, Esq., L. L. D., Professor of the Greek and Latin Languages, and Literature.

The October number of Jahn's *Jahrbücher* commences a valuable survey of all the works on Roman antiquities that have appeared since 1840. The first article reviews Ruperti, Zeiss, Becker, Göttling, Walter, Burchardi, Rückert, Schuch, and others.

We continue our summaries of the contents of the principal foreign Journals.

London Quarterly, October:—I. Widow-Burning: II. Life and Works of Bishop Ken: III. Puritanism in the Highlands—the Men: IV. Correspondence between Mirabeau and the Count de la Marck: V. Wilkin's Edition of Sir Thomas Browne: VI. The Lexington Papers: VII. Lyell on Life and its Successive Developments: VIII. Papal Pretensions: IX. Revolutionary Literature.

Irish Quarterly Review, September:—I. Moir's (Delta) Poets of the Past Half Cen-

tury: II. Shiel: III. Historic Literature of Ireland: IV. Mr. Montague Dempsey's Experiences of the Landed Interest: V. Government Patronage at Home and Abroad.

Westminster Review, October:—I. Western Africa: II. The Marlboroughs and Reign of Queen Anne: III. Reason and Faith: IV. Newman's Political Economy: V. Gregory of Nazianzum: VI. Decisive Battles: VII. Process of Pleading: VIII. Life and Immortality: IX. Foreign Literature.

Edinburgh Review, October:—I. Comparative Philology: II. Dennistoun's Dukes of Urbino: III. Sources of Expression in Architecture: IV. Juvenile Delinquency: V. Mirabeau's Correspondence: VI. Metamorphoses of Apuleius: VII. Neapolitan Justice: VIII. The Anglo-Catholic Theory: IX. Official Catalogue of the Great Exhibition.

Among the books in Classical and General Literature, recently announced on the continent of Europe are the following:—

Allgemeine Geschichte der Literatur von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart. Ein Handbuch für alle Gebildeten. Von Dr. Joh. Scherr. 1. Hälfte. Stuttgart, 1851. 359 pp. Large 8vo.

Chateaubriand, sa vie et ses écrits, avec lettres inédites à l'auteur, par F. Z. Collombet. Lyon et Paris, 1851. 8vo.

Die Weltalter. Von Dr. K. Ch. Planck, Privatdocent. 2. Theil: Das Reich des Idealismus oder zur Philosophie der Geschichte. Tübingen, 1851. 309 pp. 8vo.

Histoire des peuples anciens et de leurs cultes, ou le monde primitif, historique et monumental, ou l'archéologie primitive, par M. l'abbé Desroches. Caen, 1851. 4to.

Statistique des peuples de l'antiquité. Les Egyptiens, les Hébreux, les Grecs, les Romains et les Gaulois. Economie sociale, civile et domestique de ces peuples; territoire, population, origine, races, castes et classes; agriculture, industrie, commerce, richesse publique; forces militaires. Par Alex. Moreau de Jonnes, membre de l'Institute. 2 vols. Paris, 1851. 8vo.

Arica. Scripsit Paul Boetticher, phil. Dr. Halae, 1851. 115 pp. 8vo.

Lehrbuch der höheren Mathematik, enthaltend die Differential- und Integral-Rechnung, Variations-Rechnung und analytische Geometrie. Nebst vielen Beispielen. Von Dr. T. Franke, Prof. zu Hannover. Hannover, 1851. 759 pp. 8vo.

Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques; par une Société de professeurs et de savants. Tom. V. (Persée—Quantité.) Paris, 1851. Large 8vo.

M. Cousin et ses doctrines, par M. Roux-Lavergne. Bruxell., 1851. 112 pp. 8vo.

Christian Metaphysics; or, Plato, Malebranche, and Gioberté; the old and new Ontologists compared with the Modern Schools of Psychology. By the Rev. Ch. Bohn Smyth. Lond., 1851. 266 pp. 8vo.

Lehrbuch der Psychologie. Von Dr. G. Schilling, Prof. zu Giessen. Leipzig, 1851. 214 pp. 8vo.

Among the works in Classical and General Literature recently announced in Great Britain are the following:—

History of the Roman State, from 1815–50, by Luigi Carlo Farini, translated by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M. P., 2 vols. 8vo.:—The Germania of Tacitus, with Ethnological Dissertations and Notes, by Dr. R. G. Latham, Author of the "English Language," &c., demy 8vo:—A Handbook of the English Language, by Dr. R. G. Latham, late Professor of the English Language and Literature in University College, London, 1 vol. 12mo.:—Lectures on the History of France, delivered in the University of Cambridge, by the Right Hon. James Stephen, K. C. B., LL. D., Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge:—Outlines of Universal History, from the Creation of the World to the Present Time, translated from the German of Dr. George Weber, by Dr. M. Behn, Professor of German Literature, Winchester College:—Memoirs of Marquis of Rockingham and his Contemporaries, from Original Letters and Documents now first published, by the Right Hon. the Earl of Albemarle, 2 vols. 8vo.:—Travels in the East in 1850–51, including a Visit to Nineveh, by Lieut. the Hon. Frederick Walpole, author of "Four Years in the Pacific," 2 vols. 8vo:—Recollections of Manilla and the Phillippines, in 1848, 1849, and 1850, by Robert M'Micking, post 8vo.:—History of Greece, from its Conquest by the Crusaders to its Conquest by the Turks, and of the Empire of Trebizond, 1204–1461, by George Finlay, Esq.:—Travels in European Turkey in 1850, through Bosnia, Servia, Bulgaria, Macedo-

nia, Roumelia, Albania, and Epirus, with a Visit to Greece and the Ionian Islands, and a Homeward Tour through Hungary and the Sclavonian Provinces of Austria on the Lower Danube, by E. Spencer, Esq., 2 vols. 8vo.:—The History of the War in Affghanistan, by John William Kaye, written from the Unpublished Letters and Journals of the Most Distinguished Military and Political Officers employed in Affghanistan throughout the momentous years of British Connexion with that country, 2 vols. 8vo.:—Journal of a Visit to Thessaly, Albania, and Mount Athos, by the Rev. George F. Bowen, Rector of the Greek University in Corfu, in one volume:—A New Volume of Essays, by the Rev. S. R. Maitland, D.D., F.R.S.:—A New Edition of Porson's Euripides, edited by Professor Scholefield, 8vo.:—A Tour in South Africa, with Notices of Natal, Mauritius, Madagascar, Ceylon, Egypt, and Palestine, by Rev. J. J. Freeman, Home Secretary of the London Missionary Society:—The Ansayrii, or Assassins, with Travels in the Further East, including a Visit to Nineveh, by Lieutenant the Hon. Fred. Walpole, R. N., 3 vols. 8vo., with Illustrations:—Travels from the Rocky Mountains to California, by the Hon. Henry Coke, post 8vo.:—The Life and Times of Dante, by Count Cesare Balbo, edited, with an Introduction and notes, by Mrs. Bunbury, 2 vols. post 8vo.:—Sir W. Hamilton's Critical Discussions from the Edinburgh Review, corrected and enlarged, 8vo.:—History of the English Railway, its Social Relations and Revelations, by John Francis, 2 vols. 8vo.:—History of Greek Classical Literature, with an Introduction on the Language, Biographical Notices, an Account of the Periods in which each principal Author lived and wrote, so far as Literature was affected by such History, and observations on the Works themselves, by R. W. Browne, Professor of Classics at King's College, London, 2 vols. 8vo.:—Spain as it is, by G. A. Hoskins, Esq., Author of "Travels in Ethiopia," "A Visit to the Great Oasis," &c., 2 vols., with Illustrations:—Outlines of the History of the English Language, with illustrative specimens, for the use of colleges and schools, by George L. Craik, Professor of History and of English Literature in Queen's College, Belfast, 1 vol. fcp.:—The History of England under the Houses of York and Lancaster, with an Introductory Sketch of the Early Reformation, 8vo.:—Fresh Discoveries at Nineveh, and Researches at Babylon, being the Results of the Second Expedition to Assyria, also a journey to the Khabour, the Desert, Lake Van, Ancient Armenia, Kurdistan, and the borders of the Euphrates, by Austen Henry Layard, D.C.L., with wood cuts, 2 vols. 8vo:—Illustrations of the Sculptures, Vases, and Bronzes recently discovered at Nineveh, principally Bas-reliefs of the Wars and Exploits of Sennacherib from his Palace at Kouyunjik, from drawings made on the spot, by Austen Henry Layard, D.C.L., folio, uniform with "Layard's Monuments of Nineveh:"—Some Account of the Danes and Northmen in England, Scotland, and Ireland, by J. J. A. Worsaae, of Copenhagen, For. F.S.A., London, wood-cuts, 8vo.:—Memoirs of the late Emperor of China, and the Court of Pekin, by the Rev. Dr. Gutzlaff:—Suwarow and his last Campaign, by Major Macready:—Pictures of Life in Mexico, 2 vols., by R. H. Mason, Esq.:—China during the War and Since the Peace, by Sir J. F. Davis, Bart., late Minister Plenipotentiary in China, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Hong Kong, 2 vols.:—*History of Ancient Pottery;* Egyptian, Asiatic, Greek, Roman, Etruscan, and Celtic. By Samuel Birch, F.S.A., assistant keeper of the antiquities in the British Museum. With illustrations. 8vo.:—Women of Christianity, Exemplary for Piety and Charity, by Miss Julia Kavanagh, with Portraits:—Memoirs of Horace Walpole and his Contemporaries, including numerous Original Letters from Strawberry Hill, edited by Eliot Warburton, Esq., 2 vols. 8vo.:—Lectures on the History of France, delivered before the University of Cambridge, by the Right Hon. Sir James Stephen, K.C.B., 2 vols. 8vo.:—The Book of Almanacs, with Index, by which the Almanacs belonging to any year preceding A. D. 2000 can be found, with Means of Finding New and Full Moons from B. C. 2000 to A. D. 2000, by Augustus de Morgan, Professor of Mathematics in University College, London, demy 8vo. oblong, price 5s. cloth.

THE

METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1852.

ART. I.—FAITH AND SCIENCE—COMTE'S POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.

[SECOND PAPER.]

Cours de Philosophie Positive. Par M. Auguste Comte, Ancien Elève de l'Ecole Polytechnique; Répétiteur d'Analyse Transcendentale, et de Mécanique Rationnelle à la dite Ecole. Paris: Bachelier. 1830–1842. 6 tomes, 8vo.

THE fallacy involved in M. Comte's distribution of states and periods consists, in great measure, in mistaking a predominant characteristic for a specific difference, and hence in supposing them to be reciprocally exclusive of each other. It would, indeed, be doing injustice to M. Comte, which we are very far from having any disposition to do, to conceal his recognition of the actual co-existence of all, which is prominently and continually brought forward in the whole course of his elaborate work. But this admission recognises them merely in their antagonism, which is supposed to lead to an ultimate exclusion, and therefore we are perfectly correct in saying that, on his theory, they are logically exclusive of each other. It may seem strange that a doctrine, leading to such a result, should have been deliberately embraced by one who regards the theological habit of mind as spontaneous,* whence it should have been acknowledged as indestructible also; and who professes to have systematized and proclaimed the historical method, which ought to recognise as also indestructible, though not as incapable of restriction, all tendencies which have been characteristically manifested at any period of the progress of humanity. But it is not with these things, but with the consequences to which they lead, that we are principally concerned at present.

* "Le développement spontané des conceptions théologiques." Philos Posit., leçon i, tome i, p. 9.

If these intellectual conditions are severally exclusive of each other, then the attainment of the Positive habit of mind must be a negation and complete overthrow of the Theological and Metaphysical; or, in plain language, such as M. Comte delights to use, Science is entirely incompatible with Religion and Metaphysics,* and the acceptance of the Positive Philosophy is the rejection of both. As we have shown briefly that this supposed exclusion is fallacious, we might here arrest our argument, for the presumption is at least in favour of the possible co-existence of Science, Metaphysics, and Religion, and we might wait till M. Comte had altered or modified his premises, and replaced the defective threads of his Logic. But as he unequivocally cashiers Logic altogether, we will proceed with our refutation by showing that not merely are his premises false, but his conclusions and their consequences erroneous. We do not mean to say that they are inconsistent with such incorrect premises, for the logical concatenation of the Positive Philosophy is almost without flaw, and constitutes one of its most admirable characteristics; but they are at variance with the truth.

We will again wave the discussion of M. Comte's irreligion, remarking only that there is a gross inconsistency in this abnegation of the validity of a belief which is attested as one of the fundamental facts of human nature by the whole course of that history on which his whole philosophy is erected, and which is confirmed by the universal experience and observation on which he relies as the instruments by which science is established. Nay more: so absolutely impossible is it to escape from the recognition and influence of this necessary belief, that even M. Comte himself, undoubting and total as is his infidelity in respect to all revealed or accredited religion, concludes his long labours by appending to them as a corollary a proposition for the institution of a new creed and a new worship, of which the divinity shall be an idealized humanity.†

We are in no danger of being supposed to argue from a prejudiced point of view—at any rate the argument will not be suspected of springing from a foregone conclusion—when we discuss M. Comte's rejection of Metaphysics; and on this subject, therefore, we shall venture to dwell at greater length, inasmuch as its repudiation arises from the same principles which have led to the abnegation of religion, and involves fallacies strikingly analogous to those which are connected with the rejection of Theology.

* "La théologie et la physique sont si profondément incompatibles." Philos. Pos., leçon i, tome i, p. 13; leçon lvii, tome vi, pp. 551, 552; leçon lviii, p. 714; et passim.

† République Occidentale, Conclusion Générale, pp. 315–393.

It is generally conceived that Logic and Metaphysics are two distinct branches of moral science: but this position is not now, and never has been of universal acceptance; for sometimes Metaphysics has been regarded as a part of Logic, and more frequently Logic has been treated as a mere application of Metaphysics. The Scotch school has included all the Logic which it recognises in their narrow Psychology, while the Scholastics and many others, ourselves among the number, are disposed to comprehend within the range of Logic whatever can be distinctly known of Metaphysics. It does not fall within our province at this time to discuss which of these opinions is correct,—whether they constitute one or two sciences. M. Comte rejects both, and while we concede the propriety of this double rejection as a single and immediate consequence of that distribution of the states of mind which we have just animadverted on, we will consider the propriety of the abrogation of each, separately and distinctly.

It might still be a question whether the one or the other should have the precedence in this discussion; and a very important question it would be, if we intended to make the validity of either dependent upon the other. But, inasmuch as Metaphysics in its loose acceptation contemplates a larger scope than is ordinarily comprehended by Logic; and inasmuch as M. Comte's rejection of Metaphysics is absolute, while with regard to Logic he rather proposes to discard the term than the reality, and to substitute another Organon for the Aristotelian Logic, we shall first consider his grounds for the denial of Metaphysics and their validity, and then prosecute a similar inquiry in regard to his dethronement of Logic.

We have seen that the rejection of Metaphysics follows immediately from the principles of the Positive Philosophy as expounded by M. Comte; but he further objects to its claims to be regarded as a branch of knowledge, that it is a resuscitation of a defunct theology, that it is purely critical, meaning thereby that it only criticises other systems and is only adapted to a crisis or transition-stage of intellectual progress, that it has proved wholly unfruitful for two thousand years, that it can boast of no real discoveries, that its whole substance is a patch-work of imperfectly comprehended metaphors mistaken for reasoning, and that, when it attempts to place itself on the same platform with the other modern sciences, by supposing a distinction between internal and external observation, and thereon constructing a psychology, it makes only a futile effort.* In connexion with the last objection, he asks with more acuteness than ingenuity, How can any observation take place, when the organ ob-

* Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon i, tome i, pp. 34–38.

served and the organ observing are identical? But, however conclusive such an inquiry might be if addressed by or to a philosopher who rigidly adhered to the old Aristotelian maxim, "*vere scire est per causas scire*,"* it comes with a bad grace from one whose fundamental maxim is that the "*quid*," the fact or phenomenon, can alone be known,† and that the "*quomodo*," or manner—the how—lies absolutely beyond human cognition. Nor is the question of any weight with those who admit this maxim in metaphysics as in other science, and attempt to give to its shadowy doctrines, as much as possible, a scientific or *positive* form. In our day few metaphysicians pretend to trace causation—"*scire per causas:*" the impossibility of such knowledge has been recognised in great measure, not in consequence of its promulgation by the Positive Philosophy, but in consequence of the difficulties which were shown to attend it by the metaphysicians Hume and Brown. We have not inserted in these objections M. Comte's opposition to metaphysics in consequence of its supposition of entities, in part because we have shown this to be characteristic merely of one form of ontology, not of all, and in part because it is connected with the religious part of the inquiry, since M. Comte regards God as only a metaphysical entity.

Let us now examine briefly and separately M. Comte's objections. They present a strong array of charges, we will not affect to disguise it, and they contain much truth in them, but they have been alleged by other philosophers, themselves metaphysicians, not as destructive of this branch of knowledge, or conclusive against its existence, but as evidence of the inherent difficulty of the subject, and of the necessity for cautious and careful reconstruction.

We pass over once more the theological objection, and address ourselves to the charge of Metaphysics being purely critical. If we regard this accusation as meaning that it merely criticises other philosophies, it might have been suggested by a loose apprehension of the significance of Kant's great work; but, in all probability, it is original with M. Comte, as a transition-state of intellect can have no independent philosophy of its own,—the very idea of an intellectual crisis or transition supposing a merely provisional body of doctrine to bridge over the chasm which separates one original or normal (we cannot avoid using the expression) system from the other. If we consider the accusation as implying that Meta-

* πάντες γὰρ τὴν σοφίαν τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν αἰτιῶν φασὶν εἶναι γνῶσιν. Alex. Aphrod. Schol. Aristot., p. 525.

† ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τὸ διότι. Aristot. Eth. Nicom., lib. i, c. ii, p. 1095, b. 6.; sed contra Metaph. lib. i, c. 1, p. 981, a. 29. It is still more applicable to the πῶς.

physical science is characteristic of a crisis, we may ask in what respects it is so. It cannot be in all respects, for it has existed in all ages since the march of intellect commenced. It was born and very acutely developed under the Polytheism of Greece, which M. Comte considers only one or two removes from Fetichism; it was found in company with the mythology of the Hindoos; it grew up with the extension and development of Christianity. But if it thus accompanied all forms of Theology but the first, it has existed concurrently with the earlier stages of the Positive Philosophy, and may continue to co-exist with its further progress; and M. Comte himself regards as one of the originators of that Philosophy, which he supposes to be final and exclusive, that very Descartes,* who is universally reverenced as the father of modern Metaphysics. The truth is that a metaphysical doctrine is not necessarily transitional, except inasmuch as all change is a transition; but a transitional state is necessarily metaphysical. The difference may be in appearance only verbal, but it is nevertheless one of vast importance. During a period of transition, Metaphysics encroaches upon the domain of both Theology and Science, and retains its command of them till the one has been established and the other reconstructed. It extends its sway at such a time beyond its legitimate kingdom; but it possesses a lawful sovereignty within which it is afterwards restricted. Its usurpations alone are peculiarly connected with a transitional state; its peculiar and just reign is eternal. We think that the vagueness of M. Comte's conception of Metaphysics, and his application of the epithet, Metaphysical, to a crisis in intellectual development, have sprung very much from his recognition of the predominance in our day of both the Metaphysical and the critical spirit, and a hasty induction therefrom. Now we acknowledge most freely that this is an age of criticism,—it has long been asserted by metaphysicians;† we admit that it is also an age of transition; and we have already confessed that an era of transition is necessarily metaphysical, (the reasons for which opinion we may hereafter have an opportunity of alleging;) but we cannot assent to the position that Metaphysics belongs only to a crisis, and is nothing but a criticism. How far it is essentially critical; why it is so far critical; and what is its independent or positive value, we shall endeavour to explain after replying to M. Comte's other objections.

M. Comte further charges upon Metaphysics its utter barrenness for two thousand years, and its inability to point to any real dis-

* Cours de Phil. Pos., tome vi, pp. 455, 695, 756, 886.

† "Notre siècle est le siècle de la critique: tout doit y être soumis." Kant. Crit. de la Raison Pure, vol. i, p. 7, note, trad. Tissot; and Logique, § iv, p. 42.

coveries. This count in the indictment is rendered still more grave by its being, in some measure, supported by the high authority of Kant.* We will examine its validity as an objection, supposing it to be true; and then estimate its truth.

The period of infertility assigned by M. Comte makes us conjecture that he regards it as extending from the times of Aristotle to our own. This seems to admit that it had been fruitful previous to that time; and, if so, then, although it may have early attained its highest possible development, and may have been thenceforward stagnant, yet it must have been a valid branch of knowledge before, and at the time of its maturity, and must have possessed some value. Whatever value it then had, it must still possess, except so far as the same purposes are better subserved by some other philosophy, unless its whole scope is embraced in other science, which will not be pretended. Certainly, if M. Comte recognises its value or utility at any time, which he does distinctly on numerous occasions, its incapability of further advancement does not destroy that validity or authorize him to deny it at a future time. We may venture to say that Arithmetic is a constituted science, *tota, teres, et rotunda*, admitting no further development worthy of consideration, and already in great measure supplanted by Algebra. Yet no one, not even M. Comte himself, will presume to deny either the existence or the value of such a branch of knowledge as Arithmetic. We may also allege that Moral Philosophy has certainly made even fewer notable advances, as a purely human science, than Metaphysics since the Ethics of Aristotle and the Offices of Cicero; yet M. Comte professes his belief in the validity and existence of such a philosophy, though he would alter and amend it, and re-organize it on a new basis. Metaphysics may, in like manner, require a new basis, and may have been so long barren for want of it; but we have assuredly no right to conclude from its long failure to advance that it may not resume its progress at some future time. The science of Astronomy was almost retrograde for fourteen hundred years from Ptolemy to Copernicus, and did not in consequence prove ultimately to be either futile or barren.† Consequently, even if Metaphysics be all that it is represented to be in this unfavourable picture, its stagnant condition would not furnish in the slightest respect a reason for its entire negation.

But, notwithstanding the allegations of M. Comte, and their partial confirmation by Kant, we deny that Metaphysics has been stagnant.

* Crit. de la Raison Pure, préface de la seconde édition, vol. i, p. 331.

† By some such reasoning Kant appears to have satisfied himself with regard to the doubt which he had suggested. Crit. de la Raison Pure, vol. i, p. 332.

The facts of which it takes cognizance are almost entirely facts of internal consciousness. These are its data, and they have always been equally possessed by all ages and classes of men. No mechanic arts, no curious instruments are requisite for their apprehension; they cannot be multiplied by the advancement of science, nor enlarged by any process of invention. All that can be done is to observe them more clearly, to harmonize and explain them more accurately and consistently, and to detect their mutual relations and dependence more precisely. The subject-matter, then, of Metaphysics, once determined with any degree of completeness, remains thenceforward incapable of any considerable expansion, except when the science transcends its domain. Hence, as the territory of the science does not enlarge it appears to be stagnant—nay, as it usurps ground in its earlier stages which does not rightfully belong to it, and which it must ultimately surrender, it may appear to recede. But production may be increased by cultivation as well as by an extension of the area—the power and the action may equally exist when concentrated, as when they were diffused. And such, we think, has been the case. But, again, a new source of delusion is opened. The fruitfulness of Metaphysics consists in the clearer determination of common notions and first principles; and the moment this greater perspicuity is attained, the man of science and the politician, the philosopher and the crowd, all avail themselves of the conquest; it is received and absorbed by the general intellect of the current and succeeding ages, and all forget the instrument by which it has been achieved, and deny the claims of the benefactress to their gratitude. Yet it might be easy to show that every intellectual reformation had been heralded, facilitated, or effected by a preceding improvement in the very Metaphysics which is so despitefully entreated. If even, then, it could not now point to any real discoveries which would be generally credited to it, nevertheless it might have rendered most essential aid to the progress of society and of science, by dispelling those delusions which impeded their growth, and rendered it impossible. It might have ministered, as undoubtedly it has, to the advancement of both, by rendering all our notions more clear, distinct, and precise than they had previously been, or would otherwise have been; and surely this service would have been of no slight magnitude. Thus the absence of real discoveries, if such were the fact, would not be an argument against either the utility or the validity of metaphysical speculation.

But we are disposed, also, to deny its asserted failure to produce real discoveries. It proceeds through a succession of analogous changes, which are renewed again and again with each completion

of the circle; and hence its history, to the eyes of the prejudiced or the uninitiated, appears to be merely a silly recurrence of identically the same doctrines. But it is not so: the progress, as the fertility of Metaphysics, consists in the more clear apprehension and explanation of the same subjects—in the gradually expanding comprehension of each recurring system—and, however close may be the analogy between the philosophies of Kant and Aristotle, of Hegel and Plato, of Schelling and the Neo-Platonists, of Comte and Hippo, none will allege that the modern systems are not in advance of the ancient, because the points of view respectively may be identically the same. This progress implies discoveries; perhaps not such as M. Comte contemplates: but what does he mean by real discoveries? It has not invented a new motive power, nor analyzed soils, nor discovered another planet; but such discoveries belong not to its sphere. But it has discovered the conceptions, and invented and defined their appropriate terms, by which our science, our philosophy, and all our higher speculations are carried on. If we were required to specify an instance of real discovery, we would say, it has proved that inability to comprehend causation which is the corner-stone of the vast edifice which M. Comte has erected. He did not deduce this doctrine from his own premises or for himself; he did not receive it from Bacon or any of the earlier lights of the Positive school; but he borrowed it from Hume. Can he say that this is not a real discovery? If he does, then he denies absolutely the sole foundation on which his whole colossal scheme is reared.

It is but too true that metaphysical speculation has been frequently little more than a patch-work of half-comprehended metaphors, which have been employed with fluctuating significations. But this objection does not affect its substance; it only touches its vesture. It were to be desired that a defect so grievous should be remedied, and it may be remedied to a very great extent. The nature of the human mind, and the manner in which its knowledge is acquired, necessitate the employment of direct metaphors, borrowed from the sensible world, in Metaphysics, more than in any other department of human study. We cannot reason about things ideal with ideal symbols: when we speak of these abstruse subjects, we are obliged to apply to their discussion the terms of the common vocabulary with which all are familiar. But the metaphors which we employ gradually become fixed and definite, and lose their metaphorical character, in the same manner that most of the words of our ordinary language have been formed by the conversion of metaphorical into direct expressions. Much care may, indeed, be needed to prevent the illusions which spring from their origin; still more to avoid the

illusions which arise from their vagueness and corruption in vulgar use. The charge is a valid censure on those metaphysicians who employ metaphors loosely, and do not adhere to any strict well-defined signification; but it cannot be conceived to constitute a valid objection against the whole existing body of metaphysical doctrine—still less against the possibility or value of any such doctrine.

But the unkindest cut of all is to complain of the effort which Metaphysics has made to become positive—according to M. Comte, the only mode in which science passes from an imperfect into a comparatively perfect state. We do not ourselves believe in the possibility or expediency of Metaphysics assuming a strict scientific form, but we think that it partially admits of a positive complexion; and that the more it can clothe itself with this type, the better, provided it does not exclude or fail to recognise the existence of what is incapable of this conversion. We think, too, that the manner in which the Scotch school has sought to attain a positive character has been lamentably indiscreet, and has, in some measure, conceded the argument to M. Comte; but what shall we say of his own proposal to construct a Psychology on the positive basis, after rejecting Metaphysics altogether, and cavilling at its attempt to assume a positive form at all?

Having answered these objections, let us be indulged in a few brief remarks on the validity, the use, and the importance of Metaphysics. After what we said in our previous essay, we shall not be suspected of a disposition to exaggerate these. Metaphysics must be valid, because it is spontaneous, inevitable, indestructible, and subserves purposes not otherwise to be effected. At the very foundation of all reasoning, and especially of all science, lie primitive and abstract ideas, such as matter, substance, being, property, cause, effect, change, nature, time, space, relation, number, quantity, quality, accident, &c., which must be defined and explained—or it must be shown how far they are explicable, and how far inexplicable—before science is possible. If these explanations be seriously incorrect, science will ultimately suffer its share of the penalty; and before the science can be reformed, the Metaphysics must be amended. The Metaphysical speculations of Leibnitz, dependent upon those of Descartes and Spinoza, led to the theory of the *vis viva*, which long troubled Mechanics, and has not yet received its final solution. Even Mathematics is nothing more than the development of special metaphysical ideas by a congenial metaphysical process; and the present confusion and prospective barrenness (we retort upon M. Comte with his own word with peculiar pleasure) must seek its remedy

from a renewed and more accurate analysis of the Metaphysical principles on which the higher parts of the Calculus rest. All our reasoning and science depend upon first principles, which lie within the domain of Metaphysics. We may except to the name, and propose another, but still there is the domain, whether it belongs to an acknowledged lord and master, or not: we may hew it in pieces and apportion the fragments among the various sciences, but the mutilated members can be gathered up, and they will grow together like the limbs of the rejuvenated Æson when removed from the caldron. The partition, as the change of name, is a kind of jugglery which can deceive no one but those who are too weak to avoid deception, or determined to be deceived. If there must be then a body of knowledge concerned with first principles, to explain the very foundations of science and all other reasoning, we cannot refuse to acknowledge the validity, the utility, and the importance of Metaphysics.

But to remove misapprehension, and prevent the confusion which may so naturally flow from the tenor of M. Comte's remarks—three parts true, and one part false as they are,—we promised also to show why Metaphysical speculation was critical, and how far it was so. Its critical character proceeds, in great measure, from the nature of the subject-matter, as we have already mentioned. As its data are immutable and incapable of multiplication, all that can be done in the development of metaphysical doctrine is to examine them: and as they form the latent premises of all knowledge, we cannot hope in our examination to advance a single step beyond them, or to discover facts or laws of greater generality than those which meet us at the outset. Hence progress in this kind of speculation must consist in the criticism of those facts, and of the previous explications which have been given to them; for they are not tangible, they scarcely admit of intentional modification or experiment, and their different aspects consist almost entirely of the different interpretations which have been put upon them. But it is only with respect to such first principles that Metaphysics is essentially critical; its further deductions are spontaneous and original, although it may be necessary, in confirmation of their validity, to show how they explain or refute other conflicting theories which profess to be founded upon the same facts.

Again: Metaphysics is characteristic of a crisis, because, during a transition from one intellectual system to another, before the goal towards which the movement tends has been discovered, the only hope of advancement must be sought in the analysis of existing or anterior systems, in order to detect the germs of truth which com-

municated to them their past vitality, and the sources of error which have resulted in their present state of paralysis. In a season of doubt and difficulty we are irresistibly thrown back upon a renewed examination of the first principles of our knowledge; and this, as has already been said, is the peculiar province of Metaphysics. That, at such a time, it claims more than its due share of human thought and regard may be very true. It follows from the tendency of the human mind to render every principle which it adopts, and every theory which it receives, sovereign and exclusive. But this tendency is just as strongly manifested in M. Comte's Positive Philosophy, and the present claim of Science to universal empire, as in Metaphysics, and is further illustrated by the past or present conflicts of all the various branches of human knowledge. If Hegel and Schelling in our own day assign to Metaphysics an all-embracing empire, a like claim has been advanced in favour of Mathematics by M. Hoëné Wronski, and in favour of science by M. Comte, and less systematically by the great mass of men of science. In reply to M. Comte's objections, let it be stated that the period of the greatest influence and activity of Metaphysics is not at any central epoch between two systems, as he seems to suppose, but just on the eve of a new advancement of *positive* discovery, and is so because its conquests are essential to the further progress of Science. Assuredly recent years, which have witnessed such a brilliant career of science, have been more illustrated by the prominence of metaphysical speculation than the centuries which preceded them. Hence, though Metaphysical science appertains to a crisis or period of transition, so far as we have admitted, and for the reasons which we have assigned, it does not exclude, though it does and it ought to colour, the coincident evolution of both theology and science, for even under the alleged domination of the Metaphysical spirit, and despite its attempts to secure a usurped jurisdiction, science has so rapidly advanced as in these latter days to press claims still more exclusive than those of Metaphysics have ever been.

We have thus endeavoured to exhibit both the truth and error of M. Comte's views in regard to Metaphysics: it is not the first time that Metaphysics has been rejected, nor is it the first time that the futility of such rejection has been shown. About three centuries ago, Marius Nizolius, of Brescia, in like manner affirmed Metaphysics to be partly false, and partly superfluous and unnecessary, and was answered long afterwards by Leibnitz.*

* "Metaphysicam partim falsam, partim supervacaneam, et non necessariam esse, affirmamus." Mar. Nizol. De ver. princip. philosophandi, lib. iii, cap. iv, p. 217, ap. Leibnitii opera. Ed. Dutens, tom. i, pa. i, p. 72. Vide etiam pp. 60, 61.

But, like his predecessor, Nizolius,* M. Comte entertains hardly any greater consideration for Logic than for Metaphysics. He does not, indeed, deny the existence of logical processes and logical procedure, and he speaks continually of logical laws, and boasts of the logical consistency of his work,† but he conceives that the principles of Logic cannot be manifested otherwise than in a concrete state, and can be exhibited only in connexion with the reasoning of the separate sciences. He considers that Logic as a science is denied in the negation of Metaphysics; and that Logic as an art of reasoning, and a doctrine to be separately taught, is eminently futile and ridiculous. He contemplates, however, the possibility at some future time of constructing a Positive Logic, or, in other words, a Logic of Inductive Philosophy, but thinks that the time for such systematization has not yet arrived; and we are strongly inclined to agree with him in this opinion, notwithstanding the profound and elaborate attempt of Mr. Mill. But he conceives that, even if such a body of Logical rules and principles could be constructed, it would be of very little avail, and entirely useless except in its combination with specific scientific inquiries.‡

On this criticism we have several observations to make.

M. Comte, of course, does not pretend to deny that correct reasoning differs from incorrect; he is, therefore, obliged to recognise the existence of Logic in its loose sense of accurate argumentation. He further admits that there are principles and that there must be rules, by which such accuracy is to be determined, but he deems any attempt as yet to discover them from the analysis of scientific procedure, premature. From this source, however, he thinks that the only valid or Positive Logic can be derived. No one has done more than M. Comte towards the enlargement of the field of Logic; no one has with equal skill and judgment analyzed the organization of the sciences, and indicated more clearly the nature and the manner of their conclusions. We willingly accept from him his important discoveries in this respect, and cordially welcome them as valuable accessions to the domain of Logic. Indeed, we regard his inductive philosophy, as systematized by Mr. Mill, to be the only considerable

* "Nunc ad Nizolii errores redeundum est, ex quibus, post Aristotelem interpretibus confusum, palmarius est, omnimoda illa Dialecticæ et Metaphysicæ abolitio, quam tamen et Nominales, iisdem principiis nixi, retinuerint. Et vero quis neget, esse quædam præcepta tum artis cogitandi seu scientiæ de mente, tum pietatis naturalis, seu scientiæ de summa rerum," &c. Leibnitz, Præf. ad Mar. Nizol., § xxix, Opera tom. iv, ps. i, p. 60.

† "Toujours guidés par les principes logiques posés au tome quatrième," &c. Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon lvii, tome vi, p. 491.

‡ Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon i, tome i, pp. 38–40; leçon lviii, pp. 761–763.

enlargement of Logic, which has been effected since the writings of Aristotle. But we cannot pay the price which he asks for this augmentation; we cannot consent to regard it as subversive or exclusive of what we may call, for want of a better term, syllogistic Logic. Without this, indeed, the new addition would have been impossible as it would be valueless. Every branch of knowledge, when finally organized as a science, is so constituted by the process of deduction, and this M. Comte recognises. The facts are discovered and stripped of their deceptive appearance by observation and experiment; the general laws which regulate or co-ordinate those facts are gathered by induction; but the development of those laws into a science, their employment for the discovery or explanation of new facts, are the work of deductive or syllogistic reasoning, tested of course in each case by observation and experiment. We may go one step further and say, that induction itself presupposes deduction and employs the syllogism.* M. Comte perceives and acknowledges the necessary assumption of the proposition, that the operation of the laws of nature is general, in all inductive reasoning. This is the latent but indispensable major premiss in every inductive enthymeme. But here Comte would object, that, though this be true, yet we reason without having learned Logic, and adopt this premiss, as we pursue accurate reasoning, without reference to any technical rules of the syllogism. These objections are the old ones, which have been so often refuted before that we will not answer them again. They proceed upon the common delusion that Logic is the art of thinking and one mode of reasoning. It is not one mode, but the only possible mode of reasoning, notwithstanding Dugald Stewart asserts that "there are various modes of reasoning to which the syllogistic theory does not apply!"† It is not the art of thinking, but the art of avoiding and detecting incorrect reasoning, and recognising the correspondence of argument with the formal conditions of accurate demonstration. It is solely concerned with the form of the argument, not with its substance or subject matter. It does not pretend to furnish a man with the facts about which he reasons, but it guards him against fallacious deductions from those facts. M. Comte's objections to Logic are founded, like those of Dugald Stewart and its other antagonists, upon an entire misconception of the nature and functions of Logic. A due respect to

* We are aware that this is directly in contravention of the thesis of Mr. Mill, which has been so highly commended, (Logic, book ii, chap. iii,) which is notwithstanding invalid and illogical.

† Philosophy of the Human Mind, pt. ii, c. iv, p. 112; vide p. 111, and pt. ii, chap. iii, sect. i.

this science might have saved him from that confusion of its equivocal meanings, and that utter ignorance of its true scope and character, which have led him to reject it. It is strange, indeed, that so much should have been written in disparagement of Logic, and yet not one of the distinguished authors who have impugned it has had the least acquaintance with its true objects and nature. From John Locke to Augustus Comte not one of its adversaries has clearly understood what the Logic was which they condemned. As the science which explains the natural laws and procedure of the human mind in reasoning, it is essentially indestructible; as the art which applies to daily use the rules gathered from those laws, it is of the highest importance, although it does not teach us to reason, nor apprize us of the conclusions of science, but acts within a much more limited range. We ourselves care little for the censure of those meagre systems of Logic which have long been regarded as constituting the science; but when an attack is made upon the validity of deductive Logic, in general terms, we must express our positive dissent.

This tendency to reject Logic has sprung from the negligent study of Bacon, and a misapprehension of the tenor and design of his remarks. He objected to the *a priori* construction of science by deduction from assumed premises, and indicated the necessity of collecting these premises by induction from observation and experiment. But he clearly, distinctly, and continually avowed the value and importance of deductive Logic, in its proper sphere, and in the development of the various branches of Ethical science.* The blunder of denying the value of Logic, and of supposing that Bacon denied it, must be charged exclusively upon the ignorance of his followers of the precepts given by their master. When Logic boasts of such advocates as Aristotle, Bacon, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, and Mill—the chiefs of the most various philosophies—it may smile at the opposition of Dugald Stewart and the Scotch school, and may disregard the rebellion of M. Comte. Its validity and its use have been proclaimed by the greatest minds of all ages, and the strong eulogies of the Scholastics have been paralleled by the more sedate praise of Bacon;† the vivid mind of Leibnitz insisted strenuously

* De Augm. Sci., lib. ii, vol. viii, p. 83; lib. v, c. i, p. 256; c. ii, p. 262. Fab. Cup., vol. xi, p. 99. Adv. Learning, vol. i, p. 193.

† There has been so much misapprehension of Bacon's views of Logic that we take the liberty of quoting one passage:—"Pars ista Humanæ Philosophiæ, quæ ad Logicam spectat, ingeniorum plurimorum gustui ac palato minus grata est; et nihil aliud videtur quam spinosæ subtilitatis laqueus ac tendicula. * * At istud lumen siccum plurimorum mollia et madida ingenia offendit et torret.

upon its indispensable necessity;* and the critical depth of Kant is enraptured with "the certainty, the beauty, and even the utility of Logic."† If all positive knowledge is scientific, it is attained by reasoning; if attained by reasoning, its accuracy or inaccuracy must be determined by Logic, which only professes to determine the formal conditions of correct or fallacious argument. Had M. Comte not rejected Logical science he would have avoided the fundamental error of his philosophy of assuming a part for the whole, and of concluding that what might be true of a part was also true of the whole. He might have gone further, and, as he has traced the anarchy and revolutionary character of our times to its intellectual aberrations, he might have traced back these aberrations to the illogical character (which he recognises) and the disregard of Logic, which have prevailed for the last three centuries. So far as his objections to Logic are just, they are inapplicable to either the art or the science properly understood: so far as they are applicable, they are unreasonable.

Having thus taken notice of those important branches of human knowledge which M. Comte rejects, we are prepared to enter into the further consideration of the Positive Method, as illustrated by that Hierarchy of the Sciences, constructed or to be constructed, which he recognises. But we deem it proper to stop here for one moment to state the reasons which have induced us to dwell so long upon inquiries that may seem almost excluded by the nature of M. Comte's system, and may consequently appear to be merely preliminary to its discussion. In reality, however, these are the most important points presented in the discussion of the Positive Philosophy. The key-note to any system of philosophy must be sought in its fundamental principles and method: the criticism of these is the most satisfactory, as well as the briefest criticism of the whole; for the entire edifice is determined as soon as the data and method are established. But in the philosophy of M. Comte the exclusion of Theology and Metaphysics is one of the fundamental axioms, because it is rather assumed as a basis for Positivism than legitimately

Ceterum unamquamque rem propria si placet dignitate metiri, *Rationales Scientiæ reliquarum omnino claves sunt.* Atque quemadmodum manus instrumentum instrumentorum, anima forma formarum, ita et *illæ artes artium ponendæ sunt.*" De Augm. Sci., lib. v, c. i, vol. viii, pp. 255, 256. By Alcuin, Rabanus Maurus, and Abelard Logic was called "Disciplina disciplinarum," "dux universæ scientiæ," "sola dicendi scientia;" and of it they said, "hæc docet docere, hæc docet discere," and "scit scire sola."

* De Conform. Fid. cum Rat., §§ 62, 65; Opera, pp. 102, 105, §§ 27–31; tome i, pp. 84–87. Leibnitz Œuvres, ed. Jacques, vol. ii, pp. 93, 96, 75–77.

† Kant Logique, trad. Tissot, pp. v, vi.

deduced from it; and this exclusion decides, in great measure, the character of the method. It is this, which we regard as the vital error of the whole creed, and consequently on this point the validity or the invalidity of the scheme mainly turns. We have recognised and are willing to repeat our conviction of the justice and solidity of the Positive system as strictly applied and confined to science; but we maintain also the absolute necessity of recognising a knowledge which lies beyond the circle of scientific systems, of retaining those very branches of learning which M. Comte rejects, and we deem this to be as much required by the interests of science as by the claims of a correct and all-embracing philosophy. There is a peculiar difficulty in refuting a long and elaborate work, whose details are for the most part as correct as they are profound, and spring legitimately from a philosophy in which truth and error are closely intermingled, with a very decided predominance of the former. It is easy enough to reply to positions and systems entirely erroneous; but when more than half is true, it is an arduous task to detect those fallacies from which the dangerous tendencies flow, without denying that which is just and solid. We have attempted to do this, rendering free credit and assent to what is valid in M. Comte's system, and at the same time refusing and refuting his errors, and tracing their origin and dependence. Their source we have detected in his illogical divisions and illogical exclusions, and as this part of our labours is virtually a refutation of the fundamental sophistry involved in the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, we have been obliged to dwell upon these topics at greater length than a superficial observer might have deemed either requisite or appropriate. This apparent delay, however, enables us to achieve the remainder of our task within comparatively brief limits, though we shall be detained somewhat by a discussion of M. Comte's estimate of Mathematical Science, in consequence of its connexion with the Logic and Metaphysics which he has rejected.

As the simplest or least complex facts are those which are first observed and explained, so in the development of the Positive Method and its application to the classification of the sciences, these must succeed each other in proportion to the increasing complexity of their subject-matter. As each science requires for its full comprehension the aid of all the previous sciences, that which involves the simplest ideas and stands at the commencement of the scale, must constitute the proper introduction to all the others. Such is the position of Mathematics, and such is one of its functions. We might except to these principles, inasmuch as the sciences react upon each other and mutually require the aid of all the others; but

as this scheme of classification is the most clear and comprehensive that we have seen or can conceive, and probably as perfect as the nature of the case will permit, we receive it without question, and concede to M. Comte the praise of having solved a difficulty which Bacon could not master, and which D'Alembert could not diminish.*

The progress of the sciences, as history attests and as their present condition confirms, has been in the main, perhaps not entirely, in accordance with the principles just laid down, and therefore in proportion to their simplicity. Hence Mathematics "constitutes the first and the most perfect of all the fundamental sciences."† In regard to its exquisite perfection there can be no doubt, though we may find it necessary to examine into its extent and its explanation; but it can only be regarded as the first and fundamental science, by cashiering Metaphysics altogether, denying the possibility of any metaphysical doctrine, and striking it completely out of the field of view. This, as we have already stated, M. Comte does: he says that beyond Mathematics we cannot go without falling into the dream-land of Metaphysics.‡ This is, indeed, the only step beyond; but, as we have also said before, his reluctance to take this step—his arbitrary and arrogant negation of any such conceivable science—his effort to establish all human knowledge on a new basis, and to reform all modes of science, without recourse to metaphysical inquiry—constitute the really weak and defective side of his system, neutralize much that is good in it, and render it essentially imperfect, and insufficient for the ultimate purposes designed. It was intended to render this scheme of philosophy the spear of Ithuriel to test the validity of all knowledge, but the head of the spear, with all its magic virtue, is wanting, and the pointless shaft will not be found to be the wand of the true enchanter. All science must rest ultimately on the data and conclusions of the philosophy of the human mind: without these the support for the superstructure is wanting; and it is this basis—the *πού στῶ* of all human knowledge—which Comte has deliberately refused to employ.

It is singular enough that this sneer at Metaphysics, which contaminates his whole reasoning, should be presented in connexion with Mathematics, and alleged as a reason for regarding the latter science as primary and fundamental. But Mathematics is purely a concrete form of Metaphysics—being eminently metaphysical in

* Dug. Stewart's Diss. on the Progress of Metaphys. and Phil. Supplement to Encyclop. Britan., vol. i.

† Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, tome i, p. 145.

‡ "On ne saurait tenter d'aller plus loin sans tomber inévitablement dans les rêveries métaphysiques." Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, tome i, p. 145.

its conceptions, its materials, and its development. The *substratum*, which Comte deems it impossible to discover, is the connexion of the laws and processes of human reasoning with the materials to which it is applied. Take away the *subjecta materia*, quantity and relation, and the residuum will be the abstract laws and processes of the human mind, exhibited as applicable to all reasoning, and which, as abstractions, we may regard as existent even when not operative, i. e. Metaphysics. The substance of Mathematics is composed of two metaphysical conceptions; its axioms are purely and strictly metaphysical propositions; and its procedure is merely the deduction by Logic from these axioms and from the definition of those conceptions of the truths involved in them.

The fact, which would otherwise be inexplicable, that the great Mathematicians have also been the great Metaphysicians of their respective ages, might have led M. Comte to suspect some intimate connexion between the two departments of knowledge, if he had not been blinded by his prejudices.*

But Metaphysics being absolutely rejected, and Logic unceremoniously shoved aside, some primordial science must be introduced in their place to constitute the canon and the touch-stone of reasoning. This, under the new *régime*, is to be one of the functions of Mathematics. The rigorous logical universality of mathematical science † is announced to us as a new revelation to console us for the extinction of the old: we are assured that there is no question whatever which may not be conceived as ultimately reducible to a question of numbers,‡ and consequently brought within the range of mathematical solution. But is this possible in the case of social phenomena,—History, Law, Morals, Political Economy, &c.,—to say nothing of the rejected claims of Metaphysics and Religion? There is a large verge in these for the application of mathematical procedure, as the brilliant researches of M. Quetelet have proved; but these sciences cannot be entirely absorbed by Statistics. M. Comte has himself mentioned Pathology as an exception to his maxim. Certainly, in the present state of that science, Mathematics is not applicable to it, though we may readily conceive it to be so improved as to permit a partial employment of mathematical processes. But, in the other sciences which we have mentioned, the diversity and the varying intensity of the operative influences, the constant flux of modifications which they are ever undergoing, must at all

° Pythagoras, Plato, Descartes, Galileo, Barrow, Newton, Leibnitz, and we might add Kant.

† Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, p. 162.

‡ Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, pp. 148, 149. Cf. p. 162.

times continue to withdraw them from the range of an exclusive mathematical treatment.* Hence the complaints of writers on the sociological sciences against the introduction of such modes of reasoning or illustration. It will not suffice to say that Mathematics is applicable, but the phenomena are too complex to admit of mathematical treatment. From whatever cause the impossibility to apply it to such questions may arise, that impossibility is proof of inapplicability. M. Comte admits† that the difficulty of its application to any but the most simple phenomena is insurmountable; and this, though not actually inconsistent with his previous assertion of its logical universality, is repugnant to it. If it may be conceived applicable in theory, but is found inapplicable in practice, this discrepance might be reconciled upon a metaphysical basis; but after the abnegation of all Metaphysics, it would be an inadmissible explanation, and M. Comte can seek no aid from that source.

We were surprised to find that Sir David Brewster had fallen into the same delusion: "No sound knowledge," says he, "can exist, but that which rests immediately on facts, or is deduced from them by mathematical reasoning."‡ Sir David believes in Christianity and Metaphysics—in the former at least,—and we have a shorter reply for him. If this position be true, where is the evidence of inspiration or revelation, and whence the truth of religion? Yet he afterwards most justly reprehends the atheism of Comte. Is the being of God to be proved or confirmed by a simple algebraic equation? or the truth of Christianity by a differential formula?

Our animadversion upon the exclusive and unlimited claims of mathematical procedure by no means prevents our appreciation of the value of the science as a means of intellectual discipline and an efficient instrument in all scientific researches. We cordially assent to the eulogies bestowed upon it by M. Comte, bating their exclusiveness; and while we make this exception, we would remind him that almost every one of his Lectures is filled with reclamations against the tyranny and unrestrained ascendency of the mathematical spirit, whence, according to him, has proceeded that specialization of modern scientific inquiry, of which he constantly complains,§ and that prolongation of intellectual anarchy, which he

* *τὴν δ' ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀπαιτητέον.* Aristot. Metaph. A. minus, c. iii, p. 995, b. 14. Aristotle had discernment enough to perceive that even mathematical accuracy could not be expected in all reasoning, much less mathematical procedure.

† Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, tome i, p. 151.

‡ Review of Comte's Cours de Phil. Pos., vols. i, ii. Edinburgh Review, July, 1838, No. cxxxvi, art. i, p. 1.

§ Tome vi, pp. 67, 125, 289, 290, 302, 310, 312, 328, 339, 345, 452, 456, 457, 813.

is desirous of bringing to an end. In fact, we agree cordially and fully throughout with M. Comte's positions, except so far as they are warped from the truth by the excessive latitude and exclusive character of his principles; and slight as the amount of error may appear, in comparison with the whole body of the Positive doctrine, every fallacy and every pernicious tendency, with the exception of a few fantastic extravagances, may be legitimately traced to these fundamental defects.

But M. Comte is neither the first, nor the only philosopher, who has assigned to Mathematics its pre-eminent importance as a discipline for the mind, and who has required it as propædeutic to other scientific studies. Every one is familiar with the celebrated prohibition of Plato, but is not equally familiar with the ground on which it was placed by him. He regarded Mathematics not as a part of philosophy, but as introductory or progymnastic to it;* and the Peripatetics assigned to it a function closely analogous to that which is attributed to it by M. Comte.† The weight of Lord Bacon's opinion, as also of John Locke's, is thrown in the same direction; and in very recent times a learned, but most eccentric writer, who aims at the same practical ends as Comte, but whose philosophy starts from the opposite pole, and contemplates not the extinguishment, but the resuscitation of Christianity, asserts the same dogma,‡ though he too protests against the present ascendency of Mathematicians.§

In conceding the claims of Mathematics in this respect, we might possibly be supposed to concede more than could be justly or safely granted. It may be well, then, to inquire, Whence does its peculiar efficacy spring, or, which is nearly the same question, What is the cause of its scientific and logical perfection. This problem has in all ages afforded so large a scope for misapprehension and crude

* *φασὶν ὅτι τὸ μαθηματικὸν οὐκ ἔστι μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὡς καὶ ὁ Πλάτων δοξάζει· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸ μαθηματικὸν οὐ δοξάζει μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἀλλὰ προγυμνασμά τι, ὥσπερ ἡ γραμματικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική· δὺεν καὶ τῷ ἀκροατηρίῳ ἐπέγραψεν "ἀγεωμέτρητος οὐδεὶς εἰσίτω."* David, Schol. Aristot., p. 12, b. 8; vide Comte i, p. 112.

† *τὸ μαθηματικὸν μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ φυσιολογικοῦ καὶ θεολογικοῦ, ὡς καὶ τῶν δύο μετέχον· καὶ γὰρ ἐνυλόν ἐστιν ὁμοίως τῷ φυσιολογικῷ, καὶ ἄϋλον ὁμοίως τῷ θεολογικῷ.* David, Schol. Aristot., p. 15, b. 3, v. 24. This is Comte's distinction between pure or abstract and concrete or mixed mathematics. Leçon iii, tome i, pp. 138, 139.

‡ Hoëné Wronski, Messianisme, tome ii, p. 600. We might have added Roger Bacon to the above list. "Et harum scientiarum (the four great sciences) porta et clavis est mathematica." Opus Majus, ps. iv, c. i, p. 43, editio Veneta. But it is easy to multiply such authorities.

§ Hoëné Wronski, Messianisme, tome i, p. 18.

reasoning; it has been so miserably misconceived by idealists of every shade and school, from Plato to Dugald Stewart, that the present discussion may have other advantages than those which spring from the reduction of M. Comte's views within correct limits.

The doctrine, that mathematical truth or reasoning indicates the existence of absolute, eternal, infinite, and immutable truth, was familiar to Plato and his followers, as is proved by the examination to which it is subjected in the Metaphysics of Aristotle, and in the commentaries of his scholiasts. It was revived by Descartes and Spinoza, received by Leibnitz, reasserted by Kant in the least logical part of his great work, adopted by Whewell without being comprehended, clamoured over by the whole Scotch school, and it again reappears in Victor Cousin and Morell. Yet even Aristotle and the Peripatetics perceived that Geometry and the other branches of Mathematics were founded upon observation.* The argument of Morell is mere "*crambe repetita;*" but as a repetition in a concise form of the old staple argument, we may use it as the target for our batteries. "Take for instance," says he, "any axiomatic truth of pure mathematics. It is not through mere sensation that you have arrived at it; neither is it an arbitrary relation of your own production; nor is it conceived of in pursuance of any resolution of your own will. Try as you may, and you cannot alter the conceptions of pure reason even to an infinitesimal degree," &c. Whence he concludes that mathematical truth is transcendental and ideal.† All this is true except the inference deduced from it. There is no necessary or logical relation between the premises and the conclusion. The premises are true, because in subjects not immersed in matter, but confined entirely to the region of the intellect or pure reason, the assumptions being taken and developed according to the fundamental and immodifiable laws and processes of the human mind, the mind would have to go out of itself, and contradict its own nature, to arrive at the possibility of considering conclusions in such subjects otherwise than as they appear. In like manner, and for the same cause, such facts or truths present themselves without difference or variation, because they lie beyond the circle of passion and imagination, and result only from those general laws which are the common and necessary conditions of all intellectual action. Hence an ample explanation of mathematical truth may be afforded without any appeal to an invisible and imaginary universe; and consequently if there be such other explication of the facts, the logic of

* Aristot. Metaph. x, ii, p. 1060, b. 13; xii, iii, pp. 1077, 1078; xiii, ii, p. 1090, a. 13; iii, p. 1090, b. 7; and Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Schol. Aristot. p. 524.

† Crit. Hist. Phil., xix. Century, pp. 54, 55.

Morell's reasoning is invalidated, and the premises are insufficient to sustain the conclusion. Morell perceived that the reasoning of Descartes on this subject was in a circle,*—how could he then fail to perceive the fallacy of his own?

Into the error of the Idealists M. Comte was of course secure against falling. He very properly traces the strict logical accuracy of mathematical reasoning to the fact that Mathematics is only the explanation of the relations of mutual dependence existing between all parts of the abstractions which constitute its subject.† This, however, is only a secondary proposition, consequent upon the more general truth which forms the basis of mathematical science, to wit, that it takes cognizance only of abstractions, which are purely creations of the intellect,‡ stimulated indeed by observation, but independent any further of external matter, and therefore not liable to be disturbed or infected by the qualifying circumstances, and changing modifications, and complex aspects of everything external. These abstractions, once conceived and assumed, are developed in accordance with the pure and undiluted processes of the mind, and therefore the science which is founded upon them, consists merely of the explanation of the new relations discovered or occasioned by the intellectual modifications under which they are conceived to exist. Hence Comte's explanation is not the primary, but the derivative cause of the stringent universality and absolute perfection of mathematical truth. It fails from being in defect, as the theory of the Idealists failed from being in excess.

The rejection of Metaphysics is the stumbling-block in M. Comte's way, which prevents him from arriving, like Aristotle, at a complete solution of the question. It has also led him into an inconsistency; for, notwithstanding this rejection, he does finally rest the perfection of mathematical science upon what can hardly be regarded in any other light than as a metaphysical ground. He says that its perfection is occasioned by the extreme simplicity of the ideas which it contemplates.§ Aristotle says the same thing, but with a spirit of so much larger comprehension as to change the character of the doctrine.‖ He recognises and acknowledges the dependence of Mathematics on Metaphysics.¶ We would ask M. Comte what is

* Crit. Hist. Phil., &c., pp. 119, 120.

† Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, tome i, p. 130.

‡ This Aristotle clearly perceives. He says that mathematical reasoning is *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*. Metaph. iii, ii, p. 1005.

§ Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, tome i, p. 148.

‖ Aristot. Metaph. x, iii, p. 1061, a. 28–b. 8; vi, x, p. 1036, a. 9.

¶ *ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ μαθηματικὸς χρῆται τοῖς κοινοῖς ἰδίως, καὶ τὰς τούτων ἀρχὰς ἂν εἰη θεωρῆται τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας.* Metaph. x, iv, p. 1061, b. 17.

the nature of those simple ideas with which Mathematics is concerned? and what is the cause of their simplicity? It is that those ideas are purely metaphysical, and are therefore exempt from the fallacies and limitations which would be necessarily attendant upon any discussion beyond the magic circle of purely metaphysical speculation. The ideas contemplated by Mathematics are purely metaphysical as being intellectual abstractions; and the simplicity of the science is due to the strict retention of all its processes within the narrow and definite limits of logical intellection—which is metaphysical also. We are constantly informed by Aristotle and his commentators that the subject of Metaphysics is, τὸ ὂν ἢ ὂν, and with this the definitions assigned by all great metaphysicians accord.* If this definition is intelligible, is it not obvious that the province of Mathematics, in its higher and more abstract character, falls within its domain? if it is otherwise unintelligible, does not the nature of Mathematics light us to its significance?

Again, M. Comte rightly distinguishes between applied Mathematics (Mathématique concrète) and pure Mathematics (Mathématique abstraite,) characterizing the former as "experimental, physical, phenomenal," the latter as purely logical or *rationnel*.† Abstract or pure Mathematics are, as we have said, only the development of abstractions and assumptions which the mind has defined for itself. From whatever source these abstractions be taken, whether we regard them as the spontaneous products of innate intellectual tendencies, or conceive them to be generalizations and segregations from observed facts, after they are once received as data, no further subject-matter is introduced either by observation without, or genesis within; but we unroll the implicit and latent relations, which are involved in those data, and prosecute the development under the sole guidance of the reasoning tendencies of the human mind, or, in other words, in strict obedience to those vital laws of reason, which are inseparably connected with the thinking faculty of man. Hence, abstract mathematics is entirely the creature of reason, and therefore strictly logical; but the necessity of a constant reference to external facts, whether in the way of observation or experiment, infects applied mathematics with the deficiency incident to every part of knowledge derived *ab extra*, and thus renders it phenomenal, and of course experimental and physical.

From this discussion of the nature and validity of mathematical reasoning we may readily deduce the causes of its efficacy as an

* "Metaphysica agit tum de ente, tum de entis affectibus." Leibnitz, De Arte Combinat. Procem. Op. tom. ii, p. 344.

† Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, tome i, pp. 138, 139.

intellectual discipline and propædeutic, and also of its almost universal applicability.

Abstract Mathematics, it follows from what we have just said, is only concrete logic—it is the strictest logical procedure united and applied to the simplest and most congenial subject-matter. As concrete knowledge always presents fewer difficulties than abstract; as the practice of accurate and logical reasoning must be more efficient in inducing a like habit than any theory or art of its procedure can be, Mathematics, which is the strictest, as well as the simplest form of concrete logic, must be eminently adapted to become a wholesome discipline of the reasoning faculties. It is, however, merely the drill of the soldier, not the science of the general. It generates a spontaneous accuracy in ordinary practice, but it throws no light on the validity of its own procedure, nor does it render that most essential service of pure logic—a canon for the detection of error and the exhibition of its causes. But from this explanation we can also perceive how the prevailing devotion to mathematical studies during the three centuries which have witnessed the disregard and decline of Logic has been efficacious in postponing even to our own day the fatal consequences which must flow from inattention to the principles on which all reasoning must rest, and the limitations within which alone it can be valid.

The hydra-headed error, with which we have been contending, springs up again when we proceed to consider the reasons assigned by M. Comte for the singular efficacy of Mathematics as an instrument in its application to other sciences. This he justly refers to the generality, the simplicity, and the purely abstract character of the conceptions with which it is concerned.* But there is a step beyond, which he was prevented from taking by the fast-anchored error from which his whole system takes its departure. Having commenced with the denial of all Metaphysical science, actual or conceivable, and having assumed as the scope of his labours the substitution of a scheme, which might dispense with and render nugatory all metaphysical inquiry, he was estopped from taking the necessary step in advance, as it would infallibly have led him within the confines of metaphysical speculation.

We are barred by no such self-imposed limitation, and take this step in confidence. Mathematical reasoning is the logic of definite or definable relations. Its forms are generalized and simple abstractions: as such, they are applicable to any subject where such relations can be detected; and, being applicable in all such cases, they convey their significance without any recognised subject-

* Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, tome i, p. 146.

matter other than those relations, and are true, independent of the specialities to which in practice they may be applied. This explains the extent of the range, and the general applicability of mathematical procedure.

So far, the errors of M. Comte have been found all connected, and springing as ramifications from one central error—the supposition that all knowledge might be embraced within the circle of scientific reasoning. From this fallacy have sprung his rejection of Theology, Logic, and Metaphysics, his distribution of the periods of human history, and the progress of human intellect into three stages, his substitution of Mathematics for the sciences which have been condemned. Having refuted his delusions in this respect we have criticised, so far as they require criticism, nearly the whole peculiarities of the Positive Philosophy. Its separate applications would, indeed, well reward our attention had we time for their consideration, but they may be judged by the principles we have established in connexion with the special criticism derived from each separate science. It is only necessary for the completion of our view of the Positive Method to mention the principle of classification employed in the arrangement and distribution of the successive branches of science, and then we may pass on to a consideration of the tendencies of the Positive Philosophy and the dangers to be apprehended from it, with a brief statement of which we shall conclude our long essay, leaving for a future notice of the République Occidentale the consideration of M. Comte's development of his principles and conclusions into a scheme of social regeneration and social philosophy.

As Mathematics constitutes the primary and fundamental science in the Positive System, in consequence of the peculiar simplicity of the ideas which it contemplates, so the general principle which regulates the relations and successions of the other sciences is, that those which are the most abstract, or whose speculations are conversant with the most simple and homogeneous subjects, are first in rank, in order of development, in perfection, and furnish the bases for the more complex sciences. A similar view of classification seems to have been involved in the reasons assigned by the ancients for the precedence which they gave to Arithmetic and Music over Geometry and Astronomy.* The same principle is also employed to determine the subdivisions of the sciences, which are further distinguished into their statical and dynamical branches.† There can be no doubt that this principle of system-

* David, Prolegg. Phil. Schol. Aristot., p. 15, b. 34. Cf. p. 16, a. 38. Asclep. Schol. ad Metaph., p. 606, a.

† Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon i, tome i, p. 33.

atization is more philosophic than any that preceded it, and infinitely preferable to all others in the results to which it conduces. M. Comte's criticisms on former modes of classification are both just and acute, and it is not the least tribute which has been paid to his philosophic ingenuity that the elaborate but too cumbrous and artificial scheme of Ampère is virtually built upon his, and involves most of what is distinctive in it. Of course, even in this part of his labours, the exclusion of Theology and Metaphysics invalidates the plan; but it rather renders the scheme incomplete, than affects the value of his arrangement so far as it goes. He does, indeed, erroneously deny any distinction between Moral and Physical Science,*—a distinction which is perhaps exaggerated in the classification of Ampère,—but this was a necessary consequence of the false and contracted basis on which the whole edifice was reared. It is, however, easily corrected. But we must also remark that while it is perfectly true that the more complex sciences require and presuppose the assistance of the more simple sciences, these themselves for their improvement need the aid of the more composite and difficult. The reaction is not equal to the action, but its influence is very decided, and all parts of knowledge are mutually dependent on each other,—

alterius sic
Poscit opem res, et conjurat amice.

M. Comte recognises this interdependence, but the tendency of his system is to impede the recognition of its importance. One signal consequence of his system, which he does not fail to reiterate, is that all the sciences hang together, and explain each other:—that the attempt to treat them as entirely separate and distinct is to destroy their value and to insure their ruin, and not theirs only, but the infection of the whole tone and temper of human intellect. It is to this effort, whether consciously or unconsciously made, that he refers that excessive specialization of modern thought, which is so intimately connected with the anarchy of the age. The detection of this error is a service which is entitled to the most cordial appreciation.

The application of the principles which we have mentioned and discussed, results in the development in regular order, of the several sciences which have been created by human genius and industry. These are arranged in a tabular form and in their genetic order in a scale of classification prefixed to the first volume of the work. First appears Mathematics, with its subdivisions, the Calculus, (including Arithmetic with the various forms of the Integral and Dif-

* Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon lvi, tome vi, p. 24.

ferential Calculus,) Geometry, and pure Mechanics. Next comes Astronomy, divided into Astronomical Geometry and Astronomical Mechanics. Then follows Physics, which treats of Barology, Thermology, Acoustics, Optics, and Electrology. From these we proceed to Chemistry, Organic and Inorganic, and thus complete the circle of the sciences of inanimate matter. The next stage introduces us to the complex phenomena of the world of life, and here the deficiencies of M. Comte's fundamental principles begin to reveal themselves in fatal fallacies. The first science of organized bodies is Biology, or the theory of animation, a branch of knowledge whose outlines are as yet sketched only with a wavering and uncertain hand, although the sagacity and ingenuity of M. Comte are strikingly exhibited in the general tenor of his remarks. To this head he refers Anatomy, the Physiology of vegetation, animation, the intellect and the passions, and under it admits Phrenology into the circle of the Positive Sciences. Having thus completed the theory of human and animal nature, which he assimilates too closely to each other, he passes on to a science partly reconstructed, but in great measure created by himself, Sociology or Social Physics, and thus adds the crowning stone to his simple, systematic, and comprehensive plan. Parts of this last department of study had been previously elaborated, but either under too isolated a form, or on too arbitrary a basis, but M. Comte proposes to develop them in their mutual connexion and harmonious interdependence. Thus he objects to a separate science of Political Economy, on grounds which are not altogether valid, although they have been too little regarded by the followers of Adam Smith and Ricardo, and which, after having been ably examined by Mr. Mill, in his system of Logic, have been utterly disregarded by him in his treatise on Political Economy. We cannot dwell upon this portion of the Course of Positive Philosophy, because it does not legitimately fall within the restricted scope of this essay, but, admirable as is the whole work, no portions of it, in our estimation, exhibit so much depth, comprehension, originality, and acumen as the fourth and sixth volumes in which the application of the historical method to the philosophy of society is developed, and the outlines and conditions of the new science of Sociology are laid down.

Thus by a regular and strictly logical progression M. Comte leads us through the whole circle of *Positive* science, constructed or conceivable; and, throughout, his whole system is the consistent evolution of certain principles which he lays down at the outset. Stage above stage, in orderly sequence, the elaborate structure rises, proceeding from the more simple to the more complex in accordance with the necessary conditions of knowledge, until its ever-widening

horizon circumscribes the whole sphere of intellectual pursuits which can fall within the apprehension of the Positive philosopher. Some branches of knowledge are, indeed, excluded from this vast temple of human learning, in consequence of an error involved in the fundamental position of his philosophy, which infects, more or less, its whole development; but overlooking this error and its consequences, no more complete or perfect exposition of the genius, the functions, the successions, the defects, or the excellences of the various sciences can be imagined. The mighty edifice, and the fatal fallacy which is embodied in its construction, remind us, indeed, of the endeavour at Babel to raise by human effort a ladder to the skies; and of the legend of Greek mythology which tells how the giants of the elder world attempted to scale the heavens by piling Pelion upon Ossa, and Ossa upon Olympus, in the vain hope of hurling the gods from their thrones. The history of that futile enterprise is written,—

> Affectasse ferunt regnum cœleste Gigantas,
> Altaque congestos struxisse ad sidera montes.
> Tum pater omnipotens misso perfregit Olympus
> Fulmine, et excussit subjecto Pelion Ossæ.

A like fate attends M. Comte's labours, so far as their ultimate aim is concerned; but the mountains which he has reared will remain, a perpetual memorial of his greatness, and will attest, notwithstanding his failure to achieve the object contemplated, that his work was the work of the Prince of the Titans.

Our long exposition of the character and defects of the Positive Method will enable us to exhibit briefly the character and efficiency of the Positive Philosophy. It will be readily perceived that it is a system of extreme sensationalism, or, more correctly, it proceeds beyond sensationalism in the same direction, by absolutely refusing to entertain any opinion, or tolerate any theory in explanation of the origin or validity of human knowledge. It recognises all the great properties of the human mind, except its religious and metaphysical appetencies, and receives all the primary conclusions of the intellect and perceptions of the senses, purely as phenomena, without taking any cognizance of the existence of either substance or cause behind the phenomena. As a partial explanation of human knowledge, as a theory of its systematized or scientific branches, we admit the value and absolute truth of this interpretation—but merely in connexion with an extra-scientific recognition of the unscientific sphere of human knowledge and belief. It ought to be, therefore, eminently efficacious within its own peculiar sphere in producing larger, wider, and healthier views of science, though we much fear its value even in this respect is seriously impaired by the prejudices

which it will excite, and the fallacious exclusiveness of view which it will occasion, by its rejection of all religious belief and doctrine. In fact, science can no more dispense with the recognition, open and avowed, of an unquestioning faith, than the human race can afford to discard Christianity. Science, to achieve its noblest triumphs, to render its most eminent services to humanity, must be irradiated with that celestial light, "which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." "Cœli enarrant gloriam Dei," "the heavens declare the glory of God," and all science is but the dim and imperfect revelation of the goodness, the majesty, the power, and the wisdom of Jehovah. It is almost valueless except so far as it ministers to the greater happiness, morality, and permanent comfort of man and of society. Can these things be secured without religion? The unbecoming flippancy of the speech of M. Comte, that the heavens declare only the glory of Newton and Laplace, is strangely ill-turned, at a period when all the discoveries in Science and Philology tend to confirm the narratives of Scripture and the precepts of revelation. There is a maxim immortalized in our own English poetry which may be suitably commended to M. Comte, as the only rebuke of which a declaration, so unworthy of his lofty genius, is entitled to,—

An undevout astronomer is mad.

It belongs to the consideration of M. Comte's scheme for the renovation of society, as expounded in his latest work, to examine the special aptitude of the Positive Philosophy for this purpose. We can only say here, that the total negation of all religion allows no hope of its having any such efficacy, and is by no means in consonance with his acute discovery of the causes of present anarchy and present social evils in the unregulated license of the passions, and the decay of the noblest affections—confidence, justice, charity, mutual regard, and sympathetic faith.

The Positive Philosophy is then entirely invalid as a reformation of the intellect of the world, for it excludes the idea of such reformation in those very points in which it is most imperatively required. It is valid merely in reference to strict science, and for its full validity even in this respect it requires the cordial recognition and the lively appreciation at all times of nearly everything which M. Comte excludes. If received by itself as the gospel of a new era, it perpetuates and increases the very evils which it would redress or avert; for it petrifies science into the mere instrument of human passions instead of rendering it the obedient instrument for the better fulfilment of the duties and destinies of man. Notwithstanding all M. Comte's efforts to awaken a healthier state of feeling, to correct

the greed and egotism of the day, to refine, elevate, and develop the affections, it must paralyze these more and more, for the moral nature of man is not to be found, disciplined, chastened, or ennobled by scientific precepts, or by intellectual deductions. M. Comte recognises the fatal ascendency which is conceded to intellect in the nineteenth century; he strives manfully to hurl the usurper from the throne; but it must retain the sovereignty of human life and conduct, as long as the intellect is the sole alembic for testing the validity of the rules of human action. From the full comprehension of all science, of all philosophy, of all life, flows necessarily and irresistibly as the tides of the ocean, the conclusion that beyond human speculation, beyond human interpretation, beyond the domain of human reason, lies the absolute, authoritative guide of human thought and conduct, in the will of God, revealed in his Scriptures, or as certainly revealed in those indestructible instincts which are interwoven with the very being of man. We do not object to M. Comte's philosophy because it excludes religion; but we object to it because it fails to attain its own ends, because it vainly attempts to accomplish those things which religion does and alone can accomplish, because it does itself reveal the absolute necessity of religion for the attainment of its own ends, and hence proves its exclusion of religion to be a fatal defect.

We do not think that any of the professed followers of M. Comte can admire his genius and learning, the ponderous strength of his intellectual powers, their graceful and easy play, his fearlessness, sincerity, and simplicity more highly than we do, nor appreciate more cordially, nor accept more gratefully his philosophy so far as it is correct and applicable; but the maintenance to the end of that logical consistency, with which his scheme is concatenated, must have shown him the defect in his fundamental position and led to its correction, if his ultra St. Simonism had not rendered the denial of God and the negation of religion immutable assumptions. Yet, this is the blunder which has deprived M. Comte of the highest crown of intellectual greatness. We admit him to be second only to Bacon and Aristotle among the mighty intellects of all time: had he as rigidly incorporated religious faith into his system, as he has strictly excluded it; had he shown its indissoluble connexion and perfect harmony with all knowledge, scientific or other, instead of endeavouring to show, which he has not succeeded in doing, its absolute antagonism to science, we should then have hailed in him one greater than Bacon, for he would have infallibly furnished the solution required for the intellectual and social difficulties of the times.

Comte's Positive Philosophy is the last word of modern infidelity —its highest, most complete, and philosophic expression; it is the most undiluted development of the material, money-seeking, selfish and self-sufficient tendencies of the late centuries. A disposition to reject all restraint, to acknowledge no authority but individual passion or interest, to recognise the *summum bonum* in individual gratifications, to bow to no sovereign but human reason, and to adore human intellect with a base and beggarly worship, as corrupting as it is blind, has become the main characteristic of this nineteenth century, and has matured in anarchy, revolution, and social distress, its fatal fruits.* These tendencies have at length crystallized themselves into a brilliant system in the Positive Philosophy; but its brilliancy is death—it is the annihilating stroke of the lightning which gleams before our eyes, and dazzles us with its fatal beauty. Let us hope that the last revelation of the philosophy of this world may be a sign of the coming advent of a better, as the plagues of Egypt heralded the exodus of the Israelites.

Art. II.—ROGER WILLIAMS.

1. *Memoir of Roger Williams, the Founder of the State of Rhode Island.* By James D. Knowles, Professor of Pastoral Duties in the Newton Theological Institution. Boston: Lincoln, Edmonds & Co.
2. *Life of Roger Williams.* By William Gammell. Boston: Charles C. Little & James Brown.

Mr. Knowles has done the cause of morals and religion valuable service in rescuing from oblivion many important facts, throwing light upon the true character of Roger Williams. Several attempts had been previously made to accomplish this work, but they had all failed. Dr. Belknap designed to give the life of Roger Williams a place in his American Biography, and he sought earnestly for materials, but with indifferent success. It was announced, a few years since, that Southey intended to write the life of Roger Williams; the design was pro-

* The aims and tendencies of the civilization of the age have been so admirably expressed in a few brief formulæ by Hoëné Wronski, (Messianisme, tome i, pp. 47–49,) that we would have willingly inserted them here, had not our remarks run to such a length that we have been obliged to omit many topics of more importance. One expression has so pointed an application to the Positive Philosophy, as to indicate that the statement was intended as a criticism upon it, and it may certainly be regarded in that light, as a most forcible and just exposition of the fatal creed which must spring from the adoption of the Positivism of M. Comte.

bably relinquished for the same reason. At Southey's suggestion the Rev. Mr. Greenwood, of Boston, collected many valuable materials, but he, too, for personal reasons, abandoned the undertaking. The task of our author was a most difficult one. After receiving all the materials previously collected by Mr. Greenwood, he says, "In my further search for information, I soon discovered, that many persons, well acquainted with our early history, knew very little of Roger Williams. In the books I found almost every important fact concerning him stated differently. I was obliged to gather hints from disconnected documents, and to reconcile contradictory assertions;—my labour often resembled the miner, who sifts large masses of sand, to obtain a few particles of gold." But, difficult as was the task, he has performed it well.

Mr. Gammell's life of Roger Williams presents a truthful and striking portrait of the justly styled "apostle of religious liberty." He relies principally on the facts furnished by Mr. Knowles, and has used them with great skill and advantage. His work is unquestionably one of the most interesting biographies to be found in "Sparks's Library," of which it forms the fourth volume.

In attempting a brief sketch of the life, character, and career of the founder of Rhode Island, we shall make free use of the volumes before us.

But little is known respecting the early life of Roger Williams. From the best information received, it is supposed that he was born in Wales, in 1599. He possessed the Welsh temperament—excitable and ardent feelings, generosity, courage, and firmness. It is supposed that he was a distant relative of Oliver Cromwell—perhaps second cousin. Mr. Williams does not claim in his writings such relationship with the Protector, though he often speaks of being intimate with him. They seemed to have been kindred spirits, whose hearts beat in unison on those great principles which they labored so ardently to promote. Roger speaks of a "close conference with Oliver," on the subject of Popery, which, it is said, they both abhorred and feared. How much they may have assisted each other by their frequent and "close" conferences in the great work to which they seemed to have been providentially called, will not be known before the great day of final accounts.

He became a Christian in early life, though the exact time of his experiencing regenerating grace is unknown. Near the close of life, he observes,—"From my childhood, now above threescore years, the Father of lights and mercies touched my soul with a love to himself, to his only-begotten, the true Lord Jesus, and to his Holy Scriptures." "The religious character, whose germs were thus early

planted, grew and ripened with his years, amidst the retirement of his secluded studies, and bore fruits in a life of piety and virtue, which won for him the respect and confidence of those with whom he was associated."

As is the case with most great and good men, the stability of his Christian character and his usefulness were laid in his early piety. He was eminently spiritually-minded, and this characteristic he retained to the close of life. Few men have ever lived who possessed through a long life a Christian character so pure and blameless.

That Mr. Williams was liberally educated has generally been admitted, but *where*, has, until recently, been a matter of doubt. It has been generally supposed that he was educated at the University of Oxford, under the patronage of Sir Edward Coke, whose interest in him was first excited by an incident as follows:—

"Sir Edward observed him, one day, during public worship, taking notes of the discourse. His curiosity was excited, and he requested the boy to show him his notes. He was so favourably impressed by the evidences of talent which these exhibited, that he requested the parents of young Williams to intrust their son to his care."

From an interesting correspondence between Mr. Williams and Lady Sadler, a daughter of Sir Edward Coke, which was obtained by Mr. Bancroft when in England, and is now in the possession of the "Rhode Island Historical Society," we learn that he was educated as above supposed, which certainly reflects great honour on his generous patron. He drank deeply at the fountains of learning, as his writings abundantly testify. Says Mr. Gammell, "His mind was enriched and expanded with the best learning of the age; and it is probable, that his preparation for the sacred profession, to which he was looking forward, was, for the time, unusually thorough and complete." He was thoroughly acquainted with the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, and the Dutch, and it is said while teaching John Milton the Dutch, Milton taught him several other languages besides the above. He subsequently obtained a knowledge of the Indian languages of New-England, and wrote a "Key" to those languages—an interesting and valuable work.

He studied law under the direction of Sir Edward Coke,—his patron would naturally wish to train his pupil to his own useful and honourable profession,—and the knowledge he thus obtained of jurisprudence had evidently much to do in qualifying him for the duties of a legislator. He soon, however, turned his attention to the study of theology,—a study more congenial with his taste,—and became eminent as a theologian. "He was admitted to orders in the Established Church, though it is not known by what bishop, or in what year, he

was ordained. It is also said that he was appointed to the charge of a parish, while in England, but of this no mention whatever is made in his writings which now exist." His preaching attracted considerable attention, and he was respected and beloved as a devoted minister of Jesus Christ.

Roger Williams embraced the cause of the Puritans. It was an important period in English history. The great principles of the Reformation, first preached in England by Wiclif, now began to develop themselves in the institutions both of the Church and State. They were violently opposed by the power of the hierarchy, but hailed with rejoicing by those who had long felt the oppressive yoke, and desired freedom of conscience. The mighty struggle, which had commenced with the Reformation, between the corrupt forms of religion and the principles of civil and religious liberty, was now revived with great zeal. Elizabeth, who was supposed to be friendly to the Protestants, possessed the despotic temper of her father. She was in love with the showy rites of Popery. She actually hated the Non-conformists more than the Papists, and issued her mandate that the former should submit to the ceremonies of the Established Church.

"Severe laws were passed by an obsequious Parliament, and enforced, with ready zeal, by servile bishops. Every minister who refused to conform to all the prescribed ceremonies was liable to be deprived of his office; and a large number of the ablest ministers in the nation were thus expelled and silenced. In order to enforce the laws with the utmost rigor, a new tribunal was erected, called the 'Court of High Commission,' consisting of commissioners, appointed by the queen. This Court was invested with power to arrest ministers in any part of the kingdom, to deprive them of their livings, and to fine or imprison them at the pleasure of the Court. Instead of producing witnesses in open court to prove the charges, they assumed a power of administering an oath *ex officio*, whereby the prisoner was obliged to answer all questions the Court should put to him, though highly prejudicial to his own defence. If he refused to swear, he was imprisoned for contempt; and if he took the oath, he was convicted upon his own confession. By this Protestant Inquisition, and by other means, one fourth of the preachers in England are said to have been under suspension. Numerous parishes were destitute of preachers, and so many were filled by illiterate and profligate men, that not one beneficed clergyman in six was capable of composing a sermon. Thus were learned and pious ministers oppressed, merely for their conscientious scruples about a few ceremonies, their families were ruined, the people were deprived of faithful teachers, the progress of truth hindered, the prelatists were gratified, and a state of irritation was produced in the public mind, which led, in a succeeding reign, to the disastrous issue of a bloody civil war."

Roger Williams, whose political principles were very liberal, and who held in abhorrence the doctrines upheld by the court, could not but espouse the cause of the Non-conformists, or Puritans. James, whose accession to the throne greatly excited the hopes of the Puritans, proved to be

"An obstinate and arbitrary monarch, who inflexibly maintained in theory, and often in practice, those despotic principles which led his son to the scaffold, and expelled James II. from the throne. A mind like that of Williams, strong, searching, and fearless, would naturally be opposed to the pretensions of the king. His patron, Sir Edward Coke, incurred the resentment of James, for his free principles, and his bold vindication of the rights of the people."

Cotton, Hooker, and many other distinguished ministers were silenced, and Williams, who had become their associate and friend, could not expect to escape. With many others, he wisely concluded to seek an asylum on the shores of New-England. Consequently, on the 1st of Dec., 1630, in the ship Lyon, Capt. Peirce, master, (the same ship which bore so many of the pilgrims to America,) he embarked at Bristol, and, after a tempestuous voyage of sixty-six days, arrived at Boston, Feb. 5th, 1631. Mr. Gammell says:—

"He was now in the thirty-second year of his age, and in the full maturity of all his powers, having already acquired a reputation for eloquence and piety, which had spread widely in England, and had preceded him to America. His arrival at Boston is mentioned by Gov. Winthrop, as of 'a godly minister,' and was doubtless hailed, by the Churches of the infant settlements of Massachusetts Bay, as an accession to their strength of the precious gifts of piety and learning. They little anticipated the startling doctrines he would put forth; and he had no intimation of the singular destiny that was preparing for him amid the unknown wilderness to which he had come. When he embarked at Bristol, he had been recently married, and was accompanied by his wife, Mrs. Mary Williams, a lady who lived to share his changeful fortunes among the checkered scenes through which he subsequently passed, but of whose early history even less is known than that of her husband."

On his arrival in Boston, he was sadly disappointed. He had come, as he supposed, to the asylum of the exiled Puritans, where he would be received with open arms by his former associates and friends, and where he could enjoy those civil and religious privileges of which he had been deprived in his native land. But he had scarcely entered the colony before he found that the civil and ecclesiastical authorities were arrayed against him. He had fled from persecution, and now, to his surprise, he found that the same intolerant spirit which had caused so many martyrs to bleed on British soil, and had made his stay in England intolerable, was actually governing the Massachusetts pilgrims. He supposed that they had formed a colony and established a Church in which civil and religious freedom might be enjoyed, but he now found his mistake. Understanding the principles by which they were governed, he refused to unite with the Church in Boston. Soon after his arrival, Mr. Williams was invited by the Church in Salem to become assistant to their pastor, the Rev. Mr. Skelton; but the magistrates of the colony remonstrated against his being thus settled. They addressed a letter to the Church, in which they stated the reasons for their remonstrance. First, Mr. Williams

had refused to join the Church in Boston, "because they would not declare their repentance for having had communion with the Churches of England while they lived there. Secondly, that he had declared his opinion, that the magistrate might not punish a breach of the Sabbath, nor any other offence that was a breach of the first table." As to the first reason assigned, Mr. Williams was not alone in believing that the pilgrims had been in fault in holding communion with those who were the greatest enemies to experimental religion in England. He looked upon such communion as a compromise with iniquity.

"Mr. Williams, however, had already removed to Salem, where, on the 12th of April, 1631, he was settled as a minister of the Church, notwithstanding the opposition of the magistrates, who at that time were assembled at Boston. On the 18th of the following May, after having been duly propounded, he was admitted a freeman of the colony, and took the usual oath of allegiance prescribed in such cases. He was now, in the fullest sense of the word, a citizen of the colony, and one of the ministers of its oldest Church. He had thus identified himself with its interests by the most significant acts which he could perform, and was doubtless as ready to labour in its service, and to share its burdens, as any of those who had been appointed to preside over its affairs. The people of Salem had extended to him their confidence, and his life and ministry there had confirmed their respect and attachment, and were giving promise of a long career, as their guide, and teacher, and friend."

But Mr. Williams was not permitted to remain here in peace. He and his Church were constantly harassed and disturbed by the civil authorities, who claimed a guardianship over the popular faith. Their advice in the settlement of Mr. Williams had not been followed, and this had awakened their stern displeasure. For the sake of peace and quiet, after the lapse of a few months, in August, 1631, he left a kind and affectionate people, to whom his labours had been made a great blessing, and sought a residence beyond the persecuting jurisdiction of Massachusetts Bay, in the colony of Plymouth. Here he was received with great attention and respect. His eminent talents as a Christian minister, and his deep personal piety were properly appreciated. He was soon admitted to the Church, and settled as assistant to the Rev. Ralph Smith. But although he found in the Puritans that came over in the Mayflower a far more liberal spirit than that which governed their neighbours in Massachusetts Bay, he did not feel perfectly at home. His feelings were strongly enlisted for the people in Salem, and he longed for the privilege of again ministering to them the word of life. They earnestly desired his return among them, and strongly invited him back. After an absence of two years, during which time he had formed strong attachments in Plymouth, though the preaching of his liberal sentiments had awakened the suspicions of some of the principal

men of the colony, he returned to Salem, and again entered upon the duties of his ministry among a people that he honoured and loved. The Church in Plymouth were unwilling to lose the services of so valuable a pastor, and remonstrated with him against his departure; but believing it to be his duty, he at once sought and obtained a dismission.

Mr. Williams's second residence in Salem forms an important period of the history of this distinguished man. He resided there a year without being settled as a pastor; but at the death of Mr. Skelton, in 1634, he entered upon the duties of a regularly settled minister. A war now commenced, fierce and terrible. The General Court of Massachusetts must bring Roger Williams to terms! But in case of his refusal to submit to their unrighteous demands, he must be banished from the colony. Such were the conduct and sentiments of those who had fled from England to America to enjoy the rights of conscience! During the first year of Mr. Williams's residence in Salem, even while he ministered "by way of prophecy," he was constantly harassed by magistrates, and was several times summoned before the Court to answer for his sentiments. As the Church in Salem had invited Mr. Williams to become their minister, they wished to ordain him; but against this the Court sent in a decided remonstrance. "The Church, however, with a becoming independence, disregarded the remonstrance, and Mr. Williams was regularly instituted in the pastoral office, in August, 1634. This act was regarded by the Court as a highhanded contempt of their authority, which was not soon forgiven, and was at length punished in a most remarkable and characteristic manner." At nearly every session of the Court Mr. Williams was summoned before it, and his sentiments were complained of, or condemned. "A few months after his settlement as pastor of the Church," we find him again obnoxious to the Court, for having publicly called in question the king's patent, and also "for usually terming the Churches of New-England antichristian." Again, in the following April, 1635, the governor and assistants summoned him to appear at Boston. "The occasion was, that he had taught publicly that a magistrate ought not to tender an oath to an unregenerate man, for that we thereby have communion with a wicked man in the worship of God, and cause him to take the name of God in vain. He was heard before all the ministers, and very clearly confuted." So says Gov. Winthrop. Had Mr. Williams given a version of the argument, the result might have been differently stated.

The controversy in which Mr. Williams was engaged continued with increasing violence. Mr. Gammell observes:—

"The controversy with the authorities of Massachusetts, in which the principles of Williams had impelled him to engage, was now becoming every day more violent, and running into almost every act of the Court, and every relation of social life. They still maintained a connexion with the Church of England, and manifested a respect for its institutions. Williams retained a vivid recollection of its intolerant acts, and boldly declared its 'bloody tenet of persecution,' as he termed it, to be 'most lamentably contrary to the doctrine of Jesus Christ.' The magistrates enacted a law, requiring every man to attend public worship, and to contribute to its support. This he denounced as an open violation of natural rights, and the prolific source of every form of persecution. 'No one,' said he, 'should be bound to maintain a worship against his own consent.' The ablest divines were appointed to reason with him, and to refute the heresies that seemed wrought into his very being. But it was all in vain. His opinions were misrepresented, and carried out to absurd and unauthorized conclusions, and these were charged upon him as essential parts of his doctrine; but he contented himself simply with denying what he did not believe, and reiterating, with irrepressible boldness, the faith which he held. This faith set a clear and well-defined limit to the exercise of the civil power. 'It extends,' said he, with singular accuracy and clearness of perception, 'only to the bodies, and goods, and outward estates of men;' with conscience and with religious opinions, 'the civil magistrate may not intermeddle, even to stop a Church from apostasy and heresy.' These were the opinions that inflamed the whole body of the divines, and called down upon his head the sternest censures from both the civil and ecclesiastical heads of the colony."

Matters had now reached a point when something more effective on the part of the magistrates of Massachusetts must be done. They had denied the right of the Church in Salem to a tract of land in Marblehead, and in other respects had treated them with great injustice. In July, Mr. Williams was again summoned before the General Court in Boston, to answer certain charges brought against him, the substance of which has already been stated. At this Court no witnesses were examined, or counsel heard. They heard his sentiments, and, of course, condemned them. In October, 1635, the next General Court was held, before which he was again summoned. He now came for the last time, but he came with his principles. Under the advice of the ministers of the colony, the Court decided that he should depart out of their jurisdiction within six weeks. The following is the act of banishment:—

"Whereas, Mr. Roger Williams, one of the elders of the Church of Salem, hath broached and divulged divers new and dangerous opinions against the authority of magistrates; and also writ letters of defamation, both of the magistrates and Churches here, and that before any conviction, and yet maintained the same without any retraction; it is therefore ordered, that the said Mr. Williams shall depart out of this jurisdiction within six weeks now next ensuing, which if he neglect to perform, it shall be lawful for the governor and two of the magistrates to send him to some place out of this jurisdiction, not to return any more without license of the Court."

The sentence of banishment produced great excitement among the people of Salem, and was regarded as an act of persecution by the more soberminded citizens of the colony. The Court afterwards

gave him permission to remain till spring; but learning that he persisted in uttering and maintaining his sentiments, and fearing the influence of his teachings, they determined to send him to England, by a ship then about ready to sail. For this purpose he was summoned to attend the Court in Boston. He refused to obey the summons, on the ground of ill health. The magistrates, not to be defeated, issued a warrant for him to be apprehended and taken on board the ship, which was ready to sail for England. The officers on going to his house, found his wife and children, but he had been gone several days. Speaking of the banishment of Mr. Williams, Mr. Gammell justly remarks:—

"It is plain that the head and front of his offending consisted in his maintaining, that the civil magistrate has no right to interfere with religious opinions. Of the truth of this principle, and of its paramount importance to the well-being of society, there is no longer any room for question. It is now the cherished sentiment of the people of this country, and is rapidly extending its sway throughout the Protestant world. In the mind of Roger Williams, even at an early period of life, it was clearly conceived, and earnestly pressed to its legitimate results; though it was there mingled with other opinions, with which it had no natural connexion. It may also be admitted, that, while in Massachusetts, he advocated his principle with too urgent a zeal, and with too little regard for the prevailing opinions of the age; but, after making every allowance that either justice or charity can claim, his banishment must be regarded as an arbitrary proceeding, utterly without foundation either in justice or in state necessity. It was the offspring of a principle that would justify every species of tyranny, and it will forever remain among the few spots that tarnish the escutcheon of Massachusetts, otherwise radiant with unnumbered virtues."

It was winter when Mr. Williams was driven from his home in Salem. Referring to this remarkable period of his history several years afterwards, he says, "I was sorely tossed for fourteen weeks, in a bitter winter season, not knowing what bread or bed did mean." During his residence at Plymouth, he had become acquainted with several Indian chiefs, called sachems, and among them was Massassoit, the father of King Philip, who governed the Wampanoags, a tribe of the Pokanokets. This Indian chief welcomed Mr. Williams to his cabin, at Warren, or where this beautiful town now stands, and received him with true hospitality. "He granted him a tract of land on the Seekonk river, to which, at the opening of spring, he repaired, and where "he pitched and began to build and plant." But here he was not permitted to remain. It seems he had not gone quite far enough into the wilderness. "I received a letter," says he, "from my ancient friend, Mr. Winslow, then Governor of Plymouth, professing his own and others' love and respect for me, yet lovingly advising me, since I was fallen into the edge of their bounds, and they were loath to displease the Bay, to remove but to the other side of the

water; and then, he said, I had the country before me, and might be as free as themselves, and we should be loving neighbors together." Wishing to be entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts or Plymouth colonies, he again took up the line of march, and landed near the mouth of the Mooshausic river, where he commenced the first "plantations of Providence." Here he found a home, and was enabled to lay the foundations of a great and growing city, the name of which was to stand as a perpetual memorial of that superintending Providence, which, he believed, had directed him to this spot.

His colony was founded on the principles which he had long advocated, and for which he had been exiled. He purchased his lands of the Indians, (those which were not given to him,) whom he acknowledged as the rightful owners of the soil. The deeds were generally given in his own name, and he might have retained all his lands as his own property; but this he was unwilling to do, as he desired that the new settlement might be "for a shelter for persons distressed for conscience." Though he had disposed of all he possessed to purchase these lands, yet he gave them as a free gift to those who had united with him in forming the colony. Before he could obtain a charter, the government must be voluntary, but all belonging to it agreed that "no man should be molested for his conscience." Though great liberty of conscience was admitted, great peace and harmony were generally preserved in the settlement. In this respect, its inhabitants were not a whit behind their Massachusetts neighbours. Disturbances, it is true, often afflicted the colony, but these were not the result of the liberal principles introduced into it by its founder, but sprang from causes which always exist in new settlements.

In the summer of 1643, he set sail from New-York for England, to obtain a charter for the infant colony. This he secured through the influence of Sir Henry Vane and other friends of religious freedom, and re-embarked for America, in the summer of 1644. He landed in Boston, September 17, and was permitted to pass through the forbidden territory, by virtue of a letter which he presented from several members of both houses of Parliament, and addressed "to the Governor and Assistants of Massachusetts Bay." He was received by his friends in Providence amid great rejoicings. Several towns of the "Providence Plantations" formed themselves into a government under the charter, May, 1647. Disturbances had sprung up in the colony, owing to misunderstandings and claims that were made to a part of the territory, supposed to belong to the colony. Mr. Williams was again urged to visit England, for the purpose of obtaining the interposition of the Council in adjusting those difficulties. At length, he consented to go; and though he found it difficult to reach Boston,

in consequence of the opposition of the authorities and people of Massachusetts to his passing through their territory, yet he sailed from that port for England, November, 1651. During this visit to England he was thrown into the society of some of its most distinguished men. He held frequent intercourse with Sir Henry Vane, Oliver Cromwell, Harrison, the major-general of the army, Lawrence, the lord president of the council of state, and many other distinguished men then governing public affairs. Having accomplished the object of his mission, as far as possible, he returned to Providence, where he found a great work to be done, in removing the jealousies and feuds, which had become inveterate, and which had separated and distracted the citizens of the colony. Through his influence, and a letter addressed to the colony by Sir Henry Vane, the disputes among the citizens were settled, the government re-organized, and Mr. Williams was chosen president of the colony. Peace was now restored throughout the settlement.

On the restoration of Charles the Second to the throne of England, another effort was made to obtain a new charter for the colony, which Mr. Williams had failed to obtain on his second visit to England, on account of the unsettled state of affairs in that country. The effort was successful. The charter was received from the king, July 8th, 1663, and was presented to the General Court of Commissioners at Newport, Nov. 24, of the same year. It instituted a "government clothed with more perfect authority, and better suited to the condition of the people," and still recognising in full the same principle of unlimited freedom 'in matters of religious concernments,' on which the colony had been originally founded." Under this charter, "Rhode Island and Providence Plantations" continued to act and prosper until the famous "war" in this State a few years since, when a Constitution was adopted, though in most respects, not differing materially from the old charter. The charter, in 1843, when it was supplanted by the present constitution of the State, is supposed to have been the oldest charter of any civil government in the world.

Roger Williams is claimed to have been the first who advocated the rights of conscience. Says Mr. Bancroft, "Williams was the first person to assert in its *plenitude* the doctrine of the liberty of conscience, the equality of opinions before the law, and in its defence he was the harbinger of Milton, and the precursor and superior of Jeremy Taylor." Says Judge Story, "In the Rhode Island code of laws we read, *for the first time* since Christianity ascended the throne of the Cæsars, that conscience should be free, and men should not be punished for worshipping God as they were persuaded he required." Says another late writer, "The Bloody Tenet was

proclaimed by him in England and America in 1644, and contained the substance of the great argument for humanity. Bishop Heber seems not to have read the book, for he says, 'The Liberty of Prophesying, by Jeremy Taylor, is the first attempt to put the perilous and portentous novelty on record;' a book not published till 1647, of which Williams says in The Bloody Tenet yet more Bloody, that it is 'a monumental, everlasting testimony to the truth.' The great treatise of John Milton, On the Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Matters, was not published till 1659; but it is to be remembered that Williams was an assistant to Milton, who was secretary of state in 1653–1654, and aided him in the Dutch correspondence; so that it is very probable Milton had already adopted the views of Williams on this great subject. The great Locke did not publish his Letters on this subject till 1690, just before the 'act of toleration' was passed in the British parliament." Some have asserted that religious liberty was enjoyed in Holland long before Williams was born. The assertion is true only to a limited extent. The greatest religious liberty of Holland excluded Catholics, Lutherans, Baptists, and others from civil places, while Turks, Jews, and Pagans were in a far worse condition. This was not the religious liberty for which Williams was banished from the colony of Massachusetts, and to advocate which he spent his life.

As a legislator, counsellor, and governor, Roger Williams has had but few equals. Of the truth of this remark, the history of the colony that he planted furnishes abundant proof. The various Indian tribes of New-England were, to a great extent, under his control. He had studied their languages and disposition, and had secured their confidence. Whenever difficulties existed between them and the English, he was ready to do all in his power to effect a settlement. Through his interposition, the Massachusetts colony were saved from a long and bloody war with the Indians. What an instance of Christian magnanimity we have here! Roger Williams had been banished by this colony for maintaining the rights of conscience; but we now see him perilling his own life to save the colony from the horrors of conflagration and massacre.

As a writer, he is known by several valuable works; most of which are now out of print. His *first* book bears the following title: "A Key into the Language of America, or an help to the Language of the Natives in that part of America called New-England; together with brief Observations of the Customs, Manners, and Worships, &c., of the aforesaid Natives, in Peace and War, in Life and Death. On all which are added Spiritual Observations, general and particular, by the Author, of chief and special use (upon

all occasions) to all the English inhabiting those Parts; yet pleasant and profitable to the View of all Men. By Roger Williams, of Providence, in New-England. London: printed by Gregory Dexter, 1643." This work was written at sea, during his first voyage to England, and is exceedingly valuable for the information it contains of the languages of which it treats. The greater part of the work has been republished by the Massachusetts and Rhode Island Historical Societies. His *second* work is entitled, "Mr. Cotton's Letter, lately printed, Examined and Answered. By Roger Williams, of Providence, in New-England. London: imprinted in the year 1644." Mr. Cotton in his Letter vindicates the conduct of the magistrates in sending him from the colony. Mr. Williams replies in this work in a most able manner. A copy of the work may be found in the library of Yale College. His *third* work is called "The Bloody Tenet of Persecution, for cause of Conscience, discussed, in a Conference between Truth and Peace, who, in all tender Affection, present to the High Court of Parliament (as the Result of their Discourse) these (amongst other Passages) of highest consideration." Printed in London, 1644, and consisting of two hundred and forty-seven pages, small quarto. This work may be found in the library of Brown University. Mr. Cotton wrote a reply to the work in 1647, entitled, "The Bloody Tenet Washed and made White in the Blood of the Lamb, being discussed and discharged of Blood-guiltiness, by Just Defence." Mr. Williams's *fourth* work was a rejoinder to this work of Mr. Cotton's, with the following title: "The Bloody Tenet yet more Bloody, by Mr. Cotton's Endeavour to Wash it White in the Blood of the Lamb," &c.: printed in London, 1652, and comprising three hundred and twenty pages. The library of Harvard College contains a copy of this work. His next work is entitled, "The Hireling Ministry None of Christ's," &c.: printed in London, 1652. The doctrine of religious liberty is the subject of the work, a copy of which may be found in the library of the American Antiquarian Society at Worcester. He also published a work, called, "Experiments of Spiritual Life and Health, and their Preservatives. London, 1652." His last work was printed in Boston, and has the following title: "George Fox digged out of his Burrowes, or an Offer of Disputation, on fourteen proposals made last summer, 1672, unto G. Fox, then present on Rhode Island, by R. W." This book comprises three hundred and twenty pages, and "derives its quaint title from the accidental combination of the names of Fox and Burrowes in the work, which had been written in defence of the Quakers." It gives a full account of his controversy with the Quakers, and is said to be the most violent and denunciatory of all his writings. Even some

of his greatest opposers commended him for his opposition to the Quakers. "Mather, in his Magnalia, makes a tirade against Williams, and compares him to 'a windmill, that, by its rapid motion, was like to set the whole country on fire,' yet commends him for his opposition and firm ground against the Quakers."

The republication of the works of Roger Williams is now called for, and we hope they will soon be given to the public. They would throw much light on the age in which he lived—an age which Dr. Chalmers called the "Augustan age of Christianity." He lived "through all the days of Goodwin, Owen, and Bunyan; in the times of Robinson, Baxter, Hooker, Cotton, and multitudes of others, men of eminence; who, together with John Milton and Oliver Cromwell, effected a second reformation in the Christian Church. The lives and writings of these men have been published; and such is the call for them, that new editions are even now issuing from the press." "Those who admire Milton, cannot fail to admire Williams; admire him, not because they approve of *all* his views, but because, even when they differ from him, they will perceive that he is conscientious, and that his arguments deserve attention and consideration."

Roger Williams lived to see the colony that he planted established on a firm basis, and in a state of prosperity. He died in Providence, R. I., 1683, in the eighty-fourth year of his age. His memory will be fondly cherished while the rights of conscience are respected; and posterity will yet do justice to the character, and honour to the name, of the founder of Rhode Island.

Art. III.—RECENT EDITIONS OF THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOKLES.

[SECOND PAPER.]

225. *πολλὰς γὰρ —— ἐπιστάσεις.* Mr. Donaldson renders very inelegantly: *Troth, I have had many half-way houses of cogitation;* as if the allusion were to some such places as English "Tom and Jerry" houses. The literal translation is *many haltings of thought,* i. e. deliberation often held me back. In addition to the passages cited by the editors in support of the interpretation of the scholiast, cf. Plut. *Mor.*, p. 48, B, *ἐπιστάσεις καὶ διατριβὰς λαμβάνειν*, Aristot. *An.* I, 3, where the word *ἐπίστασις* is used as an antithesis to *ἡ κίνησις.*

234. Mr. Wunder pronounces the common reading corrupt on

account of the collocation of the pronoun, and the previous employment of δεῦρο, which, without σοι, expresses all that is necessary. Emper, also, regards σοι as the addition of an interpreter, and conjectures that Sophokles wrote, ὡς, κεἰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐξερῶ, φράσων ὅμως. Such a mode of expression would, undoubtedly, have been used by an educated speaker. Here, however, the terror and unpolished character of the sentinel justify the emphatic position of the pronoun, and its verbose repetition after δεῦρο μολεῖν. Erfurdt properly compares *Œd. Tyr.* 545, 6.

241. Mr. Donaldson has adopted Emper's suggestion στεγάζει in place of the vulgate στοχάζει, observing that the latter verb "has no signification which suits the context: στεγάζει, which means *you roof yourself in* or *cover yourself over head,* is the proper correlative to ἀποφάργνυσαι κύκλῳ, *you surround yourself with a hedge.*" Prof. Woolsey rightly retains the common reading, and remarks excellently that Kreon adapts his language to the soldier, and uses figures drawn from military matters. Compare Plat. *Legg.* p. 705, E, ὃς ἂν δίκην τοξότου ἑκάστοτε στοχάζηται τούτου, and many passages in Polybius. Render: *you take good aim, you aim excellently well at your mark and hedge the matter all around.* The addition of γε serves to heighten the ironical force of εὖ.

284. Emper has observed that Mr. Wunder's remarks upon the use of πότερον in a simple interrogation are uncalled for, so far as the present passage is concerned. The alternative inquiry follows at v. 288, where Brunck and Erfurdt edit incorrectly ἤ.

291. The commentators generally translate δικαίως, *ut decet.* Mr. Donaldson renders with a truer perception of the meaning of the passage: *and they kept not their necks in equal poise beneath the yoke.* The adjective δίκαιος has a similar signification in Xen. *Mem.* 4, 4, 5, φασὶ δέ τινες καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν τῷ βουλομένῳ δικαίους ποιήσασθαι, where δικαίους is used with singular appropriateness, because the subject of discourse is δικαιοσύνη, and a play upon the double meaning of the adjective, *justus* and *idoneus,* is intended. Ruhnken observes that δίκαιος is applied to a person or thing, in which *nec abundat aliquid nec deficit, quæ muneri suo par est, numeris suis absoluta.* So also Krüger remarks that the Latin *justus* is frequently said of a thing *quod est tale, ut recte munere suo fungatur, vices suas expleat.* Compare Xen. *Kyr.* 2, 2, 26: οὔτε γὰρ ἅρμα δήπου ταχὺ γένοιτ' ἄν, βραδέων ἵππων ἐνόντων, οὔτε δίκαιον, ἀδίκων ξυνεζευγμένων. Pollux 1, 186: ἵππος δίκαιος τὴν γνάθον, i. e. with a mouth properly trained. Xen. *de Ven.* 3, 5: ἡ ἄδικος γνάθος, *maxilla improba,* i. e. so hard-mouthed as not to feel the bit. Id. *Kyr.* 8, 3, 38: γήδιον δικαιότατον πάντων. Virg.

Georg. 2, 147: *justissima tellus.* The expression *δίκαιον σῶμα* in Hippokrates is defined by Galen: *ἀκριβῶς ἴσον ἑκατέρωθεν.*

302, 303. Mr. Wunder's translation of these verses, *qui vero mercede accepta scelus commiserunt tandem aliquando ut pœnas perfecerunt,* is unsatisfactory, since it leaves us in uncertainty, as Emper remarks, whether we are to refer *χρόνῳ ποτε* to *ἐξέπραξαν*, or to *δοῦναι δίκην.* We think that they must be joined with the former (with a reference to *πάλαι* in v. 289.) That the aorist is elsewhere used of an action which is future but must certainly happen, (Plat. *Civ.* p. 406, D; Eur. *Med.* 78,) is undoubtedly true, but inapplicable to our own passage, of which the general sense is as follows: *long since I knew that a party opposed to my authority existed in the State: — at length by an overt act they have given me the opportunity of inflicting punishment.*

323. Mr. Donaldson renders: *'Tis sad, when one thinks good, to think a lie.* To this version the objection urged by Emper against those of Brunck and Boeckh that they ignore the existence of *καί*, is of equal force.

332. Mr. Wunder writes with Neue *πολλά τε δεινά*, an alteration which makes *πολλά* the subject, and *δεινά* the predicate: *there are many things which are cunning, and man is the most cunning.* The common reading, by inverting the propositions, is far more emphatic.

353. The vulgate is manifestly corrupt. The metre is defective, and the future tense inapplicable to one of a series of events represented by the poet as of habitual occurrence. Of the various attempts which have been made to restore the passage, Emper and Donaldson concur in pronouncing Schöne's suggestion, *ἵππον ὀχμάζεται ἀμφὶ λόφον ζυγῶν*, by far the most probable. Döderlein's conjecture, *ἵππον ἀέξεται ἀμφίλοφον ζυγῶν, opibus augetur* or *proficit eo quod jugum ἀμφίλοφον imponit equo,* is a closer approximation to the reading of the books, but would be hardly intelligible, without the author's translation. Although, on account of their wide divergence from the writing of the MSS., we have not yet found any emendation which seems pre-eminently plausible, we are disposed to believe that the exigencies of the sense have been best consulted by C. F. G Arndt (*Quæst. Crit.* p. 8): —

ἵππον ἔερξ' ὑπαὶ ἀμφίλοφον ζυγόν.

Comp. Virg. *Æn.* 7, 639: *ad juga cogit equos.* Stat. *Theb.* 7, 136: *alienaque cogunt ad juga cornipedes.*

368. Mr. Wunder, without giving us a reason, tells us that *παρείρων* is corrupt. Mr. Dindorf edits *παραιρῶν*, whilst Emper and

Donaldson adopt Musgrave's emendation *γεραίρων*. Prof. Woolsey very rightly retains the manuscript reading unaltered, and remarks: "This rare word seems to mean *inserting* or *weaving in by the side of* and thus *joining to*." That this interpretation is correct is placed beyond all doubt by a comparison of the following passages: Æsch. *fragm.* 267; Archil. 81; Xen. *Conv.* 6, 2; Longin. *περὶ ὕψους* 3, 1; Polyb. 18, 1, 13. The Latin *asserere* is similarly used in the sense of *vindicare, defendere, conservare.* The meaning of our passage is therefore: *adding observance of his country's law and the oath-bound right of the gods, high is he in the State.* Comp. the observation of the scholiast: *ὁ πληρῶν τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὑψίπολις γίγνεται, ὃ ἔστιν, ἐν τῇ πόλει ὑψηλός.*

404. Prof. Woolsey calls attention to the illustration which this passage presents of the post-position of the antecedent notion, and its introduction into the relative clause as an apposition to the relative pronoun. This usage is so frequent, both in Greek and Latin writers, as to need little explanation. The grammatical point requiring special notice in our own verse is the insertion of the article (*δεικτικῶς*), which, in this transposition, is exceedingly rare. A few examples of its employment are met with in Plato. *Theæt.* p. 167, B: *ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δή τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν. Civ.* p. 477, C: *εἰ ἄρα μανθάνεις, ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος.* Cf. Krüger *Griech. Sprachl.* 51, 12, *Anm.*

412. Dindorf and Donaldson follow the Triklinian editions in writing *βάλοι*. The common reading is very properly retained by Prof. Woolsey, and is, in our opinion, greatly preferable. For if *καθήμεθα* is to be regarded as in form a historic tense, it has at least a present signification, and the use of the conjunctive in the dependent clause imparts singular animation and energy to the language of the sentinel.

452. Mr. Wunder, with the approbation of Emper, has enclosed this verse in brackets, "*ex optima G. Dindorfii conjectura, quam nuperrime mecum communicavit.*" It is matter for regret that the communications of Mr. Dindorf should in so many instances besides the present have led Mr. Wunder to lay aside the praiseworthy circumspection which, when left to his own judgment, he invariably displays. Prof. Felton regards the relative pronoun as referred to *τῶν κάτω θεῶν* in the preceding verse, and *τούσδε νόμους* as denoting *has leges, quas in mente habeo, περὶ τοῦ θάπτειν τοὺς τεθνηκότας*,— an explanation which removes all difficulty and yields a sentiment that agrees admirably with the evident intention of the poet. Kreon asks Antigone if she understood his proclamation (*τὰ κηρυχθέντα*), and subsequently expresses surprise, that she should

venture to transgress *these laws* (*τούσδε νόμους*,) meaning, of course, his own edict. She replies, that she did not consider his proclamation as emanating from Zeus or from Dike, *the co-assessor of the gods who have regulated the rights of the dead.*

505. Mr. Donaldson follows Dindorf in writing *ἐγκλῄσι* in place of *ἐγκλείσοι*, which, in addition to the unanimous support of the MSS., is defended by Eustathius, and, in no less degree, by the sense of the passage. For Antigone alludes to a future time in which the chorus will, spontaneously or upon further provocation, express its opinion.

519. The evident favour with which Prof. Woolsey regarded in his second edition the emendation of Brunck, has led him to abandon the common reading *τοὺς νόμους τούτους*. We think, however, that some further reason was necessary for the change than the supposition that *ἴσους* is alluded to and played upon in Kreon's reply. The vulgate as explained by the scholiast yields a highly appropriate sense, and the language of Antigone, in v. 517, seems to warrant the inference that she did not believe in that *ἰσοτιμία ἐν Ἅιδου*, which is spoken of by Lucian.

551. Emper and Wunder have admitted Dindorf's conjecture, *ἀλγοῦσα μὲν δή, καὶ γέλωτ' ἐν σοὶ γελῶ*. But apart from the circumstance that this alteration is wholly destitute of authority, the common reading yields a preferable sense: *If I do laugh at you, it is with grief, indeed, to myself.* Antigone says that she grieves for Ismene, although she ridicules her as she had done in v. 549.

578. Mr. Dindorf, who is followed by Wunder, pronounces the common reading to be "intolerable," and emends *εὖ δὲ τάσδε χρὴ γυναῖκας εἶναι μηδ' ἀνειμένας ἐᾶν*. We believe that a more unhappy conjecture was never given to the world. The construction is obvious. *Γυναῖκας* is the predicate of *τάσδε* and the antithesis of *ἀνειμένας*. We regard it, therefore, as unnecessary to institute any examination into the arguments by which Mr. Dindorf seeks to establish the authenticity of the very doubtful word he substitutes for *εἶναι*.

600. The MSS. exhibit *ῥίζας τέτατο*. Hermann first inserted *δ* before *τέτατο*, which restores the metre, and is regarded by all subsequent editors as necessary to the sense. We prefer the *lenior emendatio*, suggested by Prof. Klotz. This alteration (*ἐτέτατο*) is recommended by the additional emphasis it imparts to the language, and by removing the objection that the verb *ἀμᾷ* is referred grammatically to *φάος*, but logically to *ῥίζα*.—We disapprove Mr. Wunder's adoption of *κόπις* (the emendation of Jortin) in place of *κόνις*, and are glad

to observe that Prof. Woolsey has followed a more excellent way in adhering to the writing of the books. The ποιητικὴ ἀδεία, although covering a multitude of sins, will hardly justify our assigning a sword to the *Di Inferi* on the authority of such passages as Æsch. *Agam.* 538, fitly chosen by Aristophanes (*Avv.* 1240) as a mark for his satire; whilst the whole context and the words immediately following show that the reference is strictly limited to Antigone, and that κόνις is employed in direct allusion to the fatal dust which she had strewn over the corpse of Polyneikes.

605. Prof. Woolsey now follows Hermann in writing ὑπερβασία, without assigning the reasons which have led him to reject the common reading. The correction is recommended by its better adaptation to the connexion of ideas, by ὑπερφρόνησις the explanation of the scholiast, and by the authority of the two best codices. —— In the following verse Dindorf accepts the conjecture of Brunck, (supported by one MS. of inferior reputation,) and edits κατάσχῃ from the mistaken conviction that the optative cannot stand in a construction like the present without the particle ἄν. As our passage, however, is one in which the objective certainty of the proposition implied in the question is not doubted in the slightest degree, the employment of the optative without ἄν is in complete accordance with Attic usage. Compare Æsch. *Choëph.* 392: ἀλλ' ὑπέρτολμον ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγοι; So here τίς ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι; *what mortal sin can restrain thy power?* no one. The insertion of ἄν would imply that the proposition may be realized, if a certain contingency happens, or if the implied condition were granted. Its suppression, on the other hand, gives a stronger negation to the optative, rendering the denial of a contrary supposition absolute and independent of every condition or circumstance which *might* render it less likely to hold good. Excellently, therefore, does Hermann remark: "*additum ἄν mutat sententiam magisque incertam reddit, et fere posse quid fieri significat.*"

606. If παντογήρως is retained, it must, without doubt, be taken in an active sense—*qui ad senium ducit omnia, qui omnia senio afficit;* but we incline to Emper's opinion that it is not a genuine Sophoklean epithet. It seems wholly inapplicable to the balmy and invigorating influences of "tired nature's sweet restorer;" and there is much force in the observation of the critic just named that "as the gods are represented to be liable to sleep, they must be considered as obnoxious to grow old, if that is a property of sleep." He suggests that the blunder originated in the transcriber's eye having wandered to ἀγήρως, written as a various reading by the side of ἀγήρῳ; and that Sophokles probably wrote παντοδμάτῳ after

πανδαμάτωρ, which is an Homeric epithet of Hypnos. Bamberger proposes *παντοθήρως* or *παντόθηρος*, whilst Donaldson, comparing *Ai.* 660, believes the true reading to be *παγκρατής*. We prefer the conjecture of Riemer *πανταγήρως*, *never growing old*, as a closer approximation to the reading of the books. —— In the next verse, where the vulgate *οὔτ' ἀκάματοι θεῶν* offends the metre, Mr. Dindorf writes *οὔτ' ἄκοποι θεῶν νιν μῆνες* on his own authority, whilst Mr. Wunder follows Hermann in editing *ἄκμητοι*, and Brunck in transposing the order of the words. With these alterations, the line is read as follows in *his* text: *οὔτε θεῶν ἄκμητοι μῆνες*. Mr. Donaldson is still bolder; but his alterations will meet few admirers. We think Seidler's correction, *οὔτ' ἀκάμαντοι*, confirmed as it is by the MS. Par. 2886, the most probable emendation which has yet been proposed. Prof. Woolsey is silent.

611–614. We cannot coincide with the opinion of Mr. Wunder, that in this difficult passage the words *οὐδὲν ἕρπει* have been erroneously introduced from v. 618; and still less with the very positive assertion of other commentators, that they could not have proceeded from the pen of Sophokles. Mr. Wunder states that *ἐπαρκέσει*, if all other difficulties were passed over, cannot possibly signify *valebit*. As Emper has observed, its strict meaning is undoubtedly *sufficiet*, and "a more accurate translation would certainly be, *satis valebit*." The translation of the whole passage given by Prof. Woolsey, who reads *ἕρπων* with a scholiast, has apparently failed to satisfy himself, and does not, in our judgment, convey a very striking or appropriate sense. We think that the difficulty will be removed by adopting Emper's punctuation and arrangement:—

..... *ἐπαρκέσει*
νόμος δδ', ΟΥΔΕΝ ΕΡΠΕΙ,
θνατῶν βιότῳ πάμπολις, ΕΚΤΟΣ ΑΤΑΣ.

This arrangement upholds the writing of the books, yields a satisfactory sentiment, and emphatically "sets forth the purport of the law." The perplexity and mistake of the commentators originated in their considering the law to have been ΘΝΑΤΩΝ ΒΙΟΤΩΙ ΠΑΜΠΟΛΙΣ ΕΚΤΟΣ ΑΤΑΣ; whereas the words *θνατῶν βιότῳ πάμπολις* are to be joined with *νόμος δδε*, and form no part, but simply express the wide extension of the law ΟΥΔΕΝ ΕΡΠΕΙ ΕΚΤΟΣ ΑΤΑΣ. A very similar passage is found in Eur. *Iph. A.* 1062, quoted by Emper. The word *πάμπολις* is explained by *παγκόσμιος* in the note of the scholiast.

635. The "ambiguity of meaning," involved in the participle *ἔχων*, has been long ago pointed out by the critics, and in no degree ex-

tends to *ἀπορθοῖς*. None but a schoolboy who has just mastered his forms, would doubt whether this is the indicative or the optative. This will be apparent if the participle is resolved into a conditional clause with the hypothetical particle *εἰ*. See Krüger *Griech. Sprachl.* 65, 5, *Anm.* 2. Hermann rightly explains the construction, *σύ μοι τὰς γνώμας ἀπορθοῖς, ὥστε χρηστὰς εἶναι, ἔχων χρηστὰς γνώμας*. The marked approbation with which Kreon receives the assurances of his son indicates that he mistook his language for a profession of unlimited and unqualified obedience.

664. Wunder and Donaldson have admitted Mr. Dindorf's conjecture *τοῖς κρατύνουσιν νοεῖ* in lieu of the vulgate *τοῖς κρατοῦσιν ἐννοεῖ*. "Mr. Dindorf was led to form his conjecture from the writing of the Cod. Laur. a.: *κρατ——σῦσιν νοεῖ*. Both readings are doubtless admissible, but we prefer *ἐννοεῖ* as a word of wider import. *Νοεῖν* signifies *to think about, plan* or *be anxious about* a thing; *ἐννοεῖν, to have in one's mind, to fancy* or *dream of* a thing. The latter verb, therefore, imparts a fuller significance to the language of the king, and is better adapted to the remainder of the sentence." Such are the words of Emper. We believe that it would puzzle Mr. Dindorf himself to explain why in this instance he should have chosen to follow the manuscript above mentioned, and at vv. 505, 575 should have rejected its authority.

674. Emper suspects the accuracy of the common reading, and thinks *σὺν μάχῃ δορός* a very old alteration by some metrician for *σὺν δορὶ μάχης*, i. e. *σὺν δόρει μάχης*, the sense of the whole passage being: *Insubordination breaks down the ranks and causes flight in concert with the foeman's spear*, i. e. anarchy contributes as much to confusion and overthrow as the lances of the enemy. If any change is required, we should prefer *συμμάχου δορός*; but the vulgate is defended by Eur. *Erechth. fragm.* 17, 24, ed. Dind.: *οὐκ ἂν νιν ἐξέπεμπον εἰς μάχην δορός*. —— In the following verse *ὀρθούμενοι* does not mean, as Mr. Wunder translates, *qui erecti stant*, nor, as Emper supposes, *qui se regi patiuntur*, but *qui rectam aciem servant*. For Mr. Donaldson observes accurately that although *ὀρθός* strictly signifies *vertical*, and *εὐθύς horizontal*, they are both employed to denote a straight, unbroken line, whether horizontal or vertical.

677. The scholiast explains *τοῖς κοσμουμένοις* by *τοῖς ἄρχουσιν*, with the approbation of Hermann. Prof. Woolsey more accurately receives the participle as neuter: *iis quæ constitui.*

687. Mr. Wunder on his own authority edits *λέγοιτο*. But since *καλῶς ἔχον* is shown by the whole connexion to denote *καλῶς εἰρημένον τι*, the necessity for the alteration is not very apparent. "The

sense has been made clear," says Mr. Donaldson, "by the particles which the poet has employed: although I could not and do not wish to arraign the justice of your sentiments; nevertheless (*μέντοι*) it *might* come to pass that this censure would proceed with propriety from another (i. e. *γένοιτο καλῶς* —— *ἔχον καὶ ἑτέρῳ λέγειν ὅπως σὺ κ.τ.λ.*, where *καί* performs that office of emphasis which is best expressed in English by a stress on the auxiliary). At all events (*οὖν*), whether such censure were right or wrong, it is my natural office as your son (*πέφυκα*) to keep an eye on your behalf (*προ-σκοπεῖν*, cf. 732: *σοῦ γὰρ οὖν προ-κήδομαι*) to all thoughts, words, and censures which have reference to your conduct."

696. Mr. Wunder remarks that *οὔτε* ought, in strictness, to have filled the place of *μήτε*. He connects the negative particle with the infinitives, and proceeds: "*Ejus rei caussam facile apparet hanc fuisse, quod id inprimis animadverti voluit, impedimento fuisse Antigonam, ne insepultus jaceret Polynices, quum sepultura honore eum ornaret.*" Emper explains more correctly that while the language of Sophokles may be viewed as a blending of two constructions (*οὐκ εἴασε ὀλέσθαι* and *ἐποίησε μὴ ὀλέσθαι*) the use of the negation *μή* is justified by the transition from a particular to a general reference. "Ἥτις relates, it is true, to Antigone, but, by means of the second apodosis, (for the poet here employs the *protasis inter duplicem apodosin*,) the thought receives a general application: *οὐχ ἥδε*, &c.," the special allusion to Antigone terminating at *φθίνει*.

736. Mr. Dindorf edits *χρή με* on the authority of Dobree. Nothing, however, can be more unobjectionable than the employment of *γε* to emphasize the notion of *χρή* and to set forth prominently its opposition to reality.

740. In this instance we approve Mr. Dindorf's restitution of *συμμαχεῖ* as exhibited by the best MSS. The infinitive *συμμαχεῖν*, which may be explained upon the supposition of two constructions, (*ἔοικε συμμαχεῖν* and *ὡς ἔοικε, συμμαχεῖ*,) rests upon the authority of one manuscript of inferior reputation.

782. Most commentators understand by *κτήματα*, *divites potentesque*, although confessing that the antithesis between "the wealthy and the powerful," and the "soft cheeks of the virgin in her youth" is scarcely Sophoklean. Reisig gives a better, probably the true interpretation: "*κτήματα* sunt *illi qui amore capti sunt.*" The expression *ἔρως κέκτηταί τινα* is fully as legitimate as *ἔρως ἔχει τινά*, Pind. *Isthm.* 7, 29; and since *κτήματα* was notoriously used "*de iis personis, quæ bello captæ aut alio modo subactæ essent*," the phrase *κτήματα Ἔρωτος* was fairly applicable to those over whom Love exerts his irresistible might. In Plat. *Legg.* p. 906 A, men are called

κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων: comp. *Phædr.* p. 62, D, *ἡμᾶς θεοῦ κτήματα εἶναι.* This view harmonizes also with the connexion of ideas in the passage before us. Eros is invoked as the invincible in battle; the metaphor being subsequently heightened by the additional notion that he makes his own possessions or enslaves those whom he attacks. Cf. Plat. *Pol.* ix, 3. The peculiar force of *ἐμπίπτειν*, a word borrowed from the language of the palæstra, where simply throwing an adversary was deemed an incomplete victory unless the victor threw himself upon his opponent, is well explained by Eustathius, p. 1301, 25, *οἱ νικῶντες ἐμπίπτειν λέγονται, ἤγουν βιαίως ἐπικεῖσθαι.* Hence *ἐμπίπτειν τινί* signifies, *repente invadere aliquem ita, ut totum eum occupatum teneas*, (cf. Æsch. *Agam.* 841; Thukyd. 6, 24,) and is very appropriately used in our passage to set forth the resistless mastery of Love. It will scarcely be necessary to add that *κτήμασι* sustains the relation of a proleptic predicate to the action of the verb with which it is associated. See Krüger *Griech. Sprachl.* 57, 4 and *Anm.* 1. The objection of Emper that the explanation above given does not bring out the antithetical relation which the introductory sentences of this invocation bear to one another is, in our opinion, happily met by the observation of Prof. Woolsey that the opposition is "between the violence of Love in assaulting his victims and his mildness on a maiden's cheeks, between his restless roving over the sea and his retired rustic haunts, and between mortals and immortals over whom he exercises sway."

797. Mr. Dindorf expunges the words *ἐν ἀρχαῖς* and interpolates *οὐχί* between *μεγάλων* and *πάρεδρος*. Such an alteration is very unhappy in point of taste, and does violence to the concinnity of the metaphorical language by the abrupt and grating transition it makes from affirmation to negation. The common reading is defended by Eur. *Med.* 843, *τᾷ σοφίᾳ παρέδρους ἔρωτας*, aptly quoted by Seidler. *Ἐν ἀρχαῖς* signifies, *in imperando, in administrandis rebus.*

836. Prof. Woolsey explains the sense: *It is a great thing for a mortal to share alike with demigods*, like Niobe. We think that *τοῖς ἰσοθέοις* can hardly be *τοῖς ἡμιθέοις*, even if considered masculine. Emper more accurately pronounces it neuter, "because Sophokles would hardly employ the lower synonym *ἰσόθεος* in reference to Niobe, whom he had just before called *θεός* and *θεογεννής*."

840. The emendation of Erfurdt *ὀλλυμέναν*, received by Dindorf and Wunder, seems, as the participle of present time, inferior to the quasi-adjectival *οὐλομέναν*, the correction of Boeckh, which is found in one manuscript, and is supported by Eur. *Iph. A.* 793; *Iph. T.* 1109.

846. Mr. Wunder corrects *ἐπαυδῶμαι*, probably from the gloss

(*ἐπιβοῶμαι*) written upon the margin of the MS. La. The alteration is made unnecessary by supplying a concessive clause to *ἔμπας*: [even though I obtain nothing else] *you, at all events, I obtain.* Compare Hom. *Od.* 15, 214; 19, 302.

879. Wunder has written *ἱρόν*, and is followed by Dindorf and Donaldson. Why may not the first syllable of *ἱερόν* be lengthened by the arsis (as often in epic poetry), and the verse itself retained as a dactylic pentameter catalectic? —— In v. 865, Mr. Donaldson inserts *ἀ* before *ταλαίφρων*, "on account of the Cretic rhythm." Mr. Dindorf adopts a still more unjustifiable course in editing *ἔρχομαι τὰν πυμάταν ὁδόν*. If these changes are tolerated, we may well inquire where critical license is to have its termination.

884. Wunder, on Schaefer's authority, renders *εἰ χρείη*, *si utile esset, si prodesset.* We agree with Emper that since lamentation before death is made for the express purpose of retarding that event, and is so far really and not hypothetically advantageous, it would be better to render *si liceat.*

887. Prof. Woolsey very properly receives the reading of the MS. Vat. *ἄφετε μόνην*. It has not only better authority than *ἅπιτε*, but from the annotation of Triclinius, *ἀφεῖτε χρὴ γράφειν, οὐκ ἄφετε*, appears to have been the common reading in his day.

904. We think that all difficulties as to the explanation and construction of this verse are best met by the emendation of C. F. G. Arndt (*Quæst. Crit.*, pp. 9, 10):—

καίτοι σέ γ' εὖ 'τίμησα τοῖς φρονοῦσιν εὖ,

i. e. *quanquam te quidem recte honoravi judicio eorum, qui recte sapiunt.* For the repetition of the modal adverb, cf. 1031: *εὖ σοι φρονήσας εὖ λέγω*. On the frequent interchange and confusion in ancient manuscripts between *ω* and the diphthong *ευ*, see Schaefer's note on Greg. Cor. p. 469.

940. The metre gives evidence of some slight corruption of the text. Mr. Dindorf throws out the last four words, (forming an entire verse,) without perceiving that their removal is fatal to the point of the whole passage. Emper and Donaldson think that *κοιρανίδαι* could not have been used as an appellation of the chorus; and emend *τὴν κοιρανιδῶν μούνην λοιπήν*, with the rejection of *βασιλίδα*, as a marginal gloss. Prof. Woolsey evinces a sounder judgment and higher regard for the authority of the manuscripts by adopting Seidler's correction *βασιληΐδα*, which, although an epic form, is found in dactylic verse at Eur. *Hippol.* 1281. The objection that *κοιρανίδαι* cannot be applied to the chorus, is refuted by the scholiast and the practice of Sophokles. Cf. 970; *Œd. Kol.* 831; *Œd. Tyr.* 85, 882.

955. Prof. Woolsey, in common with most modern editors, has adopted Scaliger's emendation ὀξύχολος, "because the anger of Lykurgos is the leading thought in this and the following sentences." Such a construction, resolving the adjective into a secondary predicate, may be justified, according to Donaldson, by v. 135 and *Trach.* 936, where πυρφόρος and δύστηνος are, in his opinion, similarly used. We would not, for our own part, venture against the consent of the MSS. and the lemma of the scholiast to make any alteration, and are glad to find that this view agrees with the *latest* dictum of Hermann: "*recte positum adverbium, verbis ita junctis, ζεύχθη ὀξυχόλως ἐκ Διονύσου, celeri Bacchi ira.*"

959. Mr. Wunder defends the common reading upon the assumption that the words οὕτω —— μένος form no part of the history whose main features are here recited, but express a general reflection of the chorus. In this view Prof. Woolsey coincides, and adds that ἀποστάζει is intransitive. The objection to this explanation is, that the special epithets δεινόν and ἀνθηρόν can scarcely be thought to refer to anything else than the madness of Lykurgos. Emper erases the comma after ἀποστάζει, and places it after κεῖνος, the pronoun being placed last in the sentence for the sake of emphasis, and to mark the parallel between the case of the Thracian king and that of Antigone. "*She* too had exhibited her madness in violent words, v. 603, λόγου τ' ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς; and when the parallel comes, the emphasis falls naturally on κεῖνος." We agree with this critic in considering ἀποστάζει transitive, as at Æsch. *Suppl.* 582, Musæ. 123, and in thinking the repetition of μανίαις (v. 960) intolerable. As we have, therefore, no doubt that the penultima of ἀνίαις is occasionally shortened in the Attic poets, (cf. Porson on Eur. *Phœn.* 1334,) we unhesitatingly accept his most elegant emendation: ἐπέγνω δ' ἀνίαις.

982. Mr. Donaldson pronounces the word ἄντασε "inexplicable," and adopts Dindorf's correction αὔδασε in the following sense, which we need not tell our readers is *not* to be found in the Greek: *challenged her share in the old honours of the Erechtheidæ.* We could have wished that he had quoted some examples in illustration of this use of the active verb αὐδάω. The passage from the *Philoktetes* (v. 240) is not at all in point.

1035. That τῶν δ' ὕπαι γένους cannot possibly stand for ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐγγενῶν, has been shown by Wunder and Emper. The latter critic observes that "the laws of the language will justify no other interpretation than, *ab aliis vero, qui mei generis sunt*, the harshness of such a mode of expression being, however, intolerable." Mr. Donaldson's ingenious emendation τῶν ὑπ', ἀργύρου yields the ne-

cessary sense: *by whom, for silver, I have long been bought and sold.* "The resemblance between ΤΩΝΥΠΑΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ and ΤΩΝΥΠΑΡΓΥΡΟΥ led, doubtless, to the corruption which has hitherto remained in the text."

1068. We approve Emper's reading and punctuation,—

> *ἀνθ' ὧν ἔχεις μέν, τῶν ἄνω βαλὼν κατώ,*
> *ψυχὴν ἀτίμως ἐν τάφῳ κατοικίσας,—*

by which "*ἔχεις* is joined, very advantageously to the sense of the passage, with the participle *κατοικίσας*. When the finite verb *κατῴκισας* had once found its way into the text, the insertion of the copulative particle (*τε*) became an almost necessary consequence." We would add that *κατοικίσας* is supported by manuscript authority.

1080–1083. Wunder considers these verses a spurious interpolation, and Dindorf removes them from his text. Donaldson disagrees entirely with these editors, and remarks excellently that "their oracular obscurity is quite in keeping with the lines which precede." The inadmissibility of Boeckh's opinion that these lines contain a general sentiment, is forcibly shown in the remainder of his admirable note, to which with real pleasure we refer our readers.

1090. Wunder observes that the genitive *τῶν φρενῶν* depends upon *τὸν νοῦν*, and that no difficulty will be felt respecting such a collocation by those who remember the Homeric expressions *νόος ἐν στήθεσσι, ἐν φρέσιν*, and the like. The analogy is not, however, exact; for in the formulas alluded to, *στήθεα, φρένες* are used in a strict anatomical sense of parts of the human body in which the *νόος* was supposed to have its seat. Nevertheless we believe that his statement of the construction of the words *τὸν νοῦν τῶν φρενῶν* is perfectly correct. Cf. Eur. *fragm. ap. Lykurg.* 92: *ἐξαφαιρεῖται φρενῶν τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐσθλόν.*

1110. Wunder and Dindorf coincide with Hermann's surmise that some verses have perished after the words *εἰς ἐπόψιον τόπον*, and therefore indicate a lacuna by placing asterisks between this and the following verse. The lost verses contained, in their opinion, a more accurate description of the place in question and a more distinct reference to Antigone. We agree with Donaldson that such a supposition is unnecessary. The *ἐπόψιος τόπος* has been already described at v. 411: *ἄκρων ἐκ πάγων*, and "was probably depicted on the right-hand *periaktos*." The mere mention of the spot upon which the corpse of Polyneikes lay, and the direction to take hatchets in their hands for the purpose of cutting down timber for the funeral pile from the trees which stood there in considerable abundance, (v. 416: *πᾶσαν αἰκίζων φόβην ὕλης πεδιάδος,*)

would be all the description of the locality referred to, that Kreon in his haste and excitement would be likely to give to his attendants. "The antithesis in v. 1112 seems to point to an intentional brevity in describing his proposed liberation of Antigone." These remarks are principally drawn from the excellent note of Donaldson.

1156. From Wunder's explanation, *οὐδεὶς γὰρ βίος ἐστίν, οὔτε στὰς ὃν ἂν αἰνέσαιμι, οὔτε πεσών, ὃν ἂν μεμψαίμην ποτέ*, it is evident that he understands *στάντα* of a *prosperous* state of life, and supplies to *μεμψαίμην* the participle *πεσόντα* in the opposite signification. In this view the sense would be: *I ne'er would venture to praise the life of any man if prosperous, nor blame it if adverse.* Such an explanation is ingenious, but the harshness of the supposed ellipse renders it, in our judgment, inadmissible in the verses before us. Ὁποῖον *στάντα* can only mean, *in qualemcunque statum devenerit*, as the scholiast, Hermann and Emper have already seen.

1209. Mr. Wunder observes: "*pro περιβαίνει aliud quid a poeta scriptum fuisse numeris docemur.*" We do not see the reason why. The "*aliud quid*" he conjectures to be *περιπολεῖ*. Hermann also thinks *περιβαίνει* "*insolentius dictum*," and prefers *περιπιτνεῖ*. Περιβαίνειν and *ἀμφιβαίνειν* are, however, employed of analogous phenomena, and Emper remarks that Homer has used *περιήλυθεν* of sound.

1233. Prof. Woolsey leaves the student in something like a dilemma as to the meaning to be given to *κνώδοντας*. For in the first part of his note we read, "Comp. Ajax 1025, where this word has the sense *blade* or *sword*;" but at its close, "Lobeck on Ajax loc. cit. renders this word in correspondence with its usage in Xenophon, *the hilt-pieces of the sword*, and with this Hermann and Boeckh agree." The words of Lobeck are simply these: "*Nomen κνώδων, a verbo κνῶ propagatum, proprie non gladium, sed remoras venabulorum et gladiorum denotat.*" The reviewer may direct attention to the note upon the verse referred to in the Harvard edition of the Aias, p. 280.

1278. Mr. Wunder, supplying *κακά* to the participles from v. 1280, adopts Boeckh's rendering: *as the true holder and possessor of misfortune.* Emper explains more correctly that the words *ὡς ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος* do not belong, as their position would seem to intimate, to both members of the period, but are limited exclusively to the first. Hence he interprets: *whilst thou art bearing in thy hands one part of thy misfortunes, upon the supposition that* (*ὡς*) *thou hast and art fully in possession of* (all the evils that have been allotted thee, —— let that opinion be dismissed) *for thou seemest to have come with a prospect of seeing speedily the other part.*

In this way the introduction of ὡς is satisfactorily explained, and the emphatic position of the words above quoted, is seen to be due to the antithesis between the participles of the present and the infinitive of the future.

1281. In Jelf's Greek Grammar, 780, *Obs.* 2, this verse is quoted as an illustration of the occasionally pleonastic employment in poetry of ἤ before the genitive. Boeckh more correctly explains: *quid autem est pejus aut adhuc malorum?* Mr. Dindorf writes τί δ' ἔστιν αὖ; and omits all that follows,—his favourite expedient for getting rid of a difficulty. We would call attention to the elegant conjecture of Emper:—

τί δ' ἔστιν; ἦ κάκιον αὖ κακῶν ἔτι;

1290. Hermann omits the words ὦ παῖ, and Wunder observes: "*verba quidem* ὦ παῖ *mihi quoque et metro et sententiæ adversari videntur.*" Mr. Donaldson asserts correctly that the allocution ὦ παῖ cannot possibly refer to the slave who is addressed here. Why Emper's emendation,

τί φῄς; ὦ παῖ, τίνα λέγει σοι νέον,

(σοι being joined with ἀμφικεῖσθαι and σφάγιον ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ regarded as a parenthetic clause,) should be pronounced "quite out of place," we know not. Surely nothing can be more natural, in such circumstances as those of Kreon, than an apostrophe to the deceased Hæmon.

1301, 1302. Most critics agree (see Arndt, *Quæst. Soph.* p. 11) that there is some corruption in these verses, and that they could not have proceeded in their present form from the pen of the poet. The objections to the vulgate are well stated by Emper: "Although it is just possible that ὀξύθηκτος might have been applied figuratively to a personal notion as an epithet of violent passion or emotion, we should find it hard to produce another example of the use of this compound adjective in such a meaning. Admitting it, however, the connexion of ideas in this passage is broken and perverse. The words previously uttered by the exangelos refer altogether to Eurydike; how can he then, Eurydike being still the subject, connect these words with the preceding by means of ἡ δέ? Moreover, the expression λύει βλέφαρα κελαινά, if employed in the sense *kills herself*, is a very unusual substitution of the active for the middle voice. Lastly, βωμία πέριξ, apart from the affected character of the phraseology, is very unsuitable to the sense. Why should the queen be represented, when meditating death, to have figured round the altar like a *danseuse?*

"Hence," he continues, "I feel satisfied that ὀξύδηκτος does not relate to the queen, but to a weapon exhibited or pointed out by the exangelos, with which Eurydike had committed the act of self-destruction. Now of this weapon (probably the sacrificial knife from the altar) λύει βλέφαρα could be said with entire propriety The requisite sense is then obtained if, instead of πέρις, we read πτέρυξ, a word which is very applicable to a two-edged sacrificial knife, and is indeed often used in this sense under precisely similar circumstances. Such an emendation supersedes the necessity of assuming a lacuna; for in accordance with a very refined idiom of the Greek language, the grammatical here gives place to the logical subject. Whilst, therefore, πτέρυξ is the formal subject-nominative to the words λύει βλέφαρα, the queen, who bears this weapon, still remains the strict natural subject, and the exangelos can accordingly proceed κωκύσασα, &c. As, however, his language is still in some degree obscure, the inquiry of Kreon:

ποίῳ δὲ κάπελύσατ' ἐν φοναῖς τρόπῳ;

and the reply, describing in plain terms her suicide:

παίσασ' ὑφ' ἧπαρ αὐτόχειρ αὑτήν κ. τ. λ.,

are added for the sake of additional explanation."

So far, then, for the consideration of individual verses of this play. Let it not, however, be supposed that our having refrained from remark upon numerous other passages, in which modern editors have forsaken the established readings, and interpolated, upon their own authority, or that of their predecessors, such emendations as best harmonized with their own notions of what Sophokles *ought* to have written, is any proof that we acquiesce in their corrections or the principle by which their temerity is sought to be defended.

The length to which our article has extended, will, we believe, be pardoned by those of our readers who love Sophokles, and are anxious for the diffusion of a thirst for classical learning among all classes of our countrymen. To the sneer of dry-eyed utilitarians, who "*centum Græcos curto centusse licentur*," and who, to borrow the words of the most eminent of living scholars, "*nihil aliud optant quam panes et circenses, hoc est, pecuniæ cito conficiendæ et per delicias prodigendæ vias et rationes*," we profess our indifference.

We would, in conclusion, leave it with our more learned readers to determine, whether, in respect of the textual innovations and imperfect epexegesis, to which, as characteristic of the age, we have invited their attention, they have not seen ample reason, in this

review of the labours of some of the most renowned and erudite scholars of the day, to desire that the excellent rule, quoted by Prof. Blackie from Thomas à Kempis (or the writer who bears that name): "*Omnis scriptura sacra eo spiritu debet legi quo scripta est*," as essential to the interpretation of the words of Holy Writ, should be as rigidly applied in the field of classical criticism? And we cannot abstain from congratulating Americans that the necessity of this principle to the correct explanation and treatment of the "Antigone" has been most distinctly seen and most faithfully followed by their distinguished countryman, the urbane and accomplished President of Yale. *O si sic omnes!*

Art. IV.—RECENT EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS OF PASCAL.

1. *Pensées, Fragments et Lettres de* Blaise Pascal, *publiés pour la première fois conformément aux manuscrits originaux en grande partie inédits.* Par M. Prosper Faugère. 2 vols., 8vo. Paris. 1844.
2. *The Provincial Letters of* Blaise Pascal: *a new translation, with Historical Introduction and Notes.* By Thomas M'Crie, D. D. 12mo. Edinburgh.
3. *The Works of Pascal, newly translated and arranged* by George Pearce, Esq. Vol. I, Provincial Letters: II, Miscellaneous Writings: III, Thoughts on Religion, &c. 3 vols. London. 1847-1850.

Pascal has attracted almost as much attention of late years as at any former period. New editions of his works have appeared in almost every country, and almost every literary journal has undertaken, *de novo*, the task of examining and rejudging the strange phenomena of his life and genius. This revival of interest is due, doubtless, partly to the revival of Jesuitism; the very mention of the society recalls the name of its strongest assailant. But Pascal's polemical renown is, perhaps, the smallest part of his fame. As a prodigy of intellect, as a man far in advance of his times in profoundness of thought, as a model of taste and of style, and, at the same time, as a sad specimen of the weakness of that human nature whose grandeur and whose misery he has so graphically depicted, he will be, for every age, a problem and a study. The appearance of the works mentioned at the head of this article, with several others bearing upon the history and genius of Pascal, affords us a fitting opportunity for *our* attempt at a solution of the enigmas of his career. But a full investigation of the subject as well as of the books relating to it would require more space than we can allot to one article; and we shall, therefore, divide the task, devoting the present paper

to a brief survey of the new editions of Pascal's writings in France and of their translations in Great Britain.

The title, "Pascal's Thoughts," has long been a ruling one among booksellers' lists and library catalogues; but the work which passed under that name until 1844 was hardly deserving the name of an authentic book in any sense. Yet on the merits of that book, even such as it was, we should feel it impertinent, at this day, to speak, even in praise. The verdict of mankind has placed the private note-book of Pascal above the elaborate productions of most other men. The literary history of the work is very curious. After the publication of the "Provincial Letters" Pascal's mind was occupied, for the most part, up to the day of his death, with preparation for a "Defence of Christianity," on the largest scale of thought. The scope and method of the work formed the subject of frequent conversations in the learned circle of the Port Royal; and on one occasion, at least, he stated his plan, in tolerably full outline, to his friends. Soon after his suffering spirit was removed by death, his friends determined to arrange and publish his posthumous works, among which they found heads and fragments of arguments, sketches of chapters, stray thoughts and illustrations, evidently intended to form part of the great work on which his mind had been at work for years. He had formed the plan of a vast edifice, but alas! he had only been permitted to gather a few stones for the building. Numerous "thoughts" on other subjects, principally theological and ethical, were also found among his manuscripts. The manuscripts themselves were in a most chaotic state. It appears that whenever a thought occurred to Pascal, he jotted it down, not in a note-book, but on a loose piece of paper, often on the back of an old letter: and all that he did for the preservation of these "Sibylline leaves" was to arrange them in bundles or on files.

It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the "Thoughts," when published, should have been mere fragments; the greater wonder is, that they should have been preserved at all. But the worst part of the story remains to be told. Pascal's friends (of whom Arnauld, Nicole, and the Duke de Roannes were the chief) came to the wise conclusion that these remains, fragmentary as they were, were too valuable to be lost to the world. But the Jesuits, whom Pascal had immortalized by his ridicule, were then all-powerful at court; and it was a very delicate task to publish a theological work, just then, in Pascal's name. Before the work could appear, it had to undergo a substantial censorship by a committee of doctors of the Sorbonne, nine in number. *Each* of these made such corrections and suppressions as he thought necessary to make the work absolutely orthodox!

Moreover, Pascal's friends thought themselves at liberty to do *anything* they pleased with these remains, altering at pleasure both the substance and the *style*. "These fragments," says M. Faugère, indignantly, which sickness and death had left incomplete, suffered, without ceasing to be immortal, all the mutilations and alterations which an exaggerated prudence and a mistaken zeal could suggest; mutilations, caused by the same orthodox scruples which had actuated the censors; alterations, inspired by a desire to improve *and embellish the style of the author of the Provincials!*" Madame Perier, (Pascal's sister,) to her praise be it spoken, resisted all these alterations to the last, and demanded that "not a syllable should be changed;" but she stood alone, and was overruled by the literary clique, who—worthy men—stupidly dreamed of mending *Pascal's* style. In the preface to the first edition of the Pensées, (published in 1670,) M. Etienne Perier gives a very *naïve* statement of the method of procedure adopted by himself and his coadjutors in preparing the work for the press, from which it appears, that after rejecting the first plan that presented itself, viz., that of printing the MSS. just as they were, they actually, for a time, entertained the thought of filling up Pascal's outline, and "supplying, in some sort, the work he intended to write!" But "at last," says M. Perier, with inimitable simplicity, "we decided to reject this plan also, considering that it was almost impossible to enter completely into the thought and plan of an author—especially of one dead; and because the work produced would not have been M. Pascal's, but *one altogether different.*" The plan finally adopted was, according to M. Perier, to select those passages which were most clear and complete, and print them "without alteration," and to suppress all that were too obscure or imperfect. How much they printed "without alteration," may be judged from the statement of M. Faugère, that "they modified the style in a thousand ways—sometimes breaking a thought into fragments, and scattering them in an arbitrary way; at other times joining together isolated and distinct passages; and finally substituting, in many places, their own common-place for the original expressions of Pascal. There are not, in the first or any of the subsequent editions, *twenty consecutive lines* free from alteration."*

* This is abundantly confirmed by M. Cousin, who speaks of "altérations de mots, altérations de tours, altérations de phrases, suppressions, substitutions, additions, compositions arbitraires et absurdes, tantôt d'un paragraphe, tantôt d'un chapitre entier, et, qui pis est, décompositions plus arbitraires encore et vraiment inconcevables de chapitres qui, dans le manuscrit de Pascal, se présentaient parfaitement liés dans toutes leurs parties et profondément travaillés." —*Rapport à l'Académie*, ix.

Edition followed edition, with occasional additions, until, in 1776, Condorcet published his "*Eloge et Pensées de Pascal, nouvelle édition.*" A century—and such a century—had passed away; the encyclopædists now ruled instead of the Jesuits; and poor Pascal, who had formerly to be trimmed to suit the taste of orthodoxy, must now be re-edited in the infidel spirit. Assuredly, as Mr. Faugère remarks, a comparison of the *Pensées* of 1670 with the edition of 1776 would afford a curious illustration of the revolution which the French mind had undergone in that interval. Condorcet suppressed every sentiment of elevated piety and devotion as follies of superstition. In 1778 this edition was re-issued under the fit supervision of Voltaire, who added notes remarkable only for their raillery and their injustice.

In 1779 the first attempt at a *complete* edition of Pascal's works was given to the world by Bossuet. The *Pensées* occupied the second volume of this edition. It is a curious fact, that when Bossuet sought for official permission to publish the work, M. Malesherbes, then keeper of the seals, advised him to issue it under a fictitious imprint, and so it appeared as published by Détune, libraire à la Haye, when, in fact, it was published by the bookseller Nyon at Paris. M. Bossuet endeavoured to make his edition as complete as possible, and obtained many new scraps from different sources. He did not attempt, however, a correction of the old errors, but, in fact, added many new ones of his own. Such as this edition was, however, it became the standard, and has been followed, more or less exactly, by all subsequent editors, and by all English translators, up to 1844.

The fact that the printed text of the Pensées was thus mutilated and imperfect had long been known, or at least suspected, by the literary world; but the full state of the case was not understood until 1843, when M. Cousin published his *Report* above cited. The original *autograph* MS. was fortunately preserved in the Royal Library, at Paris, and M. Cousin, comparing it with the current text, easily proved the necessity of a new revision of the "posthumous works of Pascal." The task was undertaken by M. Faugère, with a zeal and industry only rivalled by his tact and ability. The basis of his edition, of course, is the autograph MS., which he describes * as a large folio volume of 491 pages, containing the scraps to which Pascal had originally intrusted his meditations, carefully pasted on the page, or, when both sides of the paper were written on, inserted between the leaves. They were not arranged on any intelligible principle, or, indeed, on any principle whatever, but thrown together pell-mell—here a portion of a fragment, and there another, whole pages some-

* Introduction, p. xl.

times intervening between two parts of the same "thought." The handwriting was almost undecipherable except by an adept. M. Faugère also had recourse to all the *copies* of this MS. known to be extant, and also to all other papers of Pascal's, or of his friends, likely to be of use in his editorial labours.* Through the course of these labours, (an accurate account of which is given in his Introduction,) we cannot follow him further than to say that he has given us *every word* of the MS., except some few which are absolutely illegible, allowing himself no liberty whatever of alteration and emendation. In the matter of *arrangement*, however, he was obviously entirely free; and his success in this regard has been admirable. The materials are divided into two parts: first, the fragments pertaining to the great work on "Christianity;" and secondly, all others—letters, observations, short treatises, &c. These last compose the first volume of his work: the "Thoughts on Religion" occupy the second. In the arrangement of this part M. Faugère availed himself of the recorded conversation before referred to, in which Pascal developed to his friends the general plan of his apology, dividing it into two parts—first, the Misery of Man without God; second, the Happiness of Man with God. Under these heads the fragments are arranged in as near an approach to logical order as possible; and in this part of the work M. Faugère was aided, in many cases, by hints and indications on Pascal's MS. scraps. The result is a work in which we may study not only Pascal's views of religion, but also Pascal himself.

Leaving now M. Faugère's work, which confines itself to the Pensées, let us pass to the recent translations, both of the Provincials and the Thoughts. It is a curious coincidence that the two translations of the Provincials named at the head of this article appeared almost simultaneously in London and Edinburgh. The *first* English translation was contemporary with the letters themselves, (1657,) a second appeared in 1744, and a third in 1816. Mr. Pearce and Dr. M'Crie appear to have each entered upon their work with the design of affording a "faithful" translation of this master-piece of style. Dr. M'Crie's is executed with tolerable accuracy, though not with elegance. It is a model, however, when compared with its London rival. Indeed, it is hardly too much to say of Mr. Pearce's book, once for all, that it is a travesty of the Provincials. There is not a page of its four hundred, in which something of Pascal's meaning, and all his grace and elegance, are not lost. The following passage from his preface will show with what admirable self-complacency, and at the same time with what humble stock of preparation, Mr. Pearce goes to work.

"In translating a composition that rises little above the ordinary level, fidelity to the author's meaning, and correctness of language, are sufficient. But, if the work be one of a high order of literary beauty—one, whose pages delight not less from intrinsic excellence, their power of reasoning and variety of illustration, than from felicities of diction and graces of style—in such a case, the effort to do justice to the great original should rise proportionably higher. The ear should be carefully relieved from the unpleasing effect of foreign idiom. Where the genius of the native tongue has sanctioned expressions, that, in a bolder vernacular, seem insipid, they should be raised: where, to a more sober taste, the language appears too exalted, it should be subdued. Especially should sympathy be shown by the translator with the higher excellences of the original composition. He should kindle with its ardour, and rise with its elevation. In those passages in which genius is wont to gather up her powers, and carry with resistless force the passions of the reader—and in such passages none abound more than Pascal—on such occasions, when the loftiest reach of thought pours its conceptions into a mould of classic beauty, he should then aim at something of a kindred vigour, and give his humbler aid to transfer with fidelity the features of his great model. His art is, after all, but an imitative one. The thought—the argument—the eloquence—the spirit and life, are all the author's. But yet, in the subordinate sphere he occupies, there is a measure of excellence to be aspired to; a merit analogous to that in the sister-arts, in which the painting or the statue will be so skilfully copied, that the practised eye of the connoisseur only can detect the imitation. The difference, however, here is, that if any measure of resemblance be achieved, no *deception*—as in the other cases—can be contemplated. The object in view is only to court respect and admiration for the master-mind that is attempted to be traced."

Was there ever candour so charming as this disclaimer of "deception," coming especially from one so evidently capable of *counterfeiting* Pascal as Mr. Pearce proves himself to be in this fair sample of his English writing? After this, an instance or two will be quite sufficient to illustrate his power of reproducing, in English, not the delicate refinements of the "Provincials" merely, but even their substantial sense. Let us select a simple, and yet celebrated passage as a test. In the fifth Letter, the garrulous Jesuit is made to recount a number of obscure casuists bearing the most gothically outlandish names of Germany and Spain,* until Pascal interrupts the catalogue with that *naïve* exclamation, strong in its force alike of irony and argument,—

"O mon père! lui dis-je, *tout* effrayé, tous ces gens-*là* étaient-ils chrétiens? *Comment*, Chrétiens, me répondit-il. Ne vous disais-je pas que ce sont les seuls par lesquels nous gouvernons aujourd'hui la chrétienté? Cela me fit pitié: mais je ne lui en témoignai rien, et lui demandai seulement si tous *ces auteurs-là* étaient jésuites. Non, me dit-il, mais il n'importe; ils n'ont pas laissé de dire de bonnes choses."

The reader will observe that in this passage there is not a particle of *idiom* to excuse a deviation from the text. And in proportion to the exquisite simplicity of the original, all departure from it in the version, however slight *grammatically*, must be, *æsthetically*, a distortion. Then hear Mr. Pearce:—

* E. g.: Achokier, Dealkoser, Dellacrux, Veracrux, Squilanti, Bizozeri, Villagut.

"O, my *good* father!" cried I, alarmed, "were all these people Christians?" "Christians!" said he, "did I not tell you they were the only *persons* by whom, *in the present* day, we regulate *our system* of Christianity?" I was concerned to hear him say this; but made no remark; and only asked him if they were all Jesuits? "No," he replied, "but that is of no importance; there are excellent things in them all."

The Italics in the French mark the *omissions* of the translator; those in the English, his *interpolations*, on both which, together with his *mis*translations, we must be allowed a word or two. And first, the phrase, "my good father," is twice faulty: the pronoun should not be rendered at all; the word "good" is neither expressed nor implied in the French; and the two together import a self-possessed and semi-sneering familiarity, grossly out of keeping with the simple and sudden consternation of Pascal. Moreover, the nice touch given to this ironical "alarm" by the word "*tout*" is perversely omitted. The word "alarm" is itself wrong; the emotion intended is obviously *terror*, in a modified degree. The ambiguity of the rest of the sentence is perhaps chargeable to our idiom. The question asked is not, properly, whether "*all* these people" were Christians; this would imply that part of them had been already recognised as such, whereas no partitive reference is designed: "All," finely expressive of affright, refers only to the magnitude of the number, not to their collective "Christianity." And this is exactly expressed by the French construction of the phrase. But the Jesuit's reply is stripped of its most characteristic trait, the "*how;*" and he is, at the same time, made to utter "Christians" with an exclamation instead of an interrogation. Both betray a great misconception of the refined spirit of the dialogue. In the next sentence "*les seuls*" is barbarously rendered "the only persons"—this last word being foisted in by the translator as if on purpose to confound the sense by substituting a vaguely generic term for a particular species—the adjective *seuls* obviously applying to "Christians" merely. Nor is *aujourd'hui* properly rendered by the uncouth phrase "in the present day;" still less is *chrétienté* by "our system of Christianity," which is, in fact, nonsense. In the next phrase—*cela me fit pitié*—the sentiment expressed is *not* "concern," nor was it excited by "hearing" the Jesuit "say this;" nor is Pascal's forbearance to manifest it easily recognised in the trivial phrase, "I made no remark,"—a phrase absurd, too, when the question whether they were "all Jesuits," is uttered in the very same breath. In this question, besides, the word *auteurs-là* is left untranslated, although it gives explicitness to the sense, and serves, at the same time, (particularly by the *là*,) to insinuate the writer's tone of lurking raillery. We have now reached the last sentence of our extract—and even that is not unexception-

able: for "that is of no importance," is a splay-footed version of *n'importe;* and "*there are excellent things in them all,*" does scarcely more justice to the vernacular than to the original.

The specimen we have given is a fair example of Mr. Pearce's handiwork in the "translation" of *Les Provinciales.* Let us now try Dr. M'Crie by the same test passage.

"O my *dear* father," cried I, quite alarmed, "were all these people Christians?" "How, Christians," returned the *casuist:* "did I not tell you these are the only *writers* by whom we now govern Christendom?" Deeply affected as I was by this announcement, I concealed my emotion from the *monk*, and only asked him if all these authors were Jesuits? "No," said he; "but that is of little consequence; they have said a number of good things for all that."

That the North-Briton is (at least in our judgment) a far better translator of Pascal than his brother of the South, will be obvious enough to the reader who has followed the above comments with attention. There is, throughout, less omission and less mistranslation. Nevertheless, Dr. M'Crie's *interpolations* show that he is only less inattentive than Mr. Pearce to the decorum of the dialogue. The epithet "dear" is improper enough to give the very shade of Pascal an æsthetical shudder; nowhere, in the whole book, we think, does he employ this form of address. It is more objectionable than even Mr. Pearce's "good," and imports rather the scorn of a Scotch Presbyterian towards the Jesuit, than the semi-reverential air and respectful address of the pious Port-Royalist and the polite Frenchman. Another instance may be found in the introduction of the word "casuist:" and still another and coarser in the term "monk." To appreciate the full grossness of these interpolations, let the reader of taste only turn them into the French, or try to imagine them on the lips of Pascal.

The lesser inaccuracies of both translations may be briefly seen from a comparison of them with the following literal rendering of the passage: "O father,"—I exclaimed, quite terrified,—"all these strange people, were they Christians?" "How, Christians?" replied he. "Did I not tell you that they are the only Christians by whom we now-a-days govern Christendom?" I was shocked at this, but I suppressed the emotion, and only asked him if all these authors of his were Jesuits? "They are not," said he: "but no matter; they have written, nevertheless, many excellent things."

To this example of ill-success in rendering the delicate vein of Pascal we might add others of a different quality, but our space will hardly allow us to do more than to cite the closing paragraph of the Twelfth Provincial—a passage justly celebrated as combining the vigour of Demosthenes with the sublimity of Bossuet—and to place

beside it the two English translations, permitting our readers to judge between them:—

"Vous croyez avoir la force et l'impunité, mais je crois avoir la vérité et l'innocence. C'est une étrange et longue guerre que celle où la violence essaie d'opprimer la vérité. Tous les efforts de la violence ne peuvent affablir la vérité, et ne servent qu'à la relever davantage. Toutes les lumières de la vérité ne peuvent rien pour arrêter la violence, et ne font que l'irriter encore plus. Quand la force combat la force, la plus puissante détruit la moindre: quand on oppose les discours aux discours, ceux qui sont véritables et convaincants confondent et dissipent ceux qui n'ont que la vanité et le mensonge: mais la violence et la vérité ne peuvent rien l'une sur l'autre. Qu'on ne prétende pas de là néanmoins que les choses soient égales, car il y a cette extrême différence: que la violence n'a qu'un cours borné par l'ordre de Dieu, qui en conduit les effets à la gloire de la vérité qu'elle attaque; au lieu que la vérité subsiste éternellement, et triomphe enfin de ses ennemis, parcequ'elle est éternelle et puissant comme Dieu même."

We give first Mr. Pearce's attempt at a translation of this noble passage:—

"You think yourselves sheltered by the impunity of power; but I stand on the vantage-ground of innocence and truth! Long and persevering may be the assaults of violence against those sacred bulwarks. No efforts of rude power can overthrow truth; they serve only to enhance her lustre; while truth's most transcendent radiance avails not to arrest the course of violence, and serves but to irritate it the more. When force opposes force, the stronger overpowers the weak; when controversies are arrayed against each other, those founded on justice and reason may silence the clamours of vanity and falsehood; but violence and truth will ever wage against each other a fruitless and interminable warfare. Yea, let it not then be concluded that their forces are balanced, and their weapons tempered alike. There is between them this immeasurable difference, that violence traces a course limited and circumscribed by the resistless decree of God, which causes all its efforts to subserve the advancement of the sacred cause assailed. But truth shall remain ever unimpaired, and be victorious over all her enemies; for she is immortal and omnipotent, like the Eternal himself!"

Dr. M'Crie gives the passage as follows:—

"You think you have power and impunity on your side; and I think that I have truth and innocence on mine. It is a strange and tedious war, when violence attempts to vanquish truth. All the efforts of violence cannot weaken truth, and only serve to give it fresh vigour. All the lights of truth cannot arrest violence, and only serve to exasperate it. When force meets force, the weaker must succumb to the stronger; when argument is opposed to argument, the solid and the convincing triumph over the empty and the false; but violence and verity can make no impression on each other. Let none suppose, however, that the two are, then, equal to each other; for there is this vast difference between them, that violence has only a certain course to run, limited by the appointment of Heaven, which overrules its effects to the glory of the truth which it assails; whereas verity endures forever, and eventually triumphs over its enemies, being eternal and almighty as God himself."

The Scotch version here maintains its general and easy superiority: indeed, it can only be found fault with in regard to the nicer shadings. But Mr. Pearce's version is a villanous caricature from the first to the last syllable. We deliberately affirm that there is not a sentence

—nay, hardly a word—which does not either belie the import or blur the expression of the original. Even the phrase on which the whole argument of the passage hinges is entirely disregarded in this mock-version. *C'est une étrange et longue guerre que celle où la violence essaie d'opprimer la vérité*, says Pascal; and from this text, and particularly from the word "strange," (as Dr. M'Crie gives it, though it would, perhaps, be better "*unnatural*,") is drawn out the silvery thread whereupon is strung the series of sublime reflections that follows; but it is all lost on Mr. Pearce and on those who are so unhappy as to read his translation for Pascal. To expose, in detail, the confusions he has wrought in the passage would occupy (and occupy usefully) one half the space of this article. His book, throughout, as we have said, is full of such. The very doctrine which the original work was written to vindicate he can neither distinguish nor designate in English—fluctuating, in his translation (!) of "*grace efficace*" between the words "effective," "effectual," and "efficient;" never once, we believe, even by accident, stumbling upon the only true and proper term, "efficacious."

Are we not justified in stopping a moment to ask what *can* be the condition of British literature and criticism, when we see a profane parody like this upon the first of modern classics issue from the metropolitan press, not only unwhipped of criticism, but we believe commended by the press, and certainly patronized by the public, as may be concluded from the recent appearance of the two volumes which profess to give a translation of Faugère's edition of the *Pensées?** Of these we have seen only the second volume, containing the "Thoughts on Religion," and find it marked by the same want of discrimination that we have so signally noted in the translation of the "Provincials." But we must have done with Mr. Pearce.

On perusing the immortal fragments of Pascal brought together by M. Faugère, one circumstance has struck us at almost every page —not so much the fact itself as that we have never seen it noted by English writers, or even by French. We allude to the *plagiarisms*

* Hear what the *British Quarterly* (!) says in praise of these and of Mr. Pearce: "It would have been difficult, we dare say, upon the whole, to have found a more graceful (*sic*) and successful (*sic*) translator of these volumes than Mr. Pearce, known by his previous version of the 'Provincial Letters;' though we yet feel bound to think that he allows himself frequently far too much license in rendering the exact statements of Pascal .... Withal, however, there are throughout his pages abundant traces of accurate scholarship, pure taste (*sic*), and, above all, of a hearty admiration, and sometimes fine discernment of the beauties of Pascal; and we are free, therefore, to commend his volumes as a skilful and attractive version of the 'Thoughts.'"

made from these "Thoughts" by many of our English classics. Our space will only allow us to allude to a few examples.

Perhaps one of the tritest saws of our criticism, from Pope downwards, is the remark, that the best written books are those which everybody thinks he could produce himself; and it is a literal translation from the following phrase in Pascal's admirable *Art de Persuader:* "Les meilleurs livres sont ceux que ceux qui les lisent croient qu'ils auraient pu faire." * Dr. Johnson himself, with all his characteristically English arrogance towards the French language and literature, has, once at least, drawn from this common source. He apologises to one of his blue-stocking correspondents for the length of his letter on the ground that he "had not time to make it shorter;" and this profound *mot* is credited to him, we believe, to this day. Pascal, however, apologized at the end of the sixteenth Provincial, for its length, in the following terms: *Je n'ai fait celle-ci plus longue que parceque je n'ai pas eu le loisir de la faire plus courte.* Burke, too, had read Pascal. In the introduction to his "Sublime and Beautiful," he lays it down that a definition ought to be the *result*, not the *text*, of a discourse or treatise. For this he has been repeatedly quoted and lauded, in particular by Dugald Stewart, who has, by the way, himself often diluted into his lemonade pages a solid idea from the same uncredited source,—thus reversing the reproach of Roscommon, and showing that

> The sterling bullion of one *Gallic* line
> Drawn to *Scotch* wire, does through whole pages shine.

Pascal had made the same remark of definitions, but much more intelligently, in his fragment on Geometrical method, and had, in fact, treated the whole subject—especially the distinction between the Real and the Nominal species—in a manner which British logicians fail as yet to appreciate, if we may judge by one of the latest and far the ablest of them, Mr. John Mill.

The learned reader will probably remember in more than one of the college philosophers, who immortalized North Britain towards the end of the last century, to have seen Lord Shaftesbury credited for having made the *heart* to be a test of truth, as well as the *understanding*. Pascal had long before said: *Nous connaissons la vérité non-seulement par la raison, mais encore par le cœur.*† But we must cut short our catalogue with one wholesale instance. In Pope's Essay on Man we read:—

> "Some, sunk to beasts, find pleasure end in pain;
> Some, swell'd to gods, confess even virtue vain."

* Faugère, i, 172. † Faugère, ii, 108.

Pascal had said: "Les uns ont voulu renoncer aux passions et devenir dieux: les autres ont voulu renoncer à la raison et devenir bêtes brutes." The same idea recurs in Pope again speaking of man generally:—

> "He hangs between, in doubt to act or rest—
> In doubt to deem himself a *god* or *beast*."

The Second Epistle opens with the famous line: "The proper study of mankind is man;" but Pascal had written: *L'étude de l'homme c'est le vrai étude qui lui est propre.* In a word, the whole introduction to Pope's Second Epistle is borrowed from Pascal:* nay, we may go further and say that *most* of the finest thoughts in this celebrated Essay could be pointed out in the same teeming repository. Nor is this said in disparagement of Pope, who, at the worst, did only what has been done by Shakspeare, Byron, and all the "better brothers." † Moreover, Pope was only the receiver of the stolen goods; the theft itself was probably committed by Bolingbroke—"the master of the poet and the song,"—who was at home in the French language and literature, and who, moreover, was in France at about the date of the first publication of the *Pensées.* We had almost forgotten Junius, the most successful imitator of the "Provincials," that has yet appeared. It is, perhaps, needless to remark that not only are the plan, the tone, and the general character of the "Letters" of Junius an imitation of Pascal, but that also his best sarcasms are but the razor-cuts of the keen Frenchman, torn open into a gash, in accommodation to the thicker perception and coarser fibre of the English public.

We hope to find room, at an early date, for an extended article on Pascal.

* Cf. especially Faugère, ii, 103. Our passage here inevitably recalls Shakspeare. Pascal thus apostrophizes: "Quelle chimère est-ce donc que l'homme? Quelle nouveauté, quel monstre, quel chaos, quel sujet de contradiction, quel prodige! Juge de toutes choses, imbecile ver de terre, dépositaire du vrai, cloaque d'incertitude et d'erreur, gloire et rebut de l'univers." Shakspeare, on the other hand, gives only the bright side: "What a piece of work is man; how noble in reason; how infinite in faculties; in form and moving how express and admirable; in action, how like an angel; in apprehension, how like a God; the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals!"

† Compare the closing paragraph of the Twelfth Provincial with the noble and well-known stanza of our own Bryant. Pascal: "La vérité subsiste éternellement, et triomphe enfin de ses ennemis, parcequ'elle est éternelle et puissante comme Dieu même." Bryant:—

> "Truth, crushed to earth, will rise again,—
> The eternal years of God are hers:
> But error, wounded, writhes in pain,
> And dies, amid her worshippers."

Art. V.—THE INTERMEDIATE STATE, AND THE PUNISHMENT OF THE WICKED.

It has been recently urged with much confidence, and with some show both of argument and of critical learning, that it is the doctrine of the Bible that human beings are entirely unconscious between death and the resurrection, and that the punishment of the wicked will be annihilation. Though these errors are not new, and have before been thoroughly refuted, yet the earnestness and plausibility with which they are now propagated, seem to demand at this time a candid and thorough investigation. Most of those who hold them are materialists, denying that the soul has any existence distinct from that of the physical organization, and affirming that it is only an "attribute or result" of the latter. It will be necessary, then, as preliminary to the discussion of the topics which will be the subject of this article, to prove that the soul has an existence distinct from that of the body, and that it may have a separate existence.

I. Among the arguments for the distinct existence of the soul are these:—

1. It is distinct in its attributes and functions. Its attributes are not those of matter. The essential attributes of the latter are solidity, magnitude, and figure. The human body has these, and is therefore material. But there exist in man certain other attributes which cannot be referred to matter, and there must be a form of existence to which these pertain,—and this we call the soul. The functions of the body and those of the soul are distinct. Among the former are respiration, circulation, motion, &c.; among the latter, reasoning, conception, volition, &c.

2. The consciousness of personal identity proves the same point. During the ordinary term of human life the body is completely renovated several times, but the identity of the individual is not affected. The impressions of which he was the subject, the emotions and desires which were active in him during childhood, are fresh in the mind of the old man. The soul, which is the seat of these feelings, has not changed with the body, and he is therefore conscious that he is the identical person that he was in his childhood.

3. Again: were the soul "an attribute, accident, or result of the physical organization," we should expect that there would be more agreement than there now is between the powers and the activity of the soul and the perfection of the physical system, and that the

loss of parts of the body would, in some sense, affect the capacity of the soul. There is, doubtless, much truth in the proverb, "A sound mind in a sound body;" yet it is manifest, that there exists by no means such correspondence between the capacity and activity of the soul and the condition of the body, as there must be if the soul has no distinct existence. In this connexion it may be remarked that, if the idea which we oppose were true, it would be a reasonable inference that the soul would repose and decay with the repose and decay of the physical powers. But philosophers have in their dreams solved problems on which they had laboured in vain when awake, and, frequently, when the body is almost worn out with disease the soul has increased vigour.

4. We now refer to the teaching of Scripture on this subject, and it proves, we believe, conclusively the distinct existence of the soul. Matt. x, 28, "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul." If the soul be an attribute or result of the physical organization, having no existence distinct from that of the body, then its destruction would occur, at the same time and by the same means, with that of the body. Then men could kill the soul. 2 Cor. v, 8, "Willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord." The apostle here evidently recognises a mode of existence distinct from that of the body. It is said in reply, that in the phrase "the body," he here referred to the Church, which is called "the body of Christ" in 1 Cor. xii, 12–27, and Col. i, 18, 24. But the whole scope of the apostle's argument, from 2 Cor. iv, 10 to v, 9, shows that in the text under consideration he referred to the human body in this world, and to nothing else. The expressions "mortal flesh," (iv, 11,) "outward man," (iv, 16,) and "earthly house of this tabernacle," (v, 1,) certainly do not refer to the Church. 2 Cor. xii, 3, "Whether in the body or out of the body, I cannot tell." It is plain from this passage that the apostle believed that the soul had an existence distinct from that of the body, otherwise he would have known that he was still "in the body" when "caught up into paradise." We might refer also to Eccles. xii, 7; Micah vi, 7; Luke xxiii, 46; xxiv, 39; Acts ii, 31; vii, 59; xxiii, 8; 2 Cor. iv, 16, and to numerous other passages.

II. We proceed now to show that the soul is conscious between death and the resurrection.

1. The Bible teaches that the dead, both righteous and wicked, are conscious. This has been the nearly universal belief of Christians from the days of the apostles. They who oppose this doctrine refer to a number of passages, contained, with a single exception, in the Old Testament. While we believe that this part of the Bible, equally

with the New Testament, was the work of inspiration, and therefore authoritative, it is evident, we think, that its light is not so full and so clear as that of the New Testament on many subjects, and particularly those which refer to the future state. These were more clearly revealed when Christ "brought life and immortality to light through the gospel." The writers of the Old Testament generally speak of death as to its effects on the physical organization, and its results in relation to the concerns and interests of this world. They speak just as we frequently do of death and the grave. We admonish our fellow-men to work while the day lasts, because the night cometh, and that in the grave there is no knowledge or work; and so did those writers. But neither they nor we, in these expressions, assert anything for or against the unconsciousness of the soul. We do not believe, and we suppose that they did not believe, that the soul is buried with the body in the grave. We thus explain Job xiv, 12; Psa. xlix, 14; cxv, 17; Eccl. ix, 10, and Isa. xxxviii, 18, 19 as referring to physical death, and to the grave as the silent receptacle of the body after the soul has left it.

There are two passages, however, which, in the view of some, may require more extended examination. Psa. cxlvi, 4, "In that very day his thoughts perish," has been regarded by some as containing conclusive proof that the souls of the dead are unconscious. The argument depends entirely on the force of the word "thoughts." It may mean either the act, or the result of thinking. If used here in the former sense, it might favour the idea of the unconsciousness of the soul in the intermediate state, for we can hardly conceive of a conscious intelligent spirit without the act of thought. But the plain sense of the passage is this,—that in the day of a man's death his plans, purposes, and counsels are brought to nothing. The word used in the original fully confirms this explanation. It is רִעְיֹנֹתָיו, a plural noun derived from the verb רָעַע, "to mould, to forge; and trop. of the mind, which forms or moulds anything by revolving it"—*Gesenius*. The noun means, then, a device or counsel, the result, not the act, of thinking. The passage, therefore, proves nothing on the point in question.

Eccl. ix, 5, "For the dead know not anything," is a text, perhaps, quoted more frequently and with more confidence than any other, by those who deny the consciousness of the soul after the death of the body, but they always stop at the end of this clause. The wise man continues in these words, "neither have they any more a reward." "If the one clause is to have its most obvious import, no good reason can be urged why the other should not. Then we have the late doctrine of Dr. Walsh fully established, that death is the

final and utter end of the wicked,—that for them there is no judgment, no resurrection, no future punishment."* The concluding clause of the next verse settles the meaning of the whole passage; "neither have they any more a portion forever in anything that is done under the sun." The passage, if it proves anything in reference to the state of the soul after death, proves too much. It plainly refers to this world, and to the knowledge, interest, and portion which the dead have in its concerns.

The passage in the New Testament referred to above, is Acts ii, 34, "David is not ascended into the heavens." We do not know that it is necessary to suppose that the souls of the righteous dead, if conscious, have "ascended into the heavens." They may exist in a state of consciousness elsewhere, which sufficiently answers the argument from this passage.

There seems, then, to be but little, if any support in the Scripture to the idea of our opponents, while in favour of the contrary doctrine there are a number of decisive passages. We quote some of them:—

Matt. xvii, 3, "There appeared Moses and Elias talking with him." This is explained by the writers under review in two ways. Mr. Z. Campbell says,† "This account furnishes no proof that either Moses or Elias was ever on that mountain. The whole was a vision." He infers this from the 9th verse, "Tell the vision to no man." The word *δραμα*, here rendered "vision," might have been rendered "spectacle" or "sight;" and that this would have been the more appropriate rendering is manifest from the account, in Mark ix, 9, of what Christ said to the three disciples, "He charged them that they should tell no man what things they had seen." Mr. Storrs‡ explains the matter thus:—"As to Moses, it seems likely that he was raised from the dead, and hence at the transfiguration the kingdom of God was presented in miniature: Christ in his glory, Elias the representative of all that will be changed without dying, and Moses the representative of all that sleep in death." This is quite plausible, but an insuperable objection to this view is that it makes Moses "the first-fruits of them that slept," and "the first-born from the dead." Mr. Storrs endeavours to surmount this difficulty, by saying, "It is not true, in an absolute sense, that Christ was the first-born from the dead: for Elisha raised the widow's son. Our Lord also raised several from the dead before his resurrection." But these cases are entirely irrelevant. It is true that these persons were restored to life, after they had really died; but none of us, not even

* J. Litch, on the Doom of the Wicked.

† "Age of Gospel Light," p. 22.

‡ Bible Examiner.—The Intermediate State, No. 1, p. 10.

Mr. Storrs, will say that they were instances of the resurrection. They were not instances of that change which will come upon all the dead, and of which Christ's resurrection was truly and "in an absolute sense" the first-fruits, and the pledge. These persons, who were miraculously raised to life, had not received their incorruptible bodies, but were still liable, and in process of time again became subject, to death, and will be, with the rest of mankind, subjects of the resurrection. But Moses, if Mr. Storrs's view is correct,—that he, in the representation of the kingdom of God on Mount Tabor, was the representative of those who should be the subjects of the resurrection,—had been, previously to Christ, properly a subject of the resurrection, had received his "spiritual, glorious body:" then he, not Christ, was "the first-fruits" of them that slept. It is clear, then, that Moses, though his body had not yet been raised from the dead, was conscious at the time of the transfiguration.

Matt. xxii, 32, "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." It is said that Christ used this expression to prove not the consciousness of the soul after death, but the resurrection of the dead. It is true that Christ designed to teach the resurrection of the dead; but it is equally true that he asserted that those patriarchs, though they had been physically dead for centuries, had, when he was speaking, a conscious existence. This remark of Christ, while it silenced the Sadducees in reference to the resurrection, was also fatal to their notion that a person has no conscious existence after the death of the body, and, without doubt, Christ intended to be so understood.

The case of the rich man and Lazarus is also in point. Both had died, yet both were conscious, though the resurrection had not occurred, for the five brethren of the rich man were yet alive. It is said that this is a parable. Many commentators have, we think with good reason, considered the account in Luke xvi, 19–31 rather as a narration of what had really occurred. But if it is a parable, and even if, as Mr. Storrs,* in common with the advocates of universal salvation, explains its meaning, it refers to the relative national or moral condition and privileges of the Jews and the Gentiles after the former had rejected the Saviour, still it not merely favours but fully sustains the doctrine of the consciousness of the soul after death. Christ represents a man who had been, during his life, possessed of great wealth, and though not, it may be, immoral or vicious, yet worldly and forgetful of God; also a good man, who had been, during his life, not only deprived of temporal comforts, but

* Bible Examiner.

reduced to the most abject penury. He speaks of them both as having died, and as being conscious, the former in misery, and the latter in happiness. Whether he designed to illustrate the influence of present worldliness on the condition of man in the future state, or the past and future relative condition of Jews and Gentiles, it is certain that, in his illustration, he recognised the consciousness of the soul after death, and if this is a false idea, then Christ used falsehood to illustrate truth.

Phil. i, 21, "To die is gain." Mr. Storrs* explains this passage thus:—"'For to me to live is Christ,' (is to *magnify* Christ,) and to die is 'gain.' 'Gain,' for whom? I answer, '*for Christ;*' for thereby Christ will be magnified even more than by my life." But Paul declares that to himself death would be gain, "*To me*, to live is Christ, and to die is gain." That he refers to himself, and what would be desirable in relation to himself, is evident from the 23d and 24th verses, "I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ; which is far better. Nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you." The reason of his perplexity, of his being "in a strait betwixt two," was this, that it was for the good of the Church that he should live, but for himself it was more desirable that he should die, and more desirable, because he should then be in a state of conscious existence with Christ. With his burning zeal for Christ, and his ardent love for the Church, he would have much preferred twenty years more of usefulness to the Church and the world to the same period of *unconsciousness*.

Rev. vi, 9–11, "I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God, and for the testimony which they held: and they cried with a loud voice, saying, How long, O Lord, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth? And white robes were given unto every one of them; and it was said unto them, that they should rest yet for a little season, until their fellow-servants also and their brethren, that should be killed as they were, should be fulfilled." In endeavouring to dispose of this passage, which is so conclusively in our favour, Mr. Storrs asks, "Had those souls any conscious being at the time John saw them and heard their cry? So far from it they were not born for several hundred years after John saw them." We certainly cannot see, and we think that it will be difficult for Mr. S. to explain, what his question and answer have to do with the bearing of the text on the point at issue. It does not in the least affect the argument, whether John saw, in his vision, what was then actually taking place, or what should take place after an interval of centuries. Mr. S. proceeds to show that

* Bible Examiner.—The State of the Dead, No. 2.

the scene which John viewed was the persecution of the Christians under the Papacy, and that the cry which he heard was the utterance of their feelings, while they were yet alive, in view of the prolongation of that persecution. But John, in his vision, saw these souls as *having been slain*, as being now *at rest*, and waiting till their brethren *should be slain also*. This is evident from the answer given to them; "that they should rest yet for a little season, until their fellow-servants also and their brethren, that should be killed *as they were*, should be fulfilled." Mr. S. objects, that "to suppose the feelings expressed, under the fifth seal, by the martyrs were their feelings *after* they left this world, is to suppose that they were *not happy*, if they were *conscious*." We do not see that their words necessarily indicate unhappiness. They imply rather that those who uttered them longed for the judgment-day, when their blood should be avenged on their enemies, and they should be fully rewarded. We doubt not that the conscious souls of the righteous are anticipating with great longings "the day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God," while the wicked are waiting for it with gloomy forebodings. There is also some argument for the idea that the soul does not sleep in the dust with the body, in the fact that in the Scripture no mention is made of its resurrection, while there are many references to the resurrection of the body.

2. We have some presumptive argument for the doctrine we advocate, in what is often witnessed at the death of Christians. When the eyes of the body are closed to all earthly objects, and the ear no longer notices the affectionate words of dearest friends, the soul seems to look into the spiritual world, and to hear seraphic music, and, as she flutters awhile on the confines of time, seems to be pluming her wings for flight. Can we suppose that she sinks at once into unconsciousness? The well-known trance of Mr. Tennent affords, at least, matter of serious thought in its bearings upon this subject.

3. It is sometimes objected to this view, that if the righteous exist after death in conscious happiness, and the wicked in conscious misery, then the state of reward and punishment has commenced, and the judgment-day will be useless. We believe that the souls of the righteous, in the intermediate state, are happy, though they have not yet fully received their reward. Paul being now "absent from the body, and present with the Lord," is happy, though he has not yet received the "crown of righteousness which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give him at that day." Peter has not yet had "an entrance ministered unto him abundantly into the everlasting kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ;" but he

is not, therefore, unconscious or unhappy. So of all who have died in the faith. They have not yet been fully made "partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light," but they are happy. To be free from the cares, and trials, and uncertainty of this probationary state; from the society of wicked men, from their influence and that of the world, the flesh, and the devil; to be absolutely certain that heaven shall be their eternal home; to gaze with purified and greatly increased powers of perception on "the things which God hath prepared for them;" to unite in ascriptions of praise to God and the Lamb, will be happiness far beyond what we can experience in this world, and yet how far short of that fulness of joy which shall be theirs when the Judge shall say, "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world!" We believe also that the souls of the wicked in the intermediate state are miserable, though not, in the proper sense of the word, punished, for they have not yet received their sentence. The assurance that the door of hope is closed, that they are forever lost, and the "certain fearful looking-for of judgment and fiery indignation" will be misery. Yet it is not strictly the punishment of their sins. That will not be inflicted until they hear, from the mouth of their Judge, the terrible denunciation, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire." Of the fallen angels, mentioned in Jude 6, Mr. Storrs says, "I suppose it will be admitted by all that the fallen angels are now *tormented;* but *that* is not *the* punishment they are to have for their sins, though it is a *consequence* of their sins." We say the same of the souls of wicked men now in hell, and with as good reasons.

III. Having presented some arguments for the consciousness of the soul between death and the resurrection, we proceed to inquire, Will the souls of both the righteous and the wicked exist forever?

1. It is generally conceded that we cannot, apart from the Scriptures, prove conclusively the immortality of the soul,—neither the metaphysical nor the moral arguments in favour of its immortality amount to demonstration.

But none who believe in the Bible will admit that the soul is essentially indestructible, in such a sense that it exists by a necessity of its own nature. It exists because God created it; and he who created, can, if he will, annihilate it. After all our metaphysical and moral reasoning upon the subject, if it can be shown that the Bible clearly asserts that God will annihilate the souls of the wicked, the question will be entirely settled in the minds of all who believe that it teaches what will be the destiny, in the future state, of the righteous and the wicked.

2. We turn then to the Bible for entire assurance on the great question of the soul's immortality; and here is assurance found. Yet, in the Bible, we think, there is no passage which can be strictly said to declare that all human souls are immortal. Some have supposed that the account of the creation of the soul, given in Gen. ii, 7, contains an intimation of its immortality. If there be in this verse such an intimation, it must be found either in the expression "the Lord God .... breathed into his nostrils," or in the phrases, "breath of life," and "man became a living soul." If it be in the former phrase, then the idea is that God infused a portion of himself, of his own divinity, into the human body at that time. But few will admit this idea. Most of us think that there is more poetry than truth in the line of one of our hymns: "Our souls are his immortal breath." If the proof is sought in the phrases, "breath of life," and "living soul," these do not prove anything; for both of them are applied, in the first chapters of Genesis, to brutes, and prove the same thing concerning them. Thus the words in Gen. vii, 15, and in Gen. i, 20 rendered *life*, are the same with those rendered in Gen. ii, 7, "*a living soul.*"

2 Tim. i, 10 has been thought by some to teach the immortality of all human souls. But the word translated immortality, as well as the scope of the context, shows that it is not the continued existence of all human beings, but the glorified condition of the saints which is referred to. The word here rendered "immortality" is *ἀφθαρσία*, properly "incorruption," from *a* priv. and *φθείρω*, to corrupt, which is used and similarly translated also in Rom. ii, 7, where its meaning cannot be questioned. It is used again in 1 Cor. xv, 42, 50, 53, 54, and translated "incorruption," and refers not to the future condition of all men, but to that of the saints; also in Sept., Wisdom ii, 23, and vi, 19, 20. The adjective *ἄφθαρτος*, from which *ἀφθαρσία* is derived, is used in several places in the New Testament, referring twice to the Deity, viz. in Rom. i, 23; 1 Tim. i, 17, and in other places to the reward of the righteous, as 1 Cor. ix, 25; 1 Pet. i, 4. Both the noun and the adjective are used in a somewhat modified sense for that which is pure and true—as in Eph. vi, 24, and 1 Pet. i, 23; iii, 4. Robinson, in speaking of this text, (2 Tim. i, 10,) says, that the phrase *ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν* is used here by hendiadys for *ζωὴν ἄφθαρτον*, and that it refers to the future life and happiness of the saints. We regard the meaning of the whole passage to be this,—that Christ hath, authoritatively and more clearly than had before been done, revealed the future state of blessedness of the righteous. It is true that the pious of the earlier dispensations "desired a better country, that is, a heavenly," and "had respect unto the recompense of re-

ward;" yet there was needed a clearer and more decisive revelation of this truth, and this text affirms that Christ made such a revelation. The 9th verse plainly speaks of the followers of Christ only, and we think that it is hardly susceptible of proof that the 10th was designed to have any more comprehensive reference.

The only passages in the Bible which clearly teach the endless existence of all human beings, are those which speak of the endless happiness of the righteous and the endless misery of the wicked. If then the Bible does not teach that the punishment of the wicked shall be endless, it does not teach that they shall exist forever, and the question is resolved into this, "Shall the wicked exist forever in misery?" The Bible answers this question, we believe, affirmatively. We examine first those passages which the advocates of annihilation claim as favouring and teaching their views. Their Scripture argument is threefold. 1. That the Bible teaches that immortality is only through Christ—that they who have not faith in him, will not have immortality; 2. That the penalty of Adam's transgression was death, and that death is equivalent to extinction of being; and 3. That many passages of Scripture assert directly that the wicked will be annihilated.

1. It is said, "*that we have proof from various passages in the Bible that the immortality of the soul is only through faith in Christ.*" John x, 28, "I give unto them eternal life." 1 John v, 12, "He that hath the Son hath life," are instances. John iii, 15, 36; v, 40; xx, 31; Rom. vi, 23, and numerous other passages, are to the same purpose. If it is admitted that the phrases "*life*" in some, and "*eternal life*" in other of these passages mean only the existence of the soul forever, the question is settled. But this, the very point to be proved, is assumed by Mr. Storrs. That they mean something else, we shall show hereafter, only remarking here that the "*life*," of which John speaks in his first epistle, is something which the Christian "hath" in this world; but Mr. Storrs and others who believe with him understand it as not enjoyed till after the resurrection.* Rom. ii, 7, "Who seek for glory, and honour, and immortality," is also adduced as proof that the immortality of the soul is the portion only of the believer. We remark here that the words "immortal" and "immortality" are ambiguous. They may refer simply to the existence of the soul as continued forever; and in this sense we say that immortality pertains to all men. These words are also used to signify the freedom of both soul and body from that corruption which is the result of sin. In the latter sense we regard "immortality" as the portion only of such as are described in Rom. ii, 7.

* Storrs's Six Sermons, p. 81.

Mr. Storrs regards it as used in the former sense here, as well as in each of the four other passages in the New Testament where the word occurs. In discussing 2 Tim. i, 10, we showed from the etymology and the usus loquendi of the word *ἀφθαρσία*, here (Rom. ii, 7) rendered immortality, that it includes another idea than mere continued existence; and we might have remarked that when they would convey the idea of perpetual existence, the Greek writers, both sacred and profane, use the words *ἀθάνατος* for "immortal," and *ἀθανασία* for "immortality;" and avoid the ambiguity of which Mr. Storrs has taken advantage. Instances of this use of *ἀθανασία* are found in 1 Cor. xv, 53, 54; also in Plato's Phædrus 246, a, and in Lucian's Deorum Dialogi iv, 5. The use of this word in 1 Tim. vi, 16 is the same, and the doctrine of the passage is that Christ, declared in the 15th verse to be "King of kings and Lord of lords," alone hath immortality or perpetual existence, i. e. of himself independently; while angels and men, whether good or bad, received it from him at their creation. Ἀθάνατος is not found in the Bible, but its use is very frequent in the classic writers, and always in this sense of existence continued forever. It is plain, then, that this passage, on which so much stress is laid by the annihilationists, affords them no support.

2. It is said, "*that the penalty of Adam's transgression was 'death,' and that death is equivalent to 'extinction or cessation of being,' or annihilation.*" We remark in reply, that *death* does not mean *extinction* or *cessation of existence*, but *of life*. The whole force of this part of the Scripture argument of the advocates of annihilation depends upon the confusion of the two ideas, *existence* and *life*. Thus Mr. Storrs says, p. 19, "Die and death primarily signify to come to nothing—the extinction of life;" that is, "*extinction of life*" is the same as "*to come to nothing*" or *annihilation*. In other places he speaks of "*to cease to have existence*" and "*cessation of being*" as equivalent to the term "*death*." All will admit that the penalty of Adam's sin was "*death*;" but the point to be settled is this, Does "death" mean "extinction, or cessation of existence?" Mr. S. assumes that it does; we deny it. Life and existence are essentially different. Webster gives a good definition of the former; that it is "that state of animals and plants, or of an organized being, in which its natural functions and motions are performed." He defines the latter to be "the state of being." *Death* is the opposite of *life*, not of *existence* or *creation*. The opposite of these two is *annihilation*. As a state it is opposed to existence; as an act, to creation. Then death and annihilation are essentially different. A stone or a clod of earth exists; it has not life. Trees,

beasts, men exist; they may have life. What the essence of life is we do not know; with many of its phenomena we are acquainted. We may describe these phenomena as the performance of certain functions in consequence of an energy or tendency in that which lives. Thus a tree lives when it elaborates sap, puts forth leaves, blossoms, and fruit. When it can no longer do this, it is *dead*, though it has not ceased to *exist*. Death is not, in this case, the cessation of *existence*, but of *life*. The same is true of the life of man. We regard this as twofold, answering to the twofold distinction in our nature, that of body and soul, material and immaterial, physical and spiritual. We speak then of life, as pertaining to the body and to the soul, and the life of each is essentially distinct in functions, phenomena, and the means of extinction. That which affects and even destroys one may not affect the other. The functions of the former are those by which the physical organization is developed, matured, and renovated. The soul includes both mind and spirit, and the life of the soul is either mental or spiritual. As mind it has life, and performs the various functions of thought, emotion, volition, &c. As spirit it has also life with its appropriate functions, among which may be mentioned the appreciation of moral truth and duty, the tendency to love that which is good and pure, and especially to love God supremely, as he is supremely good and pure, the capacity of knowing, loving, serving, and living in communion with God, or rather, perhaps, the development and exercise of that capacity. When the functions of physical life have entirely ceased, the body is dead, though it still exists with all the organs to which those functions pertained. The same is true of spiritual life. When, from any cause, its functions cease, spiritual death ensues, though the soul to which those spiritual functions pertained, still exists and still has mental life. As physical life, when in perfection, is a source and means of physical enjoyment, and as intellectual life affords intellectual enjoyment, so spiritual happiness is the result of spiritual life. God designed that man should be happy in the development and exercise of the functions of spiritual life, and in its absence there can be no spiritual happiness. As man then became spiritually dead, he became miserable, and eternal death, which is only spiritual death continued forever in the future state, will always have, as its result, eternal misery. Eternal life, which is spiritual life continued through the intermediate state, and then after the reunion of the soul with its glorified body, will also have, as its result, eternal happiness. We regard the common statement, which makes eternal life and eternal happiness synonymous, and also eternal death and eternal misery, as inaccurate. The latter, in each case, is the sure result

of the former, so constantly and intimately connected, that they have been frequently confounded.

With these preliminary remarks on the nature of *death*, and particularly of *spiritual death*, which we have considered necessary as preparatory for our further discussion, we now examine the question, What was the penalty inflicted on Adam? The authors under review take the position that it was the loss of "soul-immortality," meaning thereby annihilation. There is not a passage in the Bible which sustains this position. It is claimed, indeed, by Mr. Storrs that the tree of life was the sign and the means of the continued existence of the whole man, both body and soul, and that, being excluded from that tree, he was cut off from immortality—he lost the immortality of both body and soul. That continued existence was, in some sense, dependent on access to the tree of life, seems evident from Gen. iii, 22, "Lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat and live forever." Archbishop Whately says, "That our first parents would have been exempt from death but for a change introduced into their nature at the fall, is by some persons taken for granted very hastily. The Scripture account in Genesis rather implies the contrary; namely, that they were to be preserved from death by the continual use of a certain medicine (as it may be called) appointed for that purpose,—'the fruit of the tree of life.'"*

The same idea is presented by Watson in his Institutes, and in his Sermon on "The Tree of Life." This seems a very probable view of the subject; yet we may regard access to the tree of life as of higher import, and as conferring benefits greater than this, in connexion with the life of the soul, not as the means of its continued existence, but as Watson says, in his sermon on The Tree of Life, "It was not only the means of sustaining the immortality of the body, but the pledge of spiritual life here, and of a higher and more glorious life in a future state to which man might pass, not, indeed, by death, but by translation." Excluded from the tree of life, Adam became the subject of physical death, and was cut off from the pledge and hope of that higher spiritual life in this and the future state. The latter was restored to him in the promised "Seed of the woman." If this be the import of the tree of life, and the effect of exclusion from it, there is in it no support for the idea of Mr. Storrs.

We object, also, that the penalty of the law could not have been annihilation, because that penalty was not, in any sense or degree, inflicted on Adam "in the day" of his sin. The denunciation, the penalty was, "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." Mr. Storrs thinks that he finds relief from the pressure of

* Scripture Revelations of the Future State.

this objection in the idiomatic form of expression used in the original. He says, "The penalty was not, 'In the day thou eatest thereof thou *shalt surely die,*' but as the Hebrew language has it, 'dying thou shalt die.' That very day the whole man commenced dying." Those who are but slightly acquainted with the Hebrew idiom, very well know that our version conveys precisely the meaning of the original, and Mr. Storrs's attempt to answer this objection entirely fails. The expression in the Hebrew is מוֹת תָּמוּת, the inf. abs. with fut. kal denoting certainty.* The same phrase is used by God to Abimelech, in Gen. xx, 7; by Saul to Jonathan, 1 Sam. xiv, 44; by Saul to Ahimelech, 1 Sam. xxii, 16; by Solomon to Shimei, 1 Kings ii, 37, 42,—in each of which cases it is manifest that certain and not lingering death was threatened.

We proceed to state in what, according to our view, the penalty inflicted on Adam consisted. It was in physical and spiritual death, the former affecting the body, the latter the soul as spirit; not annihilation in either case, but a cessation of their appropriate functions. First, Physical death. As we have said, we do not see why the body of Adam, constituted as our bodies now are, though not diseased, would not, even without the violation of a single natural law, in process of time have worn out, have died, but for the renovating power of the tree of life. Access to that tree having been cut off, Adam's assurance of continued physical life was destroyed. From being possessed of a perfectly healthful and vigorous physical system and the means of its perpetual renovation, he became the subject of disease and death. Physical death, then, came upon our race in view of Adam's sin, and we may regard it as a part of the penalty, though it was not at once fully inflicted. God, in his infinite love, delayed the complete infliction of this part of the penalty to give to Adam an opportunity for repentance. Adam, doubtless, understood the denunciation of the penalty to refer to physical death, and Paul teaches the same thing in 1 Cor. xv, 20, 22, where the statement in the 20th verse, that Christ is "become the first-fruits of them that slept," is conclusive proof that the death referred to in the 22d verse, "as in Adam all die," is physical death; else Christ was the subject of spiritual death and a spiritual resurrection, that is, of depravity and the new-birth. The other, and, as we believe, the chief part of the penalty, that which affected the soul, was inflicted in the day and at the very moment of Adam's sin. Some call this "original sin;" others, "native depravity;" we have called it "spiritual death." This Adam suffered in the day of his transgression. The functions of spiritual life at once ceased; his soul was at once alienated from

* Nordheimer's Heb. Gr., vol. ii, p. 200, and Stuart's Heb. Gr., p. 206.

God. This condition he transmitted to his posterity, so that his first-born was a fratricide, and within nine generations all his descendants, then on the earth, with the exception of a single family, had become so wicked that they were destroyed by the flood. In this transmitted tendency we find the only explanation of the manifest fact that young children exhibit, not perversity only, but depravity long before they can understand the nature or the results of their conduct. This death may be continued forever, and eternal death is not, then, impossible, though there be a continued conscious existence of the soul. It is an eternal alienation from God, an eternal cessation or absence of spiritual life. That alienation from God and an utter want of spiritual life was endured by Adam, and that it is the state of all who have not been quickened to new life by the instrumentality of the gospel and the agency of the Holy Ghost, is plainly taught in the Bible. Rom. v, 15, "If through the offence of one many be dead." 2 Cor. v, 14, "If one died for all, then were all dead." Col. ii, 13, "You, being dead in your sins, hath he quickened." So also Rom. v, 17; viii, 6; Ephes. ii, 1; v, 14; 1 Tim. v, 6; 1 John iii, 14; Jude 12, &c. The life which Christ came to bestow in this world and in the future world, is the opposite of spiritual death, and is referred to in the following among other passages. Rom. vi, 13, "As those that are alive from the dead." 1 John iii, 14, "We have passed from death unto life." 1 John v, 12, "He that hath the Son hath life." John v, 24, "Is passed from death unto life." That this is not a merely relative change in the prospects of the person who is its subject, as Mr. Storrs seems to argue,* but an absolute change in his present condition in respect to his feelings and tendencies, including, it is true, a change in his prospects, is evident, not only from the scope of the passages quoted, but from the experience of every converted man. We might refer to numerous other passages, which, by direct assertion or plain implication, teach that the life which was obtained for us by the death of Christ, and made ours through faith in him, is not the immortality of the soul, but a restoration to spiritual life in this world.

3. Our opponents claim that *many passages in the Bible teach the final annihilation of the wicked*, and we claim that many passages teach their endless punishment. These two ideas are plainly contradictory, and cannot both be taught in the Bible. We shall candidly, and with an earnest desire not to pervert or misinterpret any declaration of the word of God, examine both sets of passages, remarking here, that it will be important to distinguish between those which are designed to state definitely what the punishment of the

* Six Sermons, p. 81.

wicked shall be in the future world, and those which speak only in general terms of the destructive consequences of sin; and that, as we said above, while we regard the Old Testament as authority on this and other points of doctrine, we regard the teaching of the New Testament as clearer and more decisive. We notice, first, those passages which our opponents claim as favourable to their view.

They quote about thirty passages. Most of them speak of the fate of the sinner as "death," "destruction," "perishing," &c. Thus: Rom. i, 32, "They that commit such things are worthy of death." Acts iii, 23, "Every soul that will not hear that prophet shall be destroyed from among the people." 2 Pet. ii, 12, "These shall utterly perish" (original, "shall be utterly corrupted") "in their own corruption." It is plain that the two last quoted, and a large number of other passages which speak of the "destruction" and the "perishing" of the wicked, mean nothing more than the death of the wicked. The same terms are used in reference to the righteous, as Isa. lvii, 1, "The righteous perisheth." Acts ix, 21, "Is not this he" (speaking of Saul) "that destroyed them which called on this name at Jerusalem?" Also Eccles. vii, 15; Psa. lxix, 4; Job ix, 22; Luke xi, 51; xix, 47. These phrases either do not prove the annihilation of the wicked in the passages in which they are spoken of, or they do prove also the annihilation of the righteous in the passages in which they are referred to. It is plain, then, that they mean simply "death," and refer in some cases to physical death, and in some cases to spiritual and eternal death—the death of the soul, which, as we have showed, is not annihilation. The passages which use these terms, in speaking of the punishment of the wicked, include nearly all that are relied on to sustain the doctrine of annihilation, and prove nothing in reference to the duration of the punishment of the wicked. There are, however, a few passages which deserve special notice, as the form of expression used in them is somewhat stronger than those just examined. It is said of the wicked, in Psa. civ, 35, "Let the wicked be no more;" in Psa. xxxvii, 10, "Yet a little while, and the wicked shall not be;" and in Job vi, 18, "They go to nothing and perish." These expressions are equivalent to death, and refer each of them to the end of the earthly existence, as an examination of the passages will satisfy any candid inquirer. If they teach the annihilation of the wicked at all, they teach that it will take place when they leave this world, and therefore exclude the idea of the resurrection and the judgment, and prove too much, even for our opponents. Psa. xcvii, 3, "A fire goeth before him, and burneth up his enemies round about." Much stress is laid upon the phrase, "burneth up," as meaning complete annihilation. The psalmist is

here depicting what was then occurring, whereas the annihilation of the wicked, according to those who teach it, will not take place till the end of the world. The first three verses of this psalm are a highly poetic description of the destruction of God's enemies from the earth. The same remark is applicable to Psa. xxxvii, 20, which is another passage on which they very much rely. Obad. 16, "They [the heathen] shall be as though they had not been." To understand any prophecy we must consider its scope or design. The prophecy of Obadiah was delivered on account of the tyranny of the Edomites over the Jews, and in this verse it is said that the heathen should do the same against Edom, that Edom had done against Judah. This was accomplished a few years after, when the Babylonians, under Nebuchadnezzar, ravaged Idumea. In this verse it is prophesied of the Babylonians, who are meant by "the heathen," that they should be destroyed, not as individuals, but that nationally they should cease to exist—should "be as though they had not been." The same thing is prophesied against Edom in the 18th verse, "There shall not be any remaining of the house of Esau." It is plain that in these two verses there is no reference whatever to the future condition either of the Babylonians or of the Edomites as individuals, but to their utter extinction as nations; and in this sense the prediction has long since been fulfilled. The last passage is contained in Mal. iv, 1, "The day that cometh shall burn them up." This passage, doubtless, refers to the day of judgment; and if it teaches the annihilation of the wicked, it teaches also that their annihilation will take place on that day,—"the day shall burn them up." But our opponents admit that all the wicked will exist and suffer a period of time, after the day of judgment, more or less prolonged, according to their demerit. This passage, we think, teaches only that the punishment of the wicked—here, as frequently elsewhere in the Bible, represented figuratively by fire—will commence on the day of judgment, but does not teach anything concerning the duration of that punishment. Reference to the Hebrew corroborates this view of the meaning of the phrase "burn up." The word so translated here is לְהַט, pihel, from לָהַט, which, in the pihel species, according to Gesenius, means "to make burn or kindle." The same verb is used in the same species in Psa. cvi, 18, where it is said, "The flame burnt up the wicked," meaning Dathan, Abiram, and their company, upon whom fire from the Lord kindled. Numb. xvi, 35. They were not at that time annihilated, yet this text says that they were "burnt up." The same verb is used, and in the same species also, in Psa. xcvii, 3, already examined. Each of these passages teaches only that fire shall *kindle* upon the wicked.

We now turn to the passages which teach that the wicked shall exist forever, and endure punishment forever. There are many, both in the Old and the New Testament, which are, in our view, clear on this point. We shall discuss only those which seem to us to be decisive, and to admit of no other meaning. Matt. xxv, 46, "These shall go away into everlasting punishment." It is said, by our opponents, that "*everlasting*" is frequently used in the Scriptures for that which has an end, and two phrases are quoted,—"the everlasting hills," Gen. xlix, 26; and "the everlasting mountains," Hab. iii, 6. Both of these will be found, by examination, to be parts of highly poetic descriptions; and the figurative use of this word, in such a connexion, is no argument against its literal use in the simple and direct statement of the punishment of the wicked as given by our Saviour. There are a number of other passages in the Old Testament in which the same word is used for that which will endure for a great length of time, but not strictly forever. The derivation of the word עוֹלָם, rendered in these passages "everlasting," indicates that its primitive meaning is rather "a hidden or indefinite period of time." It is from the verb עָלַם, "to hide, to conceal," and it might, even without a figurative meaning, be applied to things enduring for an indefinitely long period. The word *alώνιος* is never, we think, used in the Greek of the New Testament for that which is not absolutely eternal. The only passage in which we have any doubt, in reference to its meaning, is Rom. xvi, 25, where *χρόνοις alωνίοις* is translated "since the world began." It might have been rendered "from eternity," and the sense of the whole passage would be as well sustained as with the present rendering. There are more than fifty passages in the New Testament in which this word is used, and in our version translated "everlasting" or "eternal," in which no one will dispute that its meaning is absolute perpetuity. There are five passages which are pled as instances in which these words are used for that which has an end. Rev. xiv, 6, "The everlasting gospel." We see no impropriety in applying this epithet, in its full force, to the gospel, as its doctrines will be forever true, its hopes and promises, as well as its denunciations, will be forever realized. Mark iii, 29 speaks of "eternal damnation;" Heb. v, 9, of "eternal salvation;" and Heb. ix, 12, of "eternal redemption." It is said that *damnation*, *salvation*, and *redemption* are *acts*, and, as such, must have an end. These words may, indeed, refer to *acts*, which have an end, but, even in this sense, the epithet eternal would not be inappropriate, as their results will continue forever. But these words may also mean *states of being*, and are so used in the Scriptures; as such they may be continued forever.

The remaining passage is Heb. vi, 2, where "eternal judgment" is spoken of. It is said that *judgment* is completed on the great day, and therefore cannot be eternal in the sense of endless duration. If the word *judgment* is to be here referred to the act of judgment, the epithet *eternal*, in its strict sense, would not be inappropriate, as the results of that act will be forever experienced. But the word *judgment* is used, in the Scriptures and elsewhere, for the infliction of judgment, and is then equivalent to punishment, e. g. Gal. v, 10. The word *κρίμα*, here rendered *judgment*, is often translated damnation, and condemnation, in some cases implying, and in others directly referring to, punishment. There is no doubt that it may be taken in this sense here, and the rendering might with propriety have been everlasting punishment. This verse, then, is not an exception to the ordinary use, and that for which we contend, of the word *αἰώνιος*, but an instance of it, and is in our favour. In these five passages, then, as well as in more than fifty others which are undisputed, "eternal" and "everlasting" mean that which has no end. If this text (Matt. xxv, 46) is an exception, it is the only exception. Again: it is contrary to all fair principles of interpretation that a word should be used in the same sentence, and in contrasting the destinies of two classes of persons, in one case implying duration really endless, and, in the other, duration not really endless, without some intimation that the meaning of the word, in the two clauses, is not the same. These considerations are to us conclusive, and Mr. Dobney * feels the force of them, for he says, (pp. 213, 214,) "Let it be cheerfully granted, then, that the word everlasting must, in each part of this text, be understood in its largest, widest sense, as denoting an absolute eternity. Let this be conceded. And I not only concede it—I affirm it and believe it." But he reconciles it with his doctrine of annihilation in this way. He first claims that "this text is perpetually misquoted. Our Lord is represented as saying, 'These shall go away into everlasting misery,' (or torment;) whereas he says nothing of the kind. I affirm as strongly as any man that the wicked shall go away into everlasting punishment; but then I deem it my duty to say, as our Lord said, 'punishment.' I have not the presumption to correct *his phraseology* in order to harmonize it with my notions. But orthodoxy does this. And it is only by substituting 'misery' or 'torment' for 'punishment,' that this text can be made to support the popular doctrine." One would think, from reading the above passage, that Christ spoke the English language, for "punishment" is said to be "his phraseology." Is Mr. D. ignorant of the fact that "punishment" is only a secondary

* An English advocate of the doctrine of annihilation.

meaning of the word κόλασις; and that suffering, or torment, comes nearer to its primitive meaning, which is "cutting, or pruning," from κολάζω, "to mutilate, to prune;" and that the same word is rendered torment in 1 John iv, 18, "Because fear hath torment?" Having shown, as he thinks, (but incorrectly,) that everlasting punishment, and not torment, is referred to, he proceeds to prove that there may be everlasting punishment where there is not even everlasting consciousness, as follows: "It must also be allowed that in case God should really destroy the incorrigible, literally destroy them, so that they forever cease to be, this infliction of death would be punishment. * * * * And then surely a complete, and final, and irretrievable destruction, a destruction which is forever, is to all intents an everlasting destruction. And so everlasting destruction would be everlasting punishment." (P. 215.) We answer, that so far from such a destruction as Mr. D. speaks of—namely, a blotting out of existence, the putting an end to all thought, and feeling, and consciousness—being a punishment, it would be a release from punishment. Such a destruction would be an unspeakable boon to the angels now "reserved in everlasting chains under darkness," and to wicked men, at any stage of their suffering in hell, whether before or after the judgment-day. Were self-destruction possible, they would avail themselves of it at once. We utterly deny the propriety of the use of the term everlasting in such a case; for certainly that punishment from which there is escape, either by a change of condition or by a cessation of existence, has an end—it is not everlasting. This passage, then, is we think, conclusive, and did no other declaration of the word of God unequivocally teach the endless punishment of the wicked, we might rest the doctrine on this single text.

Mark iii, 29, "Is in danger of eternal damnation;" and Heb. vi, 2, "Eternal judgment," punishment, have been already noticed, and are clear proofs.

Matthew xxv, 41, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." What this fire is we learn from Rev. xx, 10, "And the devil, that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night forever and ever." It is said that the beast and false prophet are symbolical beings, and therefore the lake of fire and brimstone are symbolical, and have no real existence. This may be; and it is not of the least consequence to our argument whether the fire and brimstone are literal or not. If symbolical, they symbolize suffering, and that continued *forever and ever*, which expression is never used for any thing less than endless duration.

Mark ix, 48, 49, "Where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched. For every one shall be salted with fire." In answering the argument from this passage one says,—these are figurative expressions. We admit that there are used here vivid figures; but figures are designed to convey ideas, and the idea illustrated by these is clearly eternal suffering. This is clear from the parallel passage in Matthew xviii, 8, where the expression is "everlasting fire." Another says that the fire shall not be quenched till the object cast into it is consumed. But this is adding to the word of God, and comes not very appropriately from those who claim to be literalists, and who object so strongly to any departure in others from the literal statement of the Scripture, or addition to it. The 49th verse plainly shows that those cast into the unquenchable fire will be, not consumed by it, but preserved in it. "For every one shall be salted with fire, and [or even as] every sacrifice shall be salted with salt." As flesh, designed for sacrifices, is to be salted to preserve it from putrefaction, so "every one shall be salted [that is, preserved] with fire."

2 Thess. i, 9, "Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord." Mr. Storrs explains this passage thus, (speaking of sinners,)—"Too filthy to be in the sight of a holy God, as they eternally must be if immortal, he destroys them out of his presence, purifies his universe from the filth of sin and sinners." He considers the phrase "the presence of the Lord," as used in its widest sense, viz., that of ubiquity. Mr. Dobney, commenting on the same passage, shows very conclusively that it is not to be taken thus:—"The phrase, 'the presence of the Lord,' was a very ancient one; as was also another and often equivalent one, 'the glory of the Lord,' by which was generally meant that bright luminous cloud of overwhelming splendour which we commonly call the 'Shekinah,' the well-known *symbol of the divine presence.* Sometimes fire is represented as coming forth from this 'presence of the Lord,' or from 'the glory,' either to consume the sacrifice, as in Lev. ix, 23, 24, or to punish the guilty, as in Lev. x, 2; Numb. xvi, 19–35. Remembering, then, the manner in which the Jewish writers used these two phrases, we see with what perfect propriety the apostle could use the peculiar language of the text, to denote that the destruction of the ungodly would be caused by an all-devouring agency, proceeding forth from the Judge, who comes with the 'glory' of the Father." The literal rendering of the original, we think, shows that "the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power" is referred to, as it shall be displayed on the judgment-day. The original is "Οἵτινες δίκην τίσουσιν, ὄλεθρον αἰώνιον, ἀπὸ

προσώπου τοῦ Κυρίου," &c., and we translate it thus, "Who shall suffer [literally, "pay"] the penalty, eternal ruin, from the presence of the Lord," &c. The 10th verse shows that this event is to take place on the judgment-day. It cannot, then, be the annihilation of the wicked, even according to Mr. Storrs, who thinks that the wicked will be annihilated at different periods, more or less remote from the judgment-day, in proportion to the heinousness of their sins. Mr. Dobney attempts, in connexion of this verse, as in reference to Matt. xxv, 46, to reconcile annihilation with everlasting destruction and punishment,—but unsatisfactorily, as we have shown.

Psa. xlix, 8; Isa. xxxiii, 14; Jer. xvii, 4; Dan. xii, 2, and numerous passages from the New Testament, in addition to those already examined, might be discussed in their bearings upon this subject. But our limits will not permit this, and the passages above commented on are conclusive.

The points discussed in this paper are exciting much interest in some parts of the country. The views of the writers noticed have been embraced and promulged by a large number of persons who have been very zealous in disseminating them, and with considerable success. They refer constantly and, often, very plausibly to the Scriptures, in sustaining their views, and it has seemed to us desirable that all who believe in the doctrines of the gospel as of the highest importance in their influence on human conduct and destiny, should be prepared to meet these men, particularly on the Scriptural ground of those doctrines. If the thoughts and arguments contained in this paper shall be of service to any in giving direction or assistance in their inquiries, it will have accomplished its purpose. It might have been well to have enlarged on some points, and to have developed more fully several of the arguments; but it has been our wish to present in one view, and within the limits of a single article, the truths of the consciousness of the dead in the intermediate state, and the eternal existence of all human beings after the judgment-day. These points are so connected, that such a presentation seemed desirable. We have accordingly suggested the course of argument which, in our view, will be most effective, with the hope that we may at least assist the investigations of those interested in these subjects.

Art. VI.—HUNGARY AND KOSSUTH.

Hungary and Kossuth: or, an American Exposition of the late Hungarian Revolution. By Rev. B. F. Tefft, D. D. 12mo., pp. 378. Philadelphia and New-Orleans: John Ball. 1852.

Though the author of this book observes in his preface, that "it is not intended to be either a history of Hungary, or a biography of Kossuth," yet its title is not calculated to excite more curiosity than its contents will gratify. With the exception, perhaps, of the interior of Africa, Paraguay under the rule of Dr. Francia, or the empire of Japan, but few countries were less known to the world than Hungary before her recent struggle for freedom. With an enslaved press, and beleaguered about by a circumvallation of despotism nearly a thousand miles broad, her sighings for freedom were unheard, and her sufferings comparatively unknown. But in her recent conflict the tread of armies shook the continent; and when Hungary, solitary and alone, set the battle in array against the combined energies of European despotism, the jar of the collision roused the nations and challenged the attention of the world.

It is not wonderful, however, that the merits of this Hungarian movement have not been well or generally understood. A rigid censorship of the press within the Austrian dominions, and the anti-liberal instincts of neighbouring nations, with the labours of hireling pens in England, if not in America, have combined to suppress the truth, and give currency to the absurd charge, that the Hungarian revolution was a war of races, originating in the desire of the Magyars to usurp the supremacy and oppress, if not enslave, the other tribes. The luminous pages of Dr. Tefft expose this stale slander, and show it to be an invention of Austrian manufacture. Before proceeding with an examination of the work itself, it is due to the author to state, that it is not a hastily-prepared production, written with the hope that it might float into public favour upon the current of Kossuth's personal popularity, but the result of patient and laborious research, commenced in 1842, and continued for several years; and that the book was in press before it was known that the world-renowned Magyar would visit this country. We shall now proceed to give a summary of its contents.

Hungary and Transylvania were the Pannonia and Dacia of the ancients. The original inhabitants were probably the old Cimmerians mentioned in Greek and Latin fables. Posidonius makes them of Cimbric or German origin. About the year 640 before

Christ a Scythian tribe conquered Dacia, the present Transylvania, and dispossessed the vanquished people. The conquerors, in turn, were themselves subdued by the Sarmatians, about the middle of the first century of the Christian era. Pannonia, the present Hungary, was then a Roman province, having been subdued by Tiberius in the reign of the emperor Augustus; and the wild Sarmatians, flushed with recent conquest, soon pushed their incursions within the territories of Rome, when, coming in contact with the disciplined legions of the empire, they were driven back with great slaughter. The war was prosecuted at intervals with varying success for fifty years, until, at the beginning of the second century, the emperor Trajan achieved a final conquest of the country, and Dacia became a Roman province.

For a hundred and fifty years the wealth and taste of the empire were lavished upon this new possession, and fortifications were built, cities founded, roads made, and bridges erected, in so substantial a manner that their remains are still visible to the modern traveller. At this period the Goths, another race of barbarians, issuing from the vast plains beyond the Vistula, and along the shores of the Baltic, appeared on the borders of Dacia and Pannonia. Attracted by the evidences of wealth and luxury spread out before them, they swept down from the slopes of the Carpathians, and entering Dacia with chivalrous gallantry, encountered and overwhelmed the enervated legions of Rome, and this beautiful province was thenceforth as a jewel shorn from the diadem of the Cæsars. A century and a quarter terminated the reign of the Goths, who were vanquished by the Huns, a hideous race, born on the confines of far-distant China, where they had established an empire whose history can be traced backwards for fourteen centuries. Before the military prowess of these fierce Tartar hordes, the throne of China had trembled, and the terror of their arms had spread from the Yellow Sea to the confines of Europe. Overmatched at length by the policy and strength of the Chinese monarchs, the Tartar empire fell, a part of the people remaining the subjects of China, while the more independent and brave seized their arms and began a long and perilous emigration to the west. Before reaching a desirable place of settlement, this multitude separated into two divisions, one of which halted on the banks of the Upper Volga, while the other settled on the fruitful plains of Sogdiana, between the Aral and the Caspian, where, under the name of Magyars, they resided for more than five hundred years, and through a politic amalgamation with the Caucasian tribes around them, lost most of their Tartar characteristics, and assumed the appearance and manners of the European races.

Meanwhile the first division of the emigrating Tartars, dissatisfied with the sterility of their country, again took up the line of march in search of a milder climate and more generous soil. They finally reached the Carpathians, and under the leadership of the brave Rugilas, and afterwards of the renowned Attila, rushed through the mountain passes to the easy conquest of the Goths, and fixed by their complete success the name of Hungary upon the conquered country.

After the separation of the great body of the emigrating Tartars, the two divisions entirely lost sight of each other for more than five centuries. In the interim, the Magyars of the Caspian had grown numerous and powerful, while their brethren of Hungary had undergone many misfortunes, by which their power had been completely broken. Towards the close of the ninth century, the Magyars sent out a colony to the west, to explore the country and seek a more desirable theatre of action for the nation. This colony reached the Carpathians, and crossing into Hungary found themselves opposed by a mixed race of people made up of unknown tribes who came out to dispute their progress. They had reached the land of their kindred, but their relationship could not be discovered. The contest that ensued was of short duration,—the Magyar valour was invincible, and Huns, Goths, Sarmatians, and Scythians, under the general name of Sclaves, submitted to their sway, and the Magyar rule commenced in Hungary. From that period the Magyar has been the ruling race in Hungary; and the present people of that name are the descendants of the emigrants from the Caspian, and remotely from the northern frontiers of China.

The Magyars have always been passionately attached to civil liberty, and when they were about to set out in search of a new home, a general assembly of the people was called, in which the political wants of the nation were discussed, and a constitution adopted containing the essential elements of republicanism. They also elected a head chief or commander, styled Oberhaupt or Duke; and under the command of Almos they set out upon their wanderings. Like Moses, Almos was not permitted to enter the promised land, but Arpad, his son and successor, led the Magyar host in its attack upon Hungary, and after the conquest divided the land among his followers. Arpad, and three of his successors, ruled over a prosperous and happy people, and during this period no essential changes were made in the Hungarian constitution; but the renowned St. Stephen, who succeeded, having become a convert to Christianity, was persuaded by the pope to usurp the regal title. The new convert listened to the advice of the infallible successor of St. Peter, and against the violent opposition of his pagan subjects he commenced and com-

pleted a thorough revision of the Hungarian constitution. Still the monarchy established by Stephen, though hereditary, was a limited one, in which the prerogatives of the crown and the rights of the subject were strictly and clearly defined.

The first connexion of the house of Hapsburg with the Hungarian government, occurred toward the close of the 13th century, when Andrew the Third, of Hungary, married Agnes, the daughter of Albert and granddaughter of the celebrated Rodolph. Andrew was the last male representative of the house of Almos, and in his death, at the beginning of the 14th century, the dynasty of Almos became extinct. Charles Robert, duke of Anjou, who was grandson, on the female side, of a predecessor of Andrew, was elevated to the throne. He was followed by eight successors, who traced their descent in precisely the same way from the line of Hungarian kings. His granddaughter Maria, who succeeded her father Louis the Great, married Sigismund of Germany, who became, in right of his wife, King of Hungary, and by election Emperor of Germany. Elizabeth, daughter of Sigismund and Maria, married Albert of Austria, who was elected King of Hungary in right of his wife, and afterwards made Emperor of Germany.

Matthias Corvinus, elevated to the throne in 1457, was the first of the Hungarian kings who had no connexion with the line of her ancient sovereigns. Uladislaus, the second of that name, succeeded Matthias, and toward the close of his life connected his country to the house of Hapsburg by a double union. He married his son to Maria, and his daughter to Ferdinand, the grandchildren of Maximilian of Austria, and thus prepared the way for the subjugation of his country. His son Louis II., husband of Maria, who succeeded, having been killed in battle, in 1525, Ferdinand, the husband of his sister, laid claim to the vacant throne; but the Hungarian national assembly, which had strongly opposed the matrimonial alliance with Austria, refused to acknowledge his claims, and elevated John Zapolya to the throne by a unanimous election. The pretensions of Ferdinand were not, however, to be so easily set aside. The widow of the late king was his sister, and Charles V., Emperor of Germany, was his brother, and both were disposed, and the latter quite able, to give him efficient support. Ferdinand invaded Hungary, defeated Zapolya in a decisive battle, and was elected and acknowledged king. A long and bloody war succeeded between the rival monarchs, which ended in a treaty, styled the "peace of Grosswardein," by which it was stipulated that hostilities should cease, and that the country should be divided between them, Ferdinand ruling in the west, and Zapolya in the east, of Hungary. It was also agreed that

should Zapolya die during the armistice, he should be succeeded by his son Sigismund. Zapolya died in 1540, and Ferdinand in 1564, leaving the western division of the country to his son, and acknowledging the right of Sigismund to the eastern part. Old causes of contention were revived, and long years of strife and bloodshed followed. Thousands of the best citizens of Hungary, who had risen to defend their constitutional liberties, were slaughtered in a war of extermination, until finally Leopold I., toward the close of the 16th century, compelled the trembling diet to proclaim his son Joseph *hereditary* King of Hungary. The brutal and infamous means employed to crush the nation and accomplish this end exceed in savage barbarity the bloodiest acts of the buccaneers of the Spanish Main. A stern determination to crush, by any means, the Hungarian people, and blot out, if possible, even the remembrance of their constitution, was visible in the policy of the Austrian cabinet until the reign of Ferdinand II. In the mean time Luther had lighted the torch of the Reformation, and the doctrines proclaimed by him and his coadjutors had found an eager welcome among the Magyars of Hungary, and a new element was thus added to the causes of contention that had so long agitated and distressed this unhappy country. During this reign Rome commenced against the doomed Magyars one of the bloodiest persecutions recorded in the annals of Protestantism. The gloomy and relentless Ferdinand let loose all the hellish enginery of Jesuitism and the unbridled cruelty and licentiousness of a mercenary soldiery upon the helpless Protestants of Hungary. Devastation, ruin, despair, and death filled the land. Long-suffering finally came to an end, and once more the Magyar spirit was in a flame; seizing their arms in their fierce indignation they dashed like the resistless avalanche upon the imperial armies, overwhelmed and drove them beyond the frontiers of the kingdom. The thoroughly-aroused Hungarians halted not until they reached Vienna, where they encountered the Austrian commander-in-chief, and vanquished his army under the walls of that city. The national assembly having been convened, solemnly proceeded to depose Ferdinand, who they declared had forfeited all pretensions to the throne by violating his coronation oath and trampling upon their constitution. By equally-solemn action, the vacancy occasioned by the deposition of Ferdinand was filled by the election of Gabriel Bethlen to the throne, who for nine years was acknowledged and obeyed as their legal sovereign. Upon the death of Bethlen, in 1629, the suffrages of the nation bestowed the crown of St. Stephen upon George Rákoczy. Thus was the line of the Hapsburg succession broken by the lawful authority of the

people. No sooner had the Hungarian army retired from Vienna, than Ferdinand began to devise means to recover his lost power. Satisfied of his own inability to reconquer Hungary, he sent a petition to the King of Spain, in which he assured his Catholic majesty that the conflict with Hungary was a holy war, undertaken and prosecuted for the honour of the true faith, and for the suppression of heresy, and concluded by begging assistance in men and money. The Spanish king embarked heartily in his cause, and the solicited assistance was granted; but the Hungarians were so well united, and showed so stern a countenance, that Ferdinand prudently acknowledged the new sovereign, and concluded with him a truce for twenty years. During the "Thirty years' war" Austria found herself occupied with concerns of even deeper moment than the subjugation of Hungary, and the Magyars, comparatively unmolested, were suffered to maintain their independence; but the peace of Westphalia again secured to the emperor the possession of this much-coveted country. The Jesuits again commenced their machinations against the Protestant portion of the population, employing but too successfully all their influence to induce the emperor to relight the fires of persecution in Hungary. The frightful scenes of other years were renewed, until the patience of the people was exhausted and an abortive effort made to throw off the yoke of Austria. The outbreak was charged by the Jesuits upon the Protestant teachers, and the whole weight of Austrian indignation was felt by this class. Churches and schoolhouses were pulled down by soldiers aided by Popish mobs, and two hundred and fifty Protestant clergymen were sold as galley slaves to the government of Naples at fifty crowns apiece.

Once more the Hungarians rose upon their persecutors, and under the conduct of Emeric Tökölyi, both a statesman and a soldier, succeeded in driving the Austrians from the land. Again the thunder of Hungarian cannon was heard in Vienna, and at the gates of that city, vanquished and craven Austria granted to Hungary all that she demanded. The emperor relinquished his pretended hereditary right to the throne, published a general amnesty, and, in a word, did anything and everything his Hungarian subjects desired. His reward was a truce of six months granted him by the brave Tökölyi. During the continuance of this truce, the emperor sent a secret envoy to the Turks to beg assistance, a whining petition for the same purpose to the German empire, and still an ambassador to Poland with the same object in view; and then despairing of relief fled from his own court. His intrigues, however, were not in vain. Sobieski, King of Poland, the greatest general of his age, deceived by his lying representations, came to his aid; and the Turks, for a reward,

treacherously siezed Tökölyi, and sent him in chains to Constantinople. The revolution was suppressed, and Hungary again a fettered captive.

The latest effort of Hungary to throw off the Austrian yoke previous to the recent revolution, occurred in the early part of the 18th century. Its specific object was to oppose the claim maintained by Leopold I. of hereditary right to the crown. The leader in this movement was Francis Leopold Rákoczy, the history of whose achievements possesses all the charms of romance. A profound statesman, a gallant soldier, a brilliant and persuasive orator, forced to seek assistance for his bleeding country in foreign lands—returning again to renew the conflict,—his whole history has been so accurately reproduced in that of Kossuth, that the Austrians themselves have compared the latter to the former. The same lofty integrity, the same far-seeing statesmanship, the same passionate and undying devotion to Hungary, the same burning zeal in her cause that characterize the noble Kossuth, marked the character of the earlier patriot.

The effort of the chivalrous Rákoczy, though for a time splendidly successful, issued in disaster and ruin, and a night of gloom gathered over the Magyar land to be disturbed only in our own times.

From the connexion of the house of Hapsburg with Hungary, the leading object of Austria appears to have been the utter extinction of the Magyar nationality. This is transparent in her policy for successive centuries. The civil and religious privileges of the Hungarians were first destroyed, then an exterminating warfare was waged against their language and national manners and customs. The use of the Hungarian language was prohibited in legal assemblies and courts of justice, and even mechanics and peasants, who were acquainted with no other tongue, were made liable to extraordinary penalties for employing it even in their own families or in the ordinary transaction of business: so that literally a large proportion of the people were condemned to be mute, or employ the language of signs. The dress of the people, from the magnate to the peasant, was made the subject of frequent imperial edicts, and to turn down the shirt collar, to wear the Hungarian frock coat, or the Magyar *kalpag*, or native cap, was made a crime, to be punished by the judges with penalties usually enforced against heinous or capital offences.

By the constitution her diet or national assembly was the source of all law to Hungary. It was the prerogative of the crown to summon this body, but the law required that it should be convoked at least once in three years. Finding this body sometimes rather refractory, from the disposition of its members to exercise the right

of free speech and action, it had been the policy of the Austrian sovereigns to omit calling it together, and to govern the nation by imperial edicts. This artifice had been practised so habitually that at the death of Francis I., in 1832, the Hungarian constitution was in effect a dead letter, and as unregarded by the Austrian ministry as if it had never existed.

Wishing to settle such questions as might affect the succession, Francis, in anticipation of his demise, had, after a long interval,* summoned a diet, which met the very year of his death. The spirit of reform was paramount in this diet,—the lower house having a large majority of democratic members, and several of the leading minds of the nation imbued with the same political faith, occupying seats in the house of magnates. Thus constituted, the diet had no sooner assembled than it began to agitate bold and radical reforms, which at once brought it into collision with Ferdinand, the successor of Francis. The first measure discussed in the diet was the emancipation of the peasants, who from time immemorial had been a disfranchised and degraded race. Dr. Tefft states that a law to this effect was passed; but Paget, who was present and heard the debates, says that after it had been eleven times passed by the lower house, and eleven times rejected by the magnates, it was finally put off to another diet.† This diet, however, unquestionably did much to elevate the nation. The language of the country was restored, a national literary institution established, extensive internal improvements projected, and generally a course of legislation pursued in accordance with the progress of the age, and the spirit of enlightened liberty. These measures, so well calculated to sap the foundation of absolutism in Hungary, were of course steadily opposed by the Austrian government. In vain, however, was everything done that the most consummate political craft, unrestrained by any regard for common decency or honour, could devise to quench the rising spirit of republicanism among the Hungarians. After a stormy session the diet was finally prorogued, and another summoned in 1835.

The French revolution of 1830, and the expulsion from France of the elder branch of the Bourbons; the Polish revolution, and the final conquest of Warsaw by Russia, thus extinguishing the last hope of the free in that unhappy land; the separation of Belgium from Holland, with the concurrent circumstances, had sown broadcast

* Dr. Tefft observes, in a foot note, "Paget says (Hungary and Transylvania, vol. i, p. 129) *twenty-five years;* but the traveller is in a mistake. There were diets in 1807, 1812, and 1825." If Dr. T. will refer to the London edition of Paget, vol. i, p. 160, John Murray, 1850, he will find the diet of 1825 noticed.

† Vide Paget, vol. i, p. 163.

among the nations the seeds of a harvest that had sprung up rapidly and was now fast approaching maturity. The spirit of inquiry abroad among the masses, foreshadowed coming disturbance. Berlin and Vienna possessed the elements of conflagration. The period seemed propitious for Hungary, and the majority of the diet of 1835 were made of sterner stuff than to quail in the hour of emergency.

The Baron Wesselényi Miklos, a man of rare intellectual abilities, of great energy of character, and gifted with the most impassioned eloquence, was the acknowledged leader of the opposition or democratic party in the house of magnates. Failing to check the current of reform by other means, Austria sought to intimidate the liberal party by arresting its leader. Dr. Tefft states that he was arrested for words spoken in debate in the diet on the question of granting equal rights before the law to the oppressed peasantry; but other, and apparently impartial, authorities affirm that the language for which he was arrested was used by him at a county-meeting, held at Szatmar, in Eastern Hungary, when the electors were met to frame instructions for their deputies as to the vote they should give in the diet on this important question. In the course of his speech he alluded to the policy so universally charged against the Austrian government in Hungary—of exciting the nobles against the peasants, and the peasants against the nobles; of teaching each to regard the other as their natural enemies, in order by division to weaken both, and thus strengthen herself—and he stigmatized in strong terms so treacherous a policy, the ultimate object of which could only be the degradation and slavery of the whole country.* Where the words were spoken is a question of slight importance, for that Austria was ready with the strong hand to suppress the freedom of debate in the diet is conclusively proved in the case of Balogh, the member for Bárs. This deputy having declared in his place "that he should not consider himself guilty of any great crime if he adopted the very words of Wesselényi," he was included in the prosecution, and both were put on trial for their lives.

In the diet of 1832, Kossuth first appears in the moving panorama of Hungarian history. He was not a regular member, but sat as the proxy of an absent deputy, and as such was only charged with very subordinate duties. His rare abilities, however, early made him distinguished in the councils of the nation, and he soon undertook to publish a report of the debates and proceedings of the diet,

* Paget, vol. i, p. 31. An Austrian account falsely states that the Baron was arrested for addressing a regiment of hussars in the Austrian service and telling them that their allegiance was at an end.

that their constituents might have some idea of how the representatives performed their duty. The government, in spite of the law of Hungary and of the protests of the diet, prohibited the publication of the debates, and enforced a rigid censorship of the press. For a while Kossuth evaded the prohibition by having his sheet lithographed; but his press being seized, he resorted to the expedient of employing an immense number of secretaries, and issuing his paper in manuscript.

In the arrest of Wesselényi, the Austrian cabinet had made a false step which they would gladly have retraced. Private overtures were made to him, promising him immediate pardon if he would ask for it: but they were indignantly rejected. The trial of the impeachment therefore went on, and as the judges were the creatures of Ferdinand, the Baron was condemned, and sentenced to an imprisonment of three years in a dungeon.

Nearly at the same time Kossuth with others was arrested, and as there was no law in the civil code by which they could be punished, it was suspended in their case, and they were tried by a court-martial and sentenced to different periods of imprisonment. Kossuth, who had been imprisoned for some time preceding his trial, was sentenced to protracted * confinement in one of the dungeons of the fortress of Old Buda.

In 1841 the prisoners were released; but when they issued from confinement, their condition revealed the cruel and relentless character of the treatment they had received. The secrets of their prison-house were written upon their persons. The firm constitution of Kossuth was irrecoverably broken; three of his companions were languishing in the last stages of mortal disease, another was a maniac, and the great Wesselényi was entirely blind. The imprisonment of Kossuth added immeasurably to his popularity. He was universally regarded as a martyr to the liberty of the press, and in 1846 a petition for the abolition of the censorship was circulated in Vienna, and when presented to the emperor, a few days after its appearance, it had the signatures of more than two thousand well-known citizens of the capital.

No sooner had Wesselényi and Kossuth rallied in some measure from the effects of their imprisonment, than they went forward with renewed vigour in the cause of Hungarian emancipation. The former traversed the kingdom, addressing the people, and proclaiming in words of wondrous eloquence the doctrines of liberty and re-

* We have been unable to determine precisely the term of Kossuth's imprisonment. Paget says he was condemned to four years' confinement, in addition to two years passed in prison previous to trial.

publicanism. He was everywhere received with idolatrous enthusiasm, the people carried the blind old man from place to place in their arms, and the land soon rocked with the throes of coming revolution. Kossuth zealously seconded the efforts of Wesselényi through the columns of a political newspaper, the editorship of which he had undertaken.

Notwithstanding the combined influence of the gold and power of Austria, Kossuth was elected a member of the diet of 1847, for the city of Pesth. His power as a debater, his profound sagacity as a statesman, and his personal popularity, had already given him a commanding position in the diet, when both Vienna and Presburg were electrified by the news of the French revolution of February, 1848. On the succeeding day he delivered his memorable speech on the finances and the state of the monarchy, concluding with proposing an "Address to the Throne," urging a series of important and radical reforms. He finished his speech with these significant words:—"I prophesy it in the feeling of my truthful and faithful loyalty to the royal house, that that man will be the second founder of the house of Hapsburg who will reform the system of government on a constitutional basis, and re-establish the throne of his house on the liberty of his people."

Strange as it may appear, the first overt act in the Hungarian revolution took place in Vienna. Kossuth's demand for a constitutional government had found an echo in the hearts of the patriots of the capital, and men had begun to exercise the inalienable rights of freemen without molestation. Political questions were freely discussed, the public press began to speak with boldness; and before a single prohibitory statute had been repealed, the people had practically won a constitution. Desirous that the rights they had asserted should be confirmed by the government, on the 13th of March a vast multitude of the citizens of Vienna moved in procession to the palace, to request from the emperor his express confirmation of the newly-recovered rights they had assumed and begun to exercise. The imbecile monarch dared not meet his long-oppressed people, but trembling with unmanly fears, he fled in terror and consternation, and concealed himself in some subterranean passages in the rear of the palace. No persuasions could induce him to leave his burrow, but from his concealment he treated with his subjects, and granted them all they required. Thus peaceably was the revolution achieved which overthrew Metternich and his cabinet, and secured to the people the liberty of the press, trial by jury, and the promise of a liberal constitution.

When the news of these movements reached the diet, a deputation

was appointed, with Kossuth at its head, to proceed at once to Vienna and wait upon the emperor, with the demand for the restoration of the Hungarian constitution and the creation of a separate cabinet for Hungary, to be composed of Hungarians, and whose sole business should be to attend to the affairs of that country alone. The emperor yielded every demand, and the cabinet was created upon the spot. In this cabinet Kossuth held the post of minister of finance, the position of difficulty and importance.

On the 16th of March the constitution granted by the emperor was duly proclaimed by authority, amid the wildest demonstrations of joy. By this constitution the emperor confirmed his recent concessions, and gave the right to the citizens to bear arms and organize a national guard. The whole series of reformatory measures received the royal signature on the 11th of April. The new Austrian cabinet madly endeavouring to wrest from the people their newly-won privileges, the national guard rose in rebellion, and the emperor fled from his capital to Innspruck, amid the mountains of the Tyrol, leaving his cabinet to their fate. At the risk of being tedious, we venture to place on record the very language in which Ferdinand confirmed and sanctioned these changes: "Having graciously listened to, and graciously granted the prayers of our beloved and faithful dignitaries of the Church and of the State, magnates and nobles of Hungary and its dependencies, WE ordain that the before-mentioned laws be registered in these presents, word for word; and as we consider these laws and their entire contents, both separately and collectively, fitting and suitable, we give them our consent and approbation. In exercise of our royal will, we have accepted, adopted, approved, and sanctioned them, assuring at the same time our faithful states, that we will respect the said laws, and cause them to be respected by our faithful subjects."

Having thus far lost ground at every step in the struggle, the Hapsburg government resorted to the policy of weakening the opposition by exciting jealousies between the different races of the Hungarian population. Emissaries were scattered through the country, who succeeded in stirring up a spirit of hostility among the Servians and Croatians against the Hungarian ministry. This hostility soon assumed a warlike aspect, and under the Baron Jellachich, who had just been appointed Ban or Lord of Croatia, it broke out into open revolt. The emperor when appealed to solemnly denounced the course of the Ban, summoned him to appear before him to answer for his conduct, and when he refused, gravely deposed him from office and declared him a public enemy. It clearly appears, however, that Jellachich was acting under express, though secret, instructions

from the Austrian cabinet. Perfectly acquainted with the nature of the game he was directed to play, he continued, notwithstanding his deposition, to hold his power, and soon let loose his soldiers upon the inhabitants of southern Hungary. The diet, though beginning to suspect the duplicity of the monarch, waited for his authority before despatching a small force which speedily defeated and drove the invaders from the country. A word of explanation may reveal the secret of Austria's duplicity. Without compulsion she would concede nothing to liberal principles; under the pressure of adverse circumstances she would yield anything to the just demands of her people, with the mental resolution of reclaiming her concessions whenever she could do it with safety. All her concessions to Hungary, and to her own people, were made when her prospects in Italy were threatening and gloomy. The King of Sardinia, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the King of the Two Sicilies had broken with her, and circumstances seemed to threaten still greater disasters. Austria was then willing on any terms to conciliate Hungary; but when the imperial forces had been victorious in Italy, and a great reaction had taken place throughout Europe in opposition to democracy, the time had come for Austria to throw off her disguise and act openly against Hungary. Early in September, Jellachich, having visited the emperor at Innspruck, was openly acknowledged by the court, and the decree of deposition revoked. He at once invaded Hungary, but was met by the Magyars, defeated and driven out of the country in less than three weeks. The Magyars had in truth opposed the Ban by the express command of their king, who at the same time, as Emperor of Austria, had secretly authorized the Ban to invade Hungary; and when the Magyars had defeated and expelled him from their territory, the monarch at once published an edict dissolving the Hungarian diet, ordering the Magyar forces to obey Jellachich as their commander, proclaiming martial law in Hungary, and appointing the Ban military dictator of the country!

By this crowning act the duplicity of Austria was demonstrated, and after another vain effort to avoid the appeal to arms by negotiation, the diet declared itself permanent, and appointed Kossuth governor and president of the committee of safety. Driven to the wall, with no alternative but resistance or utter extinction, Hungary resolved to maintain her position by arms. Austria was prepared for the conflict. The position of affairs in Italy made it safe to withdraw a large part of her army from that country and concentrate her strength for the approaching strife with Hungary. After a brief but bloody struggle in Vienna, the patriots in that city were put down, and leaving the axe and the halter to complete the work, the Austrian

army, 120,000 strong, moved upon Presburg. A significant event transpired at this stage of the drama. The imperial cabinet felt themselves embarrassed by the frequent pledges, proclamations, and oaths by which the emperor had bound himself to observe and respect the recent laws passed by the national assembly, and to maintain, preserve, and defend the liberties and integrity of Hungary. These pledges could not be denied, and they would not be forgotten by the world. To avoid this embarrassment, Ferdinand was induced to resign the sceptre, and his brother Francis Charles, the next heir to the throne, renouncing his right in behalf of his son, Francis Joseph, a youth of nineteen, he was immediately proclaimed. The new emperor, it was pretended, was not bound by the pledges of his predecessor, and as he refused the coronation oath imposed upon her kings by the constitution of Hungary, no obstacles in the opinion of the unscrupulous Austrian cabinet now prevented the progress of events.

We cannot detail, nor is it necessary, the particular events of the war. Hungary was unprepared with an army or military supplies, but she had Kossuth. In the perilous emergency this extraordinary man exhibited marvellous energy and resources. Gathering around him Bem, Görgey, Dembinski, Damjanitch, Perczel, Klapka, and other distinguished men, many of whom were gray-haired veterans bearing the scars of a hundred fights, an army was soon levied and prepared to take the field. For a time every encounter was a victory for the imperialists, every step a triumph. Pesth was abandoned, and the seat of government removed to Debreczen. Here, amid gloom and disaster, the strong Magyar heart spoke to the world in the declaration of Hungarian independence, which was proclaimed on the 19th of April, 1849. Then followed a series of splendid manœuvres and brilliant actions universally disastrous to the Austrians. On every point they were driven back in total discomfiture and rout, until, at the beginning of May, the Hungarian territory was unpolluted by a hostile foot, save a few garrisons, which were so surrounded and shut up that they could not escape.

The result of this campaign and the general prospects of the war at its close may be inferred from the Austrian manifesto of the first of May, announcing the intervention of Russia:—"The insurrection in Hungary," it states, "had grown to such an extent that the emperor had been induced to appeal to the assistance of his majesty the czar of all the Russias, who generously and readily granted it to a most satisfactory extent." The immense Austro-Russian army, under the command of the infamous Haynau, moved upon Hungary early in June. The conflict, though short, was desperate and sanguinary;

but the issue could not be doubtful when the gigantic weight of Russia was thrown into the scale against exhausted Hungary.

A brief campaign dispersed or destroyed the Hungarian forces, and at the end of three months Kossuth resigned his power into the hands of Görgey, and Görgey surrendered himself and his army of 24,000 men to the Russians. This ended the war.

Kossuth and a few faithful companions fled towards the Turkish frontier, and sought the protection and hospitality of the Sultan. Russia and Austria peremptorily demanded the surrender of the fugitives, Count Sturmer, the Austrian minister at Constantinople, and M. de Titoff, the Russian envoy, both declaring that the escape of a single refugee would in the estimation of their governments constitute a *casus belli*. The Porte had at first returned a decided negative to the demand for their surrender, but wavered when this menacing language was employed by the representatives of the two powers. Though the English government had shown a warm sympathy for Austria during her troubles, and even given her assurances of support, yet at this juncture Sir Stratford Canning, the British minister at Constantinople, took a noble stand in behalf of the hunted fugitives, and strongly urged the Sublime Porte inflexibly to adhere to its refusal to deliver them up. The course of the British minister was fully sanctioned by the government at home, and Lord Palmerston distinctly advised Sir Stratford Canning, that should Russia and Austria attempt to enforce their demand, Great Britain would afford to the Turkish government "the moral and, if necessary, the material aid it required." And to be prepared for prompt action, in case of emergency, Sir William Parker, commanding in the Mediterranean, was ordered "to proceed at once to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, in order to take his squadron up to Constantinople, should he be invited by the Sultan through Sir Stratford Canning." The English admiral was also directed to receive on board one of the vessels of his squadron any of the fugitives whom Turkey might desire to place beyond the reach of their enemies.

While the Turkish government hesitated, and it was yet uncertain what might be her final reply to the demands of Russia and Austria, Kossuth and his companions were advised to abjure the Christian religion, and by taking the turban avail themselves of the fundamental law of Moslemism, that any fugitive embracing the Mohammedan faith might claim the protection of the government. Bem, Kmetty, Stein, and others, yielded to the temptation and embraced Islamism; but Kossuth adhered to his integrity. His noble answer, when interrogated, won for him, in our estimation, the greenest leaf in the chaplet that binds his brow, and should be recorded as an illustration

of the martyr spirit that animates him. "My answer," said he, "does not admit of hesitation. Between death and shame the choice can neither be dubious nor difficult. Governor of Hungary, and elected to that high place by the confidence of fifteen millions of my countrymen, I know well what I owe to my country, even in exile. Even as a private individual I have an honorable path to pursue. Though once the governor of a generous people I leave no inheritance to my children. They shall at least bear an unsullied name. God's will be done. I am prepared to die!"

The interposition of our own government, earnestly seconded by that of Great Britain, procured the release of Kossuth and his companions in exile, and early in September of last year he embarked on board the steam frigate Mississippi, which had been placed at his disposal by the President of the United States, and left the Dardanelles for America. His subsequent career need not be traced; it is known and read of all men.

It is due to Dr. Tefft to state, that to him belongs the honour of originating the first public movement made in this country to procure the release of the imprisoned refugees. Having expressed his views of the duty of our government in their behalf, in a lecture delivered first in Cincinnati, and afterwards in Springfield, the Doctor was invited by both houses of the General Assembly of Ohio to lecture on the same subject before them at Columbus, the capital of the State. He complied; and the lecture made so favourable an impression both upon the citizens of Columbus and the General Assembly of Ohio, that in a public meeting the former passed a resolution and forwarded it to the seat of the federal government, urging upon the president of the United States and upon Congress the duty of exercising "their utmost power to procure the liberation of Kossuth, his associates and family, at the earliest practicable period." Resolutions embracing the same sentiments were passed in the General Assembly, after a brilliant discussion of the subject, and also forwarded to the president, and to their senators and representatives in the Congress of the United States. In addition to thus setting in motion the plan that has resulted in the release of the illustrious exile from captivity, Dr. Tefft has now given to the world a historical work, that will add materially to his own literary fame, while it will embalm the noble Magyar forever in the memories and hearts of patriots and Christians.

The discreet reserve maintained by Kossuth during his imprisonment in Turkey, encouraged among his enemies the belief that upon his release he would retire to private life, hopeless of the emancipation of his country; and under this impression the tongue of slander

was for a time comparatively silent. But no sooner did he tread the deck of the Mississippi, under the protection of our flag, and begin to foreshadow his future plans, than the minions of absolutism took the alarm, and instantly every engine was set in motion to counteract his efforts, by stigmatizing his character. An attempt was made to prejudice the mind of the American people against him, by subsidizing our agents abroad, and circulating under their sanction unfavourable representations of his character and conduct, which, scattered broadcast by the press, should shut the hearts of the masses against his appeals, and deprive him of public sympathy. It is not affirmed that money was directly employed to accomplish this purpose, but it can scarcely be doubted that influences of some sort so operated upon our representatives in the Mediterranean, that they forgot the respect due to themselves, as well as their duty to their country, and the guest it delighted to honour. It is mortifying to contemplate the picture, and contrast the cowardly malice of civilians, the weakness of naval officers, with the noble self-respect of the distinguished exile.

From that moment the most reckless and unscrupulous assaults have been made upon Kossuth. From motives not difficult to discern, several of his colleagues in the Hungarian ministry have been induced to unite in this onset. He is represented by one as the champion of aristocratic oppression, and denounced by another as a socialist; a third party accuses him of being vacillating and unprincipled, while a fourth condemns him as self-willed and ungovernable.

Thus the charges of his enemies against him neutralize each other; and while absolutism employs ribald pens to destroy him, and hounds upon his footsteps the red republican and the haughty aristocrat, who once bowed to the might of his genius, the object of their vituperation prosecutes his self-denying mission, and demonstrates, by his undying devotion to his beloved Hungary, the sincerity of his motives and the integrity of his heart. Meanwhile the people of the father land gaze with mingled admiration and hope upon his luminous pathway among the nations, identifying the future prosperity of Hungary with his success, and refusing to despair while he outrides the tempest and bears aloft the torch of liberty.

At the hazard of wearying the patience of our readers we append a few remarks, for which we could not find an earlier place without disturbing the current of the narrative. It will have been seen that the right of the Magyars to their country was that of conquest, confirmed by undisturbed possession from time immemorial; the right of Ferdinand to the throne was not hereditary, but was conferred

by the suffrages of the people; the right of the present sovereign is the right of conquest alone, as he has never been elected by the Hungarian people, or taken the coronation oath. When the Magyars, in obedience to the commands of their king, had taken arms against the Ban of Croatia, and driven him beyond the boundaries of their territory, their king in effect deserted the cause he had sworn to defend, joined the Ban with an Austrian army, and openly invaded their country. In consequence of this cruel and unlawful invasion, and because the young emperor openly refused to receive the crown of St. Stephen in the legal manner, by swearing to maintain the separateness and integrity of the nation, Hungary declared herself independent. She was fully justified in her action.*

Görgey bears the stigma of a traitor. Our author has consigned him to infamy; and Kossuth himself says, "I raised Görgey from the dust that he might earn for himself immortal renown and for his country freedom; and he became Hungary's cowardly executioner." The surrender of himself and his army at Villagos, is regarded as proof of his treason. But we are not entirely satisfied with the evidence. That he more than once differed in opinion with Kossuth on important questions is indisputable, and that he sometimes followed his own judgment in opposition to the governor's wishes, is equally clear; but that he ever disobeyed his express order, or failed to put forth his best efforts for the salvation of Hungary, or violated his allegiance, does not appear. With respect to the final surrender it would seem that Görgey only yielded when resistance had become entirely hopeless; and it has never been considered treasonable in an officer to make the best terms in his power with his enemy, when he can no longer contend with the faintest hope of success. We are inclined to think that the towering ambition and military pride of Görgey, which could not brook a superior in Kossuth, a civilian, as governor, shortened the war; but with the immense power of Russia banded with Austria, arrayed against Hungary single-handed and alone, the conflict could have had but one termination.

When the Austrian army was driven out of Hungary, in April, 1849, it is understood that Kossuth advised an advance upon Vienna, arguing that the capture of the capital, and the consequent rallying of the patriots in Austria, would place Hungary in a position to

* "As soon as he attacks the constitution of the State, the prince breaks the contract which bound the people to him; the people become free by the act of the sovereign, and see nothing in him but an usurper who would load them with oppression. This truth is acknowledged by every sensible writer, whose pen is not enslaved by fear or rendered venal by interest."—*Vattel's Law of Nations*, b. i, ch. iv, § 51.

dictate terms to her adversary. But in this plan he was opposed by Görgey, who declined to advance with the strong fortification of Buda in his rear. The army, of whom Görgey was the idol, sustained him in his views, and Kossuth seems to have wanted either the inclination or the power to control him. It is affirmed that Görgey never possessed the entire confidence of Kossuth, and that even his appointment to the chief command was more a matter of necessity than of choice. In making up an impartial verdict, however, it must not be forgotten that at the crisis of Hungarian affairs, Kossuth resigned his own unlimited authority into the hands of Görgey, an act difficult to reconcile with his own integrity, had he then believed him to be a traitor. The world has, however, passed judgment upon Görgey, and though his sentence seems to us severe, it is probably irreversible.

The future of Hungary, and indeed of all Europe, appears gloomy and cheerless. A sad and disheartening reaction has taken place since the commencement of the Hungarian struggle. If Russian bayonets do not bristle along the Rhine or on the boulevards of Paris, the prediction of Napoleon has become history, and continental Europe is Cossack. The history of Russia is a history of aggression. Sprung from a band of Baltic pirates, unknown to the world till about the middle of the ninth century, she at this moment rules directly with an iron sceptre over the half of Europe, the whole of northern Asia and north-western America, countries equal in extent to one-seventh of the habitable globe, while the insidious power of her diplomacy is paramount in all the courts of continental Europe.

Light and darkness are not more antagonistic than the principles of democracy and absolutism. In the end the one must extinguish the other. We talk of the progress of free opinions, and amuse ourselves with visions of a better time coming, while a night of absolutism is settling upon the nations. It becomes those who have yet the forms of liberty to ponder well the lessons of history, and learn wisdom and duty from the experience of the past. "A prudent man foreseeth the evil and hideth himself, but the simple pass on and are punished."

While the noble Kossuth pleads with a prophet's voice among us the cause of his bleeding country, and the eyes of patriot millions look for sympathy and aid to constitutional England and free America, they will be recreant to the law of nations,* to humanity and to God, if they hesitate to say to the onward tide of absolutism, "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no farther, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed!"

* Vide Vattel, Book ii, ch. i, § 1, 2, 3, 4.

Art. VII.—METHODIST PREACHING.

In accordance with an intimation in our January number, we resume the subject expressed in the above title, premising, as we then did, that our remarks shall be of the freest character. If they should even be deemed desultory we shall not complain, for our "ideal" of a periodical work like this, supposes its interest to consist in the variety and collocation of its articles—their variety as well of style as of topics.

In our description of the "Early Methodist Preaching," we enumerated among its characteristics, its *extempore address*, its *aim at direct results*, its *style*, and its *topics*,—the latter as being almost exclusively the vital, elementary truths of revelation. The results, the really magnificent results, of this preaching, as witnessed throughout our continent, are, we alleged, proofs of its potency and appropriateness to the times. It was not only correlative to the times, but also and especially to the ecclesiastical system of Methodism—its ministerial methods—its incessant labours, its itinerancy, &c. It was a product jointly of the times and the system. While we contended that its essential excellencies should be retained, we admitted that our own times require some modifications of it. What are these modifications? What, in more general terms, should be the *characteristics* and *methods* of our preaching in these times? This question expresses, precisely enough, the subject of the present paper, extending it beyond the homiletic traits enumerated to the ecclesiastical peculiarities which justified them. The current demands for improvement take in both, especially in our large cities; and in examining these demands we must have reference to both.

To those who have read our preceding article on the subject, we need not say that our predilections for the "primitive school of Methodist preaching" are strong: we shall not dissemble, that in admitting the expediency of its modification, in some portions of the Church, and in describing what that modification should be, we shall be as much inclined to guard its old honour and excellencies as to concede to the proposed improvements. We shall attempt rather to show the limits than the urgency of the latter. We confess a conviction of the importance of some of these improvements, and yet no little jealousy of them; and our ensuing remarks will show the influence of both sentiments—perhaps in a juster appreciation of the subject than we could otherwise entertain. But to the question.

These times require, we think, more *varied preaching* than was

usual among our primitive "Itinerants,"—a more thorough treatment of the details of Christian doctrines and duties. The recency of the nation, the wide dispersion of its population, the necessarily long journies of our early preachers, and the absence of thoroughly organized or permanent congregations, except in few places, led them to confine their discourses to comparatively few topics; these, as we have said, were the most essential, the vital truths of the gospel, answering summarily the question, "What shall I do to be saved?" They entered a town or village, "sounded the alarm," held up the cross, and were gone. They were wise in this course—that which was most needed was said, though many things were left unsaid. They were driving, in all haste, the ploughshare through the fallow ground, and scattering broadcast the good seed; the time for minuter work in the field, for dressing and training the crop, would come they knew, and God would, meanwhile, they believed, raise up appropriate labourers for that necessity. They were the *Legio Fulminea*—the "Thundering Legion,"—whose duty it was to break and scatter the ranks of the enemy, and to pursue and shout onward in the rout, scaling ramparts, penetrating fastnesses, but leaving the spoils of the conquered field to the "reserve" which were yet in the distance. The latter have come up; they have gathered the trophies, and now devolves upon us the task of defining the conquered territory, of fortifying it against future losses, of dividing, subdividing, and rightly governing its provinces.

There is not mere rhetoric, but historic truthfulness in this view of the heroic mission of our primitive ministry. At the risk of a slight but not irrelevant digression, let us glance here a little further at its character, for its character is no insignificant illustration of its preaching. In all sobermindedness we do not believe its chivalry, and even romance, are rivalled in modern history, at least since the days of the Crusades. These stalwart evangelists were abroad, thundering through the land, when the storms of the Revolution were coming on, and while they were bursting over the country. Those who know intimately the early Methodist history, will doubt whether Washington and the *sans culottes* army of Valley Forge, endured more hardships, or exhibited more heroic characteristics than Asbury and his invincible itinerant cohorts. Asbury himself exceeded Wesley in his annual travels. His tour almost yearly was from Maine to Georgia, by way of the West, when a few log-cabins only dotted Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee; when not one Methodist chapel, if indeed any other Protestant church, was to be seen beyond the Alleghanies; and when he had to be escorted from one settlement or fortified post to another by armed men. He averaged

six thousand miles a year, mostly on horseback, on recent roads or through forests. During forty-five years of ministerial labour in this country his travels were equal to the circumference of the globe every four years! And yet this glorious old bishop, who ordained more men to the ministry than any Prelatical Bench of the nation,* and who in his personal traits and achievements, as well as the later results of his labours, is unquestionably the first ecclesiastical personage in the American annals, has never yet been *named* in any of our national histories, and probably has not been known to our Ramsays, Bancrofts, Hildreths, or Goodriches.

And he was but a representative of the itinerant ministry of that day. Those great times produced such great men as Lee, who journied with two horses, one for a relay when the other should be fatigued; Pickering, with a district that swept from the extremity of Cape Cod, around to the centre of Vermont; Hedding, travelling through the storms of winter, from Long-Island Sound to the Canada line; Soule, braving the Borean terrors of the Maine forests; Bangs, Coate, Worster, Sawyer, Dunham, Coleman, traversing the wildernesses of Canada; M'Coombs, Merwin, Roszel, Sharp, Boehm, Wells, Cooper, Garrettson, Mills, Smith, and hundreds of others, who incessantly went to and fro "crying aloud and sparing not," through the Middle States; Dunwody, Peirce, Dougherty, Kennedy, Capers, and many others, equally noble, the heroes of Southern Methodism. And then there were the staunch men of oak, the sons of thunder, in the West, McKendree, Roberts, Young, Blackman, Burke, Larkin, Quin, Finley, Cartwright, Collins, &c., the leaders of the memorable old "Western Conference," when it was the only one beyond the mountains—when it reached from *Detroit to Natchez*, and each of its districts comprised about two of the modern Western Conferences. Alas for the man whose heart does not palpitate at the contemplation of such men, and such indomitable energy! Theirs was a hardihood, a heroism which old Sparta would have applauded with the clash of her shields as cymbals. The success of Methodism has often been referred to as a marvel—a knowledge of the men who composed its first ministry explains the mystery.

Our history—not merely our Church history, but our national history—has an obligation yet to discharge towards these men. They laid the moral foundations of most of the American States. They

* He presided in 224 annual conferences, and consecrated 4,000 ordinations. He began his labours with 600 members in the American Methodist Church, and fell at last at the head of 212,000, who have since multiplied to a million and a quarter.

marched in the van of emigration bearing aloft the cross, and they were almost its only standard-bearers throughout the first and most trying period of our ultramontane history. When the tide of population began to sweep down the Western declivities of the Alleghanies, and during the forming period of the States of the Mississippi Valley, they were in motion everywhere, evangelizing the rude masses, and averting barbarism from the land.

Such were the men, such the circumstances of our first ministry. And under such circumstances it was wise, we repeat, to limit, as they did, the range of their pulpit instruction, to those topics which were most adapted to the immediate salvation of their hearers. Beyond these topics they did occasionally venture, as we have admitted, but in very restricted excursions—in sallies against some of the polemical dogmas of the day—Calvinism especially—or in defence of some of the important practical ordinances of the gospel; their preaching however consisted of few though powerful sermons, and aggregately, of the truths which relate to personal conversion.

These truths we must continue to reiterate, but not so *exclusively* as did our fathers. Inevitable circumstances—nay, very salutary circumstances—have intervened, and require of us a greater amplitude and detail of religious instruction, in the older sections of the country at least. Our cause has consolidated. There is scarcely a town or village in the denser sections of the nation where the Methodist chapel does not appear. Nearly all our church edifices in the Atlantic States have been erected or renovated within twenty-five years;* they contain now stated congregations and thoroughly organized societies, who, habitually assembling within their walls, cannot be edified, much less satisfied, with repetitious exhortations on obvious or familiar topics. The preciousness of such topics will redeem them, to a great extent, from the defects of the preacher; but there may be an intolerable excess of a good thing. Men cannot subsist on honey or milk, but need other, though it be inferior nourishment. A man can live better habitually on the varied constituents of the potato than on pure wheat. The axe may be necessary to fell the forest or cleave the rough mass, but more delicate and varied implements are needed to work it into useful wares.

But before entering into the details of the modification thus rendered necessary, let us define it more carefully; for we would not extend it too far, and there is more danger, we fear, of exaggerating than

* This has been a work of vast enterprise and expenditure; could its statistics be presented, we doubt not they would exhibit the liberality of the denomination in a striking light, and relieve greatly the unfavourable comparison sometimes made between its other philanthropic contributions and those of sister sects.

of depreciating it. The glory of the primitive school of Methodist preaching has not yet departed; its day, its necessity still exist, and must continue to exist on our own continent *for generations*.

First. It is needed still to no inconsiderable extent in our Atlantic communities. Our old and mature Churches may require the proposed improvements, but all around them are moral wastes, which, instead of being recovered, are absolutely growing more desert year by year. Let us not think, then, that we require in our large cities only educated and polished preachers and restricted modes of labour; these we must have, but we yet need there, as much if not more than in the first days of Methodism, voices "crying in the wilderness, prepare ye the way of the Lord"—men who will "circuit" these cities as did our fathers, and, like them, preach continually and powerfully the primary truths of religion among the neglected populace.

We would emphasize the assertion, for there is, we fear, a tendency to a very opposite opinion. The city mission is a happy idea of the times, especially as an adjunct of a local pastorate; but we do not consider it, as usually conducted, an appropriate appendage to our own system, or anything like an adequate substitute for our old *city itinerancy*. Our first preachers did in cities precisely the work which city missionaries now do, and with how much greater success! All our urban Methodism sprang from their labours. They erected their first batteries in the neglected and impoverished localities. They gathered converts into their small bands, without the invidious association of a "mission to the poor." They offered themselves to the poor; the poor virtually, though informally, accepted them as their *chosen* pastors, and spontaneously formed a tacit contract, a self-respectful habit of supporting them. These first "city missions" are now become wealthy and intelligent "city stations," and require indeed a modified ministerial treatment; but if the field for such labours remains—nay, is tenfold more ample and urgent—why is not the old ministerial apparatus, with all its powerful attributes, as appropriate as ever? Where is the reason for a change? not assuredly in the moral condition of our suburban masses; not in the necessary ministerial regimen, for certainly none could be more appropriate than the pastoral methods of our fathers. *All the original conditions of Methodist ministerial labour exist, we assert, in our present large communities, only vastly augmented.* What then, we again ask, has occasioned the change in our ministerial treatment of the poor? What else than the *illusion* which has come over us with our growing prosperity, that because our Churches, originally founded among the poor, have outgrown their first humble spheres,

therefore Methodism has necessarily changed its relative position to the destitute populace; it must now look chiefly after the comfort and intelligent treatment of its well-housed children, and send out only an occasional messenger to pick up the foundlings of the highway and convey them into a neighbouring shelter ycleped "a city mission chapel." This is not right; this is recreance to the old chivalric honour of our ministry—it is recreance to the honour of our Master in heaven.

The figure, like most figures, may be somewhat an hyperbole, for, thanks be to God, we still to a great extent preach the gospel to the poor; but is not this change coming over us? Is it not one of the most serious liabilities of our cause? While our intelligent city Churches are demanding a different class of preachers and an improved style of preaching, and also important changes in our ministerial methods, let them be reminded that the vast destitute masses around them require still the old methods, the old class of preachers and preaching—that none, since the apostolic missionaries, could more precisely meet their deplorable necessities.

The *Legio Fulminea*, whose task we said it was to break the ranks and take the ramparts of the enemy, are, then, still needed even here in our cities, where our own fortifications display their completed proportions and victorious flags; for even here many a hostile fortress stands in juxtaposition with our defences; the very citadel is yet in possession of the foe, in most of our large cities, and the circumvallations—the suburbs—are crowded with his forces. We assert that all these demoralized regions should be invaded by "Itinerant Methodist Preachers," as the cities were at first. Methodist families would be found scattered among them, as then; these would take in the evangelist and open their doors for preaching, as then; converts would multiply, as then; lay assistants would rise up, classes and societies would be formed, and these would grow into self-supporting Churches, as then. Why not? Is there any imaginable reason why not now as well as then? And is there not for such labours now a great vantage ground, which our fathers had not, in the aid which our existing Churches can afford them?

The above has been the historical process of Methodism from the beginning—it is the process of its present success in its foreign mission fields, and is precisely what is needed in this its domestic missionary work. An English friend, who is familiar with the Wesleyan Missions, gives, in a communication to the writer, the following summary view of their *modus operandi*:—

"As soon as any number of his hearers 'receive the truth in the love of it,' our missionary unites them into a 'class' under the care of a 'leader.' And thus

the hedge of discipline is placed round this cultured spot, and assistance and sympathy given to these 'babes in Christ.' The pastoral care is divided with these leaders, who watch over the little flocks in the absence of the missionary. Then, as soon as divine grace has drawn forth and sanctified the abilities of his converts, the missionary finds out who among them have an aptitude for exhortation; he licenses them to 'exhort;' afterwards, if they improve, to 'preach;' then a 'circuit plan' is formed, a place provided where a congregation can meet on the Sabbath, and there this 'native preacher' in his turn, 'of the ability which God giveth,' speaks to the people 'all the words of this life.' Such preachers multiply and improve, while the missionary directs their studies, and oversees the whole machinery—preachers, leaders, classes, schools, prayer-meetings, &c., until often such circuits rise, like those in the Friendly Isles, Africa, &c., to have 20 or 30 chapels, and 50 to 100 'local ministers.' Some of these chapels, too, are able to accommodate from 1,500 to 2,000 persons; most of them are well filled, and some of them are crowded. Of the 8,226 'assistants' there are only 843 who are *salaried*, and these give their whole time to the work, as catechists, school teachers, &c. The rest being chiefly local preachers, interpreters, &c., give their services gratuitously." *

Now this we affirm has been the universal process of Methodism until within a few years; and what we complain of is, that the Churches founded by precisely such means, now that they have become isolated and self-supporting, are generally repudiating this effective plan as obsolete, though all their adjacent fields—nay, the very interjacent fields; often, indeed, their immediate precincts—demand just such energetic labours, and demand them, in most of our large cities, *more urgently than ever before.* "Exhorters" are hardly known among us any more; the "Local Ministry" is falling into comparative disuse; "Itinerancy" in our cities is being abandoned: meanwhile, the populace are perishing in their moral destitution, and we obtrude upon them an occasional "city missionary" as an apology for the sacrifice of our once powerful and still needed methods.

We contend, then, that whatever improvements we may propose in our standard of ministerial qualification and modes of ministerial labour, we should still have, even here in our ripest fields, a large proportion of just such labours in and out of the pulpit, as pertained to the first school of Methodist preachers—its same summary themes, the same direct style, *ad populum*, the same aim at immediate results, the same effective methods.

Second. We shall still need them also, to a great extent, in that large field, the "*Provincias Internas*" of our territory, lying between the Atlantic margin and the later settlements of the West where the "circuit system" is not yet generally broken into stations. Throughout this vast region Methodism is flourishing, and will, in less than twenty-five years, be consolidated into great strength. Its ministry is now improving, but might still faster improve as the

* Rev. William Butler, now of New-England Conference.

increasing supply of candidates allows a more discriminating choice. Taking it as a whole, it is the noblest sphere for the advancement of both our ministry and Churches now occupied by us; but our primitive ministerial characteristics and methods are still appropriate to it, and could not advantageously be modified, except by such improvements as should not essentially change them.

Third. The vast unsettled portions of the continent, from the Mississippi to the Pacific, and from the Great Slave Lake to the Gulf of California, will afford them a magnificent theatre during as long a period, at least, as the Church has yet recorded in its annals.

We must be permitted to delay on this part of our subject, though in no wise proportionately to its importance.

There are several considerations respecting the settlement of this grand area which should be borne in mind. The population which is to flood it, and is now pouring into it, will be *more largely foreign* than were the earlier migrations of the country. A very considerable proportion of the first settlers in the new territories were from the older States, and they carried with them better notions of religion and morals, than come to us now from Europe. He must be of dull vision who does not see the moral liabilities to the nation which must arise from this transposition of demoralized European masses into the almost boundless region mentioned. More than half of the continent is now, and quite suddenly opening into a stupendous moral battle-field, and men, as mighty as those we have described, are needed for the conflict.

Again: this population will, for some years, probably be as much, if not more *dispersed* than were the earlier emigrations, and will therefore require our primitive ministerial modes of energetic labour and travel to supply it. It no longer maintains a frontier margin, continually thickening though extending, but throws itself into detached positions, anywhere and everywhere, so it but finds local attractions. The north-west territories, the Great Salt Lake, Texas, New-Mexico, Oregon, California—these are its diverse resorts. The whole western extent of the continent is in fine thrown open, the last barrier has fallen,* and the European masses are entering it with a rush. Our "itinerants" must, in old style, with horse and saddle-bags, rush on with them, mingling in the mighty melée, and bearing up in its very front, if possible, the ensign of the cross.

Were these stupendous migrations to be more consolidated,

* The greatest impediment, the prepossession of the ground by the Indians, may be said to be about removed. There are now about 418,000 in all our limits; most of these are the enervated aborigines of our Pacific and Mexican domains; the estimated number inhabiting our "unexplored territories" is but 30,000.

some formidable moral consequences would result, but they would be more accessible to our moral agencies. Coincident, however, with the accessions to our population have been the extensions of our territorial area, and the coming multitudes are still to be scattered as have been the preceding hordes. In 1790, the number of persons to the square mile in the United States was nine; twenty years later, it was precisely the same, though the aggregate population had increased from five millions to more than seven. In 1840, we had fourteen to the square mile, but the ratio diminished to twelve —a gain of only *three* since 1790. According to intimations from the census office the ratio has fallen still lower, to seven and twenty-two hundredths, giving one and three quarters *less* to the square mile than in 1790! The statistics of this article, throughout, were prepared before the details of the late census appeared. The latter will, probably, as in this instance, add to the force of our reasoning. And can we predict that this coincident extension of territory and people will not continue, thus giving a general dispersion to our population, and an almost indefinite missionary field for the Christian energies of the country?

They mistake egregiously who think the primitive ministerial system of Methodism is done with in this country: *there is at this hour opening a larger field for it than ever.* While we contend for modifications in the consolidated portion of the Church, in order to adapt them to the greatest effectiveness there, we affirm, and we mean literally what we affirm, that they have not yet done one-half their allotted work in the land.

Further: while this new population will be more entirely *foreign*, and, from the amplitude of the area and freer access to it, more *dispersed*, it will also be vastly more *multitudinous* than our immigrations have heretofore been. It is sublime, we were about to say appalling—this amazing growth of a nation—this exodus of the European peoples into our mighty wildernesses. We could once estimate somewhat its ratios, but now it almost defies our calculations. A few years ago it was ascertained that our western frontier line moved onward at the rate of about thirteen miles a year; and this march of a nation, extending from the Northern Lakes to the Mexican Gulf,—bearing with it all the ensigns of the highest civilization and liberty—felling the forest, dispelling at every step actual aboriginal barbarism, planting fields, building cities, erecting temples and schools, constructing canals and roads of iron,—was considered one of the sublimest spectacles in the history of man; but now the line of march is broken, as we have said, into detached columns, which have taken the extreme points of the field, and the evercom-

ing accessions meet no obstruction, and observe no rules of progression. It is quite probable, that during the next five years the average annual arrivals of foreigners will amount to half a million—they are now fast verging to 400,000! What practicable Christian agencies can meet the wants of these foreign hosts? Can we think for a moment of abandoning in this vast region any of the effective apparatus of Methodism, under such circumstances? It has been estimated that during the current decade there will be introduced into the West, a foreign population equal to the whole present population of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. We repeat, the prospect is appalling. The thoughtful man, who reminds himself of the ignorance and moral corruption of these European hordes, can hardly suppose that the better moral characteristics of the nation, already sadly degenerating, can survive the contagion of such overwhelming vice, or the better institutions of the republic withstand such a flood of semi-barbarism. One thing we must be sure of, viz.:—That every moral resource at our command will be needed, to maintain, in its present relative status, the moral and intellectual position of the country.

It is to the West, we say, that this overwhelming flood sweeps, and thither moves with it the power of the nation—the political forces which will take their moral character from these multitudes, and impart it to us all. The centre of representative population is continually tending westward. In 1790, it was twenty-two miles east of Washington; it has never been east of the national metropolis since, and never can be again. At the census of 1800, it had been transferred to thirty miles west of Washington; in 1820, it was seventy-one miles west of that city; in 1830, one hundred and eight miles. Its westward movement from 1830 to 1840, was no less than fifty-two miles—more than five miles a year. It is now probably in Ohio. During about fifty years it has kept nearly the same parallel of latitude, having deviated only about ten miles South, while it has advanced about two hundred miles west. Thus move the political destinies of the country into what we have described as the arena of its moral and religious conflicts.

With this territorial enlargement and increased accessions of European population, the national population, indigenous and foreign, is destined to swell into aggregate magnitudes truly amazing—magnitudes which it would seem must hopelessly transcend any moral provision we can make for them. If the ratios of our increase hitherto can be relied on, the population of the United States, in 1860, will be more than *thirty-one millions;* in 1870, more than *forty millions;* in 1900, more than *one hundred mil-*

lions, exceeding the whole present population of England, France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Denmark. A step further in the calculation presents a prospect still more surprising: by 1930—less than eighty years hence—this mighty mass of commingled races will have swollen to the stupendous aggregate of *two hundred and forty-six millions*, equalling the present population of all Europe. According to the statistics of life, there are hundreds of thousands of our present population—one twenty-ninth at least—who will witness this result.

It is hardly possible to restrain the pen from uttering the spontaneous and overwhelming reflections which these statistics suggest; but we leave them in their own startling significance.

Such, then, according to the mathematics of the argument, is the domestic field of evangelic labour opening before us. These calculations have no episodical irrelevancy here. We have chosen to present them, as far more relevant than general remarks. They sustain with startling force our position, that the energetic "itinerant" methods of our early ministry—its methods in the pulpit and out of it—are still needed; that there is a larger field for them now in our own country than there ever has been. We shall need, for generations, Circuits and Districts, and stout-hearted and staunch-bodied men to travel them; and let those who think they see the expediency of amending our system, in respect to "itinerancy," the "presiding eldership," &c., to suit it to our denser communities, (an expediency we are not disposed to deny,) be reminded that they should so direct their efforts as to meet a comparatively local want without inflicting a general disaster.* We have so often drawn this admonitory inference in the course of these remarks, that doubtless the reader thinks it sufficiently reiterated, but it presents itself to our attention with peculiar impressiveness. We deem it the capital lesson of our cause at this moment. Ideas of innovation are becoming rife among us; many of them are wise, the true signs of healthy progress, and few men have affirmed them more decidedly than the writer of this article; but with them seems generally entertained a vague and, as we have shown, most fallacious impression, that the primitive ministerial system of Methodism is fast becoming incompatible with the wants of the times—that its day is about past. It is all-important that this impression should be rightly qualified, that especially our intelligent and influential members in the

* We believe our ecclesiastical system is capable of such local accommodations without injury to its general harmony. The chief difficulty to desirable improvements among us, is our *fear* of them. Our fathers adapted the system to their times: we lack their courage.

older States, who can appreciate Methodism in its general capacities, as well as in its local success, should be impressed with the conviction that it has been thus far but approximating its providential mission, and that the grandeur of its general designs may still merit almost any local inconveniencies. The statistical arguments we have presented cannot fail, if examined, to arrest the attention of the Church, and to convince it that it may still move on in its old triumphant march to new, and grander fields of conflict, and that all its faithful adherents should still be willing to make magnanimous sacrifices for its success.

It can well however be admitted, that some of the desired modifications, both of its ecclesiastical system and its homiletic character, may be made; and having now accomplished what we proposed, as a chief design of this paper, viz., "to show rather the *limits* than the urgency of such changes," we proceed to admit and state some of the homiletic improvements demanded. We have said that the times require, especially in the older sections of the Church, more *varied preaching* than was common in our early ministry.

First. It should be varied by a larger range of *practical instruction.* If we except some of the main points of practical divinity, the Methodist pulpit will, we think, be found more deficient in this respect, than any other evangelical ministry in the land. This is a quite explicit remark, we know, and may be an attractive target for animadversions, but we nevertheless affirm it. Let it be observed, however, that it refers not so much to the *importance* as to the *variety* of our practical preaching. Precisely here lies the great defect of our present ministrations, and it needs plain dealing and speedy correction. Wince not, brother itinerant, at a few outright references to it, even though you should not concur in them. Frankness will not hurt us; and in a work like this, if anywhere, honest individual opinions, though even erroneous may be respectfully admitted. You will not, after what has been said, question our high estimation of the Methodist ministry—the men of genius or special talent scattered through its ranks, excel, we believe, in number and power those of any other American pulpit; the fathers we have described as a heroic host; their successors, who have been educated by similar circumstances, in the severer fields of our work, are still, as a body, rare and powerful men; but is there not a large class—their successors in the maturer fields—a class which is fast becoming our aggregate ministry there—who, without special talents, are also without the heroic characteristics of the fathers? And is it not the case that there is in this growing class many of mere indolent mediocrity—men of little study, little variety, and little thoroughness of instruction, and who not unfrequently

attempt to substitute physical for intellectual energy in the pulpit? These assuredly are not the men needed by our matured Churches of this day, especially amidst the sectarian rivalries of the cities and larger villages. Their limited topics may be as good as those of the fathers, but their local circumstances are different. What variety they possess soon becomes exhausted; and is it not often apparent that their subjects, however intrinsically good, are but hackneyed props upon which to hang "First," "Secondly," and "Thirdly," the hasty excogitations of Saturday night or Sabbath morning.

Practical training, we repeat, practical training in the details of Christian duty is the present want of Methodism, and for two reasons.

The first is, the promiscuous character of our people. It is not a denominational detraction, but a denominational honour that our Churches have hitherto been chiefly composed of the poorer classes, those who most need the gospel, and who, when properly trained by it, become its best examples; but this honourable fact has devolved upon us a peculiar responsibility,—the promiscuous masses we have gathered together need specially careful instruction. Under the ministrations of the fathers they were initiated into the great truths and the personal experience of religion. The elementary truths of religion, accompanied with a sound religious experience, are doubtless a better guarantee of Christian morals than thorough training in the latter without the former; but the one cannot supersede the other. Nor is it necessary for our argument to admit that serious derelictions are more common among us, than among other sects; it is sufficient to affirm the importance of the practical divinity of the Scriptures on the one hand, and on the other, that among us too exclusive a devotion to the consolatory or admonitory aspects of the gospel—too hortatory a style—have too much limited our practical instructions.

Another reason for improvement in this respect is, that the great variety of the practical themes of the gospel would afford more variety to our preaching, and therefore more attraction to our congregations. The restricted pulpit range of our first preachers, however suitable to their modes of labour, has too much uniformity for ours. An attempt to relieve the tameness of this uniformity of thought by energy of feeling or declamation, may partly succeed—especially in connexion with good pastoral habits—it may sometimes render it tolerable to a popular audience through a two years' appointment; but it will not make up for the defective training of the people, and must in the "long run" fail to interest, if it does not alienate, our more intelligent families.

How rich is the variety of practical themes for the pulpit! The practical bearings of repentance, the practical applications of faith; prayer—private, family, social, public; public worship; the observance of the Sabbath; baptism; the Lord's supper; modes of personal effort for the salvation of men; charity to the poor; charity to religious opinions; serial lectures on the historical characters of the Scriptures; the relations of pastors and people; and the large range of practical counsels appropriate to husbands and wives, parents and children, masters and servants, &c.—assuredly he who with such themes, and their sublime relations to time and eternity, fails of varied interest in the pulpit, must be inexcusable. It is on these very themes that the multitudinous assemblies under our care most need instruction.

Second. For the same reasons our preaching should be *varied* with more *doctrinal instruction.* Do we mistake in saying that the charge of vagueness applied to our practical instruction is applicable to our doctrinal preaching—not to the importance of its subjects, but their variety? Is there not even among us a tacit dislike to doctrinal themes in the pulpit, owing in part, it may be, to the virulence with which distinctive doctrines are liable to be discussed, or the too habitual devotion of some preachers to them, notwithstanding our denominational tendency to the contrary?

Whatever truth God has revealed should be proclaimed by his ambassadors; but are there not many such truths which have never been discussed by some who read these lines, and who have grown gray in the pulpit?

It is to be feared that some of those doctrines which we deem most vital to Christianity are most neglected, so far as their elucidation or defence is concerned. The Athanasian views of the Godhead we identify with the very essence of orthodoxy; but how seldom are these doctrines discussed in our pulpits. Our dialectics have not much to do with them indeed, but our Bible has, and the Scriptural illustration and demonstration of truths so fundamental cannot certainly be unimportant.

Here again we have an ample field for *variety* of pulpit themes—God and his attributes; Christ, his Godhead, his offices; the Holy Spirit, his Divinity and work; the atonement; repentance; faith; justification; regeneration; sanctification; the resurrection; future judgment; rewards and punishments; the spirituality and immortality of the soul; the nature and reality of experimental religion, &c.

The objection—a tacit if not an uttered one—that doctrinal preaching would tend to a speculative if not worse spirit in the Church,

ought not to be admitted for a moment—it is a slander on the truth of God. There may indeed be dialectic gymnastics attempted in this sublime arena—polemic farces, at which devils as well as men may recreate themselves; but the same may be said of experimental and practical divinity—no perversions of doctrine have been more monstrous than the recorded delusions of practical and inward religion.

On the contrary, the great doctrines of revelation rightly presented would form the most substantial basis for our practical instructions, and premises for the most powerful motives of personal religion. The good sense of the preacher of course must be their guarantee against abuse; but it is to be supposed that he who is counted worthy of this ministry should not be lacking in common sense, or the reverent appreciation of such impressive themes.

Third. There is another class of subjects not usually comprehended in our practical divinity, but having a secondary relation to it, at least, which, occasionally and judiciously treated, would increase much the variety of our pulpit themes, and afford instruction and interest to our congregations. Among these we would include first the great modern schemes of evangelization, such as Sunday schools, missions, tracts, Bible societies. The pastor, especially the "stationed" pastor, should make himself familiar, not merely with the general character of these enterprises, but with their leading data, if not their detail, at least so far as they are connected with his own denomination; not vague declamation will suffice for them—he can show their substantial value only by substantial facts. It is thus only that he can train his people to a practical interest in them. The Churches which are most familiar with these institutions are those which most liberally sustain them, and it cannot be doubted that their fuller representation in our pulpits would soon effect an appreciable change in their success among us. Do we mistake in saying that these great interests of modern Christianity are lamentably neglected by our general ministry, so far as their appropriate representation in the pulpit is concerned? Our periodicals and special agents cannot supersede this service.

Again: we would include in the present class of pulpit themes, those special addresses to the young, the aged, to females, to citizens on the ethics of their political relations, &c., which occasionally form interesting and instructive series of discourses in the modern pulpit. Important principles of Christianity are applicable to these subjects, and, rightly discussed, they may become the special occasions of most special appeals of the truth.

To these we would add, occasionally at least, other topics—those

which arise from adventitious questions of the day, or public interests indirectly related to religion or morals. Pauperism, intemperance, gambling, education, patriotism, great national occasions or anniversaries, the moral aspects of political events, the uses and abuses of wealth, the moralities of business life, war, with the practical peace questions, and even "colonization" and "slavery," if you please. We can only refer to these varied classes of subjects. They present an almost endless scope, and the preacher who avails himself of them prudently, can hardly fail to render his pulpit attractive to the people. We say *prudently*, for doubtless there is a liability to imprudence here. Such secondary topics should have but a secondary place in his instructions. They should be used merely as an occasional digression from the more essential themes of the gospel. They have nevertheless their claims and their appropriate seasons.

It is a misfortune for our argument that the non-evangelical pulpit of the day has dealt so largely in these collateral topics, finding in them a relief from the less congenial themes of true religion; let not this abuse, however, militate against the due use of such important subjects. They need not interfere with, but may be sanctified by, our very highest evangelism, and it may be affirmed that we can hardly train our people to the highest standard of Christian intelligence and enterprise without their occasional discussion in the pulpit. Let us put away the thought that such a discussion of them would interfere with the fervency of our piety or our usual revivals. The objection would give to the revilers of fervent piety and revivals a formidable argument. Our sister evangelical Churches which are most addicted to these discussions, not only take the lead in philanthropic enterprises, but abound in genuine revivals. Our own more energetic spirit should not lag behind them in either respect.

We have thus indicated some of the modifications which these times demand in our preaching, especially in the older communities, where our congregations are not only stated, but abound in intelligence and resources that require such improved treatment. What an effect on our ministrations, in such communities, would a general endeavour after this improved and varied preaching soon produce! More thorough habits of study would be formed; an improved style both of thought and address, more deliberate and exact methods in the desk, would follow; the whole intellectual tone of our pulpit would be elevated. It would, in fine, be a partial but most salutary process of self-education to our ministry, and, combined with their old distinctions, such as we have described, would soon enable them to out-rival their competitors in the larger cities, and thus stop effectually that relative declension of our cause which, according to our

own reports, has been taking place in most of them within a few years. We insist, as we did in our former article, that those old distinctions, or whatever of them may now be desirable, can be combined with these improvements. Not an iota of our moral power need be sacrificed.

It is hoped that, while we urge these improvements as appropriate to our general ministry, it is not necessary to guard our remarks against a prejudiced construction. It is admitted that there are scattered all through our ranks individual men who have surveyed thoroughly, in both the study and the pulpit, these large fields of thought, and who even stand before the public on their most advanced grounds. Honour be upon such men, for most of them owe their success to their own unaided endeavours, sustained amidst the most trying ministerial responsibilities which have been known since the days of the apostles. Our ministry has also not been without a class of men pre-eminent even above these, for reputation at least, men of renown in the Church, representative men, who have been masters of not only the great themes of the pulpit, but of the highest ability for their discussion. The names of Summerfield, Bascom, Cookman, Fisk, and Olin, have had few contemporary rivals in sister Churches, and other names, not yet rendered sacred by death, will hereafter be added to the list. All this we admit, and yet deem the preceding observations applicable to our general ministry.

Thus much, then, for the *improvement of our preaching*; but this implies also a correspondent *improvement of the preacher*. We have alluded to the effect which such an elevated standard of pulpit instruction would have on his own intellectual character. With our candidates, however, we should anticipate this improvement, and our pre-requisites should be such as to secure it. The remark is not only applicable to the older sections of the Church, but in part to the most recent; for it has pleased God so to multiply our candidates throughout the connexion, as to allow a very considerable discrimination in their selection, were we but disposed to adhere to our legitimate and economical modes of labour. Were it not for the absurd policy (for such we must be allowed to call it) of breaking up our circuits into hardly self-supporting "stations," and of gradually abolishing the local ministry, instead of a want we should now, probably, have an excess of candidates.* A single western conference

* These unfortunate changes are also ascribed to the "demands of the times," a very convenient but fallacious excuse for something worse. It will hardly be pleaded that Methodism in America is in advance of English Methodism in the intelligence or good taste of its people; the latter, however, finds no difficulty in

(Illinois) received last year *forty-four* probationers, making its list of candidates *seventy-two*, and more numerous by twenty-seven than its whole list of effective members! Another conference received twenty-five, giving it a probationers' list of forty-four; another twenty-three, giving it forty-seven candidates; another twenty-one, giving it thirty-three. The itinerant ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church (North and South) now numbers six thousand five hundred men; the Roman Catholics report but about one thousand one hundred; the Protestant Episcopalians about one thousand five hundred; the Congregational orthodox about one thousand six hundred; the old-school Presbyterians about two thousand; the new-school one thousand five hundred; the Baptists about five thousand one hundred.* These comparative statements show that Methodism is prolific in its resources of men if not of other means for its ministry. The supply would be up to its necessities if not above them, we repeat, were it not for the late impolitic deviations from its old and successful itinerant plans; and even as it is, we believe that with suitable aids and encouragements, such as other denominations provide, we could, even now, command a superabundance of candidates.

This fact is worthy of special remark. It is quite unique in the current history of the American Churches. While our sister denominations are universally lamenting the decrease of their theological students, we rejoice amidst multiplying candidates.† The fact is full of providential significance; it corresponds with what we have said of the great providential mission yet awaiting Methodism in this land; it corresponds further with the new demands of our cause which have been stated. For the latter we should avail ourselves of it in two ways.

First. We should be more choice in our selections from these increasing candidates. Would that we could impress the remark upon our conferences. Let us learn that piety, though the chief, is not the only qualification for the ministry—that *gifts* as well as *graces* are required by our own standards; and that now, more

keeping up itinerancy and a powerful constantly-working local ministry, in both country and city. We hope the old metropolis of American Methodism, Baltimore, will hesitate long to follow the example of our other cities in these "reforms." There are advantages in the change, but how dearly are they paid for!

* This includes all its preachers, whether pastors or not. If our local preachers were included in the estimate of the Methodist ministry, its amount would be more than trebled.

† Our only theological school, while yet in its infancy, has grown to be numerically the third in the nation, and will undoubtedly soon be the first.

than at any other period of our history, is this double criterion both necessary and practicable. We certainly are not yet as cautious in this respect as our circumstances require; energetic zeal without ability, if successful in its first efforts, or under special circumstances, is too readily taken as the certain pledge of enduring usefulness; and the untrained novice is urged into the conference, to be too often an encumbrance ever after, suffering himself as well as inflicting suffering on the Church for the ill-advised urgency of his brethren.

Further: This increasing supply of men should lead to more delay in their admission to the ministerial service, and thereby secure better preparation for it. This policy would be wise even in such conferences as suffer somewhat through lack of labourers. The precipitancy with which we have pressed young men into our laborious ministry has been a crying evil. It has sent hosts of them to premature graves. It has inflicted upon many physical disabilities which have subtracted from their usefulness through life. It has occasioned a startling ineffective list, which draws upon the resources of the Church for support, and suffers notwithstanding, amidst our very altars. There are now *five hundred and eleven* superannuated and supernumerary preachers, reported in our minutes—nearly *one-eighth* of our whole ministry.* Our ministerial tables of mortality have scarcely a parallel. Nearly half of all the Methodist preachers whose deaths have been recorded, fell before they were thirty years of age. The time spent in the itinerant work by 672 has been ascertained: 199 spent from 2 to 5 years; 209 from 5 to 12; 129 from 12 to 25; 90 from 25 to 40; 32 from 40 to 50; and 13 from 50 to 61. *About two-thirds died after twelve years' itinerant service.*

Much of this astonishing mortality is attributable to the haste with which we have urged youthful labourers into our hard service. What a waste of not only health and life, but of usefulness has this blindly-zealous policy occasioned. There are apologetic considerations connected with the subject we know, but none which fully justify us.

We have amended in this respect, but not sufficiently. Few sights could be more impressive than an assembled Methodist conference, for it presents the best example of what moral heroism is yet extant in our world; but there are painful detractions from the scene. It is scattered over with pallid and decayed men, who ought to be in the prime of manly vigour. It is composed too much, and, we fear, increasingly, of immature men,† whose juvenile and yet

* This includes not the Methodist Episcopal Church, South.

† Bishop Soule, some years since, in a published letter referred with emphatic regret to this fact.

often enfeebled aspect, seems out of place there—men who have too early been subjected to the labours and anxieties of our ministry, and who find that they can make up for their deficient preparation only by the sacrifice of their health. Better for them, in body and mind, would it be did we retain our old circuits, for these would require fewer mental resources, and supply invigorating bodily exercise; but appointed, as they mostly are, to isolated and hardly self-supporting stations, amidst the rivalries of older sects how can they sustain their positions without sacrificing themselves?

This offering of human hecatombs at our altars should cease, and should cease right speedily—whatever plea of necessity for it once existed, has virtually ceased. Our younger candidates should be reserved—recognised, but reserved—on a Wesleyan "reserve list" if you please, and aided in their intellectual preparation for the work in such manner as to relieve them afterwards from the pressure under which so many now sink.

And this should be the case, we repeat, not only in the older but also in the more recent fields of our ministerial work. In arguing that the later fields will still indefinitely demand our old homiletics and old methods, we have not implied that the intellectual advancement of the ministry was to be confined to the older conferences—assuredly not! If genuine ability is anywhere needed, it is in the great arena which has been described as now opening for the final moral conflicts of the country; and such ability not only in natural rudeness, but cultivated and even accomplished, may find there a most appropriate field of exertion, and find also in the severities of our itinerant methods congenial occasions of heroism and self-sacrifice.

There is, we fear, still lingering among us, and only half latent, a fallacious apprehension that intellectual improvement, pushed to any considerable advancement in our ministry, would be hurtful to its old purity and energy. We forget that Methodism, like the Reformation, modern missions, and almost every other great movement of the evangelical world, had its birth in an institution of learning. "It sounded its first trumpet," says some one, "and commenced its triumphant march over the world, from within the gates of a university." Most of its great leaders were learned men. Wesley, its founder and legislator, was the Fellow of a college; Charles Wesley, its psalmist, was a collegian in the same university; Coke, its first American bishop, and the founder of its missions, bore the highest title of the learned world; Benson was a university student; Fletcher was the president of a theological school; Clarke was a master of universal knowledge.

Among our own great names are those of Ruter, Emory, Fisk, Olin, and others of the dead and the living. Were these men unfitted for the demands of Methodism by their intellectual culture? Were they less devoted, less useful, less faithful to the peculiar duties of our system than their uneducated fellow-labourers? And would a ministry generally composed of just such men be unsuitable for even the hardest demands of our work? No, no; mental capacity does not imply moral incapacity. Methodism is compatible with large minds, as well as large hearts, and can employ them on the sublimest scale of their powers. We soberly believe that such minds, imbued with the evangelic spirit, can find nowhere else a more congenial sphere of self-devotion and self-development. Men of less capacity have been signally useful among us, but it has been appropriately asked, "What would be the standing of Methodism at this moment, if the mass of our ministry had added to their natural powers the acquired talents of such men?" Its banners would in all probability be waving over most of the world.

Let us then heed those indications of Providence which call upon us better to supply our candidates with qualifications for their work. In meeting our present necessities, let us select such as are maturest in mind and body—not always the most talented or the most devoted; for these, if feeble or young, may be prematurely sacrificed, but, in either case, may be rendered more useful by a preparatory delay.

The extraordinary fact of our large (though, for unnecessary reasons, still deficient) supply of preachers, and the convenience which, with right management, it offers for a "reserve" corps, should, we think, receive extraordinary attention from the Church. Few facts in our history have been more available for the fuller development of our ministerial energies. Our wise men should study to turn it to advantage, devising for this purpose most "liberal things." Such, too, is the popular demand among us for the intellectual improvement of the ministry, notwithstanding the "half-latent" prejudice mentioned, that it cannot be doubted the Church would respond with the promptest generosity to any plan for the benefit of its younger ministry—the ministry to which it is to commit its children, and with which are associated therefore its tenderest solicitudes.

But what plan shall we adopt for this preparatory training?

Presuming that we have thus far carried along with us the concurrence of most if not all our readers, it might only mar the influence of this article to conclude it with a discussion of debated plans of ministerial improvement. However slight may be that influence, we would have it unimpaired on the subjects thus far treated, for we deem them among the paramount Methodist questions of the

day. Relying, however, on the forbearance which we have already bespoken for honest, though they should be erroneous, opinions, when advanced in a periodical like this, where, if anywhere, inquiry should find both freedom and courtesy, we shall venture to submit a few suggestions on the question just proposed.

First, then, we think a *reserved list* should be kept by each conference, bearing the names of candidates who may not be immediately prepared for the ministry, and especially of promising young men who, even if the conference is not abundantly supplied, should nevertheless be reserved for better preparation and riper years, as this policy would be an economical one in the result. Such a relation of candidates to the conference, however slight, would be better than none at all. Though not admitted, they would at least be recognised. A tie, now unknown among us, would connect them with the "regular ministry," and not be without a partial influence. Whether this delay leads them to our institutions of learning, or to continue yet awhile in secular business, they will be more inclined to bear in mind and prepare for their destined work; their reading and local exercises in preaching, would have more habitual reference to it.

Second. We should provide *a course of study* for this reserved corps. A course of study for our local preachers has been repeatedly called for, and would tend much to elevate this branch of our ministerial service. The same course would do for reserved candidates, and brethren who design to remain in the local ranks. A modification of our present conference course, might suffice. The success of any such requirement must, however, depend upon its *authoritative* character; it should, therefore, be subject to the official care of the presiding elder, and accompanied with regular examinations, in the presence of either the quarterly conference or a committee of its ministerial members. Some sort of *system*, in other words, with *personal responsibilities*, is necessary if we would have the design effective; and those who may object to our further suggestions, should see that something precise and practicable, on the plan here mentioned, be provided as the only security against further demands.

Third. Many of the best minds among us think the time has come in which the Church should require higher literary prerequisites, and provide means for the better *education of candidates*, or at least of such as have not themselves the means. The cardinal religious denominations of the country have such provisions in the form of "Education Societies." They are important features in the philanthropic finances of some of these denominations. It has been complained that, though no Church has more promising claimants of such aid than ours, and none needs it more, yet none has

shown less disposition to provide it. Men now in our own ministry, it is said, have been compelled to receive assistance from the Education Societies of sister Churches. If the comparative paucity of our resources, or the urgency of other interests, have heretofore excused us from this claim, it is contended we cannot plead the excuse any longer. We now abound in resources, and it cannot be doubted that any financial project, sanctioned by our leading minds, and proposing an obvious advantage to the Church, can command any necessary liberality from it: its popularity and success will indeed generally be proportionate to the generosity and greatness of its designs. Has the time come, then, for the formation of an "Education Society" among us, for the better preparation of our ministerial candidates—a great, a denominational society, which shall take rank by the side of our leading financial schemes? This project need not involve the question of theological schools, nor any particular standard of ministerial training. It could, like similar societies in other Churches, provide merely a given annual appropriation for the support of candidates in our academies or colleges, subject to few and general restrictions. Personally we are not prepared to say how far such an institution would be applicable to the present circumstances of the denomination; so strong, however, is the demand for educated, or at least intellectual men, for the pulpits of our Atlantic churches, that it is believed our people would take no ordinary interest in it, provided it were projected on a scale of commanding proportions.

Fourth. There are not a few among us who believe that *institutions expressly for theological education* are appropriate to our present circumstances. Whether justly or otherwise, there is also in the Church a vast amount of not only popular but intelligent opposition to such institutions. The primitive Methodist preachers, as we have described them, were, it is justly affirmed, the mighty men of their day, but they came not forth from theological seminaries. It is replied, on the other hand, that they were providentially raised up for their times—that the times have changed, not in respect to the work, but the workmen—that Providence which especially fitted them for their times, now indicates that we should ourselves aid in their preparation. The first preachers of Christianity, it is argued, were miraculously qualified for this work, but when the early exigencies of the Church were past, miraculous gifts ceased, and the task of providing pastors was devolved upon the Church; and, continues the argument, you might as well contend that your missionaries need not study the language of China, in order to preach there, because the apostles had the miraculous gift of tongues, as to object to theologi-

cal education, because they or the first preachers of Methodism were not academically trained.

The advocates of theological schools complain that they have not been favoured with a fair hearing through our leading organs. Whatever may be the opposition of the reader to their scheme, we are sure he will be willing to hear them impartially. To silence this charge, as well as to present candidly their views, we cannot do better than to give the following rather ardent quotation from one of the most enthusiastic among them.

"Such institutions," he says, "were not considered by the founder of Methodism to be foreign to its genius and interests. In the very first conference he ever held, he himself proposed such a measure; the proposition was repeated in the second session, and was never lost sight of by the Wesleyan connexion during the long interval that elapsed before its resources enabled it to embody the design in its present noble seminaries. The success of the measure has demonstrated its wisdom. . . . . Have not our circumstances as a Church changed? Are we not able to afford our ministry the intellectual qualifications which once they could not obtain but by special endowment? And is it not clear, from the whole history of Providence, that when such ability exists, its special interposition ceases? It would be a curse on the world for Divine Providence to supersede the necessity of our self-dependence as individuals, or as communities. Our fathers are passing away. Providence supplies us no more with such men, and thereby clearly indicates our duty to qualify our ministry according to the means which he gives us. He will still call men to his work, but we must open the way for them. We propose not to *make* preachers of his word, but only to aid those whom he has evidently called to preach it. Who dares object to such a proposal? Providence has led us along from one improvement to another, until now this great want stands in our way like a mountain, with its summit glorious with light. We cannot pass round it; let us, then, go over it, that our ministry may, like Moses, come down to the people with their brows radiant with its brightness. . . . . Under our old system the repetition of a few well-studied subjects could take the place of fifty under our present arrangement. This is no detraction from the old system—it was one of its best points of adaptation to an uneducated ministry. But now we fix untrained men in small stations, amid the closest competition, where they are overburdened with pastoral duties, which were unknown to our fathers, and expect them to maintain our cause with success among a population the most enlightened on the globe. How is it possible for a young man without discipline, without a knowledge of books or of men, to furnish instruction for two years under such circumstances? A few of our most vigorous minds may nerve themselves for the necessities of such a position, but the mass of the ministry must necessarily fall into the rear of the educated ministries of other sects. . . . . It is objected that education will pervert our young men. This is one of those vandal sentiments which I hardly know how to discuss. Is it a question, in this day, whether education is favourable or injurious to virtue? Why, then, have we not waited for its decision before establishing our academies and colleges? Are we afraid that Methodism in particular cannot consist with intelligence? Then it cannot be true, and the sooner we discover our delusion, the better. Methodism is compatible with intelligence. Some of the greatest intellects have grown up under its influence; its glorious theology and mighty system are suited to the highest minds, and in no other Church can a great mind have freer scope for its powers. But how does this objection agree with fact? Have our learned men been

perverted? Have they not been among the holiest and most useful men in our Church? Did learning corrupt Wesley, Fletcher, Coke, or Benson? Whose memory is more sacred among us than Fisk's? And was he perverted by learning? Was Ruter, who left the presidency of a college for the sufferings of a missionary, one of the examples from which this objection is drawn? Was Emory another? Our most learned men have been our holiest men. They have been the staunchest friends of our doctrines and our discipline, because their capacious minds have the better comprehended their excellence. And is not this the case with the young men who come into the ministry from our learned institutions? Where do you find better pastors and more devoted preachers than they? It is mortifying that Methodism should still be trammelled and enervated by such petty prejudices. We Methodists do not yet comprehend the sublimity and promise of our cause. We have been deluded by the impression that ours is a particular, and not a general system—that it is applicable to a particular class, but not to all classes. Methodism is universal in its adaptation. We are bearing up unconsciously before the world the ensigns of the Millennium. Our doctrines and measures have been transforming other sects; they are to reach the savage and the sage, the slave and the sovereign. We believe it, because we believe they are the truth. Give, then, to Methodism a free action. Let it appropriate to itself all auxiliaries, especially learning. Its gigantic plans are suited for gigantic powers. Throw the energies of a sanctified and educated ministry into its potent system, and it will produce results which we have not yet imagined. . . . . Once more: it is asserted that 'the history of theological schools, in all ages, shows their influence to be corrupting.' If we object to theological schools because they have been abused, we may also object to nearly every other great measure. Episcopacy was observed in the early Church as much as theological schools; must we abandon it on that account? The press has been foully abused; are we therefore to turn it out of our Book Concern? Religion has been perverted in every detail; shall we therefore turn atheists? The reason of the corruption of theological schools was the corruption of all knowledge. Theological, like all other schools, will, of course, be affected by the intellectual state of the age in which they exist. It was the general prevalence of the New Platonism that introduced error into the Alexandrian school. But it introduced it everywhere else also. It infected Philo the Jew, and Longinus the Pagan, as well as Origen the Christian. It was the introduction of the Aristotelian dialectics that produced the metaphysical absurdities of the schools of the middle ages; but they infected every other department of knowledge, alike with theology. They were the intellectual characteristics of the times, deluding the monk in his secluded meditations, as well as the student in the school. But we live in a different age; science is now more thoroughly verified; a new mode of inquiry has been introduced, which will never allow a similar confusion of knowledge. There may be new corruptions in theology, but they cannot originate as did those upon which the objection is founded; they will be such as will be more likely to be prevented than favoured by knowledge. Theological schools have, indeed, like all other good institutions of religion, been corrupt; but, like all others, they have also been blessed. It would seem, from history, that Providence has wedded religion and knowledge, and signalized their union in most of the great events of the Church. The first rays of returning daylight, after the dark ages, streamed forth upon the world from the cloisters of the University of Wittemberg. It was from its gates that Martin Luther came forth, with the Bible in his hands, to summon the world to its moral resurrection. It was from the University of Geneva that Calvin, at the same time, was sounding the alarm among the Alps. And where did the next great revival of Christianity take place? It was among the theological students of Oxford. Yes! Methodism, now so fearful of ministerial education, first awoke in the cradle of English learning. It sounded its first trump, and commenced

its march over the world, in the gates of a university. Where did the first conception of foreign missions, from the American Churches, originate? Within the walls of a theological school; and from that school have gone to the pagan world a greater number of devoted men than from any other source in our land. The theological school at Basle, in Switzerland, has been one of the greatest fountains of religious influence that is in Europe. The one at Geneva is now the chief instrumentality in restoring the principles of the reformation to Switzerland and France. The great defenders of religion have nearly all been educated theologians. Science has no legitimate tendency to evil; it is the echo of the same voice which speaks in revelation. Revelation itself has as often been used for the support of error, as science; and the one must be rejected on the same ground that the other is."

After this long insertion, we hope there will be no charge of timid partiality on the question, against this journal at least. The extract certainly has ardour enough, if it has not an excess of argument. We leave our readers to judge of the latter. They are as competent as ourselves to distinguish between its logic and its rhetoric.

It is due to the advocates of this measure to say, that they are of various opinions respecting it. Some of them think that departments of theological instruction, suitable for the preparation of ministerial candidates, can be connected with our academies and colleges. Others, though very few, we suppose, advocate a high theological seminary, modelled after the best in other Churches, and requiring considerable preparatory, if not collegiate, training—a proposition which appears to us practically absurd in the present circumstances of our ministry. Others, and doubtless the greatest number, propose separate seminaries, on the plan of the "Wesleyan Theological Institutions," which shall be adapted to the actual wants of the student, whatever may be the deficiencies of his education, and shall combine with their intellectual advantages thorough training in such social and pastoral habits as may especially befit his future office: they would have them be "schools of the prophets,"—ministerial households, maintained under a strictly-religious regimen, and excluding the perverting influences and invidious prejudices which they allege would affect our young candidates in common academies or colleges. Such is the experiment now being made among our brethren of the eastern States.

We have thus attempted to show what was the *character of our primitive ministry;* how far its *preaching and methods* are still needed; what *improvements*, homiletic ones at least, are desirable; and some of the *means* by which it is proposed to secure these improvements. Our cause has reached a maturity and magnitude in this nation which give no little importance to such questions, and we dismiss the subject with the conviction that, however we have failed to do it justice, it cannot fail to command the interest of our readers.

ART. VIII.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) SOME years ago we used to see, every now and then, a paragraph in the papers, mentioning the apparition, in some out-of-the-way corner of the world, of a German lady, who was said to have visited all lands and seen all strange people. The stories told of her often appeared apocryphal, yet the lady was no *myth*, but a very substantial Austrian female, who has recently convinced mankind of her reality, by printing a book describing her travels, part of which is now offered us in "*A Lady's Voyage round the World: a selected translation from the German* of IDA PFEIFFER." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 302.) Though the continuity of the narrative is broken by the method of selection adopted by the translator, the book abounds in curious peeps into odd places. It is not every lady that has doubled the Cape, attended Queen Pomare's court-balls, eaten rice with Chinese mandarins, attended mosque in Delhi, watched the excavations at Nimroud, and gone to prison in Asiatic Russia.

(2.) MR. BOHN continues the publication of his several excellent libraries with praiseworthy promptness. Among the recent issues, we have in the "Scientific Library," "*Petrifactions and their Teachings*, by G. A. Mantell, LL. D." (12mo., pp. 496.) The work was primarily intended as a hand-book for visitors to the Gallery of Organic Remains of the British Museum, and as an explanatory catalogue for the scientific student of those remains; but it also answers for those who never have seen or shall see the Museum, as an illustrated account of its contents. The "Classical Library" is enriched by a "*Literal version of Lucretius*, by Rev. J. S. WATSON, to which is added the poetical version of John Mason Good," (12mo., pp. 496,) affording to the mere English reader a better opportunity of knowing Lucretius than has ever before been offered. In the "Illustrated Library," we find a "*History and Description of Modern Wines*, by CYRUS REDDING," (12mo., pp. 440,) which describes the wines of various countries, and informs the uninitiated how they can be *manufactured* to order. In the "Standard Library," we have "*Vasari's Lives of the Painters*," vol. iv. A supply of all the Libraries is constantly kept on hand by Bangs, Brother & Co., New-York.

(3.) CONFIRMATIONS of the general veracity and accuracy of HERODOTUS accumulate with every year's additions to our knowledge of ancient history, and no library, even of the most moderate pretence, can afford to be without a copy of his work. We are therefore glad to announce a neat reprint of Beloe's translation, (New-York: Bangs, Brother & Co., 13 Park-Row, 1852; 8vo., pp. 488.) This edition is enriched by a life of Herodotus, by Leonard Schmitz, LL. D., and has all of Beloe's notes, with a copious index. It is got up in excellent style, both as to printing and binding.

(4.) THE LORD'S PRAYER has been the subject of many learned treatises both in ancient and in modern times, but its unfailing abundance, and its marvellous adaptation to the exigencies of each successive age and of every new development of humanity, make new expositions constantly desirable. We welcome, therefore, a volume of "*Lectures on the Lord's Prayer*, by WILLIAM R. WILLIAMS," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 12mo., pp. 241,) which are marked by the same characteristic clearness of conception, soundness of exposition, and eloquence of style, that distinguish the other works of the same writer heretofore noticed in this journal.

(5.) WE announce with pleasure the second number of Neander's Practical Expositions, namely, "*The Epistle of James, practically explained*," (New-York: L. Colby, 1852; 12mo., pp. 115.) Not intended as a critical commentary, its exegesis is yet founded upon a strong scientific basis, and it penetrates into the meaning of special passages with a skill that is only surpassed by the comprehensiveness with which it grasps and sets forth the scope of the Epistle as a whole. Mrs. Conant does the work of translation at once gracefully and accurately.

(6.) WE are late in receiving, and therefore in acknowledging, "*Isaiah translated and explained, by* JOSEPH ADDISON ALEXANDER," (New-York: John Wiley, 1851; 2 vols., 12mo.) The work is an abridgment of the author's larger critical commentary on Isaiah, which is now out of print. It has not been rewritten, but contracted by simple omission. In its present form the work is admirably adapted to popular reading, while it still remains the best commentary on Isaiah for theological students in our language.

(7.) "*An Address delivered before the Sterling Medical College*, by EDWARD THOMPSON, M. D., D. D., President of the Ohio Wesleyan University," (Columbus: 1851,) is an earnest appeal to medical men to cultivate *logic*—an appeal pre-eminently needed. No books are worse written, both as to logic and style, than the medical books of the present generation, unless, perhaps, the law-books. Dr. Thompson's address is full of sound thoughts, expressed in admirable language.

(8.) THE "*Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution*," (New-York: Harper & Brothers,) continues to appear at regular intervals. The narrative grows in interest, if that be possible, and the illustrations are as numerous and beautiful as ever. A more attractive family book of history has never been issued in this country. Nineteen parts have appeared—a few more will complete the work.

(9.) SINCE Bunyan's Pilgrim, we doubt whether a better allegory has appeared than "*Salander and the Dragon, a Romance of the Hartz Prison*, by F. W. SHELTON, M. A." (New-York: John S. Taylor, 1852; 18mo., pp. 250.) We have read it through at a sitting, and few of our readers who take it up will fail to do likewise. The fearful results of *slander* are illustrated in a most striking and effective style. We commend the book, to young and old, as one that will enchain their attention while it will fix a great moral lesson upon their hearts.

(10.) The usages of Methodism are becoming a common topic of discussion and criticism, both in and out of the Church. We could not hinder this if we would, and would not if we could. No mere *usages* can be permanent in stereotyped forms—unless stereotyped by death. We have before us an excellent "*Discourse delivered in the Clinton-street Methodist Episcopal Church, Newark, N. J.*, by Rev. L. D. Barrows," the object of which is to show that Methodism excels other Churches in its "self-sacrificing spirit for the salvation of the race." (Mr. Barrows calls this "*the distinctive* feature of Methodism;" but surely he does not mean to assert that other Churches are *entirely* destitute of it.) This spirit of self-sacrifice is shown in three leading features of Methodism; namely, class-meetings, church-building, and itinerancy. On the first of these heads the discourse is clear, pointed, and convincing; on the second, it is somewhat obscure and hesitating. Mr. Barrows does not wish to advocate "an inferior order of church-building," but deprecates "expensive" churches. Closer definition is necessary to make his views *practical*. So too he appears to justify pewed churches *for New-England*, but to oppose their introduction anywhere else. The third head is treated very vigorously.

(11.) We welcome most cordially the first volume of Putnam's Semi-monthly Library for Travellers and the Fireside; namely, "*Home and Social Philosophy*," (New-York: G. P. Putnam, 1852; 12mo., pp. 263,) which is the first series of a classified reprint of Dickens's "Household Words." The distinctive characteristics of the "Semi-monthly Library" are, a periodical issue, so that the books can be mailed; size and form, fitting the books for the traveller's pocket as well as for the book-case; excellence in the selection of matter, and *low* price. The present volume affords a large collection of delightful reading for *twenty-five* cents. We trust this series will take the place, to a great extent, of the yellow-covered works which are hawked about our steamboats and railroad cars; and that Mr. Putnam's taste and enterprise will be amply rewarded by a large sale.

(12.) We have received the sixteenth and seventeenth numbers of Mayhew's "*London Labour and the London Poor*," (New-York: Harper & Brothers,) in which the *scavengery* of the great metropolis is treated in very full detail. It were heartily to be wished that the municipal authorities of some great cities nearer home than London would take a leaf out of Mr. Mayhew's book on the subject of *clean* streets.

(13.) Rev. J. O. Choules passed some months in Europe last year with three of his pupils. The boys kept a journal, and wrote a number of letters to a friend at home, which are now gathered into a neat volume, under the title of "*Young Americans Abroad; or, Vacation in Europe*," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 18mo., pp. 371,) which will be very acceptable to youthful readers.

(14.) "*Memories of the Great Metropolis; or, London from the Tower to the Crystal Palace*, by F. Saunders." (New-York: G. P. Putnam, 12mo., pp. 311.)

The design of this volume is to furnish a compact manual for visitors to the British metropolis. It has the accuracy of a Guide-Book without its dryness; and abounds in precisely the kind of information which a cultivated traveller most desiderates. And for stay-at-home travellers, who make their excursions only through the medium of books, we recommend this volume, as one which, by its pleasant, easy, and yet scholarly talk about the famous spots of London, will be to them a most entertaining and instructive companion.

(15.) THE value of Dr. Lardner's elementary treatises on physical science has been long known to teachers and students. New editions of the "*Mechanics*," the "*Hydrostatics*," and the "*Optics*," have just been issued by Messrs. Blanchard & Lea, of Philadelphia; and the three books are also bound up in one strong thick volume of 750 pages, forming the best and most complete manual on these subjects extant, to our knowledge. Full questions for examination adapt the work to use as a text-book in schools and colleges.

(16.) ANOTHER volume of Schmitz and Zumpt's classical series is now offered, viz., "*Eclogae ex Q. Horatii Flacci Poematibus*," (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea, 1852; 18mo., pp. 311.) The text is founded on Orelli's. The commentary was begun by the late Dr. C. G. Zumpt, and finished by his son A. W. Zumpt. The work is done in the same spirit of care and discretion that characterizes all the books of this excellent series. It is a sad pity they are not better printed and on better paper: though these advantages are probably incompatible with the very low price at which the books are sold.

(17.) THE second volume of the reprint of the "Young Christian Series," is "*The Corner Stone*, by JACOB ABBOTT." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 380.) The work is designed to illustrate the fundamental truths of Christianity in clear and plain style, free from technical terms, and adapted to general use. CHRIST is justly made the centre of the Christian system in this admirable work, and the great truths of religion are set forth as they naturally connect themselves with his history. Mr. Abbott's peculiar power of graphic description, as well as of pure narrative, find abundant scope in a work of this plan.

(18.) WE have heretofore once or twice commended "Woodbury's Method with German," and have now to record a high tribute to its merit in the issue of a work avowedly modelled after it, viz., "*A New Method of Learning the French Language*, by LOUIS FASQUELLE, LL. D., Professor of Modern Languages in the University of Michigan." (New-York: M. H. Newman, 1852; 12mo., pp. 499.) The work, like Woodbury's, combines both the analytic and the synthetic modes of teaching, giving in Part I. the rules in the most simple form, applying them at once, and introducing the idioms of the language gradually, so as not to present too many difficulties at once; and in Part II. a tolerably ample Grammar of the language. The work is done everywhere with conscientious thoroughness.

(19.) "*Sinfulness of American Slavery*, by Rev. CHARLES ELLIOTT, D. D." (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Power, 1850; 2 vols., 12mo.) By some mishap this book has not reached our table till a very late period; so that our tardiness in noticing it is not our own fault. The author was appointed by the General Conference of 1848, to write the History of the Church for the preceding four years—a requirement which obviously involved a survey of the subject of slavery. His resources for this survey are ample; indeed, few libraries can be so rich in the literature of the subject as Dr. Elliott's, if we may judge from the full list of authorities appended to the second volume; and no man could be more patient and diligent in the *study* of authorities. Dr. Elliott never undertakes the investigation of a subject that he does not sift thoroughly. No book, pamphlet, or even newspaper article of value, can escape his ever-watchful vigilance. So it has been in the case before us. These two volumes are a complete repertory of facts on the subject of Slavery in its relations to the moral law. Another volume, on "Servitude and Slavery," is in preparation; and the three are intended to show that the "Scripture neither sanctions nor tolerates slavery: that the regulations of the Mosaic code referred to *servitude*, so as to prevent it from running into slavery." The history of the Methodist Episcopal Church from 1844 to 1848 will follow the third volume.

The work before us is divided into six parts, of which Part I. treats of "American Slavery and the African Slave trade," and shows that in principle the two are identical. Dr. Elliott, however, is careful to discriminate between *guilty* and *innocent* slaveholders:—

"Some may become the legal owners of slaves by will or inheritance. Others, though convinced of the sinfulness of the system, may not have it in their power to set their slaves free, for the present, and they hold them in order to do them the greatest good possible. Such, certainly, cannot be placed in the list of transgressors or sinners: otherwise, one person, by his act, can make another a sinner; or one can be made a sinner by the act of another—which is absurd. Such employ the mere legal tenure to emancipate the slave, and prevent him from becoming a slave for life, and his posterity after him; or he employs this legal tenure to do the slave all the good he can, although he cannot set him free.

"There are others who love slavery and the laws which authorize and protect it. They daily strive to render that law more stringent. They use their power over the slave for their own benefit, without regard to the rights of man or the law of God; and they resist the annulment of slave laws."

Part II. shows that slavery deprives men of their natural rights, personal liberty, property, education, religious privileges, marriage, &c. Part III. exhibits, in strong colours, the injuries inflicted by slavery. Part IV. treats of its contrariety to the Christian Scriptures: Part V. of its effects on the master, the slave, and the community: and Part VI. offers a number of observations on the duty and practicability of emancipation. It will be seen from this brief statement, that in the volumes before us, and in those that are to follow, Dr. Elliott proposes an extensive survey of the whole subject, which, like his great work on Romanism, will afford in itself a treasury of facts and arguments on the matter of which it treats.

(20.) "*The Iliad of Homer, with Notes for the use of Schools and Colleges*, by JOHN I. OWEN, D. D." (New-York: Leavitt & Co., 1851; 12mo., pp. 740.)

The text is reprinted from Wolf's, with occasional variations. In the preparation of the notes Professor Owen has in this, as in all his text-books, consulted the *real* wants of students, preserving a just mean between the two extremes of meagreness and prolixity. Prefixed to the text is a summary of each book, affording the student a general view of the plan of the poem. A brief grammatical Index, and a more copious historical one, add greatly to the value of the edition for the use of students. The type is of the beautiful Porsonian cut—and the whole getting up of the work is admirable.

(21.) AMONG many indications of evil to the Church, the demand for works of practical religion is one of the most hopeful signs of the times. "*A Wreath Around the Cross*, by Rev. A. MORTON BROWN," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 18mo., pp. 313,) is intended to exhibit Scripture doctrine through the medium of Scripture facts—"to elevate the Cross above all, and to plead with all classes to look to Jesus." It is accompanied by a recommendatory preface from Rev. J. A. James.

(22.) THE "*True Practice of Religion*, from the Dutch *Shorter Doctrine of Practice*, by Rev. EWALDUS KIST, D. D." (New-Orleans: John Ball, 12mo., pp. 448.) Of the writer of this book we know nothing, except that he wrote some volumes of sermons, besides this manual of practical religion, which has long enjoyed an extensive circulation in Holland. It would be a most excellent *vade-mecum* for Christians of all classes, were it less Calvinistic in its groundwork.

(23.) MR. LAYARD has done a most excellent service to that large portion of the reading public which was precluded from purchasing his "Nineveh and its Remains," by its high price, in preparing "*A Popular Account of Discoveries at Nineveh, abridged by the author from his larger work.*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 360.) The plan pursued in the abridgment has been to omit the second part of the original work, and to introduce the principal Biblical and historical illustrations into the body of the narrative. This last is a great improvement, and makes the abridgment a better book for general readers than the original. The work is beautifully got up, and profusely illustrated, and is yet sold at a remarkably low price.

(24.) "*Wesley and Methodism*, by ISAAC TAYLOR." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 328.) In this work Mr. Taylor abandons the line of spiritual pathology, and takes to that of criticism and prophecy. An extended review will be offered as soon as possible.

(25.) "*Lectures on the History of France*, by the Right Hon. Sir JAMES STEPHENS, Professor of Modern History, in the University of Cambridge." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 8vo., pp. 710.) In publishing this volume, Sir James Stephens disclaims any pretence of entitling himself to a place in that small and illustrious company of historical writers to which Mr.

Macaulay and Mr. Hallam belong. Indeed, it is only a wonder that he would put before the public, under any circumstances, a work so rapidly executed as to be necessarily imperfect. But it is a course of lectures, not a history, and as such it is to be judged. Appointed to his professorship in 1849, Sir James delivered the first twelve lectures in this volume in the spring of 1850, and the remaining twelve in the summer of 1851. They are printed, because, strange to say, no other introduction to the History of France, worthy of the name, or fitted to accompany young students in listening to a lecturer, exists in our language. And for general readers they possess all the attractions which have made the author's contributions to the Edinburgh Review so popular—viz., breadth of view, clearness of statement, and animation of style. The book, large as it is, and abounding in discussion as well as narrative, is everywhere readable. In view of all its qualities, it is worthy of a place in every library.

(26.) "*The Successful Merchant: Sketches of the Life of Mr. Samuel Budgett*, by WILLIAM ARTHUR, A. M." (New-York: Lane & Scott, 16mo., pp. 420.) This is the biography of a man who commenced trade at ten years of age by picking up a horse-shoe and selling it for a penny—and ended at fifty-six, as one of the largest merchants of the West of England. The book is full of attraction: the reader who takes it up will hardly be inclined to lay it down till he has finished its perusal. Mr. Arthur is known as the author of "A Mission to Mysore," in which he showed great power of description and capacity for clear and pleasant narrative; and these qualities are strikingly displayed in the work before us. The book is valuable, not only as a narrative, but also for its valuable reflections on *commercial morals*, a subject prolific of interest in all times, and which never needed thorough discussion more than now.

*** A large number of notices are necessarily omitted.

ART. IX.—LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Theological.

EUROPEAN.

WE have received the third volume of "*Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament*," completing the work. (London: Bagsters, 8vo., 656 pp.) It will, as the author modestly hopes, prove acceptable to the growing class of theological students who are alive to the tendencies of the age, as "a contribution towards a full understanding of the questions connected with the department of Introduction." Dr. Davidson has not that highest skill of authorship—the selection of *just* the points on which perspicuity and completeness depend, and the apt subordination of all others to these—but he works laboriously and faithfully, and puts his readers in the way of forming independent judgments on many questions, which, without his aid, it would require the study of many books to master. We hope the work will soon be reprinted in America.

THE Wesleyan agitation in England has given rise to many discussions of mere transient interest, but it has also called forth some writings of more permanent value. Among these are "*The Polity of Wesleyan Methodism, exhibited and defended*" by GEORGE SMITH, F. A. S., (author of the

Patriarchal Age, the Hebrew People, &c.,) which consists of two lectures, giving a historical review of the rise, progress, and present state of Wesleyan Methodism, and a careful comparison of all its leading peculiarities with the teaching of Holy Scripture. Mr. Smith has also published a treatise on "*The Doctrine of the Pastorate, considered with special reference to Wesleyan Methodism.*" (8vo., 123 pp.) The work treats of the Divine Institution, the Religious Responsibilities and the Scriptural Claims of the Christian Ministry; and although it was suggested by the controversies of the times, it avoids polemics as much as possible, aiming rather to present a portable summary of Christian teaching on the subject of the ministry.

A MANUSCRIPT of Wiclif's in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin, has been recently published under the title of "Three Treatises of John Wiclif, D. D.,—I. On the Church and her Members: II. On the Apostasy of the Church: III. On Antichrist." (Dublin:) The work is edited with notes and a glossary by J. H. Todd, D. D.

THAT veteran writer, Faber, who has kept his pen at work with restless activity for half a century, has just offered to the world what he calls his "last, and perhaps his dying, performance" in the "*Many Mansions of the House of our Father, spiritually discussed and practically considered,*" in which he maintains that this earth from first to last is the exclusive theatre of all which concerns the human race.

PROF. JACOBI has published, in Berlin, a volume of "*Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen,* von Dr. A. NEANDER," (268 pp.,8vo.,) containing a number of addresses and essays, theological, moral, and historical.

"*A Brief History of the Wesleyan Missions on the Western Coast of Africa,* by William Fox," (London, 1851,) is a handsome 8vo. volume of 624 pages. Why it should be called a "brief history," we are at a loss to imagine: for a more wearisomely prolix book we have rarely seen. Yet in spite of this grave fault the book abounds in interest. It contains a full account of the slave-trade, past and present, a description of the principal European settlements on the African coast, a sketch of all that has been done by the Wesleyan Missions there, with biographical accounts of all the Missionaries (Wesleyan) who have died in that important field of labour. As the author was himself two years in this perilous service, he is well acquainted with the coast, and has penetrated farther into the interior than any European now living; he is well entitled to speak on the subject, and we bespeak for him an attentive and favourable hearing.

ULLMANN'S "*Gregory of Nazianzum*" has been translated by G. V. Cox, M. A., and published in a neat 12mo. volume by Parker, London. (318 pp.) We regret to say that it does not include the dogmatic part, or the statement and examination of Gregory's theological opinions; but it is yet a most interesting and instructive biography, furnishing a valuable contribution to the ecclesiastical history of the fourth century.

WE have repeatedly spoken of the excellence, in its peculiar line, of the "*Journal of Sacred Literature,*" (London: R. B. Blackader,) edited by *John Kitto, D. D.*, and are now glad to announce to our readers that arrangements have been made for its regular distribution in this country, at a comparatively low price. Messrs. Crosby, Nichols & Co., Boston, have been appointed general agents for the work, and will supply it at $1 25 per number, or at $5 00 per annum. Subscriptions are also received by C. S. Francis & Co., New-York. The following statement of the contents of the number for January, 1852, will give an idea of the general scope and aims of the Journal. Art. I. treats of the "Relative authority of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures of the Old Testament," and gives a high, yet well-sustained estimate of the value of the Septuagint version—not indeed as *inspired*, but as of use to correct the Hebrew original whenever there is good ground to believe it is corrupted. The writer carefully investigates all the citations of the Old Testament in the New, and gives us the following result:—

Of the 225 quotations contained in the New Testament Scriptures, there are,—

1. Quotations agreeing *verbatim* with the Septuagint, and agreeing also with the Hebrew..... 129
2. Quotations agreeing with the Septuagint *verbatim*, except that a synonymous word occurs once in two or three lines; or some other equally trifling variation exists..... 39
3. Quotations agreeing, either *verbatim*, or nearly so with the Septuagint, but differing in sense, more or less, from the Hebrew..... 22

Total Septuagint quotations..... 190

4. Quotations agreeing neither with the Hebrew nor the Greek..... 27
5. Quotations agreeing with the Hebrew, but not with the Septuagint... 8

Art. II. on "the Ministry of Angels," reviews in order the principal passages of Scripture relating to the subject. Art. III. "Solomon's Song," is reprinted from an article by Prof. Stowe in the American Biblical Repository for April, 1847. Art. IV. is a candid examination (in fact the only intelligent and candid one that we have seen) of Mr. Forster's book on the Sinaitic Inscriptions, ("*The one primeval language*, &c., by Rev. C. Forster.") Art. V. discusses the "Serpent" of Genesis, and endeavours to show that it is to be regarded as a name of Satan, and not as descriptive of the creature in whose form he appeared, or which he used as an instrument in the temptation. Art. VI. is the conclusion of an elaborate and erudite article on the "Rephaim," commenced in the October number of the Journal. Art. VII. treats of the "Characteristics of Miracles," with special reference to the claims of the Popish Miracles, (so called.) Art. VIII. is a review of Ferguson's "Palaces of Nineveh and Persepolis restored;" and Art. IX. of Fairbairn's Exposition of Ezekiel. Art. X. is a critical examination of Matt. v, 21, 22. The number closes with Correspondence, Notices of Books, and a large amount of valuable literary and theological intelligence.

The thirty-third volume of the "Library of the Fathers, translated by members of the English Church," (London: J. H. Parker,) contains the first part of Chrysostom on the Acts; and the thirty-fourth volume gives Chrysostom's Homilies on St. Matthew, Part III.

"Pool's Annotations on the Holy Bible" (in three volumes imperial octavo) has heretofore been sold at three guineas; but the publishers announce an edition to be ready early in June, equal in all respects to that now on sale, for *one guinea and a half* to all purchasers who shall apply before the first of May, (R. B. Blackader, 13 Paternoster Row, London.)

We have received a copy of "*The Chronological New Testament*, in which the Text of the Authorized Version is newly divided into Paragraphs and Sections, with the Dates and Places of Transactions marked, the Marginal Renderings of the Translators, many parallel illustrative Passages printed at length, a brief Introduction to each Book, and a running Analysis of the Epistles." (London: R. B. Blackader, 13 Paternoster Row.) The project of issuing such an edition had its origin in a conviction that something could be done to make our invaluable English version more intelligible to devout students of the word of God, by helps in arrangement and printing. The divisions into chapters and verses (being entirely of human origin) have, in this edition, been retained solely for the purpose of reference, —custom having sanctioned their use; but they have been made subordinate to another arrangement into paragraphs and sections, according to the subject-matter; and these sections have, by means of figures placed over each, been put into chronological order. An index is supplied at the end showing where any section is to be found. Quotations from the Old Testament have been distinguished by being printed in capitals, and speeches have been denoted by inverted commas.

Mr. T. K. Arnold has just issued a "*First Hebrew Book*," (London, Rivington, 12mo., 250 pp.,) which has many good points to recommend it to the use of beginners in Hebrew. Another book (which, however, we have not seen) gives promise of utility to students, viz.: "*An Analysis and Critical Interpretation of the Hebrew Text of the Book of Genesis*, preceded by a Hebrew Grammar and Dissertations on the Genuineness of the Pentateuch and on the Structure of the Hebrew Language. By the Rev. W. Paul, A.M." 8vo., 520 pp.

Dr. Robinson's "*Greek Lexicon to the New Testament*" has been reprinted in England—and has also been abridged there "for the use of schools and students."

We have noticed Mr. Conant's excellent translations of Neander's Practical Exposition of Philippians and James, and now observe that both have been translated, at the same time, in Edinburgh, by Rev. Alexander Napier.

Dr. James Thomson's Expository Lectures on St. Luke are now completed in three volumes, 8vo. (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black.)

The third volume of Clark's "Foreign Theological Library" (Edinburgh) for 1851, has Olshausen and Wiesinger's Commentary on Philippians, Titus, and 1st Timothy. The fourth volume has Hengstenberg on

the Revelation of St. John, vol. I. This work has now been going on for six years,—each year with increased success. Subscriptions are still received—seven guineas for seven years' issues up to the end of 1852.

We continue our summaries of the contents of the principal European Theological Journals:—

Kitto's Journal of Sacred Literature, for January:—I. The Relative Authority of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures of the Old Testament: II. The Ministry of Angels: III. Solomon's Song: IV. The Voice of Israel from the Rock of Sinai: V. The Serpent: VI. The Rephaim: VII. Characteristics of Miracles: VIII. Ancient Oriental Palaces: IX. The Last Vision of Ezekiel: X. Reconsidered Texts—Correspondence.

Eclectic Review, for *January*:—I. Early Independency: II. Homœopathy, a Topic of the Day: III. Memoir of Bishop Stanley: IV. Walpole's Assassins of the East: V. Francis's History of English Railways: VI. Life and Writings of Dr. Chalmers: VII. Prentice's Personal Recollections—The Manchester School of Politics: VIII. A Page of French History, December, 1851. *February*:—I. Railways to India: II. The Lives of the Saints: III. Military Memoirs of Colonel Skinner: IV. Maurice on the Old Testament: V. Sir John Richardson's Arctic Expedition: VI. D'Israeli's Lord George Bentinck: VII. Napoleon and War: VIII. Humboldt's Cosmos: IX. The Projected Parliamentary Reform. *March*:—I. The Genius and Writings of Bunyan: II. Liberia and American Colonization: III. Sir James Stephen's Lectures on French History: IV. The Poetical Works of J. Edmund Reade: V. Bishop Philpotts: VI. Lord Mahon's History of England: VII. Hildebrand and the Excommunicated Emperor.

Prospective Review, for February:—I. John Sterling, Carlyle, and Hare: II. National Education: III. Ethics of the Voluntary System—Spence's Social Statics: IV. Violenzia—a Tragedy: V. Bailey's Theory of Reasoning: VI. Norica; or, Tales of Nürnberg from the Olden Time.

Among the new works in theology and kindred topics recently announced on the continent are the following, viz.:—

Geschichte der Kirche von der französischen Revolution bis auf die Gegenwart, von *Jos. Ign. Ritter*, Prof. d. Theol. an der Univ. Breslau. (155 pp., 8vo.) Bonn, 1851.

Der welthistorische Zweifel, oder: Ist Gott nur Idee oder objective Realität? Von *K. F. E. Trahndorff*. Mit einem Vorwort von Dr. *R. Stier*. (200 pp., 8vo.) Barmen, 1852.

Martha und Maria. Die innere Mission und die Kirche, von *Bruno Lindner*, Dr. u. Prof. d. Theol., u. Frühprediger zu St. Pauli in Leipzig. (94 pp., 8vo.) Leipzig, 1851.

AMERICAN.

Moses Stuart died at his residence, Andover, Mass., on Sunday evening, January 4th, 1851. There have been greater men and greater theologians in America, but none whose services to theology have been so numerous and so timely. In more senses than one Moses Stuart not only marked, but *made* an epoch in American and even in English theology.

Born at Wilton, Conn., in 1780, he passed his early years on a farm, gathering such knowledge as an inquisitive mind could pick up from observation and from scanty books. At fourteen years of age he went to the Norwalk academy, and there, of his own motion, commenced the study of Latin. At seventeen he entered the Sophomore class of Yale College, and soon distinguished himself by his industry in study and by versatility of talent. The course of study at Yale was then meagre enough, but he made the most of it. In 1799 he graduated with the highest honours of his class, and soon commenced the study of law, which he prosecuted for two years, occupying himself, at the same time, in school-teaching. In 1802 he was admitted to the bar, and soon after assumed the duties of a tutorship in Yale College, and taught there for a year or more. The following account of his conversion we take from the *New-Englander*, (Feb., 1852.)

"At the time of his admission to the bar, inquiries and studies of another sort were already beginning to engross his attention.

"President Dwight was accustomed in those days to read occasionally at evening prayers, a chapter from the translation in Macknight on the Epistles. Something in that exercise had interested Mr. Stuart; and he began to study the Scriptures on the Sabbath, borrowing for that purpose from the President a volume of Macknight. As he read, an interest deeper than any merely intellectual inquiry was excited; his religious consciousness was beginning to

be awakened. Presently his Sabbath-day study of the Scriptures was continued into the week; his ardent and impetuous mind felt itself grappling with infinite realities; religion had become to him a matter of immediate inquiry; his personal reconciliation to God was to him the greatest of all concerns, and the foremost of all duties. He saw in Christ, as in a glass, the glory of God; and thus his views of life and of the world, and all his plans of activity in life, were changed. After a little study of theology under the guidance of President Dwight, and the writing of a single metaphysico-theological dissertation, which, with a text prefixed, was made to answer as a sermon at his examination for licensure, he was duly "approbated" by the Association, and commended to the Churches as a candidate for the ministry of the Gospel. Having written another sermon, (from 2 Kings ii, 12,) he began to preach. This was about the close of the year 1804."

In 1806 Mr. Stuart was ordained and called to the charge of the First Congregational Church in New-Haven, in which he succeeded the venerable Dr. Dana. His preaching was (it is said) like a new revelation to the people; his earnestness, freshness, freedom from all mere clerical trammels—and above all, his spirituality and zeal, soon breathed new life into the congregation. He served this church four years, and during that time more than 200 names were added to its list of members. In 1809 the foundations of the Theological Seminary at Andover, (the first school of the kind in America,) were laid, and Mr. Stuart was invited to the Professorship of Sacred Literature, which he accepted, with few qualifications, however, except industry, talent, and energy. The following statements are taken from Prof. Park's discourse on the death of Prof. Stuart, as reported in the *Congregationalist*.

"In January, 1810, he was inaugurated Professor of Sacred Literature in this Theological Seminary. His knowledge of the Hebrew then enabled him to translate, with the aid of Parkhurst's Lexicon, only five or six chapters of Genesis and a few Psalms. His acquaintance with the Greek language was far from being extensive. He was to be a self-made man. In about two years he prepared a Hebrew Grammar without the points, for the immediate use of his pupils. They were obliged to copy it day by day from his written sheets. In the third year he published it, at his own expense. To print a Hebrew Grammar was then a strange work. He was compelled to set up the types for about half the paradigms of verbs with his own hands. He taught the printers their art. Is he not fitly termed the father of Biblical philology in our land? That grammar he afterwards enlarged and improved in successive editions, and the labour which he has expended upon it would have filled up half the life of an ordinary man.

In consulting Schleusner's Lexicon he met, here and there, a German word. No one could explain to him its meaning. His curiosity was aroused. At an exorbitant price he obtained the apparatus for German study, and in a single fortnight had read the entire Gospel of John in that language. Self-taught, he persevered through Seiler's Biblische Hermeneutik, and this work introduced him to the wide range of German literature. He felt himself to be in a new world. It was that one volume which, through the generosity of the trustees of the institution, enabled him to fill our library with the richest collection of German treatises then in the land. For ten years, he performed the rugged work of a pioneer, and in his maturer life he often said, that he did not know how to begin the study of the Bible until he was forty years old. For forty years he had been in the wilderness. He entered late in life upon the promised possession. Nor was he merely alone in the efforts of the first ten years of his professorship. To have been simply friendless would have been to him a relief. But the suspicions of good men were excited with regard to the results of his German study. He endured the whisperings of his brethren. Many of them met him with an averted face. Dark predictions were uttered concerning him, but he kept his eye fixed upon the distant goal. Morning after morning, he sallied forth from his house at five o'clock, through rain, hail, snow, storm, and as his attenuated figure breasted the winds of our cold winters, it seemed a type of his spirit, encountering manfully the opposition not of foes only, but of friends. The time at length arrived for developing the influence of his communion with the Teutonic mind. The Unitarian faith had acquired a dominant influence in our commonwealth. Buckminster and Channing had commended it by the graces of their style, and by the beauties of their character. The celebrated Baltimore sermon had begun to attract a general admiration. At this crisis, Prof. Stuart published his Letters to Dr. Channing. The first edition was exhausted in a single week. Two other editions rapidly followed. His opponents admitted and admired his learning. His friends confessed their error in resisting his German progress. They felt the importance of it for the Church. Before his day, scarcely one of our divines was acquainted with German literature. He has made it common. With a great sum, he obtained for us this freedom."

Of Prof. Stuart's long career at Andover, as teacher and author, we have not room to

speak at length. No man ever taught with greater success—not because he was more learned or more accurate than all others, for in these respects he had his superiors; but because he possessed that most precious of gifts for a teacher—the power of inspiring his pupils with his own enthusiasm. His scholars number fifteen hundred men, scattered over all the earth as preachers, teachers, and missionaries: and of them all, few could be found to forget their obligations to the spirit and the teachings of Moses Stuart. With broken health he worked on unremittingly year after year—studying with the ardent zeal of youth up to old age—ever vigorous, hopeful, and delighting in his work. He was able of late years to devote but three or four hours of each day to work—but it was *work*, and its fruits remain. His published works amount to twenty-three or four volumes, besides many hundred pages of reviews, essays, and pamphlets. Compelled in 1848 by wasted health to relinquish the active duties of his professorship, he still continued to study and to write, and but a few days before his death he corrected the final proofsheets of a Commentary on the Book of Proverbs. A fall on the ice, followed by a severe cold, confined him to his bed, and typhus fever set in. In a few days it was clear that his work was done.

"When asked whether he retained his confidence in the great system of truth which he had defended, his emphatic reply was, 'Yes.' 'Have you any doubts with regard to your former principles?' His answer was, 'No. I have long since learned,' he said, 'that feelings in religious experience are deceptive. I look mainly to my life for my evidence. I think my first aim in life has been to glorify God, and that I have been ready to labour and suffer for him.'

"When afflicted with severe pains he loved to repeat the words, 'Wearisome days and nights hast thou appointed unto me.' He had thought of death long and carefully. He was familiar with it. He was ready for it. It was less even than a Sabbath day's journey. When he heard the hope expressed that his last sickness would be unto life, and not unto death, he replied, 'Unto the glory of God, but unto death. I am prepared to die. Lord, have mercy, but thy will be done!'"

A critical survey of Professor Stuart's works will be, for us, a pleasant duty at a fitting time.

Messrs. Derby and Miller, Auburn, N.Y. propose to publish the "Complete Works of James Arminius, D. D.," partly from Nichols's translation, and partly in a new translation by the Rev. W. R. Bagnall, M.A., of the New-England Conference. The whole work will be comprised in two octavo volumes of 500 pages each, well printed on fair type, and bound in cloth, and will be sold at the low price of $5,00 per set.

The following is the *Table of Contents:* I.—Orations—1. The object of Theology. 2. The Author and End of Theology. 3. The Certainty of Sacred Theology. 4. The Priesthood of Christ. 5. On reconciling Religious Dissensions among Christians. II.—A Declaration of his Sentiments on Predestination, Divine Providence, the Freedom of the Will, the Grace of God, the Divinity of the Son of God, and the Justification of Man before God; delivered by Arminius before the States of Holland. III.—The Defence of Arminius against thirty-one Articles, in which he was charged with Novelty and Heresy on the subject of Religion. IV.—The Answers of Arminius to nine questions proposed to him, with the other Professors of Divinity at Leyden, by the Curators of the University. V.—Twenty-five Public Disputations or Lectures on some of the principal subjects of the Christian Religion; delivered in the University of Leyden. VI.—Seventy-nine Private Disputations on the principal articles of the Christian Religion, commenced by Arminius as the ground-work of a Body of Divinity. VII.—A Dissertation on the true and genuine sense of the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. VIII.—A Letter to Hippolytus a Collibus on the Divinity of the Son of God, the Providence of God, Divine Predestination, Grace and Free-Will, and Justification. IX.—Twenty-nine Articles, to be diligently examined and weighed. X.—A Letter to John Wytenbogard, on the Sin against the Holy Ghost. XI.—The friendly discussion of Arminius and Francis Junius concerning Predestination. XII.—An Examination of the Treatise of William Perkins, a distinguished Calvinistic writer of England, on the mode and order of Predestination, and the extent of Divine Grace. XIII.—An Analysis of the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

We are glad to see a "*Manual for Missionaries and Superintendents of Missions under the care of the Methodist Episcopal Church*, prepared, we presume, by the Missionary Secretary and published in pamphlet form by order of the Board. It contains a fund of practical details in regard to the qualifications and duties of missionaries and their relations to the Board and to the Church.

THE "*Annual Report of the Sunday-School Union of the Methodist Episcopal Church*" shows a gratifying increase in the usefulness of that excellent institution, and in the general work of Sunday schools during the past year. As usual, the New-Jersey Conference takes the lead in the amount of contributions to the funds of the Sunday-School Union. The statistics for the year fall below the real facts—yet they show an increase of 685 schools, of 8,721 officers and teachers, of 43,723 scholars, and of 143,475 volumes in libraries. This interest may now be regarded as thoroughly established in the affections of the Church.

The Sunday-School Union has also issued "*A Brief Exposition of the Character, Operations, and Claims of the Sunday-School Union of the Methodist Episcopal Church*," which will serve a most useful purpose in making known the extent of our Sunday-school operations and their relations to the Church in all its branches.

Rev. H. J. Fox and Rev. W. B. Hoyt are preparing a volume under the title of "*Quadrennial Register of the Methodist Episcopal Church and Universal Church Gazetteer*," the plan and importance of which may be inferred from the following outline of its prepared contents:—A Map of the Territory included within the Bounds of the Methodist Episcopal Church, with Conference and District Boundaries, and the location of the Stations; the important parts of the Discipline, with Dates of the Alterations and Modifications; Outlines of the History of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Colleges, Theological Schools, Seminaries, Missionary Society, Sunday-School Union, Book Concern, Church Papers, Periodicals, &c., Annual Conferences, Dates of Formations, Names of Officers, Presiding Elders, Deacons, those on Trial, Station, Numbers in Society, Monies raised by Districts, per member. General Information of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South; Wesleyan Church; Canada Church; Smaller Wesleyan denominations; other Churches; Laws of the different States, affecting Ministers or the Church—as on Taxes, Marriages, Trustees, &c., &c.

The work will appear soon after the close of the next General Conference.

We continue our summaries of the contents of American Theological Journals:—

Theological and Literary Journal, (New-York,) January:—I. Fairburn's Typology of Scripture: II. Origin of the Sabbath III. Interpretation of Scripture: IV. Designation and Exposition of the Figures of Isaiah: V. The Fulness of Time: VI. Order of the Principal Events which are to precede Christ's Coming.

Brownson's Review, (Boston,) for January:—I. Christianity and Heathenism: II. Willitoft, or the Days of James I., a Tale: III. Piratical Expedition against Cuba: IV. Continental Prospects: V. Sick Calls; from the Diary of a Missionary Priest.

Quarterly Review of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, for January:—I. English Infidelity: II. Ralph Waldo Emerson: III. Egyptian Archæology: IV. Jewish Sacrifices: V. Pulpit Hermeneutics: VI. The Rule of Faith.

Bibliotheca Sacra, (Andover,) January:—I. Resurrection of the Body: II. The Sin-Offering: III. Hebrew Criticisms: IV. The Four Gospels and the Hegelian Assaults upon them: V. Kingdom of Congo and the Roman Catholic Missionaries: VI. Theology of Richard Baxter: VII. New England Theology.

Church Review, (New-Haven,) for January:—I. Value of the Christian Fathers: II. Haliburton, Hildreth, and the North American Review: III. American Episcopate before the Revolution: IV. Church Lands in Vermont: V. Biographical Notice of Rev. William Crosswell, D. D.: VI. Humphrey's History of the Propagation Society.

Christian Review, (New-York,) for January:—I. Doctrine of Original Sin: II. Epicurus: III. Distinguishing Features of the Baptist Denomination: IV. Unity of the Race in its Higher Relations: V. Permanency of American Institutions: VI. Works of Dr. Williams: VII. Robert Southey.

Messrs. Lane & Scott are about to publish two valuable works, one in the department of Biblical Literature, "*A New Harmony and Exposition of the Gospels*, consisting of a combined and parallel arrangement, on a new plan, of the narratives of the four Evangelists, according to the authorized translation; and A Continuous Commentary, with brief notes subjoined. With a Supplement, containing Extended Chronological and Topographical Dissertations, and a complete Analytical Index. Illustrated by Maps and Engravings. By James Strong, A. M.;" the other a work of great interest to the Methodist Episcopal Church, viz., "*The Economy of Methodism Illustrated and Defended: in a Series of Papers.* By T. E. Bond, Sen., M. D."

Classical and Miscellaneous.

EUROPEAN.

The eighth and concluding volume of the translation of "Schlosser's History of the Eighteenth Century and of the Nineteenth till the overthrow of the French Empire, with special reference to Mental Cultivation and Progress" has appeared in London. It is furnished with copious indexes to the whole work.

B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, announces a new edition of Sophocles from the text of Dindorf, with a Latin version. The first volume contains Ajax, Electra, Œdipus Rex; the second, Œdipus Coloneus, Antigone, Trachiniæ, Philoctetes. The whole work costs about $2.

Mr. Archibald Alison is preparing for publication "The History of Europe, from the Fall of Napoleon in 1815 to the re-establishment of Military Government in France, in 1851."

By the provisions of the last copyright agreement between France and England not only are reprints of English Copyright Works in France, but even the introduction of those from America, Holland, or any other country prohibited. This measure will materially affect the publishers of the United States, and will prove eventually, perchance, of service in bringing about a similar treaty between the American and English governments.

We have received a prospectus for a new edition of the writings of the Dutch Philosopher, Hemsterhuys, under the title "*Œuvres Philosophiques de François Hemsterhuis*, nouvelle édition, augmentée de plusieurs pièces inédites, de notes et d'une étude sur l'auteur et sa philosophie, par L. S. P. Meyboom, Docteur en Théologie." The work will be published at Utrecht, and completed in three volumes, with portrait, at $3 50.

The following sketch of editors and contributors to some of the English Reviews, is taken from a recent number of the *London Critic*:—

Although The Edinburgh still preserved a title which seemed to connect it intimately with Scotland, it had, some time before 1842, ceased to be in any sense a Scotch Review. Not only was it published in London, but its editor was an Englishman, and never in any way very peculiarly Scotch, especially under the influence of a light cosmopolitan thinker like Jeffrey, it was now in no way to be distinguished from the professedly English *Quarterly*, save by the difference of its political tone. But in 1842 there happened an event which shook Scotland from its circumference to its centre. In the May of that year, two or three hundred members of the General Assembly took sad and solemn leave of their old ecclesiastical parliament, and, with Dr. Chalmers at their head, set up the "Free Kirk." The chief "organ" of the disruption was an Edinburgh newspaper called *The Witness*, conducted with considerable nerve and talent by Hugh Miller, of *Old Red Sandstone* notoriety, a man great no less in theology than in geology, whom his native abilities and Lady Gordon Cumming, of Altyre, herself geological, and mother to the South African lion-hunter, had helped up from a very humble obscurity. *The Edinburgh*, of course, looked coldly, and *The Quarterly* inimically on the seceders; and the friendly zeal in their behalf of Mr. John Robertson, in the pages of *The Westminster*, was of too purely secular a kind for the chiefs of the Free Kirk. After two years, when it had been found that the most potent furtherer of the secession was not any minister, however eloquent, or any layman, however influential, but a mere newspaper like *The Witness*, it was resolved to start a quarterly organ, and to call it The North British Review. Noblemen and gentlemen, enthusiastic for the Free Kirk, like the Marquis of Breadalbane, and Mr. Campbell of Monzi, subscribed funds. Mr. Blackie, the Glasgow publisher, and Mr. Cowan, the Edinburgh papermaker, gave their aid. It was this Mr. Cowan that ousted Macaulay at the last Edinburgh election. He guaranteed the carrying on of the speculation for a certain period.

A Dr. Welch, who had suffered losses in the cause of the Free Kirk, who was a writer in *The Edinburgh Review*, and the biographer of Dr. Thomas Brown, was selected as the editor. Indeed, it was something done to him that heated the Free Kirk enthusiasm so as to boil over and form *The North British Review*. Dr. Welch, when the disruption took place, was "Moderator," that is, President or Speaker of the General Assembly, Professor of Church History in the University of Edinburgh, and Secretary, with a salary of five hundred pounds per annum, to the Scotch Bible Board. At the secession he of course cheerfully surrendered the Moderatorship and the Professorship, but saw no reason to surrender the lucrative Secretaryship, of which, however, Sir James Graham took the liberty of forcibly relieving him. Whereon *The North*

British was hastened into existence. Welch was a man of ability and tact, and began operations with a promising staff of veterans and others. He did not fall into the error which, in his circumstances, might have easily been committed, that of making his review too theological. His great gun, Dr. Chalmers himself, fired off articles chiefly on politico-economical subjects, his first being one on Sterling's *Philosophy of Trade;* but his most famous was that on Morell's *History of Philosophy*, which was considered as an annihilating manifesto against Continental speculation. In physical science, the biographies of its heroes, and books of scientific travel, Sir David Brewster, the noted *savant*, was mainly depended on; he wrote the papers on Cuvier, Humboldt's *Cosmos*, Watt, Cavendish, and the like, and is still a contributor. Hugh Miller led off his series of performances by a vivid paper in which herring-fishing was made poetical. Mr. Moncrieff, now lord advocate, reviewed Jeffrey's *Essays*, the first of a set on the light literature of the day. Dr. Heugh, of Glasgow, recommended "Christian Union," and Welch himself dealt with Archbishop Whately. Among the early contributors too, if we are not mistaken, was Dr. Samuel Brown, of Edinburgh, a singular and gifted individual. With the zeal of an old alchemist, (but with a purer enthusiasm,) he has been occupied many years in endeavouring to effect the mutual transmutation of some of the primary chemical elements, and by some of the good people of Edinburgh is looked upon as one in search of the philosopher's stone. He is a man, however, of sane, clear, and subtle understanding, of varied accomplishments, and deeply versed in his own science, the chair of which, in the Edinburgh University, he narrowly missed attaining. He sometimes lectures with success in public; he published, a good many years ago, a series of tracts by "Victorious Analysis," with a high and beautiful meaning, and more recently the tragedy of *Galileo Galilei;* and so he lives on there, in Edinburgh, with one believing and helpful disciple, a life of scientific romance in an age of scientific prose. But to return. In religion, the aid had been secured of the well-known Isaac Taylor, the author of *The Natural History of Enthusiasm*, and of *Wesley and Methodism*. So that, on the whole, *The North British Review* started under very good auspices, and with very fair promises of success.

Dr. Welch died the year after he had commenced the labours of editorship, and it passed into the hands, for a short time, of Mr. E. Maitland, an Edinburgh advocate, whence it was received by Dr. Hanna, the biographer and son-in-law of Dr. Chalmers; so that three of our chief reviews were being conducted by sons-in-law of distinguished men—*The Quarterly*, by Mr. Lockhart, a son-in-law of Sir Walter Scott's; *The Edinburgh*, by Mr. Empson, a son-in-law of Lord Jeffrey's; *The North British*, by Dr. Hanna, a son-in-law of Dr. Chalmers'; while a son of James Mill was editing *The London* and *Westminster*. So powerful, even in literature, is the hereditary principle! Somewhat more than a year ago, *The North British* ceased to be edited by Dr. Hanna, and was transferred to Professor Fraser, its present conductor. This gentleman is the son of an Argyleshire minister, was educated for the Scotch Church, at the Edinburgh University, where he was a favourite student of Dr. Chalmers, whom he followed into the Free Kirk to become professor of Logic in its metropolitan college. In England, as well as in Scotland, *The North British* is said to be doing well among reviews, not at present a very prosperous class of publications. In politics, its principles are liberal; it recognises the interest and importance of the new social theories, without committing itself to any of them. It acknowledges the right of the State to supervise industrial arrangements, and tends towards the advocacy of a general system of education; altogether its religious views are orthodox, without, however, being sectarian. In addition to the contributors already named, we can mention that most shrewd and hearty observer, Mr. Samuel Laing, the Norway tourist; Principal Cunningham, and Professors Fleming and McDougall, of Edinburgh; Dr. Hamilton, the earnest minister of the National Scotch Church in Regent's Square; Dr. Kitto, versed in Palestine; Thomas de Quincey, who has contributed some half-dozen articles or so, among them a striking one on Pope; the Rev. Charles Kingsley, the author of *Alton Locke*, whose hand we recognised mauling Festus-Bailey; and Mr. Anthony Panizzi, the Librarian of the British Museum, who writes upon Italian literature and Italian affairs, and in a review of Sir Harris Nicolas's *Nelson Despatches*, is said to have "settled" the question whether our naval hero was right or wrong in hanging some Neapolitan prince or other. Indeed, the library of the British Museum sends more than one contributor to *The North British*. Thus Mr. John Jones lately explained in its pages the system pursued in his own department, and there, too, figures Mr. Coventry Patmore, whose ingenious and subtle essays on architecture are, we confess, more to our taste than his poetry. Last, not least, among the contributors to *The North British*, is Mr. David Masson, a searching and meditative writer, chiefly on social topics, yet the critic, too, of Wordsworth and Carlyle's *Latter-Day Pamphlets*. But stop—we are forgetting one of the cleverest articles that have been recently published in any review—that on "The Literary Profession," which appeared about a year ago, and is from the pen of a Mr. John W. Kaye, of whom we are likely to hear more.

It had been one of the designs of *The North British* to secure the support of the English Dissenters, but this was soon found to be impossible. Stimulated by the appearance of *The North British*, some wealthy English Dissenters founded THE BRITISH QUARTERLY REVIEW, the first number of which came out in February, 1845, then, as now, under the editorship of Dr. Vaughan. The doctor is the Principal of the Lancashire Independent College, a leader of the Congregational dissenters, and formerly preached in a chapel at Kensington. He writes a great deal in his own review, and chiefly with the aim of diminishing the influence of such living authors of renown as he considers, from their insinuating scepticism, dangerous to the faith of the rising generation. The more marked of his papers in this branch are those on Theodore Parker, Emerson, and Carlyle. Yet an article from his pen in one of the earliest numbers of his review, entitled, "The Priesthood of Letters," said a good many things which were looked on by his friends as far too bold. In theological and biblical literature he has had the assistance of Dr. Davidson, likewise of the Independent College. In political and social economy, a good deal has been done by that striking mediocrity, Mr. Edward Baines, the editor of *The Leeds Mercury*. Mr. Edwards, formerly of the British Museum, and now at the head of the Manchester Free Library, contributed an instructive paper on public libraries. And here, too, in these dashing sketches of Macaulay, Carlyle, and D'Israeli, do we not once more recognise the hand of the omnipresent Mr. Lewes?

The same month of the same year that witnessed the birth of *The British Quarterly*, welcomed to the light the first number of THE PROSPECTIVE REVIEW, the organ of English Unitarianism, as the other is of orthodox dissent. This small and modest-looking publication has been and is managed by a trio of Lancashire Unitarian ministers, the Rev. John James Tayler of Manchester, and the Rev. Messrs. Thom and Martineau of Liverpool. In general talent, although it is of a refined rather than of a vigorous kind, Mr. Tayler is considered to stand at the head of his class; and certainly none of his brethren have produced a work displaying as much acumen as his *Retrospect of the Religious Life of England*, although as sermons many Unitarians would rank Mr. Martineau's *Endeavours after the Christian Life* higher than Mr. Tayler's *Christian Aspects of Faith and Duty*. But we must leave these questions of precedency to more competent judges, and conclude with saying, that while *The Prospective*, by the nature of the case, circulates almost exclusively among the sect of whose doctrines it is the organ, yet it occasionally contains articles on neutral topics which, from their calm elegance of style and discriminating intellectuality, might be perused with pleasure by even the most orthodox.

The contents of the chief English Reviews in General Literature since our last, are as follows:—

Edinburgh Review, for January:—I. Genius and Writings of Descartes: II. Bishop Philpotts: III. Recent Progress of Legislation: IV. Church Music: V. International Copyright: VI. Palgrave's History of Normandy and England: VII. Ordnance Map of England: VIII. The Expected Reform Bill.

Irish Quarterly Review, for December:—I. Haliburton's English in America: II. Maria Edgeworth: III. A Glance at the Past and Present Condition of Ireland—the Exodus: IV. Celtic Records of Ireland: V. Mr. Dempsey's Experiences of the Landed Interest: VI. The Poor Law in Ireland: VII. Ruskin and the Pre-Raphaelists:—*March*:—I. History of the Streets of Dublin: II. D'Israeli's Biography of Bentinck—Free Trade and No Trade: III. Mitford's Literary Recollections: IV. Maturin: V. Sam Slick's American Humour: VI. Irish Church History.

London Quarterly, for January:—I. Russian and German Campaigns: II. Kew Gardens: III. Physiognomy: IV. Junius: V. Highland Destitution and Irish Emigration: VI. Sir Robert Heron's Notes: VII. Italy: VIII. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte.

Westminster Review, January:—I. Representative Reform: II. Shell-fish—their Ways and Works: III. The Relation between Employers and Employed: IV. Mary Stuart: V. Latest Continental Theory of Legislation: VI. Julia Von Krüdner as Coquette and Mystic: VII. The Ethics of Christendom: VIII. Political Questions and Parties at Home: IX. Contemporary Literature of England: X. Retrospective Survey of American Literature: XI. Contemporary Literature of America: XII. Contemporary Literature of Germany: XIII. Contemporary Literature of France.

AMONG the new works in Classical and General Literature recently announced in England are the following:—

History of the Whig Ministry of 1830 to the Passing of the Reform Bill, by J. A. Roebuck, M. P. 2 vols., 8vo.:—Life in Bombay, and the neighbouring out-stations. Royal 8vo., with numerous Illustrations:—

The Earl of Albemarle's Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham and his Contemporaries. 2 vols., 8vo.:—The Invasions and Projected Invasions of England. By E. S. Creasy, M. A. Post 8vo.:—Memoirs and Correspondence of Mallet du Pan. Collected and edited by A. Sayous. 2 vols. 8vo.:—The Court and the Desert; or, Priests, Pastors, and Philosophers. With an Introduction, by the Rev. Dr. Croly. 3 vols.:—Alfred the Great and his Place in the History of England. By Dr. R. Pauli. Edited, with an Introduction and Notes, by Thomas Wright, Esq., F. S. A., &c. Small 8vo.:—Roughing it in the Bush; or, Life in Canada. By Mrs. Moodie, (Sister of Miss Agnes Strickland.) 2 vols.:—Scenes and Adventures in Central America. Edited by Frederick Hardman, author of "Peninsular Scenes and Sketches," "The Student of Salamanca." Small 8vo.:—History of England and France under the House of Lancaster. With an Introductory View of the Early Reformation. 8vo.:—Grote's History of Greece. Vols. IX and X. From the Restoration of the Democracy at Athens, down to the Accession of Philip of Macedon, B. C. 403–359. Maps. 8vo.:—Modern India. A Sketch of the Civil System, and our Present Position. By G. Campbell, Bengal Civil Service. 8vo.:—The Illustrated Classical Manual of Mythology, Biography, and Geography, designed for the Youth of both Sexes. By W. Smith, LL. D. 200 Woodcuts. Post 8vo.:—The Grenville Papers. From the Archives at Stowe; including Mr. Grenville's Political Diary. Edited by Wm. Jas. Smith, formerly Librarian at Stowe. 2 vols., 8vo.:—Lives of the Friends and Contemporaries of Lord Chancellor Clarendon. Illustrative of Portraits in his Gallery. By Lady Theresa Lewis. 3 vols., 8vo.:—Modern India: a Sketch of the Civil Administration of India. With some Account of the Natives and Native Institutions. By George Campbell, Bengal Civil Service. 8vo.:—The First Years of the American War. By Lord Mahon. Forming vols. 5 and 6 of his History of England. 8vo.:—King Gustavus Vasa; his Adventures and Exploits. With Extracts from his Correspondence and Chronicles of his Reign. Portrait, 8vo.:—Notes on Public Subjects, made during a Tour in the United States and Canada. By Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, Esq. Post 8vo.:—The Political Works of Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. With an Original Memoir of his Life, brought down to the Present Date, drawn from Authentic Sources, Critical Notes, &c.

X.—RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH.

A MOVEMENT in favour of Lay Delegation in the judicatories of the Church has been going on for some months back. For the information of our readers, and, still more, with a view to preserve the facts for the use of the future historian of the Church, we present a summary account of all that has been done from the beginning of the movement until now.

In obedience to the call of a Committee of *Nine*, (appointed at a preparatory meeting,) a large and respectable meeting of the male members of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the city and county of Philadelphia was held in the Union church, Thursday evening, December 11th, 1851.

At this meeting the following preamble and resolutions, after discussion, were adopted by a very large majority:—

Whereas, to secure success in any great enterprise, it is deemed highly important that due respect be paid to the mind and spirit of the age upon which it is expected to make an impression:

And, whereas, in religious as well as civil governments, it is both prudent and wise to make changes and modifications to meet the wants and necessities of the times, as they may be indicated by the march of intellect and the progress of knowledge:

And, whereas, the government of the Methodist Episcopal Church was doubtless formed under the indications of Providence, and was admirably adapted to the times and circumstances in which it originated; yet, inasmuch as these have vastly changed, and equal rights, interests and dependencies, in civil, religious and social compacts,

are amongst the great principles of the age in which we live, we believe the indications of Providence are no less clear, that some alteration in its polity is essential to the accomplishment of its great mission to "spread Scriptural holiness over these lands:"

And, whereas, it is self-evident that the efforts and energy in any department of life are generally in proportion to the responsibility belonging thereto, and, applying this principle to the Church, it is equally evident that a lay representation in its councils would more certainly secure a division of the responsibilities between the ministry and laity, and thereby arouse to greater activity and usefulness the Church, greatly increase its future prosperity, and secure the honour and glory of God:

And, whereas, it behooves all men, everywhere and under all circumstances, to ask direction at the hand of Infinite Wisdom, and seek the benefit of the counsel of the wise and prudent; we therefore deem it important, in so grave a matter as a fundamental change in the government of our Church, to obtain, as far as practicable, the aid of the united wisdom and prayers of our brethren throughout the Methodist connexion; therefore,

1st. *Resolved*, That a committee, to consist of twenty persons, be appointed by the chairman of this meeting to act as an Executive Committee, whose business it shall be to adopt the necessary measures to call a General Convention, to be held in the city of Philadelphia, on Wednesday, the 3d day of March, 1852, to consist of delegates from the various stations and circuits within the bounds of our Church, to take into consideration the propriety of petitioning the General Conference, to be held in Boston, in May next, for such action in their body assembled as will secure the introduction of lay delegates into our Conferences, and such other modifications in the government of our Church, as the wisdom of the convention may suggest or agree upon.

2d. *Resolved*, That we not only disavow all intention to interfere with the episcopacy or the itinerancy of our Church, but hereby declare our determined purpose to advocate and sustain them both.

3d. *Resolved*, That we love, honour, and respect the ministry of our Church, and hesitate not in declaring our purpose to sustain them in their high and holy calling, by our sympathies, our prayers, and our means; and we sincerely invite them to co-operate with us in seeking the change contemplated.

4th. *Resolved*, That the editors in connexion with the Methodist Episcopal Church be requested to publish these proceedings, and also the call for a Convention, as provided for by the first resolution.

The Committee subsequently issued the following:

Address to the Ministry and Laity of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States.

Dear Brethren,—The undersigned, having been appointed a Committee under a resolution adopted at a meeting of male members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in the City and County of Philadelphia, held on the eleventh day of December, 1851, at the Methodist Episcopal Union Church, in the city aforesaid, deem it due to you, as well as to themselves, to make a brief exposition of the nature and objects of the present movement.

It is well known that the laity of our Church have no voice in making and modifying the laws by which, as Church members, they are governed. It is also known to many of you that this exclusion of the laity from a share in the government of the Church has been a source of discontent and agitation among its members for many years. The division which occurred in 1844, and the events which have followed that division—among which an alarming diminution in the membership of the Northern Church is not the least significant—have given new activity to this long-continued dissatisfaction.

Fearing a wide-spread disaffection in the Church, which would result in supineness, alienation, and indifference to interests, over which the laity have no control, and deeply solicitous for the welfare and prosperity of our Zion, a few of the brethren in this city assembled together to deliberate upon the propriety of adopting such measures as offered the best promise of putting this subject forever at rest. Believing that "in the multitude of counsellors there is safety," they invited five members from each station in this city to unite with them; and the meeting, thus constituted, appointed a committee of nine to call a public meeting of all the male members of the Church in the City and County of Philadelphia. At this public meeting, after a free discussion, the preceding resolutions were adopted by a large majority.

By reference to the first resolution, it will be perceived that it is no part of the duty of the undersigned to dictate to their brethren the course to be pursued by them in this movement, but simply to invite them to send delegates to a general convention of the Church to take into consideration the propriety of petitioning the next General Conference to make such changes in the law of the Church as the proposed convention may recommend.

It will, of course, devolve upon the convention to set forth its reasons for the changes which it may agree upon, and the undersigned do not feel called upon to enter upon any argument in anticipation of its action. But, as they have reason to believe that the movement is not generally understood—that it is even regarded by some of their brethren as dangerous, radi-

cal, and revolutionary, and that it will result in discord and schism—they feel bound most solemnly to disclaim any intention of marring the peace or mutilating the integrity of the Church. They go still further, and not only disclaim all interference with the episcopacy and itinerancy of the Church, but they declare their determination to advocate and sustain them both. So far from taking any step which might excite prejudice or distrust in the mind of the laity towards the ministry, it is their earnest wish to allay and remove these by bridging the gulf which separates the two orders; so far from threatening to withdraw their support from the ministry, they declare their purpose to sustain them in their high and holy calling, by their sympathies, their prayers, and their means; and so far from wishing to exclude them from participation in this movement, they cordially invite their co-operation in seeking the contemplated change.

The undersigned are met at the outset with the argument that the Church has prospered under its present form of government, and has been instrumental, under God, in bringing more than a million of souls into the fold of Christ, and that it is, therefore, unwise to disturb an organization which has worked out such glorious results. They submit, in reply, that these results have been attained, not *in consequence* of the exclusion of the laity from the councils of the Church, but *in spite* of it. They are more justly attributable to the doctrines of the Church, which address themselves to the hearts and consciences of the people, to its itinerancy, its class and prayer meetings, its mourners' bench, its earnest ministry, its zealous laity, and its facilities for reaching the poor. If the Church, by these means, has accomplished so much, with a form of government so opposed to the genius of our political institutions, how much more might it have done for the salvation of men and the glory of God, if, with the same doctrines and usages, it had had the advantage of a constitution more in harmony with the spirit of our age and people! Without detracting from the veneration felt by all Methodists for the founder of our Church, we should do well to remember that Mr. Wesley dictated our form of ecclesiastical government at a time when the principles of civil freedom, and particularly the right of the people to govern themselves, were not so well understood as at present. He formed his system of Church polity in accordance with monarchical ideas; but since that time, the great experiment of self-government has been made in this country, and what was then regarded as a doubtful trial, has now become a demonstrated fact.

The undersigned do not deny that the condition of the early members of the Church may have been such as to justify the ministry in assuming the entire legislative, judicial, and executive control; but that state of things has passed away; and, advancing with the steady progress of knowledge, the laity have attained to a degree of intellectual capacity which qualifies them to render valuable aid to their clerical brethren in the councils of the Church. They respectfully submit that the tutelage of infancy is not adapted to the condition of manhood, and that every institution should, from time to time, so modify its laws as to conform to the progressive movements of civilization. Changes to suit the exigencies of progress are written on every page of our country's history. The constitutions of nearly all the thirteen States, which originally composed our confederacy, though adapted to the wants of the period in which they were framed, have been revised and altered to meet the necessities of the present age. And while the governments of our sister Protestant Churches have been so constructed as to harmonize with our National and State institutions, the Methodist Episcopal Church alone remains indifferent to the improvements going on around it, and pertinaciously adheres to an obsolete and unprogressive system. The undersigned believe that all civil, social, and religious organizations are capable of self-government. Justice at least requires that those who *pay*, should be represented in the councils of those who *expend*.

The undersigned furthermore submit that the movement in which they are engaged, so far from being *radical*, *revolutionary*, and *dangerous*, is eminently *conservative*, *peaceful*, and *safe*. It proposes that all the usages of the Church, which have been the springs of its prosperity, shall be sacredly preserved. It contemplates no action except by the firm friends of the Church, through its legally-constituted legislature, to whose wisdom they appeal, and to whose authority they submit. It throws no firebrand of dissension within the hallowed gates of our Zion, but offers to spread oil upon the troubled waters of agitation and controversy. It disclaims all motives of ambition, and seeks the sole object of benefitting the entire Church, by drawing more closely the bonds of brotherhood between the ministry and laity. It promises to aid the ministry, by sharing its responsibilities; to infuse new energy into the laity, by giving them a direct interest and influence in the work of the Church; and to remove an objection to our polity which has driven multitudes of its most valuable members out of the Church, and prevented multitudes more from uniting with it.

The undersigned cannot suppose, for a moment, that a question of so much importance, submitted to so large a body, embracing almost every variety of mental constitution, will be acted upon without opposition. But may they not hope it will

receive from their brethren a calm and dispassionate investigation? They are far from believing that evil is the necessary result of the discussion of a great question; but they can readily see that indulgence in unholy tempers and unkind epithets, in place of a brotherly interchange of views, may result in injury to our beloved Zion. They, therefore, earnestly exhort their brethren throughout the connexion to endeavour, in the consideration of the measures proposed, to present to the Church, and to the world, the sublime spectacle of a vast brotherhood exhibiting in their discussions the legitimate fruits of our holy Christianity: "on earth peace, and goodwill toward men."

In conclusion, the undersigned submit for your consideration and action the following preamble and resolution, with their earnest prayers to the great Head of the Church, that he will so direct your hearts and minds, that your deliberations shall promote the triumphs of his gospel, and the "spread of Scriptural holiness over these lands."

Whereas, at a meeting of the members of the several Methodist Episcopal churches, in this city and county, held at Union church, the 11th December, it was deemed advisable to call a convention, to be composed of delegates from the different circuits and stations throughout the connexion; said convention to be held in this city, on the 3d of March next, to take into consideration the propriety of presenting a memorial to the next General Conference, asking for such a change in the government of our Church as will secure the introduction of lay delegates into our Conferences: therefore,

Resolved, That we recommend to the several circuits and stations throughout the Church to appoint lay delegates in such way as may be most convenient, either by separate action of the circuits and stations, or by a general meeting in such cities where there are more than one station. Provided, that not more than five delegates shall be sent from any circuit or station; but, when no appointment be made in any circuit or station, it may be represented by any member or members of the society, not exceeding five; said delegates being, in every case, at least twenty-one years of age, and three years a member of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

W. H. Allen,	Thomas W. Price,
J. J. Boswell,	Anthony Null,
John Whiteman,	Ephraim Clarke,
W. P. Tilden,	J. B. Dare,
P. R. M'Neille,	Colson Hieskell,
T. K. Collins.	J. B. Chrisman,
S. Ashmead,	A. Cummings,
John Huff,	W. P. Hacker,
Chas. B. Hare,	D. H. Kollock,
M. Cramer,	C. Perrine,

W. W. Pidgeon.

The *Convention*, thus summoned, met in the Nazareth Methodist Episcopal Church, Philadelphia, on Wednesday morning, March 3d, 1852. After devotional exercises the names of delegates were called, when about one hundred and twenty answered—representing the following churches, viz.:

St. John's Church, Philadelphia—Liberty-st. Church, Pittsburg—Sanctuary Church, Philadelphia—Ovid Church, Seneca Co., N. Y.—Wharton-street Church, Philadelphia—Chelsea Church, Mass.—Pacific-street Church, Brooklyn—Ebenezer Church, Philadelphia—Burlington Church, New-Jersey—Eighth-street Church, Philadelphia—Nazareth Church, Philadelphia—Beaver-street Church, Alleghany City—Twelfth-street Church, Philadelphia—South Common Church, Alleghany City—Smithfield-street Church, Pittsburg—First Church, Pottsville—Madison-street Church, New-York City—Niagara-street Church, Buffalo—Swan-street Church, Buffalo—Paul-street Church, Buffalo—Western Church, Philadelphia—Wesley Chapel, Washington City—Trinity Church, Philadelphia—Salem Circuit, Ohio—Kensington Church, Philadelphia—Washington-street Church, Brooklyn—Prospect-street Church, Paterson, N. J.—Ebenezer Church, Manayunk—Salem Church, Philadelphia—Mount Zion Church, Manayunk—Vestry-street Church, N. Y.—Cohocksink Church, Philadelphia—Chester Church, Pa.—Norwich Church, Vermont—Asbury Church, Philadelphia—Lehman's Chapel, Pa.—Carlisle Church, Pa.—Haddington and Monroe, Pa.—North Russel-street Church, Boston—Second Church, Pottsville—Central-street Church, Newark—Clinton-street Church, Newark—Franklin-street Church, Newark, N. J.—Putnam Station, Ohio—Union Chapel, Cincinnati—Havana Station, N. Y.

Of these delegates, part were chosen by the Churches named, and part were volunteer delegates; how large the proportion was of each, we have been unable to ascertain.

The Officers of the Convention were chosen as follows:—

President—W. H. Allen, of Girard College. *Vice-Presidents*—Colson Heiskell, of Philadelphia; W. G. Deale, of Washington City; John B. Shea, of Pittsburg; Lewis B. Loder, Brooklyn; Saml. Walker, of New-York; F. H. Root, of Buffalo; Jabez Pratt, of Boston; Dr. W. P. Tilden, of Philadelphia; W. G. Lord, of Newark; Prof. C. E. Blumenthal, of Carlisle. *Secretaries*—John B. Chrisman and George J. Hamilton, of Philadelphia; H. S. Gilbert, New York; and Saml. Norment, of Washington City.

The Convention remained in session two days, and finally passed the following preamble and resolutions:—

Whereas, This Convention is deeply impressed with the responsibility it has assumed, but is nevertheless confidently assured, as the result of its observation and information from various parts, of the extended work of Methodism, that the time has fully come when the expediency of change in our Church policy is clearly indicated by that Providence which it was always the glory of our Church, in its earlier history, to watch and follow; and

Whereas, We, as members of that Church, feel that our happiness and our hopes are identified with the prosperity and effectiveness thereof, in carrying out the great object of its mission to spread the Scriptures—holiness through all lands; and

Whereas, We believe that the feature in our Constitution which invests the clergy of our Church exclusively with legislative and governmental powers and prerogatives, is by no means essential to its prosperity, but contrariwise, very detrimental, furnishing a prolific cause of murmurings, contentions and disaffections to our own members, and a bar to the increase which, under other circumstances, would accrue to our Church; the thoughtful and considerate, in very many instances, declining to place their religious interests where they can exert no controlling influence—to say nothing of the want of resemblance to all other Protestant Churches, which, without an exception, recognise the right of the laity to participate in making and modifying the laws by which they are governed, leaving the Methodist Episcopal the only Protestant Church in the United States which refuses the co-operation of the laity in its legislative councils; and

Whereas, We verily believe that not only greater effectiveness will be secured by the change sought, a fruitful source of contentions and just cause of complaint removed, and the fair proportions and arrangements of our Zion, in comparison with other Protestant Churches, stand out in a prominent and advantageous position, but all the financial, benevolent, and charitable enterprises growing out of our economy, vastly promoted, and a fair and full remuneration to our preachers and their families rendered certain, as it ought to be. Therefore,

1. *Resolved*, That this Convention do hereby declare, that in their deliberate judgment, the Constitution of the Methodist Episcopal Church ought to be so amended as to admit the introduction of lay delegates into the General and Annual Conferences, under such restrictions as shall not conflict with the rights of the clergy in their appropriate ministerial and pastoral duties and privileges; yet so as to secure effectually the voice and influence of the laity in the legislative or rule-making department of the Church.

2. *Resolved*, That the Convention do hereby respectfully petition the General Conference to give this subject the thought and attention which its importance requires, and in accordance with the spirit and aim of the first resolution, so to modify the Discipline of our Church, as to provide for lay delegations in our General and Annual Conferences.

3. *Resolved*, That, desiring as well to save the time of the General Conference, as to facilitate the object we seek, we suggest the following general plan as, in our judgment, fully meeting the case:—First, That every circuit or station should be allowed annually, at the last Quarterly Conference for the year, or otherwise, to elect one lay delegate (who, by virtue of his election, shall be a member of the Annual Conference, with the right to vote on every question except in passing the character, or, on the trial of a preacher) for every effective minister in full connexion whom such circuit or station supports. Secondly, That the delegates thus elected, join their clerical brethren in an election at such time and in such manner as the Discipline may prescribe, in electing delegates, clerical and lay, in equal numbers, to the General Conference; the expenses of all the delegates, lay as well as clerical, to be paid as such expenses are now paid.

4. *Resolved*, That the members of this Convention are now, as they ever have been, strongly attached to the itinerancy and the episcopacy of our Church, and they earnestly recommend the General Conference to adopt any measures that may be found necessary to strengthen the latter, and perpetuate the former, as they regard them both as a great means of our past success, and essentially necessary to our future prosperity.

5. *Resolved*, That in advocating lay representation in the councils of our Church, we most earnestly disclaim any intention of marring the peace, or mutilating the integrity of the Church; and though we are most firmly convinced of the propriety of the movement, and most conscientiously believe that if carried out, it would prove one of the greatest possible blessings to the Church, yet whatever may be the immediate result, we shall not cease to love and cherish the Methodist EpiscopalChurch and its doctrines, and we shall ever respect its constitutional authorities, and acquiesce in the expressed wishes of a majority of its members.

A Committee was appointed to lay before the General Conference the Memorial and Resolutions of the Convention, and to advocate the object set forth in them to the best of their ability. The same committee was authorized to correspond with the Churches.

We have thus given a sketch of this convention and its results, and are happy to note the Christian temper and spirit in which its proceedings appear to have been conducted. As yet, the CHURCH at large has shown little sympathy with the movement. As far as can be gathered from any signs that have yet appeared, the Methodists of the United States, as a body, are fully satisfied with the present organization of the Church.

CONGREGATIONALISM, as a system, cannot go along with missionary activity. The theory breaks down inevitably when aggressive movements are needed. A new illustration is afforded in a recent call for a General *Convention* of Congregationalists proposed by the General Association of New-York. We extract the following passages from the "Circular."

DEAR SIR,—At the meeting of the General Association of New-York held in Brooklyn, in September last, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:—

"*Resolved*, That this Association respectfully suggest to Congregational ministers and Church members in the United States, the propriety of holding a General Convention or Council, to consider the relations of the Congregational Church polity to Home Missions, and generally to the spread of the gospel in this country.

"*Resolved*, That a committee be appointed to correspond with Congregationalists in other States relative to the time and means of calling such a Convention, to co-operate with similar committees that may be raised in other States, and in any event to issue a call for such a convention in the spring of 1852."

In bringing this subject to your notice, we would respectfully invite your attention to the following considerations, that led to the proposal of a GENERAL CONVENTION OF CONGREGATIONALISTS.

The work of Home Missions, so long conducted with harmony and efficiency by the union of Presbyterians and Congregationalists in the American Home Missionary Society, is in danger of being compromised by the denominational spirit now becoming rife at the West, and by the relations of the A. H. M. S. to slaveholding Churches. This is evident from the action of ecclesiastical and ministerial bodies and conventions at the West, and from the animadversions of prominent and responsible individuals upon the policy of the A. H. M. S. Many whose views are entitled to much consideration, are of opinion that the Home Missionary Society is unequal in the distribution of its funds, and that it is unduly committed to the support of slaveholding Churches: others, no less eminent for wisdom and piety, are firm in the conviction that the A. H. M. S. is administered with strict impartiality; and that in sustaining the pastors of slaveholding Churches it is doing its part for the removal of slavery, by the meliorating influence of the gospel. In these circumstances it is thought that a fraternal conference of the friends of Home Missions in the East and the West, would contribute to remove misunderstanding, and to settle the principles upon which this work should be conducted. Such a conference is proposed to be held in the year 1852, at some point from Albany to Cleveland, inclusive, to be composed of ministers and members of Congregational Churches, delegated either by ministerial or ecclesiastical bodies, or by particular Churches; the object of the convention being prayer and conference with respect to the great work of Home Missions, and the promoting of acquaintance, sympathy, and harmony among those of like faith, engaged as labourers or helpers in that work.

Such a convention is rendered more important by the fact that urgent appeals are made from the West to the East for aid in the erection of church edifices. It should be carefully considered whether this shall become a regular department of Christian benevolence.

As an index of the views of the body in which this proposal originated, we give the following extract from a report adopted in 1850:—

"While, for the sake of harmony and efficiency in the Churches of our body, as well as for the general good, we recommend the relinquishment of all *ecclesiastical* unions whatever, we would no less strongly urge the continued co-operation of Congregationalists with Christians of other denominations, in the work of Home Missions, as conducted by the American Home Missionary Society. A divisive movement in that direction would be injurious to the cause of Christ, and particularly disastrous to those by whom it should be begun. Let the principles of our order be diffused by books, discourses, and newspapers; and let Congregational Churches be planted and sustained distinctively as such, wherever that is the wish of the people; but let no movement be made, and no organization formed to propagate Congregational-ISM upon missionary ground."

Will you please lay this matter before your district Association, or other ministerial body, at its next meeting, and invite its advice and co-operation, by a committee of conference, or by correspondence with us? Your brethren in Christ,

JOS. P. THOMPSON,
HENRY W. BEECHER,
DIRCK C. LANSING.

THE

METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1852.

ART. I.—INSTAURATIO NOVA—AUGUSTE COMTE.

EVERY age has its own distinctive excellence, and boasts of the greatness of its own reformer, real or supposed. Even in the degradation and despondency of a declining civilization, the hard necessities of the times, if they fail to produce any actual relief, generate the strength to resist or the fortitude to bear the impending fate, and nurse into belief the credulous hope that some great name, on which all reliance is reposed, may prove the instrument of salvation. Nero could dream of alleviating the intolerable miseries of his subjects by the chimerical project of abolishing taxation;* and, long after the tyrant's death, the wretched populations of the Roman empire deluded themselves with the conviction that he would one day return as their deliverer.† In a more degraded age, and under an emperor almost baser than Nero, dreams of social regeneration sought for practical realization; and the pure and profound Plotinus attempted, with the sanction of Gallienus, to give effect to the visionary socialism of Plato.‡ It was in the hour of their greatest gloom and despair that Moses was sent to deliver the Israelites from the bondage under which they groaned; and every race and generation of men trusts in like manner that its Moses has appeared or will soon descend to lead it from present wretchedness to the distant and dimly apprehended land of promise. Rarely is the expectation realized; but occasionally it proves the instrument of its own fulfilment; and at times the desired renovation steals on silently, like the coming of a thief in the night, and is only recognised after its accomplishment. Most frequently, as Niebuhr truly remarks, no Moses appears, and the long agony lingers on to its close, and sinks beneath the ever-

* Muratori, Annali d'Italia. Ad ann. 58.

† Taciti Hist., lib. ii, c. viii.

‡ Sismondi, Fall of the Roman Empire, c. i.

waning hope which never ripens into fruit. Still, the belief, fluctuating but indestructible, remains—that time, and change, and circumstance, and the potency of some novel scheme, or the influence of some cherished name, will end the long sorrow, and ultimately "lead up the golden year." The reasonableness of the anticipation, and the particular form which it assumes, vary necessarily with the condition of the age in which it is entertained, and the character of the relief or advancement which may be required; and, we may add, that seldom is the belief more sincere than when it is without adequate foundation. But the natural tendency, in its diverse manifestations, whether romantically looking for the resuscitation of King Arthur, or impelling the Mormons to the Valley of the Salt Lake, produces many false hopes, and leads to the acknowledgment of many as prophets and deliverers, who have no claim to such honour, or an inadequate one. But, with the tenacious hope of better days to come, with the anxiety for some stable faith as a refuge from perplexing difficulties and constant uncertainty in regard to things human or divine, and with the perverse attachment to error once embraced, especially if recommended by novelty—which are all so pre-eminently characteristic of the human family—the blind credulity of a hasty superstition adheres more tenaciously to its newly-discovered idol, than a well-founded belief adheres to an object of legitimate veneration. It is thus the part of prudence to dispel, if possible, the haze of an impending delusion before it has gathered into a settled atmosphere of cloud; and to challenge the mission and the revelation of an alleged prophet, whom it is proposed to recognise, before his authority becomes firmly established, and his dream is consolidated into an accepted creed.

The last half-century has been singularly prolific of new schemes of philosophy—wide-sweeping and universal in their pretensions; and in new projects of social reform, designed to remodel the whole framework of society, and to induct new and purer forms of organization over the ruins of all existing institutions. Genius, learning, ingenuity, and, we will add, self-sacrificing and sincere enthusiasm, have been displayed in the construction of these vast theories. We must lament the application of such earnest zeal and such splendid intellectual powers to the overthrow of Christianity as a necessary preliminary to the attainment of the ultimate aims. It remains for the future to disclose whether the originators of these devices have attained the highest flight to which the human intellect is destined to range in the current hundred years, or have yet "dissolved the riddle of the earth;" or whether there may not be still reserved for us a nobler, juster, and more comprehensive philosophy,

from which may spring, as naturally as the fruit swells upon the tree, an adequate solution of the intellectual enigmas and social problems which now distract the times. Our own impression is that the great heresiarchs of the day are merely the first swallows of the coming spring, and are the Giordano Brunos, the Patrizzis, the Telesios, and Campanellas of an impending intellectual instauration. Certainly neither in Strauss nor Comte, neither in Schelling nor Fourier, nor in Leroux, Proudhon, nor Wronski, nor in any of the other supposed prophets of the time, are we willing to recognise the culminating intellect of the nineteenth century, until convinced by the fruitless lapse of time that we must look backward instead of forward for the great mind that is to give character to the age. But, whether this hope be a delusion or not, few of the great schemes which have been propounded in our times for the renovation of a decrepit system, whether they have belonged to the domain of politics or of metaphysics, or even of science, have failed to win for their founders the homage of a school, a sect, or a party.

But, far above all recent philosophers and reformers, in point of present prominence and prospective influence, as in point of comprehensiveness, ability, and practical skill, is the author of the system of Positive Philosophy, who has embraced within the wide scope of his contemplations, philosophy, science, politics, and practice; and who, after running through all the departments of human knowledge, except those which he had predetermined to reject, has endeavoured to augment the intellectual heritage bequeathed to us by the past, and to subserve the necessities of the present, by the construction of the new science of Sociology, which he designs to be the climax of his own labours, and the crown of all human research. The vastness of the plan, the singular ability with which it has been executed, its compact and symmetrical development, the profound results at which he has arrived, and the bold claim of universal dominion with which his system has been promulgated, have gained for Comte a party, daily increasing in numbers, and including many of the illustrious intellects of the age, who are not merely willing to follow his footsteps in particular instances, but assign to the Positive Philosophy the honour of being a new instauration, and enthusiastically hail its founder as the Bacon of the nineteenth century. The undefined hopes and the vague wants of the age are thus preparing to crystallize themselves around a recognised centre of attraction.

Having examined in former numbers of this Review the system of M. Comte as a philosophical method, and having endeavoured to determine as accurately as might be, within brief limits, its value, validity, and defects, we were naturally desirous of hasten-

ing as rapidly as possible to the consideration of its ulterior developments. We should have left nearly half our task unaccomplished, if, after pointing out what we deem to be the inherent fallacy and insufficiency of the mode, we had neglected to exhibit also the excellences and defects of the science constructed, and the practice proposed, in accordance with that mode. We were, therefore, solicitous of proceeding to the consideration of the *fruits* of the Positive Philosophy. We wished to analyze and examine M. Comte's Sociology; to review the dependant branches, which, admitting of independent treatment, have been brought within the vast sweep of that great science; to investigate, with as much sobriety and impartiality as we might be able to command, the grotesque scheme of political and social reorganization which is advocated in the République Occidentale; and to endeavour, from this wide, but by no means complete survey of M. Comte's labours, to estimate the merits and tendencies of the Positive Philosophy and its applications, in the symmetrical integrity of the mighty system. But, just as we were preparing for the execution of this task, our pen was arrested by the intelligence that the long-promised, long-expected *Système de Politique Positive*, wherein the new science of Sociology was to be revised, systematized, and definitely constituted, had issued from the Parisian press. Under these circumstances we have resolved to interrupt the continuity of our own criticism, until we can examine this important and anxiously desired work; and thus guard ourselves against the danger of either misapprehending or imperfectly apprehending the positions, the tendencies, the virtues, or the errors of the most original and *influential* portion of Comte's great enterprise. But, while we thus wait for the final exposition of the social science, we may not unprofitably employ the short interval with careful examination of the claims which M. Comte and his Positive doctrine possess to the high honour attributed to them by his zealous admirers, of being the Bacon of the age, and the second great instauration of the modern intellect. This investigation is by no means alien to the main tenor and purpose of our general inquiry; for these are points which, at some stage or other of the discussion, must demand a solution at our hands, and form a subject of anxious speculation or angry debate between the partisans of the new tenets and those who are not willing to renounce their settled convictions and cherished associations, and to abandon the venerated doctrines of their hallowed faith, until assured by incontrovertible evidence that they have lost all valid claim upon their allegiance, and are incapable of longer defence. If Comte be truly, as has been alleged, the great reformer of the present intellectual world, we cannot

too soon or too cordially recognise his lofty mission, and submit to his guidance; but if, on the contrary, his pretensions to this high character have been indiscreetly urged, and we must expect the desired instauration from the hands of some other prophet, we cannot too soon convince ourselves of the blighting delusion, and dispel the vague hopes which so readily cluster around a new name of promise.

The right of M. Comte to be esteemed the Bacon of the nineteenth century might be regarded as an isolated question, and treated accordingly. We might confine our attention strictly to him and his philosophy, estimate its prospective results, and from these data draw, by a summary process, a hasty conclusion as to the justice of the pretension put forward on his behalf; or we might contrast him and his labours with the Baconian philosophy and its founder: but, though this might barely suffice for a temporary and partial solution of the immediate problem before us, no such formal and imperfect parallelism would permit the inclusion of the wide and important bearings of a question which merits a much more comprehensive examination. Even if the title of Comte could be satisfactorily disproved by this brief process, the like honour might be challenged again and again by Proudhon, Lamennais, Gioberti, Wronski, and the hundred other reformers, now existing, or shortly to arise, who have invented or may propound schemes of social or intellectual regeneration, or both. If such a process should conclusively settle the pretensions of one candidate, it would excite the claims of a multitude of others; and the same question, under different aspects, would have to be moved, discussed, and decided on, whenever a bolder, more vigorous, original, or popular theory should inflame the expectations or the imaginations of enthusiastic sectaries. Thus, a mere comparison of Comte and Bacon, and of their respective philosophies, however thorough and minute it might be, would only lead to an unsatisfactory, because inadequate, decision. It would be defective, though the deficiency might not be altogether apparent, even with respect to the validity of Comte's own pretensions; for, while such a contrast would reveal the existence of many analogies and many dissimilarities, it would be difficult, if not impossible, from any such contracted field of view to determine what was purely accidental and what was essential in either the differences or the similitudes, and how far these characteristics of accident or property legitimately appertained to the analogies or the discrepances. It is of the most urgent importance also to embrace within the scope of the same inquiry, the higher and more general, but still kindred investigation into the functions and distinctive traits of that philosophy which may

rightfully claim to be a New Instauration, and secure for its author the inestimable honour of being truly the Bacon of the nineteenth century, and the Coryphæus of an intellectual renovation ampler, loftier, nobler, and even more fruitful and beneficent than its great precursor. We shall, therefore, with anxious diffidence, venture to enlarge the limits of speculations sufficiently difficult and extensive even in their most contracted form; and while estimating Comte's own claims by a higher standard and with a more comprehensive survey than would be afforded by any lower range, we shall render their consideration subordinate to the discussion of a wider question, and bring within the sweep of our horizon those collateral but more important topics, which will enable us definitely to determine the justice of Comte's and all similar pretensions, and, if not to expedite or anticipate the coming of the true reformer, at least to recognise the validity of his mission when his task has been done.

The plan, thus lightly sketched, may seem too unlimited, and is certainly difficult of suitable execution; but, perhaps, by an orderly method of procedure, we may be able to accomplish it in a manner not wholly unsatisfactory, and to compress it within briefer limits than might at first blush appear practicable. The same course, very nearly, which ought to be pursued for the adequate solution of the narrower problem, will also furnish the clue for our guidance in the treatment of the wider one. In order to maintain the due sequence and logical consistency of our investigation, it will be necessary in the first instance to determine whether the condition and characteristics of the present day are such as to require the radical and universal reform of the modern intellectual world, and the aid of a reformer like Bacon to effect it. If we should conclude this to be really the case, we may next examine whether the signs of the times justify the expectation that any such assistance will be vouchsafed to us. These questions may be more briefly embodied in the simple inquiry, whether a New Instauration is really imminent. If this important interrogatory should be found to demand an acquiescent answer, we may then balance the doubt, whether it would be possible to recognise the advent of any second Bacon, when he might appear; for, unless this were possible, any further inquiry into the characteristics by which either himself or his philosophy could be detected, would be futile. If, however, all these questions admit of satisfactory determination, and we are able to arrive at an adequate comprehension of their significance and the responses which ought to be given to them, it will be a comparatively short labour to determine whether

Comte and his Positive System possess the characteristic marks required: nor will it be either a very long or very difficult task to delineate the general type of that philosophy which the age requires, and which may deserve to be regarded as the philosophy of the nineteenth century, and the second Great Instauration of the modern intellect. It is true that no anticipation can do more than exhibit the negative aspect of such a philosophy; but if we obtain a rule or a criterion for the exclusion of the erroneous or the defective, it will unquestionably avail for the recognition of the true. In the procedure proposed, it will be readily perceived that the preliminary questions are the most arduous, and that they will furnish, in great measure, the means of replying to the concluding problems. Our investigation thus naturally divides itself into three distinguishable but mutually dependent inquiries. First, we examine the probability of a New Instauration; next, the claims of Comte to be the Bacon of the nineteenth century; and lastly, though in close connexion with the second question, the characteristics of that philosophy which may justly bear to our age the same relation that the Baconian philosophy bore to the seventeenth century. The present paper will be fully and sufficiently occupied with the discussion of the first topic.

The simple fact that Comte has been hailed as the second Bacon by a party, inconsiderable neither in numbers, nor intelligence, might by some be construed as evidence *prima facie* that the condition of the times is such as to require and to welcome the mission of such an intellectual reformer; for the maxim,

Nec deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus,

is as applicable to the dramatic evolution of human progress, as it is to the construction of a tragedy; and it might be supposed that, unless the crisis were sufficient to warrant the demand, no indication of any such latent want would be afforded. It is true that this presumption might be rebutted by the simple allegation that a still more numerous party, embracing all religious persuasions, and the leading intellects in nearly all the walks of science and philosophy, have slighted the new revelation; but such a plea we reject without a pause, because it is absolutely certain that the true reformer will be rejected, scorned, reviled, and trampled upon by the supporters of ancient doctrines, in the same spirit that the prophets of old were stoned in the streets of Jerusalem by the chosen people. But, if we decline to give any weight to this objection, we are as little disposed to attach authority to the presumption which it is intended to overthrow, though we refuse to accept it for a very different reason. There is

too great a proclivity, especially in the bosom of a highly-artificial civilization, to exaggerate the difficulties of the present, to hope for sudden relief and extraordinary assistance, to behold in the objects of partial idolatry the resuscitation of former idols, and to attribute to each new prophet or favourite of the hour the names which have won the veneration of the past, for us to be satisfied with any such fallible tests. A calm and patient appreciation of the actual phenomena around us, united with a diligent comparison of the present age with similar conditions of the world in previous times, can alone justify us in venturing to claim the assent of reflecting men to the conclusions at which we may arrive.

There are three periods in the past history of civilization, which offer no slight analogies to each other, and must bear a corresponding relation to the passing century, if this be indeed predestined to witness an intellectual revolution, and a general reform of intellectual procedure. These critical eras of human progress are those which have been immortalized by the names of Socrates, or rather of Aristotle, of Abelard, and of Bacon; and it is from the phenomena which they exhibit that we must derive our principal historical illustrations of the significance and prospects of the present time. We shall, indeed, leave to a future branch of our inquiry the formal exposition of the relations which bind these periods to our own age; but as it may be necessary to make an occasional reference to the characteristics of these centuries in the earlier part of our task, and as we desire such reference to be frequently made in the tacit reflections of our readers as we proceed, we have deemed it expedient to specify them here. There are, moreover, two other eras, unequal with respect to each other, but both marked by a more potent renovation and indicating a more profound crisis, whose consideration might have lent valuable aid to our contemplated inquiries, but these were religious and moral rather than intellectual reforms; and this difference, but still more the sanctity of the subject, and Comte's entire negation of Christianity and all divine religion, compel us to exclude from the list of periods, more or less closely analogous to the present, the age which witnessed the advent of our Saviour, and that which was signalized by the great religious Reformation of the sixteenth century, both without and within the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church. We, therefore, purposely forego availing ourselves of the valuable suggestions which might be derived from a consideration of the circumstances preceding and attending the introduction of Christianity and the commencement of the Lutheran Reformation; and we do so, from reluctance to confound, or to appear to confound, direct divine agencies with the natural operation of the ordinary laws

of human progress. We shall, therefore, confine both our references and our remarks to those secular instaurations which are more directly allied to our present subject, and which offer less temptation to erroneous or dangerous speculations. But, though we have indicated the periods which we design to employ as criteria in our estimation of the current age, it is imperatively necessary, before recurring formally to them, that we should determine the actual phenomena of the times, and their relation to the main question, by a separate and almost entirely independent examination.

The great fundamental vice of the nineteenth century, from which nearly all its graver errors have sprung, and to which the origin of the multitude of social and other evils complained of may be traced, almost without exception, is undoubtedly the contemptuous rejection and negation of all valid and indisputable authority. In every walk of practice, in each of the varied departments of speculation, this same inherent vice is equally apparent. The individual will, employing the mere physical sense as its minister, but more frequently as its tyrant, has constituted itself the sole, unlicensed canon of human actions and of human doctrines; and after a struggle of more than two centuries, has succeeded in enthroning its interpreter, the Intellect, (amidst the deafening applause of myriads who drown the feeble cry of the few dissentient voices,) as the supreme arbiter of truth and error, and the autocratic judge of right and wrong. To this has been accorded a dominion which has been fancied legitimate because conceived to be universal and exclusive, and which has been regarded as exclusive because the instinctive play of the human conscience has been checked and crushed by the domineering influence of sordid passions. Thus, it has become the highest boast of humanity, in the supposed culmination of enlightened civilization, that the Intellect is

> Lord over nature, Lord of the visible earth,
> Lord of the senses five.

We remember, however, the terrible castigation, which of old overtook a similar, but not equal self-idolatry, in an individual case; and, though the authority may not be altogether acceptable to the anti-scriptural reformers of the present day, we cannot refrain from recurring to the exultation and doom of the Assyrian king, and employing this prominent instance of like vanity and presumption as an illustration of our present condition. In the pride of his greatness and unquestioned dominion Nebuchadnezzar exclaimed: "Is not this great Babylon, that I have built for the house of the kingdom by the might of my power, and for the honour of my majesty?"

But, "while the word was in the king's mouth, there fell a voice from heaven," which wrested from his hands the rod of his authority, and exiled him, in the very act of pompous self-glorification, from the abodes of men, and drove him to make his dwelling with the beasts of the field, and to eat grass as the oxen. The swamps of the desert now hide from the eyes of men that great and mighty city in which the deluded monarch placed his exclusive confidence; and a few rude and shapeless mounds, filled with crumbling bricks and shattered monuments, suggest rather than attest the site of the splendid Babylon of Nebuchadnezzar. A like fate may be even now impending over the modern Babylon of the intellect, and its unsuspecting lord; and the inchoate fulfilment of a like curse may perhaps already be recognised by those whose eyes are not blinded by popular prejudice, and who have refused to look upon the Gorgon's head. For, this exclusive autocracy of the human mind, which has rendered the epithet of the Age of Intellect a term of complacent self-laudation, instead of being a source of humiliation and shame to the nineteenth century, has been the cause of that universal anarchy of thought, sentiment, and action, from which those plenteous streams of evil, and that devastating deluge of error have flowed, from which at length we would now seek redemption. The undoubting recognition of the exclusive dominion of the mere intellect, which, once admitted, necessarily overrides both the moral dictates of the human conscience and the solemn prescriptions of God, has left all forms of human development a prey to the blind passions of men, to the rabid fury of their sensual impulses, and to those latent errors, which are inevitably involved in the limited and defective premises of human speculation, and which, once received without question, must ultimately infect both the theory and the practice which they are employed to sustain.* Nothing short of omniscience could so lay down the premises for future reasoning, or could so order the general principles and conditions of thought, as

* It is scarcely necessary for us to say that we do not accept the philosophy of Kant without important modifications, nor admit the entire validity of his principles or the logical strictness of all his conclusions. But the Critique of the Pure Reason is imperatively the *primer* to all adequate philosophical speculation in this age; and the latter half of it, devoted to the Transcendental Dialectics and Methodology, is of indispensable importance in determining the necessary imperfections and limitations of the human reason, and their causes. To these we would, in the present connexion, most earnestly refer, as we have not the space to develop the grounds of our own positions in extenso. Of course, we have still less opportunity to give the points of our dissent from Kant and their reasons. These things have, indeed, been partially done by us in a previous article.

that they should be wholly unalloyed with error, or secure from the consequences of original error in their ultimate results. When, however, the whole circle of truth, as of scientific knowledge, is bounded by the narrow horizon of mere intellectual vision, and there is no ever-present recognition of wider and more authoritative, but unapprehended, or dimly-apprehended realms of truth beyond the little sphere which is measured by the radius of the human intellect, defective conclusions rarely reveal the fact of their own deficiency, and never suggest the probability of the premises themselves being fallacious, nor can these be readily suspected even of being insufficient.

The intellectual anarchy of the day, and the entire negation of all valid authority, of which we have spoken, are loudly proclaimed from all quarters around us. This important truth, first clearly detected by St. Simon, and exhibited in all its details by M. Comte, has now become a subject of familiar apprehension to every mind which has maturely reflected upon the condition of the age. Authors of all degrees of eminence and ability, writing upon subjects the most diverse, and looking from the most dissimilar points of view,—divines of all shades, from the bishop to the covenanter—professors of all science, and all practice—the poet and the philosopher, the statesman and the man of science, the archæologist and the literary dilettante, the traveller and the novelist, the artist and the artisan, the publicist and the essayist,—all lend their testimony to the existence of these striking and deplorable phenomena. To the close observer of the private life, the social economy, and the political organization of modern communities, this wretched distemperature of the times is displayed in every phase of the subjects of his contemplation. The keen apprehension of these solemn facts has inspired the long labours of Comte, and suggested the dissimilar and grotesque reveries of Wronski. They are everywhere asserted in the *Messianisme* of the latter; and they colour with their own sombre hue nearly every page of the Positive Philosophy of the former, not expressly devoted to their exposition. The quick sense of the error and its bitter fruits, without distinct recognition of its cause, has also dictated the chimerical schemes of Proudhon, Leroux, and the multitudinous shoals of socialists and communists, which have of late years so grievously infested France.

The fatal consequences of these fundamental vices are continually and ably exhibited by Comte, and constitute the greater, but negative portion of his extensive work. He makes them manifest under all the Protean forms which they have assumed; traces them to their lurking places, and attacks them in their strongholds; unveils their

ramifications, and their mutual interdependence; points out their wholly untenable character, and the singular or pernicious fallacies to which they give rise; shows their corroding influence on the whole body of our modern science and philosophy; detects their agency in the rapidly-advancing disintegration of society, and in the social calamities which so fearfully distract Europe; discovers them sapping the foundations of political organization, paralyzing governments, and rendering them either impotent or baneful; and proposes to remedy these disasters, and eradicate the original errors from which they descend, by the application of remedies neither safe in themselves, nor adequate to effect a cure of the deep-seated and chronic disease. As we have remarked on a former occasion, we accord our almost entire assent to Comte's criticism of the speculative and practical errors of the times, differing from him chiefly in refusing his therapeutics, his postulates, and his philosophy, as an exclusive system; in tracing the main vices to other and more remote sources than those supposed by him, which are true but only proximate causes; and in desiring an intellectual and social renovation of a wider character and more ennobling tendency than that which is contemplated by his philosophy. We would neither deny nor exclude religion because our modern systems of theology may be tainted with error, or, more properly, not in harmony with the requirements of the age; but we would look forward with hope to such an intellectual renovation as would lay the firm foundations of a better philosophy, which would correct the imperfections or aberrations of our theology, while restoring to it its due efficacy, and re-establishing its harmony with human science, and would, at the same time, and principally through the influence of a genuine and operative Christianity, alleviate or remove the other disorders of the time. The philosophy that we long for, is one which may supply the moral wants of men, and satisfy the sublime appetencies of their religious nature, at the same time that it ministers effectually to the other but subordinate wants of society. It is, however, no fantastic, transcendental, or remodelled system of Christianity, but solely such an explication of the fundamental grounds of religion, and of the accordance of the plain, practical doctrines of Christianity with the legitimate demands of the human mind, as may terminate for a time, if not forever, the formidable schism which now fatally divides human reason and Christian faith. We would revise not the doctrines or prescriptions of Christianity, but the arguments employed to establish them, and the essential relations of the human reason to religious belief. We trust that this development of our views will prevent any misapprehension in regard to a point where misapprehension is easy.

To survey in detail the derivative errors which have emanated from the intellectual anarchy of the times, or from the uncontested dominion of the intellect, (terms which, if not convertible, are almost synonymous,) would be to renew the long labours of Comte, and, in great measure, to repeat the task which occupied twenty years of his life, and furnishes, in point of bulk, the main staple of his six obese volumes. Of course, we have no design of entering upon any such extended inquiry. Even a brief summary of the separate evils and fallacies, which he and others have pointed out or omitted, would be too prolix and tedious for the present occasion. All, therefore, that we can pretend to do, will be to indicate a few of the more significant and prominent phenomena of the times, which have a direct relation to the principal topic of investigation, and may aid us in arriving at a safe and intelligible solution.

It can scarcely be denied, even by those who adhere with the most unquestioning faith to the creeds of their fathers or of their choice, that the principles of religious belief and the forms of *dogmatic theology* are fluctuating and uncertain, while the direct influence of religion is almost entirely nugatory with a large portion of her professed votaries. The constant dissensions about mere shades of Christian doctrine to the exclusion of more important considerations; the general substitution of ethical for dogmatic instruction, of human morality for divine prescription; the too frequent incapacity to repel the assaults of infidel or rationalistic antagonists, the violence which is done to the principle of faith in the attempt, and the unwarrantable exaggeration of the authority of the individual reason in such efforts; the unsettled and invalid lines of argumentation adopted in the refutation of objections; the demonstration of the truth of Christianity, and the existence of God by illogical evidences; the growing claims of a ricketty and fanciful philosophy, almost in the bosom of the several Churches, to concurrent and equal authority with religious faith and established theologies, in the construction, interpretation, and determination of religious problems; the ever-enlarging circle of intelligent minds, which allege, and frequently, we believe, with a sad and sincere conviction in the justice of the charge, the inconsistency and irrationality of the Christian doctrines which are propounded to them as the reason of their revolt; the anxiety, despondency, and despair both of those without and those still within the pale of the Church; and the habitual indifference of accredited Christians, and their refusal to be governed in their daily walk and conversation by the plain commandments of the gospel:—all these things indicate the decaying efficiency of religious control in practice,

and the unsound or illogical condition of our theological systems. We have no disposition either to multiply or to amplify the charges which may be brought against the present condition of the religious world, but we think that the key-note to any adequate process of amelioration was sounded by the author of Alton Locke, when he said, "The only thing to regenerate the world is not more of any system, good or bad, but simply more of the Spirit of God." If we would render such regeneration possible, it is imperatively necessary that we should boldly and candidly avow the deficiencies and the inherent disease of our present religious practice and theological methods, and by the discovery and confession of our errors prepare ourselves for the task of seriously, soberly, and completely removing them. We have blinked too long the real difficulties of the case; we have denied, and endeavoured to bolster up our consciences in the denial of, charges, which, though false in their too wide expression, and productive of most fallacious consequences, are nevertheless founded upon a morbid and one-sided apprehension of valid objections. With respect to the large mass of civilized communities, there can be no doubt that the Christian Church has lost the direction and censorship of both the private life and the public conduct of men. So far then it fails to perform its legitimate mission, and in order to retrieve its steps and regain its lost authority, it must discover and acknowledge the causes of this temporary and partial failure, abandon the useless and tedious occupation of fighting the dead and buried chimæras of former infidelity, and adapt itself to the urgent wants of the time by combatting new forms of error with other and keener weapons than of old, and by ministering to present social ailments by a profound estimation of the causes and remedies of existing social, moral, and religious disease. Nothing can be gained by either denying the strength of an adversary, or refusing to acknowledge our own weak points.

But worse, perhaps, than even those things which we have mentioned as indications of the diseased state of our modern religious systems, because the seat of the disease lies deeper, and the canker is less easily reached, is the travesty of Christianity, which moulds and modifies the doctrines of the faith into a transcendental dream, lubricating the clear, precise, practical realities of a divine revelation with the oily but poisonous slime of a spurious and seductive idealism. Yet, it is unfortunately under this form, which is the mere phantasm of religion, that modern Christianity exhibits most vitality and most aptitude for credence; and though Dr. Chalmers and other divines have boldly encountered and imperfectly refuted the weakened form of this pseudo-philosophical religionism which was offered

to the British public by Morell, the well-head of the error cannot be reached, nor the ulcer which it has produced arrested, until Strauss be completely overthrown, and the systems of German Pantheism from which he drew, and which have percolated in feeble streamlets through the French eclecticism to all countries, have been swept away before a sounder and juster philosophy. The Christian apologetics of modern times are antiquated and powerless; we burden ourselves with the cumbrous and inefficient armour of defence which served in earlier days, but is useless against the attacks with which we are now assailed. The science, the philosophy, the social organization and the social passions of modern times are for the most part adverse to Christianity, yet we refuse to avail ourselves of the advantages which are turned against us, and refuse to change our tactics and strategy, when the enemy by a skilful change of front has turned our flank, and is marching unopposed as a conqueror over our domain.

The origin of the theological difficulties we have commented on is of easy detection, if we are candid and bold enough to recognise the truth which presses itself upon our notice. We have admitted, even within the sphere of our theology,—or, without any formal admission, the all-pervading spirit of the times has introduced into it,—principles and maxims, which, in their unlimited acceptation, are fatal to the permanent recognition of any authority, human or divine. We have canonized, even in our religious contemplations, the supremacy of the intellect, and now the creature threatens to dethrone its Creator; for the intellectual Titans of the current ages, like their precursors in heathen mythology, seek to scale heaven by their own native powers, and by the superposition of the lofty mountains of terrestrial science. In the ancient legend human aid was necessary even to secure the victory of the gods; and the terrible onslaught of the modern Giants must be met with a more dexterous use of their own terrestrial weapons. But the great error of which we have been culpable is this: In the first flush of the rebellion against excessive and arbitrary hierarchical control, the absolute right of the individual mind (which soon becomes synonymous with that of the individual will) to interpret and thereby to establish its own creed, and to determine the religious complexion of its own actions, was laid down too broadly; and the ministers as the advocates of religion now find themselves estopped, without recognising the cause of the estoppel, from denouncing the usurpations and the exclusive claims of the intellect, in its most intellectual, but most purely human phase, to wit, in its strict scientific development. Of our modern theology it may be said,

> "She nursed the pinion which impell'd the steel,
> While the same plumage that had warm'd her nest
> Drank the last life-drop of her bleeding breast."°

Indeed, something very much like this has already been said, and in a Review published under the auspices of the Free Church of Scotland.† When, too, the individual judgment is warped, betrayed, excited, and blinded by the materialistic, sensual, pleasure-seeking, money-craving, debasing tendencies of the age in which we live, it is too late to express surprise at the decline or impotence of that religious faith, or the inefficacy of that theology, which itself crippled its own sinews, and broke its own wand of empire at the outset. But, if too late for wonder, it is not too late for contrition and reform; and unless some means can be discovered of reconciling the claims of reason and religion—of science and faith—without recognising the joint and equal reign of both, or unduly subordinating the latter to the former, we may prepare ourselves betimes for the certain enthronization of science or the Positive Philosophy, as the sole arbiter of human thought and practice.

To shew that we have neither exaggerated nor misrepresented the deficiencies of our modern theology, and the inefficacy of our religion in modern practice, we take the liberty of citing the significant remark of Dr. Chalmers: "As things stand at present, our creeds and confessions have become effete, and the Bible a dead letter; and that orthodoxy, which was at one time our glory, by withering into the inert and lifeless, is now the shame and reproach of all our Churches."

As we do not ourselves forget that the main scope of the present essay is to determine the probability of an approaching regeneration of the modern intellect, in order to keep this aim distinctly before the minds of our readers, and to facilitate the estimation of our views, we beg them to compare the present condition of religion with the religious aspects of the times immediately preceding the career of Socrates, Abelard, and Bacon—the three periods of past history which we have specified as likely to afford analogies to the present age, if it be truly the precursor of a New Instauration.

We shall not suffer ourselves to be detained to estimate the

° When the simile is given to us so beautifully and forcibly in our own language by Byron, we do not deem it necessary to recur to either the Aves of Aristophanes, v. 808, or the Myrmidons of Æschylus, fragm. 123, ed. Dindorf, for its earlier or original expression.

† "The Christian Church would dig her own grave, and might write over it the pathetic confession of Jacobi, that the head had prevailed over the heart, and that she lay down in darkness without hope of a resurrection." North British Review, Feb., 1850; No. xxiv, art. v.

sanctimonious, pharisaical, and wavering *morality*—public and private—which is necessarily incident to such a condition of the religious world as we have described. The dependence of true morality upon the Christian faith is so intimate, that the divorce of the two, or the decay of the latter, can only result in the substitution of a hollow formalism—a whited sepulchre, cleanly and decorous without, but full of dry bones within—for the genial and ever-operative glow of conscious obedience to divine commands. We need only add that, under the impulse of prevalent errors, immutable principles and rigid rules of integrity have been in great measure supplanted by temporary expediencies and the shifting caprices of private sentiment. The reality of virtue has given place to its hypocritical semblances, with which we first delude ourselves, and then hope to deceive others. Nay, so far has this tendency been developed that we have a popular system of morals, taught in our colleges, and unchallenged in our marts, which is founded upon this miserable counterfeit of the reality; and Utilitarianism is welcomed with applause as a safe guide, and credulously believed to be a tenable philosophy. The tide is indeed turning: all the various forms of Socialism are so many emphatic protests against this wretched excuse for morality, which has been deemed the sign of an advancing, instead of the mark of a degraded civilization. Much as we admire the general criticism of Comte upon the fallacies of the day, there are few points which more closely rivet our regard than the sagacity with which he has detected, and the ability with which he has exposed, the fallacies of Utilitarianism, and the absolute want of a solid basis for our modern ethics, practical or speculative. But, indeed, the perspicacity and acumen of Comte are never at fault in unravelling the tangled webs of sophistry which have clustered around those popular fallacies, which have elsewhere met with almost unquestioning acquiescence, and too frequently with the undiscriminating admiration of the age;—

Proprii mirantur monstra furoris.[o]

When we note the sobriety and skill with which M. Comte unveils such errors, it is to us a source of amazement that a mind, which winds its way so securely and unerringly through the mazes of accredited delusion, should have failed to solve completely the great enigma of the times, and should have so easily bewildered itself and wandered from the truth in the fanciful labyrinths of its own construction. Let us add, however, that he is distinctly right in recognising the necessity of an ethical reform, both in speculative and practical morals, as the indispensable accompaniment and condition

[o] Claudian., in Eutrop., lib. ii, v. 519.

of either social or intellectual renovation. As in the days of Socrates so in our own, the restoration of sound morality and the re-establishment of the firm principles of morals is the *sina qua non* of either advancement or alleviation. In our estimation, indeed, the moral problem is absorbed by the religious one, and embraced by it.

To those whose attention has been arrested by the highest and consequently the most obscure manifestations of human thought, the *metaphysical philosophy* of the nineteenth century is not the least significant or suggestive of the portentous signs of the times. In this difficult and airy department of speculation we can readily detect, notwithstanding the confidence of its tone and the arrogance of its language, the same hesitancy and confusion, the same want of clearly apprehended and consistent principles, accompanied by the same erratic energy, and the same self-sufficiency, which are displayed in the other intellectual phenomena of the day. All schools have their modern representatives. From the dim mysticism of oriental philosophies, Hindoo or Gnostic, down to the most purely materialistic explication of the phenomenal laws of the universe, every old opinion has been revived and refurbished, though they now appear under disguised or fantastic forms, and contend for the mastery with each other, before they have accurately examined either the validity or the stability of the bases on which they respectively rest. The hasty assumption of primordial data, by a mistaken application of a supposed inductive process, but, in reality, in compliance with a mere vague impulse, or a wild and fanciful assurance, has been made the point of departure of all the multitudinous systems of metaphysics, which, within the last half-century, have dazzled their credulous votaries, and often hopelessly baffled those who were not acolytes of their schools. Even Kant is, in many respects, obnoxious to this censure; for his system is partially founded upon foregone conclusions, though their employment is not perceived by him, and there is an interfusion in all his reasonings of unexamined principles, which vitiate his scheme, and introduce inconsistencies and invalidities into the most beautiful and perfect specimen of profound metaphysical research. Nor does Comte escape this defect by his negation of metaphysics, for this negation is a no less unwarrantable assumption than any other presumptive tenet would have been.

But, besides the extension and development of half-forgotten systems, with a rare recognition of the actual relation of the later to the earlier forms, other schemes have been propounded, which blend in an intricate web the characteristics of different previous methods of procedure, and conceal their affinities by the wild reveries with which they are combined and gilded over. The wheels of all the

recent forms of philosophy run in the ruts which had been worn long ago; but at times they pass so rapidly from one track in the *stadium* to another, and wind about so curiously and intricately, as they follow the interlacing lines of former circles, that it is almost impossible for either their adepts or others to recognise the actual character and direction of their courses throughout their whole extent. But, while hazarding this condensed criticism of modern metaphysical speculation, we are blind neither to the pre-eminent intellectual abilities which have been devoted to this renewal of old projects, nor to the fact that the researches of the great minds which have already ennobled this century, have uncovered to the day the great fundamental problems of metaphysics and ontology, which they have been unable to solve, but which demand a partially satisfactory solution before real progress in any direction is possible, or the intellect can cease to be the cause of its own stumbling. It must be observed, too, that the result of this devious and chimerical investigation of the sublime enigmas of the human intellect has been to revive in late years, with renewed interest and with brighter hopes of some partially satisfactory solution, the great problem of the certitude of human knowledge, which both lies at the foundation of metaphysics, and must constitute the regulating principle of all intellectual development, scientific, philosophical, or practical. Gioberti and Rosmini, Franck and Javary, Véra, Mercier, and Gerbet, the greater and the lesser minds of our time, are at length addressing themselves with a clear perception of the true aims of philosophy, to the determination of this primary and all-important question. The same instinctive recognition of the great desideratum of the times has also induced M. Comte to attempt a solution of this riddle of the human mind by lopping off that portion of knowledge which is the source of difficulty and the fountain-head of those anomalies and antinomies which appear to refuse to be reduced to either uniform laws or fixed principles. The misfortune has been that hitherto philosophers, with scarcely an exception, have confined themselves to the old range and mode of procedure, and have sought by a further extension and stricter development of those very systems which have caused and at length pressed into the open day their errors and paralogisms, to escape from the fatal consequences which have been incident to the contracted stadium within which the discursions of the intellect have been restrained. The same guide, which has betrayed their floundering steps into the hopeless quicksands where no firm footing is to be found, is still employed to lead them on to a solid ground which is fancied to lie beyond. Vain hope! they have taken as their exclusive authority that very scientific intellect

which has undermined all authority, and occasioned all their embarrassments.

A re malvagio consiglier peggiore.

The great metaphysical problem of the nineteenth century, which is the present enigma of the modern sphinx, extending its influence as its doom to the permanence and vitality of all forms of human development, individual or social, is to determine the bond of conciliation by which the world of knowledge can be rescued from its purely experimental character, and the external world invested with something more than the shadowy phases of a merely phenomenal existence:* in other words,—in the language of the German schools,—to give knowledge, both in its subjective and objective aspects, the stability and reality which are now denied to it by Sensationalism as well as by Idealism; and to exhibit the intimate harmony, if not entire identity, of the fundamental principles which determine the mutual dependence and yet dissimilarity of the two. After this point has been settled, the question arises, which is concerned with the application and development of this primitive doctrine, as to the limitations within which this doctrine is to be held, and within which each of its modes of development can be safely and logically employed.

The great problem to which we have alluded has been reached, perhaps propounded by the general tenor of our modern philosophy; the necessity of a solution has been indistinctly perceived; and some blind and staggering efforts have been made to vault over, rather than to explore the difficulty. M. Comte's mode of procedure has been already alluded to; and kindred with it, though less consistent, is the attempt of Mill. The German school has rushed to the other extreme; while the French Eclectics, like the blind Polyphemus in the cave of the Cyclopes, dash their heads vainly first against one

* It is, perhaps, coaxing too far the interpretation of the mysticism and obscurity of Hoëné Wronski to recognise the dim suspicion of this fundamental problem in the following enigmatical passage of his *Messianisme*, tom. ii, pp. 459, 460:—"Pour peu que l'on approfondisse, d'une part, le scepticisme de Hume, et de l'autre surtout, la dualité de Leibnitz, que nous venons de signaler comme ayant été, tout à la fois, et les termes respectifs du sensualisme et du rationalisme philosophiques, et les motifs de la nouvelle tendance de la philosophie, on reconnaîtra que cette tendance supérieure consiste à découvrir un *Principe Absolu* qui puisse d'une part, concilier ou au moins embrasser en lui les deux principes hétérogènes de l'univers, c'est-à-dire, le savoir et l'être, et de l'autre part, fonder péremptoirement la certitude des connaissances philosophiques. Comme tel, ce principe inconditionnel de l'être et du savoir, n'est rien autre que *l'Absolu* lui-même, cette source suprême de toute réalité." This last sentence plunges us so deep into the peculiar mysticism of *Messianism*, that here we leave M. Wronski.

side and then against the other side of the cavern, which is to them hopelessly and impenetrably dark, notwithstanding the fancied spectres which float before their unperceiving eyes. The Germans are at least consistent; they have immersed themselves in the infinite abyss of Pantheism, and have identified the creation with the Creator, the objective with the subjective side of knowledge, and have suffered the object known and the subject knowing to be both simultaneously absorbed in the fountain-head of knowledge and the material of knowledge, whence both are represented as emanating and returning by an incessant pulsation of the Godhead—the continuous efflux and reflux of divinity from and to its own centre. Such an explanation may beguile the mind by the apparent perspicuity of its phraseology, and simplicity of its doctrine; or it may overwhelm it by the rigidity of its logic, as well as by the obscurity and fluidity of its substance; but no form of Pantheism can be accepted by a sober, reflecting mind, which is self-conscious of its own processes and their results at every step of its deductions, for it deprives the intellect of any fixed point of view from which to survey the universe, and denies it any stable ground on which to stand, (the *postulated* ποῦ στῶ of Archimedes,) in its interpretation of the facts or phenomena of either life or nature.

But, though such be the delusive and chaotic state of metaphysical philosophy, we think that, in its secret and troubled workings, which have stirred it from its lowest deeps, it has thrown up on its shores, as the results of its tempestuous agitations, the great philosophical problem of the nineteenth century, and that it now impotently and blindly fumbles over the difficulties which it has evoked, without being competent, in consequence of the indistinctness and invalidity of its own principles, to give the urgently demanded solution.

We shall not follow the influences of erroneous metaphysics in their reaction upon all the sciences, the religious life, or the social and political action of the day, nor trace the modes in which the distemperature in these branches of intellectual development has reacted upon metaphysical philosophy itself, important as both these inquiries necessarily are to the full comprehension of the diseases of the times, their causes and their prospective issue. It suffices for our present purpose to have shown that metaphysics, like morals and theology, has its own great problem demanding adequate solution, and is unable in its present state to satisfy the demand which is made upon it. It is the magnitude of the intellectual requirements of the times, their relations, their interdependence, and their universality, which must determine whether a New Instauration is essential to further intellectual progress.

The general tenor of that criticism which we contemplate attempting hereafter, though not in the present essay, on the former periods of intellectual crisis, will sufficiently reveal the close analogies between the ethical and metaphysical, and also the logical wants of the present age, and the similar necessities of the generations preceding previous intellectual reforms.

From the tendency of our hurried observations it will be readily gathered, that the metaphysical aberrations and incapacities which we have signalized, originate almost entirely in the nebulous domain of what is termed by Kant Transcendental Logic. But dim and cloudy as is that supramundane region, even when the skies of intellect are in other respects most clear and serene, it is thence that the rains descend which fertilize and determine the expansion of all sciences, and it is through them that all the heavenly light which illumines the mind is refracted. As the lofty mountains of the terrestrial globe penetrate the mists and clouds of the upper air, so the summits of all human sciences hide themselves in the obscurity of metaphysical and logical speculation; and it is in that dusky region that we must grope for the discovery of their principles and the rules which insure their accurate and healthy development. Hence it is, that, in a period like the present, when all intellect is so profoundly agitated, we are obliged to recur to these arduous and ethereal branches, whose necessary use is hardly recognised or suspected in the ordinary periods of tranquillity. Our present difficulties are in great measure attributable to the neglect of Logic, and the looseness of metaphysical speculation, which have characterized the centuries since the Baconian Instauration. We have neglected to establish correctly the principles, conditions, and limitations of valid reasoning; we have slighted Aristotle and scorned the schoolmen; we have employed premises obtained by insufficient or unwarrantable processes, which are neither true in themselves nor coextensive with the amplitude of the conclusions which they have been conceived to support; and we have either narrowed unduly the range of human thought, or rejected with contempt the controlling influence of well-marked lines of demarcation beyond which the human mind at any rate, in its present stage of development, cannot safely or consistently wander. Safe in the supposed universality and infallibility of our processes of observation, experience, and induction, and deluding ourselves into the belief that the whole Baconian philosophy is contained in the mutilated fragment of it of which we boast, we have forgotten that the validity of even these instruments in their most perfect form depends almost entirely upon their employment by the reason, and we have heedlessly overlooked the necessity of

analyzing and regulating our logical procedure at the same time that we were hunting for what were unduly considered the only real facts for use. But, if the data of Transcendental Logic have been imperfectly determined or habitually slighted, the doctrines of the mere science, as the prescriptions of the art, have been wholly disregarded, or contemptuously flouted, without being understood. Through a regularly *diminuendo* scale, the estimation in which Logic has been held and the use which has been made of it have rapidly descended since Peter Ramus and John Milton, or even since Raymund Lully, until, a few years back, the lowest attainable limit was reached, and this essential branch of learning was represented in popular belief by the miserable and illogical shreds of Watts and Hedge. True, the tide has at length turned, and this we regard as one of the most favourable omens of the time. The inquiries undertaken by Kant, and prosecuted by the great leaders of the derivative schools of Transcendentalism; the more recent labours of Mill, Hamilton, and De Morgan, and the daily returning reverence for Aristotle, evince a growing sense of the necessity of recalling the lost science, rather than any very great aptitude for its enlargement and reconstruction. The importance, however, of this incipient movement can scarcely be fully appreciated, until we master the lessons taught by all former intellectual renovations, and to be exhibited hereafter in some detail. It is somewhat remarkable that M. Comte, though cashiering Logic at the outset of his work, has himself noted and constantly censures in strong terms the looseness and illogical texture of modern reasoning, and has rendered signal service towards the *co-augmentation*—we cannot say constitution—of Inductive Dialectics. His labours have been employed by Whewell, and turned to profitable account by Mill: the latter has cordially acknowledged his obligations; the former has appropriated them with ungracious and suspicious silence. These indications, however, of a returning sense of the necessity of logical studies have not yet been welcomed with any corresponding change in practice; nor could this have been expected, since none of the philosophers whom we have mentioned, with the exception of Kant,* has analyzed the foundations on which the superstructure, to be either valid or adequate, must rest. If, indeed, De Morgan understands his own Formal Logic, which is put forth with much pretension, it is more than we have been able to do, though we have accorded to it a more diligent study than it apparently merits; and if Mr. Mill fails to perceive the deficiencies, fallacies, and inconse-

* Of course, we cannot stop to analyze the analysis of Kant, but can only say, without being altogether accurate, that it rather examined received doctrines than extended their range.

quences of his own valuable work, we might, perhaps, aid him in their detection. Of Sir William Hamilton we will only say that any permanent fame corresponding with his apparent capacity must be acquired by ulterior productions; for of his published works, much as they deserve approbation, we must say as was said by Cicero in regard to a different subject, "*Non res laudanda, sed spes est.*"* Thus Logic needs extension as well as renewed estimation; the leading intellects of the day are becoming sensible of this want, and also discovering that the science is imperfect both in its higher and its lower branches, and that its habitual neglect hitherto as science and as art has exercised a most deleterious influence on the forms and the conclusions of modern intellectual development.

With a defective system of Logic, or without the practical recognition of any, the expectation, credulously entertained, that the experimental sciences would be free from the risk of logical errors, has been eminently irrational, and has been grievously disappointed. It is by no means surprising, however, that there should have been a general failure, on the part of the votaries of science, to recognise the fallacies involved in their favourite pursuits, for, besides being almost uniformly the last class of cultivated men to accept or to perceive the necessity for any great intellectual mutation, the narrowness of the *intelligible* sphere to which they have confined themselves—supposing it the while to be illimitable—proves a positive bar to their discovery of its imperfections. The exclusive devotion to the experimental method, which has not been apprehended with either the sobriety or the just appreciation of its value with which it was contemplated by its great legislator, Bacon, has limited its criticism of the intellectual processes employed by it, to a mere examination of the fallacies of sense and the formal conditions of ordinary induction. We are not insensible to the beauty and profundity of Sir John Herschel's Discourse on Natural Philosophy; we are not inclined to underrate the value or the solidity of the third and fourth books of Mr. Mill's Logic; and we are still less disposed to deny the services rendered by M. Comte to the Logic of Induction; but still we must assert that science has denied itself the indispensable benefit of a vantage ground beyond its own limited sphere, whence it might securely survey its own legitimate range, and determine the conditions of its own validity, and the extent of its incompetency. This want Comte is naturally prevented from suspecting by the essential character of the Positive Philosophy. But, though neither the actual nature of the defect nor its cause has yet been clearly recognised, the consequences are already becoming sufficiently apparent.

* Fragm. Incert. Rei Publ., cit. Servius., Comm. ad Virg. Æn., vi, 877.

The numerous efforts which have been made in recent years to review, criticise, co-ordinate, and reclassify the sciences, with the purpose of facilitating their symmetrical adunation and prospective amplification, furnish indubitable evidence of a latent and instructive sentiment that, notwithstanding our noisy boasts about the age of intellect, some new principles, or some revision of old ones, are essentially required for the accurate determination of the truth and validity of our scientific conclusions. The works of Comte, Azaïs, Ampère, Whewell, Mill, Wronski, and a host of others, indicate, with greater or less precision, the existence of such a want, and have commenced, with varying degrees of ability and success, that preliminary criticism of the sciences which is felt to be essential to their further progress, and by which alone their inherent vices and the modes of redressing them can be discovered. This retrospection of former acquisitions, and the formal registry, as it were, of present possessions—the Domesday Boke of Science—are an almost certain guarantee that current methods of procedure have displayed nearly their whole efficacy, and that a limit has been reached, beyond which it is impossible to proceed with any just confidence, without recurring to first principles, and a reconstitution or reform of the scientific methods hitherto exclusively employed. This significance of the modern attitude of the sciences is, indeed, apparently avowed in express terms, by Dr. Whewell, as the stimulus for the composition of his works on the Inductive Sciences. We may draw fresh courage from the augury: for this symptom of our existing science may be regarded both as a sign of its supervening enervation in its present form, and also as an omen of approaching renovation under ampler conditions.

The censure of the science of the nineteenth century, which we have ventured to offer, is necessarily vague and indistinct from its extreme brevity, and the exclusion of all details; but our space does not permit us to be minute, nor do we consider ourselves authorized by our inadequate acquaintance with the multitudinous sciences themselves to do anything more than present a few general reflections upon what we regard as the characteristic faults of procedure which are common to all of them, but most especially attributable to those which are esteemed the most rigid and firmly established—the Physical Sciences. Our brevity in this respect is the less to be regretted, inasmuch as the defects of modern science—its omissions, its unwarrantable assumptions, and its inconsequential reasonings—have been to no inconsiderable extent exposed with remarkable sagacity and with singular fulness of detail by M. Comte, who has dwelt, perhaps, too frequently upon the specialization of

modern intellect, whereas it is equally guilty of the opposite offence of crude and premature generalization. He has failed to recognise its erroneously exclusive character, which is the chief sin of his own philosophy; but he has justly shown the impending sterility of received scientific procedure, and its debasing subordination to purely utilitarian ends. If we had the time and the ability now for the execution of the task, which at some future day we hope to achieve, the charges which we should bring against modern science would lie beyond the domain of Comte's speculations, and would be equally applicable to his own Positive System, which is the very sublimation of the scientific tendencies of his age, and their purest and most consistent realization; for the fecundating principle of evil which we discover in the much lauded science of the times, consists in its divorce from all other knowledge, in its negation of everything not demonstrated in accordance with its own exclusive views, and in its failure to recognise its own dependence upon higher but less systematic sources of knowledge. In the mean time, however, we have no hesitation in referring to the first three volumes of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* for the special criticism of the Physical Sciences, and for sufficient confirmation of the general tenor of our remarks, though not of our separate positions: we would also most particularly refer to the first volume of that great work for the exposure of the improper and illegitimate applications of Mathematics, and the insecurity of its foundations in its higher departments; for, though we do not agree with his profound strictures in all respects, and dissent entirely from him in our interpretation of the characteristics of mathematical truth; though we must conceive any survey of this or the other sciences imperfect, which is exclusively made from a point within their sphere, that is to say, from a purely positive point of view, and must regard this as peculiarly insufficient to satisfy the necessities of the present times; yet all the obvious objections to the actual constitution of Mathematics and the Sciences, and many which are visible only to the most acute scrutiny, are exhibited by M. Comte with masterly skill. There is, indeed, one defect of our mathematical science which his philosophy precluded him from apprehending, and which we will accordingly indicate here. The metaphysics of Mathematics is unheeded, or, if heeded, is not understood by modern mathematicians: indeed, this branch of the science has never been accurately constituted; and the consequence is, that when we leave the simpler branches of the study, and plunge into the abysses of the Calculus, under its various modifications and applications, we are hurried along by the irresistible force of our blind machinery, without adequate consciousness of the significance of the several stages

of advancement, without the means of detecting adventitious errors, and without the hope of comprehending the validity or the invalidity of the reasoning which is disguised under our algebraic symbols. To us the Calculus, in the hands of modern mathematicians, is like the Dutchman's steam leg: before the journey is commenced, the direction and even the distance may be determined; but once set in motion, it hurries on regardless of everything but the completion of its route, and drags along the unfortunate wretch attached to it, without permitting him the least control of his own progress, or the least deviation from the arbitrarily prescribed course. This is an objection which, from M. Comte's point of view, could not have been apprehended, and which we may, perhaps, have exaggerated; but though we do not regard M. Comte's criticism as complete, we refer to it as amply sufficient to demonstrate the urgent necessity of scientific reform. The mere English reader may discover a few additional censures and many repetitions of Comte's observations in Whewell's History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, which may be profitably consulted as his philosophy is entirely diverse from that of Comte; and inquirers of a lower grade may find some shrewd but humble speculations on this subject in the *Génie du XIXe siècle* of M. Alletz. We are, of course, as little disposed to accept or endorse the infidel tendencies, remarks, or deductions of Comte, as we are to assent to the feeble, spurious, and blundering Kantism of Whewell. Both writers, however, indicate the consciousness of existing defects in science, and the necessity of a general renovation of its whole structure. Whewell, indeed, scarcely conceals the vain delusion that he may be destined to be the Bacon to inaugurate the new reform; and Comte has been hailed with this title by his followers, and has himself avowed his conviction that only through his philosophy can the desired regeneration be effected.

When we pass to the applications of science and philosophy to practice—or what is usually held to be practice beyond the domain of either—we enter upon the province occupied by the latter and larger moiety of M. Comte's great work; for his projected science of Sociology, which has been welcomed with very flattering acceptance, embraces both the different branches of Positive Ethics and Positive Psychology, and also attempts with very great success to reduce to a scientific form all the manifestations of the public and private life of communities. It is not the purpose of the present essay to examine, or to express any opinion on the subject of M. Comte's Sociology; as we have already said, we must examine the *Système de Politique Positive* before entering upon this inquiry. We have referred to this science at present solely to authorize our

combining under one head, for the purpose of enabling us to accomplish our proposed task with greater brevity, the very various topics which would otherwise demand to be considered under separate divisions. This course is not designed as an approval of M. Comte's procedure, but solely as a measure of expediency with respect to the attainment of our own immediate objects.

At a time when Europe is convulsed with revolution, and shock after shock vibrates through the whole family of civilized nations, as if the ancient order of things, with its hopes, its boasts, its great achievements, and its delusive splendours, were destined to be buried under the waves of a new cataclysm; when the theories of the political economists have only succeeded in multiplying wealth in the hands of the wealthy, of taking away from him that hath nothing even that which he hath, and of increasing both the bitterness and extent of pauperism; when Socialists and Communists, Positivists and Messianists, assert their claims to exclusive dominion over the regulation and re-organization of societies, which are now left without any adequate direction, and a prey to all the miseries which have sprung from fallacious and unlicensed habitudes of thought and action, for relief from the fatal consequences of which errors they vainly look to those effete and antiquated systems, which have not impeded, if they have not actually occasioned their present ruinous condition,—at a time, when the lust of gain is the sole impulse of human activity, and almost the only umpire of human life; when nations have been cut loose from their moorings, and drift about on the stormy seas of political and social agitation without rudder as without pilot; when all the bonds that of old linked man to man in harmonious intercommunion and mutual dependence have been rudely snapped asunder, and society has declined from a vital organization to a loose and fluctuating aggregation of men; when intellect has become the slave of avarice, though proclaiming its incontestable dominion over the universe, and science has descended into the mere tool of huckstering gain; when all classes are profoundly agitated and consumed with reciprocal jealousies, because steeping their daily bread in the life-blood of each other; when all authority, religious, political, social, domestic, or intellectual, meets with only a transient and hesitating obedience,—at a time like this, it were folly to dwell upon the political, the economical, the social, or the domestic aspects of the day, in order to deduce from a detailed examination of them a measured response to the inquiry, whether these are such as to suggest the necessity of a general reform of the intellectual convictions which have reduced the civilized world to such a state, or have suffered the continuance of such evils. The answer is borne to us

upon every wind that sweeps from beyond the ocean: in the Parliamentary Reports of England, in the statistical tables of the Irish population, in the memoirs of the French Academy, in the note-books of travellers, and in the essays of the poor-law doctors, as well as in the whirlwind of revolution, whose temporary lull only indicates a more violent coming out-burst, the same voice of warning is upon the blast, announcing in tones that cannot be mistaken, except by the most perverse stupidity, the alternative of an immediate regeneration of the whole circle of speculation and practice, or of imminent and overwhelming disaster.

The analogies between the social characteristics of the present times and those of the other critical ages of humanity which we have regarded as suitable aids or tests for our speculations, are singularly close and striking, as will be afterwards made apparent, and as may be detected by even a hasty examination.

In closing this part of our investigation we would remind our readers that our object on the present occasion has not been to discover the remedies to be applied to the evils which we have pointed out, nor even to determine exactly the nature or extent of those evils, but simply to show that the diseases with which the present century is infected are of such a character as to require a complete intellectual renovation for their satisfactory removal. To settle accurately the diagnosis of the malady, and to determine the therapeutics to be employed, and the modes of their application, is an ulterior and entirely distinct problem.

Summary as has been our hurried consideration of the aspect of the times—and no one can be more sensible than ourselves of either its excessive compression or of its manifold deficiencies—we think that it sufficiently indicates the need of another Bacon, or of such a universal instauration of the intellect, as would be analogous to that introduced by the sage of Verulam, only penetrating deeper than before, as befits the more advanced cultivation of the age, and comprehending a vaster scope for the exercise of its curative powers. But this investigation has also furnished a few passing indications both of the sense of this necessity, and also of an expectation, more or less faint, that the want is about to be supplied. The justice, however, of this expectation remains to be established by further evidences, which we will endeavour to furnish in a very brief form.

A strong presumptive evidence of the reasonableness of this hope may be detected in the general tenor and tone of our current literature, notwithstanding this too shows clearly the chaotic confusion in which it is weltering for want of fixed principles, and its almost entire subjection to the licentious and passionate individualism of the day.

Science and philosophy, as we have already seen, have faintly distinguished beyond the haze which surrounds them, shadows of approaching change, and have made efforts, for the most part both vain and vague, to accomplish prematurely the incumbent duty, either partially or completely, and thus "outstrip the slow result of time." With an impatience which springs from a keen instinctive perception of the urgent need, uncontrolled by any sufficient knowledge of the preliminary conditions of its healthy satisfaction, and with a rashness which argues their own audacity rather than their competency for the task, authors of all grades of eminence or insignificance, and of all shades of ability, have flooded the press with their own special propositions for a sweeping reform. Many of them certainly illustrate the truth,

> Tout esprit n'est pas composé d'une étoffe,
> Qui se trouve taillée à faire un philosophe.°

But such names as Comte, Mill, and Wronski, cannot be properly included in any such category; least of all the first, for the last only proves that the most fatal union—as fatal as his own *Union-Absolue*—is the alliance of profound philosophy with extravagant folly:—*nil exitialius quam cum ratione insanire.*† But the instances are endless around us, in which the most chimerical dreams of fancy in its wildest moods have been gravely commended by the patronage of really acute and able minds.‡ What has been thus crudely apprehended by science and philosophy, has been more distinctly perceived by the critical literature of the times, and still more clearly foreseen, without generating the intemperate desire for premature realization, by the divine frenzy of poetic inspiration, which scales the heaven in the early morning like the lark, hails with prophetic instinct the first rosy dawn of light on the distant mountains, and heralds forth the coming day, without pretending to hasten its advent, or determine the exact mode of its appearance. Much of our recent poetry breathes the cheerful air of hopeful anticipation—dashed, indeed, in its expression with the individual idiosyncrasies of different authors. Thus, the poet of the Reverberations sings:—

> True the plaint,—but, if more true,
> I would not deplore it;—
> If an Eden fade from view,
> Time may yet restore it.
> ° ° °

° Molière, Les Femmes Savantes, acte i, scène i.

† H. Cornelius Agrippa, De Vanitate Scientiarum, c. i.

‡ "Somniorum patrocinium philosophi *susceperunt*, nec ii quidem contemptissimi, sed in primis acuti, et consequentia et repugnantia videntes."—*Cic. de Div.*, lib. ii, c. lxxii, § 150.

Winter still succeeds to spring,
But fresh springs are coming;
Other birds are on the wing,
Other bees are humming.

Tennyson, the Laureate of England, displays the same enthusiastic credence in the future, though still more distinctly and in a more self-conscious manner. His whole poetry is, indeed, irradiated throughout with the ever-present sentiment of the certainty and magnitude of the coming change; and this sublime instinct constitutes the loftiest merit of his genuine poetic inspiration.

Not in vain the distance beacons. Forward, forward, let us range;
Let the great world spin forever down the ringing grooves of change.

Through the shadow of the globe we sweep into the younger day:
Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay.

And in that splendid and most philosophic poem, "The Palace of Art," the dim mutter of the same oracular wisdom forms the undertone of the whole allegory.

As in strange lands a traveller walking slow,
In doubt and great perplexity,
A little before moon-rise hears the low
Moan of an unknown sea;

And knows not if it be thunder or a sound
Of stones thrown down, or one deep cry
Of great wild beasts; then thinketh, "I have found
A new land, but I die."

And, again, in "The Poet's Song:"

And the nightingale thought, "I have sung many songs,
But never a one so gay,
For he sings of what the world will be,
When the years have died away."

If we rightly comprehend the significance of that strange medley, "The Princess," it is designed to convey the prophetic anticipation of a better age, already knocking at the doors, when the supremacy of intellect, which has caused our present confusion, shall in consequence of its own restoration to health, give place to the nobler dominion of religious sentiment and moral duty. But the whole of Tennyson's poetry is coloured with the glow raised by the confident hope of a better and healthier organization of the intellectual condition of the world. The same song, which he sings with so many returns, is also re-echoed in fuller or fainter notes by a hundred minor poets, who have either caught at second-hand the inspiration, or have been touched by the magic of the approaching change.

Such examples of the cheerful and prophetic spirit of our recent poetry might be indefinitely multiplied; the difficulty is to reduce the number of our selections—not to find them. It would be equally easy to produce like evidence of the assured belief of the coming renovation from other sources, usually regarded as of greater authority. From the works of philosophers and divines, and from the essays in the English and Continental Reviews testimony which would be stronger to some minds, though improperly so, could be easily collected. Indeed, we have before us at this time, a long series of such testimonials, which we have been gathering for some years in the course of our reading, but we do not insert them here, both on account of the inordinate space which they would occupy, and because on this point we regard the higher poetry of the day as the most credible of all witnesses.

The reform thus proclaimed by poetry, and whose urgent necessity is attested by the more sober speculations of men, may be reasonably expected; for, in addition to this sort of oracular vaticination, a strong incentive to hope is afforded by the unquestionable intellectual energy and ability of the time. There is no decline of intellectual activity, but rather an excess; no sign of intellectual enervation, but rather of Herculean strength directing its forces to mistaken ends and under unfavourable conditions, because in the midst of a distempered atmosphere. In such circumstances we may legitimately regard the notes of promise as indications of its fulfilment, and the voice of hope as the prelude to the song of victory.

We have thus arrived at a satisfactory answer to the first great question in connexion with this subject; and have concluded, we think, on valid grounds, that a new Instauration is required, and may be expected at no distant time. A future essay will afford us the opportunity of determining the characteristics of "the future man,"* and of weighing the claims of Comte to be regarded as the Bacon of the nineteenth century.

* Tennyson's Princess, conclusion. In our citations from Tennyson, we omitted in consequence of its length, perhaps the most striking indication of his active faith, which is furnished by the series of his poems. This is the *acephalous* poem, printed vol. i, pp. 204–208 of the American edition; and especially that part of it commencing,

> Even now we hear with inward strife,
> A motion toiling in the gloom——

with which may be compared Jordano Bruno, De Minimi Inv., lib. i, c. i, p. 97, cit. Brucker. Hist. Crit. Phil., tom. v, p. 9. (Add also to our citations: Bailey, Festus, p. 280, Am. ed.)

Art. II.—COLONIZATION.

1. *Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the American Colonization Society.* Washington, 1851.
2. *Nineteenth Annual Report of the New-York State Colonization Society.* New-York, 1851.

African Colonization is among the great facts of the first half of the nineteenth century. A Christian commonwealth, animated by the spirit of modern civilization, now occupies the abandoned sites of the slavers' barracoons; and, whether in the form of increasing Christian states stretching along the pestilent Guinea coast, or only in the wasting vestiges of a vigorous but shortlived civilization, the memorials of that work will long remain, and in the distant future it will appear to have been among the memorable things of the present age.

The history of European misrule in Western Africa is among the darkest chapters in the annals of human depravity and crime. The simultaneous discovery and occupation of America gave a greatly increased importance to African commerce. From an early antiquity Africa to the south of the Great Desert was known almost exclusively as an exporter of slaves. Before the age of the Cæsars slaves from beyond the mountains of Nubia or the Great Desert were sold in the marts of Carthage and Cairo, and were to be seen in the rich villas of the luxurious Romans. The same trade was prosecuted to a limited extent by the Saracens; but its growth was greatly circumscribed by the genius of Islamism, by which freedom was awarded to all slaves who embraced the faith of the Prophet.

The exportation of slaves from Africa grew out of the prevalence of slavery in that country. No despotism is so intense as that of an African king, and nowhere else is there found so general and complete a system of slavery as prevails in the kingdoms of that continent. Slaves are the chief commodity; in this form wealth is chiefly embodied, and the price of things is reckoned at so many slaves. When European commerce had created new wants, slaves were freely offered in exchange for the coveted wares; and as slave-labour was the only available form of African industry, the trade in slaves naturally began to be regarded with favour by the European merchants.

Down to the middle of the fifteenth century, however, the demand for labour was too limited to create, to any considerable extent, a demand for African slaves; nor was the foreign slave-trade known till the de-

mand for labour in the American colonies called it into existence. The adaptation of the African, who had been reared in bondage, to the condition of a slave, as opposed to the unconquerable love of freedom in the American Indian, suggested to the humane, but short-sighted bishop of Chiapas the scheme of substituting negro for Indian slavery in the Spanish American colonies. A more controlling argument soon appeared in favour of the proposed substitution,—it proved to be profitable,—and impelled by such an influence the newly-created commerce advanced rapidly, though opposed by both the civil and the ecclesiastical powers. From that time forward the African coast was the scene of an ever-active traffic in the bodies and souls of men. Hundreds of thousands of unhappy victims of European cupidity were thus torn from the homes of their childhood and borne beyond the deep into hopeless exile; while the American colonies became peopled with a servile race, widely distinguished in mental and physical characteristics from the colonists. The slave-trade has long since ceased in all those parts of America that were originally occupied by British colonies, and in most of them slavery itself has been abolished by law; but the descendants of the victims of that trade are still to be found there in increasing millions.

The native Africans when separated from their national institutions and home associations were wholly without institutions, laws, or religion. They were men only so far as physical character, and moral and intellectual susceptibilities are concerned; of those mental endowments that dignify manhood they were entirely destitute. Their native tongue, no longer available as a medium of communication, was disused and soon forgotten; the rites of their conjurers, at first but imperfectly understood, soon passed from their memories; and all of the very little originally possessed above mere infantile ignorance was entirely lost. America received from Africa only unfurnished human animals, possessing, indeed, all the capacities of men, but as destitute of mental as of material endowments.

The system of African slavery, though one of the most stupendous wrongs ever inflicted by human cupidity upon defenceless innocence, has nevertheless been overruled by Providence to the good of its victims. It has removed the debased and ignorant savage from his degrading associations, and has placed him in contact with the Christian civilization of another race. Here his susceptible nature has imbibed the spirit of the institutions among which he was placed, and thus his character has been elevated and his social position improved. Other nations have advanced rapidly in civilization and refinement since first the African race was naturalized on American soil, but none has made

the same relative progress that the negro has done. To-day the three millions of that race in this country embody a mass of moral and intellectual power, that will compare advantageously with the middle classes of any European country as they were three hundred years ago. The children of unlettered Africans—slaves or princes—have in numerous instances attained a respectable rank of intelligence, even when compared with the advanced standard of the present age. The worshippers of the most worthless *gree-grees*, whose only religious emotion was slavish fear, and whose only worship was a senseless or degrading ceremony, have listened to and received the simple faith of the gospel, and by it have been elevated to the dignity of Christ's freedmen. The elements of a nation were cast upon our shores, but by reason of mental destitution they wanted the cohesive properties that change individuals into societies. These properties have since been supplied, and now we have in our midst the strange spectacle of the elements of a mighty nation, instinct with all the properties of manhood, yet wholly disintegrated and incapable of uniting with the established social mass. The difference between the African race in America and their brethren in their fatherland is an incidental result of the system of slavery; though, as it is wholly incidental, neither the institution itself nor its patrons can plead this in mitigation of the unmixed iniquity of the system.

The enslavement of one portion of society by another is not merely the result of arbitrary acts of legislation. Where there is great disparity of mental and moral elevation among the various classes of society, something approaching to the character of slavery will always exist, and without such disparity even legal slavery will be more nominal than real. It is questionable whether even the forms of slavery can be maintained beyond a certain point in the approach of the enslaved to the mental elevation of the superior order. To avoid this result, slaveholding powers have sometimes purposely placed obstructions in the way of the mental culture of the enslaved. That however until recently had not been found necessary, as the means of education were not so readily accessible as to come within the reach of those for whom they were not specially designed. If therefore we see, in this age of benevolence, and in our own Christian country, this hitherto almost unknown enormity, it obviously is not owing to any unprecedented wickedness, but rather to the peculiar difficulty of sustaining the system of slavery among surrounding influences, compelling those interested in its perpetuation to resort to stringent measures for that purpose But the remedy is too violent to be long used. It is too late to expect to perpetuate a social organization by cutting off one portion of

the people from the means of self-culture, that they may the more certainly remain the chattels of another portion. The moral sense of American slaveholding communities will effectually frustrate any such fiendish purposes, though the throne of iniquity should frame that mischief by a law. But the fact that such insane legislation has taken place, is evidence that the slave population is already approaching that standard in mental progress at which slavery must cease. And this progress must continue, unless the standard of education among the whites shall decline also. While masters and slaves are fellow-Christians, deriving their common hopes and learning their reciprocal duties from the same Bible, the privileges most valued by the former will not be wholly denied to the latter. And as there is good ground for the presumption that at no period has the progress of the American slave population been so rapid as it is at present, it must be evident that the whole system is steadily approaching the point of its extinction—and that too under circumstances that threaten no violent or hurtful collisions of rival castes. The precise mode in which this shall result, is among the secret things of the future.

The scheme of African Colonization, in the present condition of things, is only incidentally related to slavery. The American Colonization Society professes to have nothing to do with it, and proposes only to colonize free persons of colour in Africa. But it would be neither just nor wise to pretend that the two things are not intimately related. But for the sub-incumbent slave population, the interest in behalf of the free blacks that gave rise to the cause of colonization would not have been felt; and nearly every effort in behalf of that cause has been made with a reference, more or less direct, to its influence upon slavery. That interest, too, has, in the great majority of cases, been prompted by benevolent feelings towards the enslaved, and of more or less intense hostility to the system of slavery.

The plan of restoring any portion of the exiled children of Africa to the land of their forefathers originated in England, and is one of several schemes devised for the benefit of the negro race, by that noble band of philanthropists whose names are inseparably joined to the glory of the abolition of the slave-trade and the complete overthrow of British colonial slavery. The origin of the scheme is also connected with the history of our own revolutionary struggle. At the close of the American revolution, among the provincial troops in the British army were more than a thousand negroes, who had been allured to the royal standard by the promise of emancipation. With quite as much fidelity to an unprofitable obligation as is commonly found in such cases, the British government undertook to remove these destitute and homeless ones to places of safety. A por-

tion of them were taken to London and there discharged, and the rest to Nova Scotia. The miserable condition of those in London arrested the attention of certain benevolent individuals in that city, and as it was found impracticable to render them efficient aid in England, the plan of transporting them to Africa was hit upon. Accordingly they were conveyed to that distant shore, and there, with their brethren from Nova Scotia, who joined them soon after, they laid the foundation of the colony of Sierra Leone.

In America the plan of colonization had a broader and more comprehensive design, and it was instigated by a no less genial charity. About the year 1815 two pioneers in that enterprise—Mercer of Virginia, and Finley of New Jersey, unknown to each other—were deeply engaged in studying to find out some method for benefitting the African race in America; and to both the plan of colonization appeared at once the best and the most feasible. During the next year these philanthropic men were brought together at Washington city, and there, in connexion with Messrs. Key, Caldwell, and Mills, all genuine friends of the coloured race, they laid the foundation of the American Colonization Society. That any other than benevolent purposes actuated any of them in this movement could be suspected only by those who know neither the men nor the work in which they engaged.

The American Colonization Society was organized in the city of Washington, in December, 1816. The most prominent agents in its organization were, besides those just named, certain distinguished public characters from the more northerly southern States,—Clay of Kentucky, Randolph of Virginia, Wright of Maryland, and some others. The views and expressions of these eminent men, of course, gave tone and colouring to the new society. From the first an extreme sensitiveness in reference to slavery was manifested, and great pains were taken to vindicate the society against even the suspicion of hostility to that institution. It is somewhat difficult to account for all that appears of this kind. It can hardly be thought that the antislavery sentiment of the country was not recognised and relied upon. Perhaps that was set down as so much fixed capital. The old Emancipation Societies had become inactive for want of some definite object, and it was natural to expect that the feelings that had hitherto found expression through those bodies would now be brought to operate in behalf of colonization. Accordingly the first aim of the nascent society seems to have been to conciliate the more sensitive and uncertain slave-interest. The society was strictly inhibited from any intermeddling with the subject of slavery, by having the field of its action confined to *free* coloured persons, while neither

slaves nor slavery is alluded to in its fundamental laws. But this significant silence was not deemed sufficient, and accordingly pains were taken to pledge the new organization to a course of action that should not be inimical to the cause of slavery.

Mr. Clay, the early and steady friend of the Society, who may be said to have stood sponsor at its baptism, and to have been security to the slave power for its good conduct ever since, on the occasion of its organization took the opportunity to define the relative positions of the Society and slavery, and his own position as to both. "It was proper and necessary," he remarked, "distinctly to state, that he understood it constituted no part of the object of this meeting to touch or agitate, in the slightest degree, a delicate question connected with another portion of the coloured population of our country. It was not proposed to deliberate on, or consider at all, any question of emancipation, or that was connected with the abolition of slavery. It was upon that condition alone, he was sure, that many gentlemen from the South and West, whom he saw present, had attended, or could be expected to co-operate. *It was upon that condition only that he himself attended.*"

He was followed by the celebrated John Randolph, who, notwithstanding his occasional antislavery paroxysms, was now more emphatic than Mr. Clay himself in vindicating the society from any suspicion of hostility to slavery. He said, "it appeared to him, that it had not been sufficiently insisted on, *with a view to obtain the co-operation of all the citizens of the United States*, not only that this meeting does not in any wise affect the question of negro slavery, [towards emancipation, of course,] but as far as it goes, must materially tend to secure the property of every master in the United States over his slaves. It appeared to him that this aspect of the question had not been sufficiently presented to the public view. It is a notorious fact, that the existence of this mixed and intermediate population of free negroes was viewed by every slaveholder as one of the greatest sources of the insecurity and unprofitableness of slave property; that they serve to excite in their fellow-beings a feeling of discontent, of repining at their situation; and that they act as channels of communication, not only between different slaves, but between the slaves of different districts; that they are the depositaries of stolen goods and the promoters of mischief. In a wordly point of view, then, without entering into the general question, and apart from those higher and nobler motives which had been presented to the meeting, [by Mr. Caldwell,] the owners of slaves were interested in providing a retreat for this part of our population."

Randolph was followed by Mr. Robert Wright, of Maryland, who,

in giving in his adhesion to the society, thought it necessary to accompany it with his protest also. "As I discover," said he, "the most delicate regards to the *rights of property*, I shall, with great pleasure, lend my aid to restore this unfortunate people to the enjoyment of their liberty..... But while we wish to promote the happiness of these free people of colour, we ought to take care not to furnish the means of transporting out of the reach of the master *his property*."

These addresses were designed to define the position of the society before the public; and to secure the favour and co-operation of the friends of slavery, a tone of whining deprecation was adopted by its friends towards them, while those who consented half-reluctantly to be its sponsors, did so with the language of warning and menace upon their lips. Everything was done to appease the pro-slavery interest—the anti-slavery sentiment of the nation was disregarded. The society had a southern aspect from the beginning. This was seen not only in the sentiments uttered, but also in the *personnel* of its organization. The president and eight out of thirteen vice-presidents were from slave States,—probably most of them were slaveholders; and the executive-officers—as the society was located at Washington city—were all from slave territory.

The favour of the great men who officiated at the organization of the society, or were named among its officers, though purchased so dearly, was not expected to extend so far as to induce them to make any considerable personal or pecuniary sacrifice for its benefit. The burden of the details of the society's affairs was to be borne by the original projectors of the enterprise, while the national government was relied on as the source of the pecuniary means that would be required. Accordingly, among the first acts of the new organization was the presentation of a memorial to Congress in behalf of their designs. That document was the work of a very different set of men from those who spoke for the society at its constituent meeting. It portrays in vivid colours the degraded condition of the free coloured population, and feelingly deplores their wretchedness. The designs of the society for their relief are then set forth, and spoken of as affording the government a favourable opportunity "for repairing a great evil in our social and political institutions, and at the same time for elevating from a low and hopeless condition a numerous and rapidly increasing race of men, *who want nothing but a proper theatre*, to enter upon the pursuit of happiness and independence in the ordinary paths which a benign Providence has left open to the human race." A yet more expanded and elevated view of the subject is presented in another part of the same document. "It may be

reserved," say the memorialists, "for our government to become the honourable instrument, under divine Providence, of conferring a still higher blessing upon the large and interesting portion of mankind benefitted by that deed of justice, by demonstrating that a race of men, composing numerous tribes, spread over a continent of vast and unexplored extent, fertility, and riches, unknown to the enlightened nations of antiquity, and who had yet made no progress in the refinements of civilization, for whom history has preserved no monuments of arts or arms—that even this ill-fated race may cherish the hope of beholding at last the orient star revealing the best and highest aims and attributes of man. Out of such materials to rear the glorious edifice of well-ordered and polished society, upon the deep and sure foundation of equal laws and diffusive education, would give a sufficient title [to a nation or to individuals] to be enrolled among the illustrious benefactors of mankind, whilst it would afford a precious and consolatory evidence of the all-prevailing power of liberty, enlightened by knowledge and corrected by religion." That this first official document of the Society, rather than the unofficial remarks of the speakers at the organization, should have been taken as the real language and expressed sentiments of the new organization was not an unreasonable demand; though, since such papers are often passed over unread, while short and earnest speeches very generally arrest public attention, these and not that would, to the public mind, give character to the society. Such to some extent was the case, and to the same degree was the efficiency of the society destroyed.

The real strength of the cause of colonization lies in the moral convictions of the American people that they owe a long-delayed duty to the coloured race. That sentiment prevails in all sections of the country, and is shared in common by slaveholders and non-slaveholders. It is the necessary result of the common Christianity of the country, and is cherished by the benevolent spirit of the age. In the free States that spirit manifests itself in the form of the anti-slavery sentiment that almost universally pervades the enlightened and conscientious portion of the community; but which, on account of the difficulties attending the subject, and for the want of some practicable method of rendering itself available in doing good to its objects, too generally wastes its energies in inaction, or vents itself in unavailing anathemas against the institution of slavery. At the South the same spirit exists, if less generally than at the North, yet in a more practically active form. It is occupied in meliorating the condition of the enslaved, and in forming a public opinion that compels the most heartless master to award to his bondmen many of the privileges of fellow-creatures. It is teaching the whole slave-

holding community to recognise the enslaved as moral agents responsible to God, and therefore endowed by him with rights corresponding to their responsibilities. Accordingly the duty of allowing them religious privileges, and affording them the means of religious culture, is more and more recognised and practised. Their morals are cared for; they are taught to hallow the Sabbath; and though slavery necessarily discards marriage, yet in spite of this, there is a constantly increasing tendency to protect the chastity of the enslaved, and to invest their *quasi* marriages with the sanctions of religion. In many individual cases it has led to the emancipation of whole estates of slaves, and in others to liberal pecuniary contributions for the benefit of the coloured race. Had the friends of colonization relied more exclusively on the influence of this sentiment, resting their claims chiefly on high moral considerations, instead of pandering to the selfishness of heartless slave-masters, they would have gained for that cause the respect and confidence of its natural allies, and so been enabled efficiently to prosecute their benevolent enterprise. Their course in this matter has been a succession of grievous blunders; for in attempting to please all, they have not succeeded in satisfying any.

At first, indeed, the colonization cause was in danger of suffering the fate of the child of many fathers. As it had a face for everybody, so everybody was its friend. It came into being under the auspices of the great. The general government looked patronizingly upon it. It was commended to the friends of slavery as an expedient for increasing the value and security of their "property;" to the enemies of slavery it was held up as the one safe and speedy method for its extirpation. The missionary zeal of the Churches was invoked in its behalf, since it promised to open the way for preaching the gospel to the heathen, and was to be, in some sense, itself a missionary organization; while the propagandism of the politician and the scholar, and the cupidity of the merchant were to find in union with it an ample field for their peculiar enterprises. But at the same time none of these numerous and powerful friends of the cause of Colonization were responsible for its subsistence; and while each left it to the rest, not a few were alienated by reason of the bootless favour of antagonist parties.

These results, however, were only gradually developed. Northern antislaveryism was very generally, though rather languidly, enlisted in favour of colonization, notwithstanding the ungracious attitude at first given to that cause. Auxiliary associations were formed, by the spontaneous action of the people, in most of the free States, and considerable sums of money were raised. A friendly feeling to-

wards the society and its objects was also gaining ground among the more intelligent of the coloured people, and many of them, especially in the middle and more northerly southern States, began to look towards Africa as the hope and the home of the American coloured people. This was the more important, since the success of the society's operation is dependant upon their favour and confidence. This fact has been too generally overlooked, especially when, to gain the favour of the slave interest, the confidence of those without whose co-operation the society can do nothing, has been most uselessly sacrificed. Could the favour of the friends of slavery have been purchased at such a price, it would have been too dearly paid for. Here was the capital blunder. Not that the Colonization Society ever deserved to be suspected by the coloured people, but that it permitted itself to be placed in a false position by professed friends, who have proved not worth the price at which it was attempted to buy them.

For the first fifteen years of its history the Colonization Society drew out a languid existence; though during that period a settlement was fixed on the coast of Africa, whither some twelve hundred American negroes were transported, and about three hundred recaptured Africans,—the latter at the expense of the government of the United States. But this same period produced great changes at home, relative to slavery. The demand for slave labour was largely augmented, and the value of slaves increased accordingly. Men now saw their pecuniary interests involved in the institution, and casting aside the claims of justice, they began to question the prescriptive authority by which it had so long been denounced as an evil, and to look with disfavour at anything that tended, however remotely, to its removal. Then first arose a decided and avowed proslavery party in our country, to whom belongs the distinction of being the first to avow the monster dogma of the times—the moral righteousness of slaveholding. At the same time, by virtue of the steady progress of the age, the antislavery sentiments of the better portion of society were becoming more and more intense; and of course the antagonism of parties grew more decided and violent. A further, though accidental, cause of irritation was also added, which greatly complicated and rendered more intricate the existing difficulties. The antislavery cause at the North fell into the hands of parties but poorly qualified to manage its delicate and complex interests. The work that under more favourable circumstances had puzzled the shrewd and dispassionate Quakers, was now undertaken by men of directly opposite characters. Assuming a speculative and romantic theory of duty as to the relations of masters and slaves, these men laboured to propagate their opinions with all the zeal and much of

the usual intolerance of enthusiasts. Resting in the conviction that the subject admitted of no compromise, and that whatever came short of their own standard must be rejected and opposed, these newly-fledged philanthropists denounced the Colonization Society as one of the bulwarks of slavery. This assault was uncalled for and unwise; and whatever may have been the opinions and motives of the assailants, many of their imputations were unjust. But unluckily for the cause of Colonization, so much had been conceded, that it was not difficult to place the society in the aspect of an apologist for slavery.

The assault, however, would probably have proved comparatively harmless, had not the friends of the society been driven by it into a position still more fatal to the interests of their cause. Never did the strategy of an experienced campaigner succeed more perfectly in drawing his enemy into a snare, than did the movements of the Abolitionists, (the name is used in no opprobrious sense,) whether they designed it or not, in entangling the Colonizationists in a net from which it was impossible they should escape without great damage. The very worst that the Colonizationists could have done, was to take up the gauntlet thrown down by their new enemies, and so come before the public in opposition to those who were recognised as, *par excellence*, the enemies of slavery. And that very thing they did. Of course, they were worsted at every onset; for though they were cheered on by the mobs that were overriding all law to put down the Abolitionists, the sober and discerning drew away from the contest and did nothing; or, impelled by sympathy for the victims of a remorseless persecution, made common cause with them, in their follies as well as their sufferings. The position into which the Colonization Society was brought by the mistaken policy of its friends, was as unfortunate as its worst enemies could have desired; for while the North was almost wholly lost to colonization in the contest, the South entirely withdrew its confidence, and left the society and its interests to drag out a feeble existence, or to perish through neglect. There is cause to believe that the experience has not proved entirely profitless, though there is much yet for the directors of that society to learn. When its reports and other official papers shall cease to be vehicles of vituperation against abolitionists, and of apologies for slavery and slaveholders; when its orators and essayists shall cease to vilify our free coloured population, and to teach the comparative advantages of slavery over their condition; when, in short, the society shall express a friendly sympathy with the objects of its beneficence rather than with their enemies, a new and greatly improved state of things will occur in its affairs.

We will now turn our attention from the domestic affairs of the American Colonization Society to contemplate the scene of its foreign operations. Liberia in Africa lies on the western coast of that continent, extending in a south-eastern direction from the vicinity of Sierra Leone to Cape Palmas, a distance of over three hundred miles, at which point the coast turns to the eastward, and runs three hundred miles farther, along the northern border of the Gulf of Guinea, to the great Delta of the Niger. This region was for a long time the seat of European and American commerce in Africa, especially the slave-trade. That part occupied by the new republic is a beautiful and fertile region, well watered and highly productive. Situated between the equator and the northern tropic, it enjoys perpetual summer, and is richly supplied with the means of human subsistence. The climate, though fatal to white men, is eminently congenial to the constitutions of the African race, who feel the scorching rays of the vertical sun less painfully than the breeze that fails to blast the opening flower, and to whom the miasma is less deleterious than the winds that only nerve up the energies of a race adapted to another climate.

It does not fall within our design to trace the progress of the colony planted on this coast by the emigrants carried from America under the auspices of the Colonization Society; we purpose only to notice results, and from them to deduce appropriate conclusions. Down to the present year (1851) the aggregate receipts of the Society, from various sources, amount to $913,636; to which may be added $312,000, the amount raised and expended by independent societies in the same work; making a total of nearly one and a quarter millions of dollars, expended in the cause of colonization in thirty-four years. Out of this sum the current expenses of the society have been paid; the territory extending nearly four hundred miles along the coast has been paid for; over six thousand American coloured persons have been colonized in Africa, and many considerable public improvements made. These facts, though they proclaim the feebleness of the society's efforts, and the insignificance of its means, also very satisfactorily establish the fidelity and economy of its administration. But these statements very inadequately exhibit the results effected by the society. The coast for four hundred miles, once the principal seat of the horrid slave-trade, has been redeemed from its worse than heathen barbarism, and erected into a Christian state, abounding with appliances of a vigorous civilization. All along that coast, and penetrating into the interior, are found the towns and settlements of a well-regulated republic, that is now claiming its place among the sovereign nations of the earth, and launching out upon

a successful career of industrial and educational enterprises. Nearly two hundred thousands of the members of the native tribes acknowledge the authority of the new government, and rejoicing in its protection, are steadily, and in some cases even rapidly, preparing themselves for a full participation in the privileges of citizenship. Modern civilization, instinct with the spirit and life of Christianity, has become naturalized in the land of the negro.

In searching for the first-fruits of colonization, attention should be directed to Africa rather than to America. If its only results were the removal of a very small portion of our coloured people, the enterprise would be worthy of very little attention. But the persons whose removal from America caused no perceptible vacuum, have been widely and most beneficially felt in Africa. The American negro goes back to the land of his forefathers a very different kind of person from the representatives of his race that originally went out to the land of the coloured man's enslavement and emancipation. He comes back to his fatherland and to his kindred tribes a relatively educated and elevated character, and so, from the necessity of the case, becomes to them an apostle of civilization. And as the spirit of a youthful civilization is instinctively aggressive, though its standard, as compared with older communities, may be low, when acting on a mass of barbarism its success is certain. If the social elevation of our native population may suffice to raise, to their own level, the semi-enlightened masses that Europe is disgorging upon our shores, may not the American coloured emigrants in Africa in like manner elevate the native tribes to their own advancing standard? The facts now occurring in Liberia abundantly prove that this must be the case.

The native Africans regard their kindred from America as a superior race of beings, and yet as so related to themselves as to be objects of hopeful emulation. To speak the language or to wear the apparel of these strangers becomes an object of their ambition. Ideas peculiar to a state of civilization, and full of its diffusive life, are readily received and rapidly disseminated among them. The wants thus created give occasion to increased industry, and this in turn increases the appliances of civilization. Commerce brings the barbarian of the interior into contact with the civilization of the seaboard, whence he returns to his inland home with new incitements to action, and new ideas of life and manners. The schools established in and about the colonial settlements are already giving a new character to the rising generations of natives in those parts, and the more powerful influences of vital Christianity are steadily transforming those savage tribes into orderly Christian communities.

It has been asked, in reference to this work of colonization, whether

there is not danger that it may result, as have other similar schemes, in the subjection and ultimate extinction of the native tribes. The fraternal relations hitherto maintained by the colonists towards the natives are not thought to be sufficient surety that such will not be the case; for the period of colonial infancy is not the time of most imminent danger, as then a sense of weakness restrains the colonists from violence, or even from such flagrant acts of injustice as would arouse the vengeance of their barbarous neighbours. Nor is the progress of Christianity among the natives alone a sufficient safeguard against the most sanguinary conflicts between them and the colonist. Christianity, at an early date, made most encouraging progress among the American Indians, but it did not save their tribes from exterminating wars with the whites. The Hottentots and Caffres of South Africa have received the gospel; nevertheless we hear the shout of *extermination* uttered against them by their colonial neighbours. And with such examples before us it is well to ask whether like dangers do not threaten the relations of Liberian colonists and the native tribes in their vicinity.

In the cases above named, and others of like character, it must be observed that the distinction between colonists and natives did not consist exclusively in disparity of mental character arising from the accidents of education. They were of different *races*, distinguished by obvious and immutable physical characteristics, the well-known and ever-active causes of sectional prejudices and partisan divisions. And as diversity of race is made an occasion of prejudices, so unity of race has its corresponding affinities; and while the former are too stubborn to yield to the force of education, and too powerful to be overcome by the amount of Christian charity that may be reasonably calculated on in any civil community, the latter also co-operates with those influences, to unite in one body individuals very far separated in mental and moral characteristics. While therefore among us, the Caucasian race is found incapable of assimilating with either the American-Indian or the African race, and consequently living in virtual hostility to both; and while in Australia and South Africa the European colonists are steadily pushing the native tribes towards extinction, in Liberia, on account of the absence of this cause of hostility, there is no apparent tendency towards such a catastrophe. Everything there indicates another state of things. Though the colonists cannot be expected at once and entirely to forget their superiority as a class, yet so perishable are the barriers between themselves and the natives that they cannot be perpetuated. The families of colonists and of natives live in close proximity to each other; their children attend the same schools; and by thus growing

up together they imbibe the same ideas and become a common people. The institutions of the new republic all tend to efface the distinction of the two classes. Already many native Africans are enjoying the rights and privileges of citizens, and some of them are found in positions of honour and responsibility. The forming mass requires only a larger infusion of the American element to secure and hasten the assimilating and elevating process now so happily in operation.

Among the probable results of colonization, none is more noteworthy than its incidental influence towards elevating the negro character, by creating among men of that race a just self-respect, and by inspiring in others corresponding sentiments towards them. Once the language put into the mouth of the naked and kneeling African, by the British Society for the Abolition of the Slave-trade—"Am I not a man and a brother?"—was a question; but the results of colonization have changed it into an indignant demand. Oppressed by the superincumbent weight of an unapproachable superior *caste*, the African in America could never assert his claim to equality with his fellow-men, and no monuments or historical traditions remain to vindicate such claim in his behalf. But the opportunity so long withheld has been at length afforded; and well has the coloured man justified the largest expectations of his most sanguine friends. In contemplating the facts presented in the history of Liberia, all but the perversely blind must detect some of the highest attributes of the human character, among the leading men of that infant commonwealth. There the coloured man has discovered his own latent capabilities, and learned to venerate his own manhood. There the African race stand forth demonstrating their powers and susceptibilities for high intellectual and moral culture. The truths thus elicited must soon be everywhere recognised; and then the world shall be called to admire a race of men, once accounted the connecting link between rational and irrational beings, advancing with unparalleled rapidity towards a lofty eminence. Had colonization done no more, such an achievement would a thousand fold repay all its cost of labour and treasure. From this point of observation the future is full of promise to the African race; and things quite as improbable have actually occurred, as would be a rivalry in social progress during the ensuing centuries between that race and the Anglo-Saxon. Each of those races has its peculiar adaptation for success in such a contest, and both have advantages not possessed in equal measure by other portions of mankind.

In this way we may look to Liberia for an influence that must act most efficiently in favour of the final emancipation of the African race. Such an influence must necessarily arise from the very ex-

istance of a wealthy educated and powerful republic of coloured people, holding and maintaining its place among the great nations of Christendom. Hitherto the world has silently assented to the enslavement of the African race from an indefinite but effectual conviction of their mental inferiority. Take away that notion, and compel the world to confess the real manhood of the negro, and every generous soul will cry out against his enslavement. Already the infant republic of Liberia is operating toward this great end, and this tendency must increase with the growth of the republic. Its probable influence upon slavery and the condition of the coloured population of this country has been a subject of special interest among all classes who have concerned themselves in the cause of colonization. It must now, however, be apparent to all that its immediate influence towards removing that population is very inconsiderable. A few thousands have been removed in a period of thirty years, and during the same time the increase of that race among us has been by hundreds of thousands. For the last ten years the ratio of emigration to increase has scarcely equalled two to a thousand. Nor can such an increase of emigration be anticipated, for many years to come, as will sensibly affect the numerical progress of this increasing mass. It is evident, therefore, that one of the primary designs of the originators and early advocates of colonization, whether prompted by benevolence or cupidity, is not likely to be realized.

The effectual obstacle to the removal of the slave population is the profitableness of slave labour. Not that slavery is favourable to the increase of national wealth, but to immediate individual aggrandizement. As a system of practical political economy nothing can be more ruinous; yet on account of the state of things where it most flourishes, the few are enriched by it, though at the expense of the whole. This state of things depends chiefly on the greatly increased demand for cotton, by which an enhanced value has been given to slave labour. By this means the planting interest in the cotton-growing region has completely risen above all others; and so, while one class has been directly enriched, the community, as a whole, has been impoverished. Still this interested class, by virtue of their numbers and social influence, and the dependence of all others upon them, have been able to lead the public mind and to dictate the measures of government. Their plantations constitute a ready market for the domestic slave-trade, and thus the slave interests of Maryland and Virginia are united with those of Georgia and Mississippi. The cotton-trade extending from the planter to the consumer is rooted in and derives its existence from slavery; and in

return it imparts vigour and stability to that institution. While, therefore, these things continue as they now are, we cannot expect any general movement towards the removal of the slave population from the country. And here lurks the danger of the system of slavery. The glitter of gain usually effectually blinds the sight to every other object. The perpetuation of slavery is sought as a means of personal gain; and regardless of the tendency of the age to condemn the whole system as illiberal and unjust,—alike anti-American and anti-Christian,—and of the increasing moral and intellectual power of the slaves themselves, thus rendering them a most unsafe element in the body politic, the system is extended, and all thought of its annihilation, or even modification, is scouted, and proscribed as a pestilent heresy. The future as viewed from this stand-point, is dark as the prophetic writing upon the walls of Belshazzar's palace.

But if by any of the many possible changes in the affairs of the world, the value of slave labour should be greatly diminished, the same interests that now effectually forbid the removal of the slaves would as earnestly demand it. Make slavery unprofitable to the individual master, and it will very speedily become extinct. And should cotton come to be largely cultivated out of the United States,—in the East or West Indies, or in Africa,—or should some substitute for cotton, better and cheaper, be discovered and brought into extensive use, that event would occur. And should these things take place while the present social relations of the two races continue they would at once separate by their own natural repulsions. But whether in that case Liberia would become the asylum of the freed coloured people would depend upon ulterior causes. If an exodus awaits the American negro race, their land of promise is not yet certainly ascertained. It may be Africa, or the Antilles, or the wilds of Northern Mexico. It is possible, too, that the regions where they shall then be chiefly collected, would be gradually abandoned by its white population, as in Jamaica, and so the negroes at length possess the fields they once cultivated for others. The only valuable consideration connecting colonization with these contingencies, is that it is preparing an adequate asylum for that population, if at any time it shall come to be needed.

Independent of these things a few years may produce great changes in the affairs of the American Colonization Society. The institution was from the first ostensibly devoted to the free people of colour, and to them it may address itself without hindrance. Did the free coloured people know their own best interests, and had they sufficient enterprise to prosecute them at a little present sacrifice, the address

would not be unheeded. Whatever may be thought of the colonization scheme as to its ulterior purposes, its immediate fruits upon those who embrace its offers are unquestionably beneficent; and every free coloured man in America should be taught to feel that his individual welfare, as well as the best interests of his race, are pointing him to Liberia. But in order to this, the language of the Colonization Society and that of its agents and platform orators must be so modified as to conciliate the good-will and inspire the confidence of coloured men. Could they themselves be convinced that those who are inviting them to go out to find for themselves a country in a distant land, are really their friends, acting from purely benevolent motives, multitudes would speedily accept the invitation. While, however, the representatives of the Society assume the tone and port of negro-drivers, it is not wonderful that the gifts brought by their hands are regarded with suspicion. It is believed that of late there has been some improvement in this matter; and also that the character of the Colonization Society is becoming better understood by the coloured people of the free States. It is truly desirable that these good works may continue to advance.

Among the most valuable of the immediate results of colonization is the opportunity it has afforded benevolent persons to emancipate their slaves, and make adequate provision for them in a state of freedom. In many of the slave States emancipation is rendered exceedingly difficult or quite impossible; and where it is practicable, the condition of free coloured people is not such as to invite the benevolent to seek it as the portion of their freedmen. Accordingly in such cases emigration and perpetual slavery are the only alternatives presented to the slave whose master earnestly desires to do his whole duty towards him. To these, therefore, colonization is truly an angel of mercy, and Liberia a land of refuge. More than three thousand—over half the number sent out—were emancipated expressly for that purpose, nearly all of whom would have remained slaves had no such place of refuge been offered; nearly two hundred thus purchased their own freedom. It is further evident, that the legal owners of a great many slaves only need to be convinced that an asylum is there prepared for their unfortunate wards, where freedom may be enjoyed in reality, to induce them to grant the boon. Only let it be demonstrated by a proper array of well-attested facts, that the colonized negro is benefitted by the change of his condition, and many masters will hasten to send their servants thither.

The reports named at the head of this paper amply prove the assumptions we have made as to the position of the society. In

the appendix to the Report of the Parent Society is a statement of the emigration to Liberia, (exclusive of that to the Maryland Colony at Cape Palmas,) from the beginning of 1820 to the end of 1850,—a period of thirty-one years. In February of the first-named year the ship Elizabeth sailed from New-York for Africa, under the direction and at the expense of the government of the United States, with eighty-six emigrants, chiefly from New-York and Pennsylvania. The emigration for the next ten years amounted to thirteen hundred and thirty-six, and for the ten years following, to two thousand, four hundred and twenty-three; while that for the last decade is only twenty-three hundred, of which number nearly fourteen hundred fall to the last three years. These figures demonstrate the absence of any available favour towards the society among any considerable class of the people of the United States, and as clearly prove the bad policy of trying to please everybody. Had the same amount of efforts towards conciliation, that has been addressed to the slave-power, been used towards "the free people of colour residing in our country," without whose consent the society can do nothing, a very different state of things would have ensued. A change for the better as to that particular has taken place within a few years past, and a corresponding increase is seen in the number of emigrants.

It is equally instructive to observe from what places these emigrants have come, and from what they have not come. More than one-third of the whole (twenty-two hundred and fifty-eight) were from Virginia, nearly an equal proportion from North Carolina, and a much larger proportion from Maryland, including about eight hundred sent by the Maryland Colonization Society to Cape Palmas. Of about seven thousand persons sent out to the two colonies, over forty-four hundred have come from these three States. In these States it is well known that there is a large number of free negroes intermingled with the slave population, constituting the class of persons so often and earnestly alluded to, by a certain order of colonization advocates, as a troublesome and dangerous body. In these States, too, are to be found some of the most reliable friends of the coloured race,—persons whose views of the subject have been formed upon an intimate and extensive acquaintance with the facts of the case, and whose benevolence has not expended itself in barren expressions of sympathy. Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia have each contributed over five hundred; South Carolina about three hundred and fifty; Tennessee and Kentucky about two hundred and fifty each, and Louisiana nearly two hundred. Many of all these were liberated slaves, freed and sent out by their former masters. On the list of States from which emigrants have gone, the names of

Maine, New-Hampshire, Vermont, Wisconsin, Florida, Arkansas, and Texas, do not appear. Massachusetts, New-Jersey, and Michigan have given one each; Iowa, three; Delaware, four; Connecticut, ten: the other States range from twenty-one—the number from Illinois—to one hundred and seven—the number contributed by the Empire State. These statements very satisfactorily demonstrate that at the end of thirty-four years' labour the cause of colonization has scarcely made itself felt by the great mass of our coloured population. The great work upon which depends all its efficiency is yet to be done.

Did the reports inform us of the sources of the society's income, we should see still more clearly where lies the strength of the cause of colonization. From the Parent Society we have no information on this subject; but in the last report of the New-York State Society is given a classified list of Churches from which contributions were received during the year. The information thus given is significant and highly suggestive. Only four denominations are named as contributors,—the Old, and the New School Presbyterian, the Reformed Dutch, and the Methodist Episcopal Churches. From the other great denominations,—the Episcopalians, a body noted for the wealth and high position of its adherents, and from among whom the Colonization Societies are ambitious to choose their vice-presidents; from the Quakers, the ancient and steady friends of the coloured race; from the Baptists, among the most numerous and liberal religious bodies among us; from the Congregationalists, a denomination second to none in enlightened liberality,—from all these no account is given. Nor are the reports from the denominations named as contributors such as to impress one with the conviction that even in these bodies the cause of colonization has come to be regarded as one of the great religious and benevolent enterprises of the times. The Old School Presbyterian Church has been esteemed the strong tower of the Colonization Society; and yet of all its numerous Churches in this State, only twenty-two are heard from, and the aggregate of their contributions ($1,591 54) falls below what many of them pay singly to other benevolent institutions. The New School Presbyterians occupy a somewhat less cordial relation to the cause. Only ten of the numerous Churches of that body have sent contributions amounting in all to six hundred dollars,—more than half of which come from our congregation. The Reformed Dutch Churches have shown a much more general and steady attachment to the cause than any other denomination. The relation of the Methodist Episcopal Church to this cause has long been anomalous and ambiguous. The society has been endorsed by our highest ecclesiastical bodies, and warmly commended to the favour of the people. Three of our bishops (North

and South) and four other distinguished clergymen of our name are among its long array of vice-presidents. A fair proportion of its travelling agents are Methodist ministers; and of the emigrants, there are more Methodists than of all other classes of Christians united. And yet it is evident that the society has but very partially enjoyed the confidence and sympathy of the great body of our people. The cause of this we have pointed out in the preceding pages; the evidence of it is found in the reports under notice. Previous to the summer of last year the contributions to that cause from our Churches had been indefinitely small. It was then determined by the State Society to employ as an agent, a regularly accredited minister of our denomination, charged expressly to visit our Churches and lay before their congregations the claims of the colonization cause, and make collections. The experiment was made, and, as a result, at least one man is thoroughly convinced that the great mass of the Methodist people in the State of New-York do not cordially sympathize with the Colonization Society, though probably nine-tenths of them are decidedly in favour of colonization. All this is patent upon the face of the report. Twenty Churches are named, giving an aggregate contribution of about two hundred dollars; and then it is added in a note—"probably forty Methodist Churches visited by the agent gave collections to the amount of one thousand dollars." It would have been nearer the truth probably had the report said eighty Churches were so visited, and that the contributions (generally public collections in small country Churches) were elicited by considerations of favour towards the agent personally rather than by any particular regard for the society he represented.

From the facts thus presented by the Report it is evident that the heart of the people of New-York has not been reached by the appeal of the Colonization Society. Now we will not charge this to any fault in the cause itself; nor will the friends of the society lay it to the heartlessness of the people. Shall we then charge it to the interference of the Abolitionists? That would not mend the matter, as it would imply a want of independent understanding among the people, leaving them to the cunning of designing men. It would also be unjust, since many Abolitionists are opposed, not to colonization, but only to certain positions and measures of the Colonization Society, and more especially to the language of its orators and agents. The fault is in the unfortunate position that that society has always occupied toward free coloured persons, and toward such white men as have especially sympathized with them.

We have written these things with only good wishes for the cause of colonization. We look upon it as an agency promising much

good to the African race, and as such we account it worthy of the confidence and support of every true philanthropist. But we cannot shut our eyes to the manifest and egregious blunders of the administration of the Colonization Society; and as we value the cause we feel constrained to protest against some of the unnatural alliances into which it has been brought by its false or mistaken friends. It is high time that good and wise men should look at this whole subject of slavery and the affairs of the coloured race with calmness and in the spirit of Christian patriotism. Too long have criminations and recriminations made up the staple of the controversy on this subject. The issue of the controversy cannot be doubtful. The point of interest is not whether a change may or may not come—as to that there can be but one opinion among men; but that when it shall come it may prove in the least possible degree disastrous to the quiet and security of our beloved country.

Let the special advocates of freedom remember that Providence is seldom or never in a hurry, and therefore learn to wait patiently the development of his purposes. There is no cause to suspect that the resources of his wisdom, even in this most difficult case, are exhausted. If with a hopeful confidence the whole affair is commended to Infinite Power and Goodness, and in the mean time present opportunities properly occupied, a happy issue may be anticipated.

Art. III.—PLUTARCH'S THEOLOGY.

Perhaps no one moralist or philosopher of antiquity is so fit a representative and interpreter of the best elements in the religious systems of the ancient pagan world, as Plutarch. His peculiar adaptation to perform this office will appear from several considerations.

In the first place, the age in which he lived enabled him to gather up *all* the valuable results of heathen philosophy and theology, of purely human wisdom and virtue, and hand them over to those who were to enjoy the brighter light of the Christian revelation. He flourished in the latter part of the first, and the beginning of the second, century after the birth of Christ; when the religions of man had had full scope to do their utmost for the elevation of the race, and the religion of God had just entered on the work of human redemption; when the old world was ripe and ready to be dissolved, and history was to begin, as it were, anew with the reign of Immanuel, God with us. Then, if ever, was the time to gather up the fragments, that nothing might be lost. He was acquainted with all that was valuable in the history and philosophy of the past; of the truth and grace that were destined to make all things new in the time to come, he was entirely ignorant. He was, therefore, in just the situation to testify of heathenism, the whole of heathenism, and nothing but heathenism.

The pagan world, as a whole, was not then, perhaps, in its best state, either of morals or politics, literature or religion. The mass of mankind, so far from having attained to a better knowledge and a purer worship of the Deity by unaided human wisdom, had, doubtless, departed more and more from the true God, as they receded farther and farther from the light of the primitive revelation. The Greeks and Romans had degenerated from the virtue and piety of their ancestors. Grecian liberty had long been extinguished, and with it Grecian literature, science, and art had been bereft of their pristine light and life. The Roman empire had passed its meridian, and was already on its decline. Roman faith, Roman virtue, Roman piety, once proverbial, had become a by-word. The learned were to a great extent sceptical, the great were monsters of iniquity, and the masses had reached a point of corruption and degradation which, while it fully justified the dark picture that inspiration has drawn of them in the Epistle to the Romans, also demonstrated, to the painful conviction of the wisest and best of the heathen philosophers, the necessity of some new wisdom or power to deliver them

from the bondage of error and sin. Yet, at this very time, there were some of the noblest spirits that have ever lived; and the very degeneracy of the age nurtured their virtues to an unwonted greatness, and quickened their energies to search out—if perchance it could be found in all the accumulated resources of human thought and experience—an adequate remedy. These then, we repeat, were the very times, and these the very men, to collect and concentrate, as in a focus, all the scattered rays of truth and goodness that were diffused over the ages and nations of pagan antiquity.

In the second place, the school of philosophy to which Plutarch belonged, was eminently favourable to such a work as we have assigned him. The Academy, of which he was a disciple, was, in its moral and religious tendencies, the best of all the Grecian sects; insomuch that when learned men were first brought into the Church, this was, in the providence of God, the preparatory school—the connecting link between philosophy and Christianity. Moreover the Platonists of this age, the New-Platonists, were Eclectics. They were not so addicted to any master as to abjure the doctrines of every other. They loved Plato, they loved Socrates; but they loved truth more, and felt at liberty to seek it wherever it could be found, though it were in other sects and in foreign lands.

Plutarch was an Eclectic in religion as well as in philosophy. While he practically embraced the religion of his ancestors, he held that there was essential truth in all religions. And he made it his study to mediate between them, to interpret their real significance, and thus to reconcile their diversified forms with each other and with the fundamental doctrines of the religion of nature and reason. In what other way could he have been so *well schooled* for the office of an interpreter and representative of pagan antiquity to the Christian scholar and philosopher?

In the third place, the character of the man conspired with the age in which he lived, and the school to which he belonged, to fit him for this work. He was constitutionally and habitually devout. He was in principle and in practice a moral and religious man, a moral and religious philosopher. Not a trace of scepticism appears in his works. Not a stain of vice or impiety rests upon his character. A sincere and controlling faith is seen everywhere in his life and in his writings. His historical works, beyond those of any other pagan historian, are consciously and intentionally a history of divine providence. His philosophy was not, like too many philosophical systems both ancient and modern, a temple without a God. The secrets of nature were, in his view, so many sanctuaries of the Deity; still more were the good man's closet and heart. Nor was it a re-

ligion of reason alone to which he gave his assent. He accepted, not with an indiscriminate credulity, still less to the exclusion of others, but with an intelligent faith, the religion of his fathers, resting on authority and tradition, embracing positive institutions and supernatural revelations—a religion of miracles and prophecies, of prodigies and mysteries, above the powers of nature and beyond the comprehension of man.

His mental, not less than his moral, constitution and habits qualified him to be the representative of ancient theology and religion. While his faith predisposed him to believe, and his virtues prepared him to love, all that was excellent in antiquity, his extensive knowledge brought it all within his reach, his thoughtful mind subjected it to a careful examination, and his practical sagacity discerned its moral and spiritual significance. He observed, he reflected, he travelled, he read. As a historian, he knew all the facts; as a philosopher, he analyzed them; as a moralist, he contemplated them in their relation to morals and religion.

The following are those treatises of Plutarch which pertain more particularly to theology and religion. On Superstition; Of Fate; Of Fortune; Concerning the Demon of Socrates; On the Cessation of Oracles; Concerning the Oracles of the Pythian Priestess; Of the Ει over the Gate of the Temple at Delphi; Of Isis and Osiris; Consolation to Apollonius; Consolatory Letter to his Wife; The Delay of the Deity in the Punishment of the Wicked. Besides these, the Arguments against the Stoics and the Epicureans, of which there are four, have important bearings on theology, and acquaint us incidentally with the theological opinions of Plutarch. Furthermore, there are scattered passages and incidental allusions throughout his moral and even his historical works, which should be brought together in order to a full exhibition of the author's sentiments.

A brief exposition of the design and method of each of the above-mentioned treatises may not be uninteresting or unprofitable, before we proceed to a more formal and synoptical statement of the author's theological opinions.

1. On Superstition. This is not, like most of the Moralia, in the form of a dialogue, or an epistle addressed to some individual; but an essay, or rather an indignant declamation, setting forth, in the strongest language, the unparalleled weakness and misery of superstition. There are no bounds to the fears and sorrows of the superstitious, as there are no limits to the power and presence of the gods. They cannot flee from the dominions of the universal tyrant, like other oppressed subjects. They cannot, like other slaves, demand or expect a change of masters. Criminals fly to the altar for pro-

tection; the altar is *their* place of torment. Most men find rest and relief in sleep; their sleep is made up of frightful dreams. Indeed, their life is one perpetual dream of horror, in which their reason is always asleep, and their fears always awake. They fear everything—the land, the sea, the air, the sky, the dark, the light, a sound, a silence, a dream. Death itself, instead of the end, is, to their apprehension, the beginning of sorrows that will never end. Other fears lead to exertion, that evil may be avoided or escaped; superstition paralyzes effort and forbids the use of means, since evil comes by divine appointment—as the Jews would not fight on the Sabbath, and the Athenians under Nicias suffered themselves to be cut in pieces by their enemies, rather than engage in battle during a lunar eclipse.

The essay draws an extended comparison between superstition and atheism. Atheism is unhappy, but superstition is more so. It is a fatal calamity to be blind in a matter of such moment: but it is better to be blind, than to see tyrants and monsters in our best friends; better to be deaf to the sweetest strains of music, than, like a tiger, to be driven mad by them. It is as bad to think ill of the gods, as to speak ill of them, and far less manly. He who fears, hates the gods; and he who fears and hates the gods, is their enemy. He wishes there were no god, but is too great a coward to say there is none. Yet it is more honourable to the gods to deny their existence, than to libel their character by representing them as pleased with human sacrifices, like the Celts, or as requiring parents to cast their own offspring into the fire, like the Carthaginians. The author would rather have it said, that there is no such man as Plutarch, than that he is a monster of cruelty and wickedness. In conclusion, he exhorts his readers strenuously to avoid superstition: but not in so doing to rush into the opposite extreme of atheism, overleaping true piety, which lies between them.

There are rhetorical extravagances in this essay, which, interpreted in their full and literal sense, would hardly be consistent with other treatises of the same author, where he represents superstition as in some respects preferable to atheism.* There is also a radical defect in his apparent philosophy of atheism, (growing perhaps out of the fact, that he treats of atheism only incidentally,) in that he makes superstition a disease both of the understanding and the passions, but atheism an error of the understanding alone.† Still it is an exceedingly able and eloquent dissuasive from superstition, and, on the whole, a very sound and judicious essay.

* Cf. Pleasure not Attainable according to Epicurus.

† For the true philosophy on this point, see Rom. i, 21–28; also Xen. Mem. Soc., i, 4, 18.

2. Of Fate. This is addressed to Piso, and purports to be written at his request. But it wears less the aspect of a familiar letter, than of a theological treatise.

Considered as a substance or essence, Fate is the universal soul of the world, and exists under a threefold distribution, answering to the three sisters in the Greek mythology, and inhabiting severally the solar, the lunar, and the sublunary sphere.*

As an energy or exercise, Fate is defined (in terms collected and expanded from Plato) to be a divine principle intransgressible through a cause that cannot be hindered; or a law, consequent upon the nature of the universe, according to which all things, that are done, are transacted. Though comprehending an infinite succession of events, it is not itself infinite, but finite, since it does not go forward as in a straight line, but moves, as it were, in a circle, which returns into itself. Like the civil law, it ordains generals primarily and antecedently, particulars secondarily and consequently; and determines things not absolutely, but by hypothesis; not separately, but in mutual connexion. By all things being transacted according to fate, the author explains himself as meaning, that all actual events are contemplated by it and comprehended in it—not that all are necessitated or made imperative, not that all are, in the strictest sense, fated or according to fate; just as the civil law extends to all that is done in the state, and contemplates treason and comprehends in its scope valour, though neither valour nor treason is strictly lawful or commanded by law. Fate is consistent with the possible and the contingent, with chance, fortune, and free-will, (as he endeavours to show by a definition and analysis of each,) since (such is the substance of his argument) though all things are comprehended by fate, all things do not occur by necessity, but everything *according to the law of its being and nature.* As it regards providence, fate does not comprehend it, but is comprehended by it. Fate is always according to providence, but providence never according to fate. In providence, as in fate, he makes a threefold distinction,† first, the sovereign will of the Supreme Ordainer and Disposer of all things; secondly, the energy of the second order of deities, who are the authors of generation and preservation; and thirdly, the agency of the demons, who are the guardians and overseers of human affairs.

The subject of this treatise is one which has always awakened discussions of the liveliest interest; and, whatever we may think of

* So we learn by comparing this treatise with the Face in the Disc of the Moon.

† And like the Fates, residing severally in the starry or solar, the lunar, and the sublunary sphere.

our author's success in solving the great problem of "fixed fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute," we must at least concede to him the merit of having handled it with much frankness and boldness, and at the same time with eminent judiciousness and reverence for practical piety.

3. The little piece on Fortune is an earnest vindication of human affairs from the dominion of blind chance and physical necessity, and a practical demonstration (based chiefly on analogy and common sense) of the supremacy of mind, the necessity of wisdom and good conduct, and the responsibility of each individual for his own character and destiny. It does not touch upon the doctrine of chance as related to the origin of the material universe; nor does it contemplate particularly the bearings of that doctrine on the divine government or the future state of the soul. It seems rather to be directed against a perversion of the doctrine of divine agency; in other words, against a species of fatalism and Antinomianism, as affecting the whole character and conduct of men, whether in the duties which they owe to themselves, to each other, or to God. Fortune, in the view of Plutarch, does not exclude the idea of God, —it is included in his universal providence. It belongs especially to the province of the demons. But it is a perversion of the doctrine of providence to expect any deity, whether higher or lower,—any demon, whether good or evil,—to do for us what we can and ought to do for ourselves. Still more absurd is it to rely on an unintelligent cause for that which must be the result of reason. *Mind* sees,* *mind* hears—the senses, in themselves, have no percipient power—still more true is it, that only mind can *foresee* and provide, regulate the conduct, and secure a virtuous and happy life. Mind makes the man, as distinguished from the brute; and reason, not instinct; character, not fortune; free-will, not physical necessity, makes the mind.

4. Concerning the Demon of Socrates. This, like some of Plato's, is a dialogue within a dialogue, and, owing perhaps to the conscious or unconscious influence of the subject, is conducted with more Platonic art and skill than any other of Plutarch's writings; though it wants the inimitable ease and grace with which the *dramatis personæ* are introduced, and the rapid and exciting yet natural succession, in which the question and answer follow each other, in the regular Platonic dialogue.

Cephisias, the brother of Epaminondas, goes to Athens on an embassy, and falling in with Archidamus, an Athenian, is requested by him to narrate the incidents attending the recent return of the

* "Light is in the soul." Milton, Sams. Agon.

Theban exiles to their country, the recovery of the citadel from the usurped possession of the Spartans, and the restoration of the Theban republic. The principal scene of the dialogue is, therefore, laid at Thebes; the time is one of the most important points in the most brilliant period of Theban history; the actors are Epaminondas, Pelopidas, Simmias, (the disciple of Socrates,) and the other principal men of the state; and the narrative of the surprise, the massacre, and the recapture awakens a thrilling interest. Our author took the more pains, perhaps, to interweave these political characters and events with the main subject of the dialogue, because they shed such lustre on his native Bœotia. They appear, indeed, as the prominent figures in the foreground of the picture. The discussion about the Socratic Demon arises incidentally, as the conspirators differ somewhat touching the significance of certain omens, which seem to portend good or evil to the conspiracy. It grows, however, very naturally into the main question in the presence of the Socratic Simmias, and also of a Pythagorean philosopher, Theanor, who, warned by dreams and visions, has come from Italy to Thebes to offer sacrifices at the tomb of a brother Pythagorean, that had been generously nursed, in his last sickness, and honourably interred by the family of Epaminondas. The answers to the main question —touching the nature of Socrates's Demon—are various. One, somewhat sceptically inclined, suggests, that it was only his own sagacity, discerning the natural significance of signs which are not understood by common minds. When pressed, however, with the objection, that he is thus justifying the charge of atheism which the accusers of Socrates brought against him, he replies, that this explanation does not exclude superhuman agency, since the sign must have an intelligent *cause*, as well as a sagacious interpreter. A soothsayer, on the other hand, maintains, that some particular demon, attached to Socrates from his birth, guided him by some mysterious vision in all the actions of his life; and he relates an instance as occurring under his own observation, when Socrates, having set out to go by a certain street to a certain destination, suddenly stopped, considered a moment, and then took another direction, urging his companions to do the same; some of them complied, but others, passing on through the same street, were met by a very annoying, though not very serious, accident. Simmias said, that having once asked Socrates about it, and received no answer, he never repeated the question. But he had often heard him declare those to be vain pretenders, who professed to have seen a divine apparition; while to those who affirmed that they had heard a supernatural voice he would gladly listen and inquire into the particulars. In his

opinion, therefore, the Demon of Socrates was not so much a vision, as a voice, addressed, not to the outward ear, but to the inward sense, just as in dreams the mind seems to apprehend unspoken words. And such voices are addressed to all, but are heard only by the eminently wise and good; the heedless multitude do not hear them. In conclusion, Simmias relates a story of an inquisitive and virtuous youth, (Timarchus, the friend and companion of Lamprocles, Socrates's son,) who, in his eagerness to ascertain what the Demon of Socrates was, went down into the cave of Trophonius, and there, on the second night, in a trance, his soul left his body and visited the unseen world, where he saw the demons, like stars, leaping about an immense cavern or hollow sphere, some rising out of it and shining brighter as they rose, others falling back into it and growing more and more dim as they sunk, but each bound by an almost invisible cord to a soul, which it endeavours with very different degrees of success to draw upward to a higher sphere; and he is informed by way of explanation, that each man's demon is the better, the rational part of his own soul, which, the vulgar think, is within them, (just as they suppose the image reflected from a mirror to be in the glass,) but the more intelligent, knowing it to be without and above them, call it a demon. Those stars, therefore, which he saw to be extinguished, were souls whose whole existence was merged in their bodies; those that rose and recovered their light, were such as retire from their bodies after death, having escaped the dominion of sense, and not being subject again to generation in a material body; and those that were carried up on high were the demons of philosophers and wise men. But you will know more of these things three months hence, concluded his invisible guide; and three months after, he died.

The Pythagorean philosopher pronounces this story credible, and confirms it by reasoning; though, in his argument, he proceeds on the supposition, that the demons are souls that have escaped from all union with flesh, and have turned guardian spirits to preside over *other* souls. The demon, however, does not go along with every one; but as in a shipwreck, those that are far from land their friends only look upon with pity, while they encourage and help those that are near, so the demons deal with mankind. While we are immersed in worldly affairs, and put off one body only to put on another, they let us alone to try our own strength and reach the haven by ourselves; but when a soul that has gone through a thousand generations and almost finished her course, struggles bravely to ascend, the Deity permits her proper demon to come to her assistance. The demon enters promptly on the work: and if the soul hearkens to his voice and obeys his instructions, she is saved; if not, the

demon leaves her, and she falls back into a miserable, hopeless state.

This dialogue presents Epaminondas in a noble and attractive light, as in choice a patriot and philosopher rather than a warrior, who thinks much, says little, and always acts in strict obedience to the dictates of his own reason and conscience, despite of friends or enemies. He refuses to take part in the conspiracy, because he would never put men to death, except in obedience to law. Yet the conspirators know, that all his sympathies are on the side of liberty and his country; and when the blow is struck, they find in his moderation a tower of impregnable strength.

5. On the Cessation of Oracles. The scene of this extended conversation, or debate, is laid at Delphi, where our author, very appropriately, fixes the locality of several of his theological discussions. The interlocutors are a company of priests, scholars, and philosophers, who have come from, or travelled in, almost every part of the world. The main question* is, why oracles have almost ceased; for the cessation is acknowledged not to be entire. A Cynic philosopher answers, that the gods have forsaken men because of their increased and increasing wickedness; and when others scout the doctrine as imputing caprice to the gods, and undertake to explain the fact by natural causes, he leaves the company in righteous indignation. Demetrius, a grammarian from Tarsus in Cilicia,† refers the cessation of oracles in Greece to the diminished population of the country, especially in the neighbourhood of the oracles, and the consequent diminished necessity for oracular responses. Cleombrotus, the Lacedæmonian, who has just returned from a visit to the Temple of Jupiter Ammon, argues, that the demons, who preside over the oracles, have died or transmigrated and left the oracles dumb. He also expresses the belief, that evil demons, sometimes, take possession of the oracles, and return wicked responses, and demand cruel sacrifices, unworthy of the gods. Lamprias, the Delphian, thinks, that the failure of the inspiring exhalation from the earth may be a proximate cause, though the ultimate cause,

* The agitation of this question among pagan priests and philosophers is peculiarly significant at the very time when "the living oracle" of God had come down to dwell on earth.

> ..... "*henceforth* oracles are ceased,
> God hath now sent his living oracle," &c.—*Milton, Par. Reg.*, b. 1,

It was about the same time, too, that human sacrifices ceased to be generally offered in the ancient pagan world, giving place to the one sacrifice on Calvary. Cf. Hackett's Plutarch, p. 98.

† "No mean city," the rival of Athens and Alexandria in literature, science, and the arts.

whether of the cessation or of the commencement and continuance of inspiration, as of every other finite being and event, is God.

The discussion, it will be seen, involves incidental questions of great interest, such as the relation of first and second causes, the nature and manner of inspiration, the existence and duration of demons or inferior deities, and the character and government of the Most High. A long argument is entered into to prove, that there is not one world only, nor on the other hand an infinite number, but five—the proof being drawn chiefly from the mysteries of the number five, and from the analogy of other things that exist by fives, as the five senses, the five regular solids, the five zones, &c. An effort is also made to establish and explain the fact, that the year was growing shorter and the seasons growing colder; an idea which was suggested by the declaration of the priests of Jupiter Ammon, that from year to year less and less oil was annually consumed by the lamps in the temple.

6. Concerning the Oracles of the Pythian Priestess. The scene of this dialogue is the same as that of the last. The plan is also similar, and the subject kindred. It is a dialogue within a dialogue, or rather, it is a familiar report of a rambling conversation, which arose among a mixed company of priests and philosophers, natives and strangers, as they visited in succession the apartments and inspected the offerings of the Temple at Delphi, sometimes discussing the material of the statues, as, for instance, the origin and composition of the far-famed Corinthian brass, at other times, the significance of the symbols which chanced to meet their eyes; now the appropriateness of the offerings, and the merit of the acts or actors in whose honour they were consecrated, (where, by the way, Plutarch seems to hint, that the prostituted beauty of the courtezan is quite as worthy to be canonized, as the misdirected heroism of the mere warrior,) and now again the reality of prodigies and predictions, many of which are related, and their alleged fulfilment referred to mere chance by an Epicurean philosopher, but declared by another interlocutor, who doubtless represents the opinion of our author, to be an actual and unquestionable accomplishment, as little referable to blind chance as the writings of Epicurus himself. The principal question, however, is, why the Pythian priestess, in modern times, no longer gives her responses in verse. In answer to this question, it is said, in the first place, that the *ancient* oracles were, not unfrequently, uttered in prose, and the modern are sometimes communicated in verse. In the second place, the earlier ages were in their nature more poetical than the present. Everything was then written, or rather spoken and sung, in verse. This suited the

taste of the nations in their infancy. Moreover it aided the memory at a time when books were unfrequent and unknown. Now, on the contrary, poetry was associated with fiction, and to couch the oracles in a poetical form were to bring discredit or suspicion on their truth. Prose had become the vehicle of history and philosophy; why should it not also be the language of religion and revelation.? Furthermore, the questions now referred to the oracles were of minor importance and of a more prosaic character; and propriety required that the answers should correspond. Besides, in ancient times, when kings and statesmen came to the oracles with questions of great national import, the responses were given often in a poetical and even enigmatical form for the sake of obscurity, since, if communicated in more intelligible language, they might occasion offence, or otherwise injure the credit of the oracle. The form, it is further argued, is a matter of comparative indifference, subject to the demands of expediency, or the changes of times and circumstances. But the response is neither more nor less true, neither more nor less miraculous, whether it is communicated in prose or verse. If it was to be given in writing, instead of being orally pronounced, surely no one would find fault with the chirography, and say, that the response was not Apollo's, because the letters were unworthy of a divine hand. Neither the voice, nor the sound, nor the words, nor the metre proceed from the god, but from the woman. The god only presents the visions and kindles in the soul a light to discover future events. Hence, if, as some wonder and complain, the responses, when in verse, are not always in Homeric or Hesiodic perfection of metre, this is no reproach to the deity. It is befitting, that the priestess be chosen from among the illiterate, in order that she may approach Apollo with virgin soul immaculate. And the revelation, as it reaches us, must partake of the nature and the imperfections of the organ through which it is communicated; since it is the actual, if not the necessary, method of inspiration, as also of providence, to use instruments in accordance with their nature; just as in Homer, when Minerva would persuade the Greeks to any enterprise, she brings Ulysses on the stage; when she designs to break the truce, she finds out Pandarus; but when she would put the Trojans to rout, she addresses herself to Diomede—it being, in fact, impossible to move a cylinder like a sphere, or make a trumpet sound like a harp, or an illiterate person speak like a man of letters.

The author, it will be seen, proceeds on the assumption of a general conformity of the supernatural to the natural. The laws of nature are never *contravened*. The course of nature is *interrupted* no further than is necessary. The great law of proportion and adapta-

tion of means to ends governs the special intervention, as well as the ordinary succession of events.

7. Of the Ει over the Gate of the Temple at Delphi. This is addressed to Serapion, an Athenian poet, who is one of the interlocutors in the foregoing dialogue, and to whom Plutarch gives an account of a discussion, in which he himself took part with Ammonius the philosopher, Lamprias the Delphian, and several others, (two of whom were also among the *dramatis personæ* of the last dialogue,) at the Temple of Delphi, about the time when Nero visited Greece. The subject of discussion is one—the significance of the mysterious inscription (Ει) over the gate of the temple. All agreed that it was symbolic or enigmatical, in accordance with the well-known character of Apollo, whose very surnames (Pythian, Delian, &c.) indicated a fondness for such curious and recondite questions. But they put widely different interpretations upon it. The first said, the current report was, that the original *five* of the seven sages inscribed the letter E on wood because it was the *fifth* letter in the alphabet, and dedicated it to the temple of Apollo, as a perpetual protest against reckoning the other two (Cleobulus and Periander, both tyrants) among their sacred number. The second believed, that it was the contingent particle Ει, meaning *if*, and significant of the *questions* and *prayers* which inquirers brought to the oracle, and in both which the particle Ει held a prominent place, as, for example, in the question, *If* I shall marry? or the petition, *If* (would that) it might please the god! The third agreed with the preceding in considering it equivalent to *if*, but preferred to interpret the *if* as expressive of the logical relation of the antecedent and consequent, (*if* such a thing is *given*,* such a result will follow,) and so symbolical of the consecration of the logical faculty, or reason, to the god. The fourth, deeming mathematics a more worthy offering than logic, pronounces the number five (expressed by E) to be an emblem fit of that sacred science. Or the same sacred number may be taken as the representation of the five senses, the five musical chords, the five regular solids, or the five orders of living beings from the brutes to the supreme God. The last, (Ammonius, Plutarch's teacher in philosophy,) while he speaks respectfully of the traditional, the grammatical, the logical, and the mathematical interpretations, sets them all aside, and propounds a solution more strictly theological. He takes the Ει to be the second person singular of the verb of existence, and by addressing the deity thus, (THOU ART,) he supposes the worshipper to ascribe to him what belongs to him, and him only—necessary, eternal, and

* *If* is well known to be but a shorter form of *give*, and ει is probably a kindred imperative of an old Greek verb.

immutable existence.* Thus interpreted, it stands in beautiful relation to that other famous inscription at Delphi, γνῶθι σεαυτόν. The god admonishes the worshipper, *Know thyself:* and the worshipper responds, *Thou art*, and none besides thee *is;* myself and all creatures have but a derived and dependent existence, which scarcely deserves the name of *being*.

8. Of Isis and Osiris. Of the Religion and Philosophy of the Egyptians, would be a title more fully and exactly descriptive of this piece, which is accordingly addressed to a priestess of Isis, who was also priestess of Apollo at Delphi. The doctrine of the discourse is, that the religious rites of the Egyptians, so far from being the mass of folly and superstition which it was then customary to consider them, concealed beneath appropriate symbols, truths in religion or philosophy that were fraught with practical utility and moral excellence. It was not strange that a people who not only placed sphinxes before their temples, but concealed their written language and literature, history and philosophy under a veil of hieroglyphics, should set forth their religion in the disguise of symbolical rites and enigmatical tales, which, literally interpreted, were indeed absurd and monstrous enough, but which yet contain obscure hints and shadowy resemblances of the most important truths. The dress of the priests, the form of the temples, the sacrifices and modes of worship, and all the romantic tales of the birth and death, the wanderings and wars of Isis, Osiris, and Typhon, are so many dispersions and refractions of the logical and philosophical truth, as the rainbow is of the sun. Accordingly Egypt has been visited by Grecian sages in every age, all of whom have brought away more or less of their mysterious wisdom, and some, especially Pythagoras, have borrowed not a few of their religious symbols. Plutarch not only identifies the Egyptian gods with those of Greece, (Osiris, or what is another name for the same deity Serapis, with Pluto, Isis with Proserpine or Minerva, &c.,) but, though not altogether unconscious of the absurdity he is perpetrating, suggests many contradictory Greek etymologies for their Egyptian names. He relates at considerable length the story of the three principal personages of the Egyptian mythology, and then, with exemplary patience, details several of the allegorizing constructions that have been put upon it—such as the physical, which identifies Isis with the land, Osiris with the Nile, and Typhon with the sea; or, perhaps, Osiris with moisture, and Typhon with drought—the astronomical, which refers Isis to the earth, Osiris to the moon, and Typhon to the sun; or, as others will have it, for there is no agreement in this matter, Osiris to the sun,

* So Jehovah in Hebrew. Cf. Exod. iii, 14.

Isis to the moon, and Typhon to the chaotic tendency of matter—and the metaphysical, which makes Osiris the First Cause, or Intelligent Principle, of the universe, Isis the faculty of reception, Orus the effect, and Typhon the principle of disorder. He speaks, with manifest partiality, of the dualistic system of the Persians, and seems to recognise the necessity of a distinct and intelligent author of evil, who must himself be evil or malevolent, but who will at length be overcome by the benevolent author of all good. The adoration of animals by the Egyptians our author condemns, but he puts the most charitable construction upon it as of a piece with other forms of idolatry, which always stops with the form, and fails to penetrate to the thing signified; and though it were better, like the Greeks, to speak of the several animals as sacred severally to the several gods, than to worship them like the Egyptians, yet to worship them is quite as excusable as to worship images of wood and stone, or gold and silver, since the meanest creature that is endowed with life and sense and motion, belongs to a higher order of being, and therefore is a more fit symbol of the deity, than any image of however costly material or however exquisite form and finish.

With all its doubtful allegorizing and fanciful etymologies, this treatise is a valuable contribution, not only to the history and philosophy of the religion of Egypt, but to the hermeneutics of idolatry and mythology in all the heathen world, excessively charitable doubtless in its interpretation of heathen rites and traditions, yet distinctly recognising their degeneracy and corruption in the understanding of the mass of mankind, and that as the result of their own degeneracy and corruption.

9. Consolation to Apollonius. This is a consolatory letter addressed to a friend on the death of a son who bore the same name with his father. The usual precepts and considerations which philosophy suggests for the solace of the afflicted are here urged, such as the fruitlessness of grief, the weakness of excessive sorrow or extreme joy, the mutability of all things earthly, the liability of the race to afflictions, some of which are heavier than ours, the miseries of life and the desirableness of escaping the evils that may be in reserve, and the necessity of death, sooner or later, since it is the lot of mortals and the debt of nature. History also is searched for examples of fortitude under affliction, and poetry is laid under contribution for the choicest gems of consolation. But our author seems to have been aware that religion is the most efficient comforter in the hour of sorrow; and it is with the religious considerations which he presents that we are chiefly concerned. As Socrates well said,*

* Cf. Plat. Apol. Socr. 32.

death is either like a deep sleep, or it resembles a journey into a far country and for a long time, or it is the utter extinction of the soul as well as the body; and in neither of these views can it be considered an evil. For if death is annihilation, it is the end of existence, and therefore of all the ills to which existence is subject. If it is a profound sleep, (poets have always been fond of representing sleep and death as twin-brothers, and sleep as the image of death,) what is more refreshing, what more grateful and welcome to weary mortals than sound sleep? Or if it is rather a journey to a distant country, a removal from the body into the land of spirits, what more desirable, than to escape the prison in which we are here confined and go where alone liberty, truth and wisdom can be found? Hence to the question, What is the greatest good? the oracle has often responded, death; and the gods have bestowed death on those whom they love, as a reward for their piety. If then we mourn our own loss, when our children die in early life, it is criminal selfishness; and if we mourn for their sake, we ought rather to rejoice and thank the gods, that they have been delivered from the ills of humanity and made to participate in the divine nature. As compared with eternity, there is no difference between a long and a short life; and to mourn that our friends die in childhood or early manhood, is more absurd than it would be for the ephemeræ of Pontus, whose whole existence is but for a day, to sorrow immoderately, if some of their number should perish at midday or even in the morning instead of living till evening. At all events, call away whom they will, and when they may, the gods take only what is their own, since they have an absolute property in us and ours; and if, according to a tradition so ancient that Aristotle says it may well be called eternal, they, at the same time, exalt us to a more refined nature and a more blessed life, they justly claim our thanksgivings, instead of our complaints. Like music, poetry, and painting, life should be estimated, not by its duration, but by its excellence. Not the longest life, therefore, is the best, but the most virtuous. And Apollonius was an eminently virtuous youth, dutiful to his parents, dear to his friends, benevolent to all mankind, and devout towards the gods. His father should, therefore, be comforted with the belief, that he had been withdrawn from this low earthly entertainment, before he was surfeited with drunkenness, and been admitted to a high seat of honour and blessedness in the abode of the pious, where, as Pindar says,

> The sun shines with an unclouded light,
> When all the world above is thick with night.

10. Consolatory Letter to his Wife. Plutarch having lost a daughter, two years old, who was born after four sons, and who died

and was buried in his absence, writes a letter full of tender sympathy, yet manly fortitude, to the bereaved mother, whose name the daughter bore. He draws a beautiful picture of the bright, playful, innocent, and affectionate child, the life and joy of a family brought up under parental care at home; and he deeply laments her early death. But a daughter for two years was better than none, was a gift to which they had no claim, and for which they should therefore be grateful; and the very charms which delighted their eyes, while she lived, might and should still live in their memories and in their hearts. He commends his wife for her decorum, not only on this, but other occasions of the same nature, (for they had lost two children before,) in that she had not put on mourning apparel, nor disfigured herself or her maid-servants, nor filled the house with mourning and lamentation; but, as in times of prosperity and festal rejoicing she had ever been marked for her frugality, so in the hour of sorrow she had shown herself a pattern of moderation. He maintains here, without any alternative hypothesis, a full persuasion of the immortality of the soul; and the shorter the time during which it has sojourned in the body, the less does it become contaminated and fettered by fleshly appetites and passions, the less likely is it again to sink back into a bodily form, and the more sure it will be to rise at once pure and unconstrained to the realm of purity and light—just as a bird, soon let loose from a cage, forthwith exults in its recovered freedom, whereas, if it remain too long in the cage, it becomes attached to its prison, and, when set free, spontaneously returns to its captivity. The soul of the aged man, like his body, stoops and bows down to the earth, while that of the youth looks upward. "Hence by the laws and traditions of our ancestors, when children die, no libations nor sacrifices are offered for them; for infants have no part of earth or earthly affections. Nor do they tarry and hover about the sepulchres and monuments where their bodies are buried. The religion of our country teaches us otherwise; and it is an impious thing not to believe, what our laws and traditions assert, that the souls of infants pass immediately into a purer, better, and more divine state. Let us, therefore, conform to the laws in outward deportment, and endeavour still more earnestly to have our hearts chastened, pure, and undefiled."

In these consolatory letters of Plutarch, we see the utmost that philosophy and natural religion can suggest for the consolation of the afflicted. And it is not a little—with gratitude to God, as well as in honour to our author, do we say it—it is not a little comfort and hope which this thoughtful and devout spirit was able to derive from natural religion for his own solace and that of his bereaved

friends. Yet how far was he from having attained to that full assurance of a resurrection and a reunion in a better world, and that tender, affectionate, filial confidence in a heavenly Father's love as manifested and proved by his severest discipline, which Christianity inspires, which even the Old Testament inculcates, and which Job and David, Paul and John breathed so spontaneosuly from their lips and lives! The Bible was made for a sorrowful, because a sinful, world.

11. The Dialogue on the Delay of the Deity in the Punishment of the Wicked purports to have taken place at Delphi, between Plutarch, Patrocleas his son-in-law, Timon his brother, and Olympicus, and to have been occasioned by the wild ravings of a follower of Epicurus against the justice and the providence of the gods. As becomes the mutual relation of the interlocutors, Plutarch undertakes the office of answering questions and solving difficulties, while the others appear in the character of inquirers and objectors; and the piece is, for the most part, a monologue in which the author discourses at considerable length on the great subject of punishment as related to the government of God. The principal objections against the delay of divine justice are first brought forward, in that tardy vengeance affords no satisfaction to the injured, and imposes no restraint on the evil-doers, and that it destroys all belief in the reality of divine providence in the minds of the wicked, who impute the punishment, when it does come, to chance, and call it, not a penalty, but a misfortune. Plutarch begins his reply by disclaiming, with the diffidence characteristic of the Academy, all *knowledge* on a *subject* which *lies beyond the scope of human wisdom.* Even music, war, and medicine are beyond the comprehension of those who are strangers to the arts. How much less shall mortals comprehend immortality! The laws and customs of men often appear absurd to those who do not understand the reason for them. What wonder, then, if there are difficulties and, to our apprehension, even absurdities in the government of God!

With these prefatory remarks, not intended, however, to evade the question or its difficulties, but to secure a retreat should he be found unable to cope with them, the author proceeds to assign some of the *probable* reasons, why the Deity may delay for a season the infliction of deserved punishment on the wicked.

1. He thereby sets us an example of forbearance and long-suffering. Human virtue is but an imitation of divine excellence—a participation of the divine image. God made the world so as to teach us wisdom and moderation; it was worthy of him to govern it so as to teach us patience and long-suffering, which is not the least divine of his attributes.

2. He thereby affords the wicked an opportunity for repentance and reformation. Character is eminently susceptible of change, as the very words τροπός (turn of mind) and ἦθος (custom, habit) intimate. History records the names of many who were dissolute, licentious, or tyrannical in early life, but who afterwards reformed and rendered illustrious services to their country and mankind. "If Miltiades had been put to death when playing the tyrant in the Chersonesus, or Cimon when living in incest with his sister, or Themistocles when rioting and revelling in the agora, where then would have been Marathon, Eurymedon, or glorious Artemisium, where the Greeks laid the foundation of their liberties!" The very excesses of such men in their youth show the depth and richness of the soil from which they spring.

3. He preserves the wicked in order to use them as instruments of punishing and restraining other wicked men, or, perhaps, that they may give birth to a virtuous and noble posterity, as the Athenian law, after the example of the Egyptian, deferred the execution of a pregnant woman, who was convicted of a capital crime, till she had brought forth her child. Thus Pericles and Pompey sprung from a despised and accursed parentage, and Ulysses and Æsculapius descended from such tyrants and monsters as Sisyphus, Autolycus and Phlegyas. Even the inhuman Phalaris was, as it were, a medicine to the Agrigentines; and so was Marius to the Romans.

4. By delay, punishment sometimes overtakes the wicked under more appropriate and striking circumstances, than if it came upon them immediately. They suffer or die by the same means, perhaps by the very same instruments, which they used in wronging and destroying others. Or their ill-gotten gains prove the occasion of their ruin. Or their own consciences betray the guilt which had escaped detection, and bring on the punishment which they might otherwise have avoided. Pertinent examples of each of these suppositions are cited from history. Among the rest is the case of a youth who had murdered his own father, and long passed without suspicion. But at length, as if in a fit of frenzy, he suddenly rose from his seat at a banquet, struck down a nest of swallows with his spear, and crushed the young under his feet. When asked what could have possessed him to do so barbarous an act, he replied, Do you not hear, how they have this long while been crying out against me, that I murdered my father? The remark excited surprise, led to examination, and issued in the conviction and punishment of the unnatural son.

5. All this on the supposition, that punishment is actually delayed in those instances in which it appears to be. But it is not so.

Crime is always more or less its own punishment, just as the criminal bears his own cross to the place of execution. Children in the Roman amphitheatres admire and almost envy the poor creatures who, dressed in gay attire, dance for the entertainment of the populace, till they see the flames bursting from that very attire (inlaid with combustibles for that purpose) and hastening to consume them;* then they perceive that their punishment had begun at the very time when they were the objects of their foolish admiration: so the wicked begin to be punished as soon as they begin to do wrong, and pay the penalty of their crimes (when it seems to be deferred) not later but longer; nor are they punished only when they have grown old, but they grow old, all the while suffering punishment. And this long time, it should be remembered, has reference merely to human apprehension, not at all to the gods; for in their view the whole duration of human life is nothing, and to hang the criminal or stretch him on the rack now instead of thirty years ago, is the same thing as to do it in the evening instead of the morning. Meanwhile they run no risk of his escape by any possibility out of the prison of life in which they confine him till the day of execution. And what though, during his imprisonment, he eat and drink, and dance and play with the halter over his head! Shall we say, that he is not punished, till we see him hanging by the neck, or already stiff and cold after having drunk the hemlock? Shall we say, that the fish, that has already swallowed the hook, is not caught, till we see it roasted by the cook or served on the table? If, then, the soul has no existence after death, the Deity may be said to deal severely rather than too mildly with those whose days are prolonged.

But, 6. The soul is immortal. This is implied in the providential care which the gods take of men, since it is absurd to suppose, that they would lavish so much expense and pains-taking on so short-lived a creature as man is, if the present is his only state of existence.† Moreover, the immortality of the soul is implied in the sacrifices which men offer, and the gods accept, for the souls of the departed;‡ and in the evocation of departed spirits from the unseen world, as it is practised by necromancers, and sometimes enjoined by oracular responses.§ And if the soul exists after death, it is reasonable to

* It will be observed, that the allusion is to such punishments as Nero is said, in Ecclesiastical History, to have inflicted on the Christians. The illustration in the previous sentence is also a *locus classicus* in relation to our Saviour's having his own cross laid on him, till he was no longer able to bear it.

† Compare Matt. xxii, 32: "God is not the God of the *dead*, but of the *living*."

‡ So the author of the Second Book of Maccabees proves, that Judas believed in a resurrection from his offering sacrifices for the souls of the slain.

§ In like manner, (as Prof. Hackett justly remarks, in his excellent edition of

suppose, that it will be rewarded or punished. For, during life, it contends like an athlete at the games; and when the contest is ended, it receives its reward. By way of illustrating and confirming this truth, Plutarch relates, with some hesitation lest it should be deemed a fable,* a singular story of a young man, named Thespesius, who, after having been for several days apparently dead, was said to have returned to life, and communicated to his friends an account of what befell him in the interval.

Thespesius, before this occurrence, had been a most unprincipled, profligate man; but the disclosures thus made to him, respecting the tendencies of the life he was pursuing, had such an effect on his mind, that he immediately reformed and became henceforth a pattern of every virtue.

In order to give a consecutive analysis of Plutarch's argument on the main question, we passed over, in its place, a kindred subject of no small importance, which comes up incidentally and occupies no inconsiderable space. It is the imputation or visitation of the sins of parents upon their children—sometimes, according to the current belief, many generations after the guilty individuals have passed away from the earth. Plutarch pronounces many of the popular stories of this kind to be sheer fictions; but he acknowledges the truth of the doctrine, and proceeds to justify the providence of God therein—from analogy, from the natural bond of connexion between parents and children, and from the salutary influence of such a procedure, as a means of moral discipline and correction. Men instinctively honour even the remote posterity of the great and good. On the same principle, whether of justice or of expediency, they may, and sometimes do, entail disfranchisement and other penalties on the descendants of the atrociously wicked. Time, no more than space, has a necessary power to sever the chain of cause and effect. If a plague which originated in Ethiopia infected Athens, why may not justice—penal evil—pass over from one generation to another. A family, like a state, and even more than a state, is a unit so long as it continues to subsist, and must possess a collective responsibility commensurate with its identity. Besides, nothing has a more powerful tendency to deter men from a vicious life, than the fear of entailing the consequences of their follies and vices upon their offspring.

this treatise,) such instances as that of the witch of Endor in the Scriptures, demonstrate a belief in the doctrine of an existence after death among the Hebrews, Warburton and his disciples to the contrary notwithstanding.

* Plutarch, like Plato, usually couches his views of the unseen world under the guise of a myth, for whose truth he will not vouch; and in Plutarch, this myth usually takes the form of a trance, or dream, or vision.

The punishment of the wicked after death is unseen and disbelieved; but the pains and penalties which they bring upon themselves and their posterity in this life are open to observation, and cannot fail to impress deeply all who are not quite destitute of natural affection. And as in medicine, so in punishment, the great question is, What will cure the disease? whether the remedy is applied directly to the diseased part, or reaches it, indirectly or sympathetically, through some other organ, is of minor importance. In all cases, however, where moral medicine is applied to the children of the wicked, the children are also wicked; in other words, they inherit the disease of their parents, or a predisposition to it, and punishment is a remedy or a preventive for the children's malady, while, at the same time, it impresses a salutary lesson on all vicious parents.* Accordingly Providence does not always visit the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, but only when the children resemble them in character. If the children of vicious parents are themselves virtuous, the penalty will not fall upon them, though it may reappear with the vice in some future generation; as warts, moles, black spots, a dark complexion, or other family marks, sometimes sink out of sight for a time, and emerge again perhaps after the lapse of a century.

Such is the substance of this remarkable treatise. We feel that we have not done it justice in the process of abridgment, especially in sacrificing the numerous historical examples which, while they embellish the style and illustrate the meaning, never seem to interrupt the course of the argument, but superadd the light of facts and the conviction of reality to the force of demonstration. A quick and accurate moral sense—a sort of moral and religious intuition—conspires with a fertile memory and a prolific imagination, to lift this treatise, not only to a high pre-eminence above any other on the same subject that has come down to us from pagan antiquity, but to elevate it to the rank of a standard work on the subject for all coming time.

Having extended our analysis of these works of Plutarch to such an unforeseen length, our space will allow us to furnish only the most condensed summary of his theology, as it is found in these and other writings.†

* "Sin begets sin, and nothing can stay the plague but the direct interposition of Heaven,"—this lesson is written wide and deep in the poetry as well as the philosophy of the Greeks, in the literature as well as the history of nations, in the hearts and consciences of men as well as in the sacred Scriptures.

† Every article in this summary might have been accompanied with a voucher: but these references would have occupied much space, and we deem them unnecessary; by far the greater part will be readily found in the treatises here analyzed.

1. The Relation of the various National Religions to each other and to the Religion of Nature. All nations worship the same gods under different names, ascribe to them the same attributes under different representations, honour them with rites diverse indeed in outward appearance, but alike in their essential meaning; in short, hold a religious faith in modes and forms manifold and various, but in spirit one and the same. The modes and forms distinguish the national religions, the spirit and essence constitute the religion of nature and reason. Even so the heavens and the earth are common to all nations, though each gives them a different name. The sun is intrinsically one and the same for all countries; but his light wears a very different aspect, as reflected from different objects, refracted by different atmospheres, and seen by different eyes. Plutarch's position is a medium between the vulgar heathen notion, that every nation has its own deity or deities, and the uncompromising doctrine of the Bible and the early Christians, that there is but one true God, while the gods of the heathen are vanity and a lie.

2. The Proper Interpretation of Religious Rites and Myths. This is a great secret, which men have always been studying, but with imperfect success. Some take the myths in their literal sense, and the rites merely in their outward forms, and fall into the grossest superstitions. Others explain them all away, and leave nothing but blank atheism. If there is essential truth and unity in the mythologies of different nations, they must, of course, receive a figurative interpretation. The theogonies and theomachies, the marvellous stories of the gods, are allegories. The rites and sacrifices, the temples and altars and sacred vestments are all so many symbols of religious truth. And in the interpretation of them, two extremes are to be avoided—an excessive allegorizing, which virtually annihilates all mysteries, all religions, all gods, and a mere literalism, which sets them at variance with each other and with the reason and common sense of men. Especially are they chargeable with absurdity, who resolve the deities into mere powers of nature, making Bacchus a mere personification of wine, Vulcan of fire, &c. As well might we take the sails and rudder of the ship for the pilot, or the loom and the web for the weaver. Nor is the method of Euhemerus any better, who reduces all divine things to the level of *human* affairs, and degrades the gods to the form and state of kings and commanders of the earliest ages, thus doing violence to the intuitive convictions of the human race.

3. Nature and Origin of Idolatry. Plutarch's doctrine of symbols leads to his explanation of the nature and origin of idolatry. All

those creatures and things which have become objects of worship in different nations, were originally contemplated as symbols of the Deity, who is the only proper object of adoration. Thus the Greeks esteem certain animals as sacred to certain divinities, whom, in certain respects, they represent or resemble. But the Egyptians worship the animals themselves as divine. The sun is a striking image of God; and thus the Persians came to worship it, as itself God. Sometimes we see a nation or sect stopping at an intermediate stage and regarding the animal as an incarnation, the sun as an embodiment of the Deity, &c. The undiscriminating multitude are ever prone to confound gifts with their givers, words with things, signs with the things signified. The men of an early, believing, and poetical age very naturally called the gifts and creatures of the gods by the name of the gods themselves, not really believing them to be divine, but honouring them as manifestations of divine power, wisdom, and goodness. But those who came after them, having degenerated alike from their poetry and their piety, not only called such things by divine names, but believed them to be divine. So we call the works of Plato by his own name. But a man must be very stupid and vulgar, when he hears his neighbour say, he has bought Plato, to suppose that he has purchased the philosopher himself. The use of any appropriate symbols is not to be forbidden; though some are far preferable to others, and the use is always liable to abuse. The symbols themselves are worthy of homage, but only as, and in proportion as, they are seen and felt to be fit representatives of the Deity, or of the worship that is his due.*

4. The Sources and Standard of Authority in Religious Faith and Practice. These are tradition, and the laws and customs of nations. To demand a reason or demonstration for the opinions which we entertain of the gods, is to raise questions which ought not to be agitated, and, indeed, to subvert the very foundation of all piety and religion. It is sufficient to believe and worship according to the faith of our forefathers and the instructions of the country where we have been born and bred.† The office of reason in religion is that of an interpreter and mediator. It is the business of the priest to receive from the laws the representations that pertain to the gods, and then apply his reason to the investigation and discovery of the truth contained in them. In like manner, it is the work of the philosopher to classify, reconcile, and interpret the common con-

* It will be observed, that the most intelligent Catholics have borrowed or reproduced Plutarch's doctrine in justification of their image worship.

† So Socrates, Xen. Mem. i, 3, 1; Porphyry, Ep. ad Marcellum 18; and so the general voice of antiquity.

ceptions and intuitions of men concerning God and their relations to him: for these universal ideas or instincts are the teaching, the handwriting of God himself; and the religious traditions and institutions of men go back to a period so far beyond the memory of man, that they may well be deemed eternal, and therefore divine—go back at least to that earlier and better age of the world, when man, in his pristine purity and piety, held more frequent and intimate converse with God. Great deference is due to the earliest *poets*, particularly Homer and Hesiod, as competent witnesses to the truth, as it was believed in that early age. The opinions of philosophers so wise and good, so virtuous and pious, as Socrates and Plato, are also entitled to much respect. Homer and Hesiod, Socrates and Plato are cited by Plutarch almost as frequently as Moses and David, Paul and John are quoted by Christian theologians. Still they are cited rather as witnesses, than authorities; their testimony is to be received no further than it accords with the laws and religious institutions, the sacred traditions and intuitive convictions of mankind, or with that system of doctrines and duties, which reason, by a fair and consistent interpretation, derives from these sources.

5. Existence of the Deity. Plutarch seldom enters into an extended process of reasoning for the express purpose of proving the existence of the Deity. He assumes it as an admitted and unquestionable fact; or he contents himself with the moral argument drawn from the evil tendency and manifest fruits of atheism. Still it is sufficiently evident, on what kind of proof his own convictions rested. He relied chiefly, as we should presume from the statements under the last head, on the universal and intuitive belief in the Divine Existence which has prevailed in every age and nation. A government without a religion, a nation without a god, never existed, and never will exist. As well might there be a state without magistrates, or a city without foundations. The argument from the relation of cause and effect must have had great weight with him, since he not only felt the necessity of a First Cause prior to all second causes, but he could not conceive of any efficiency in any material cause aside from divine agency—as well might the rudder supersede the pilot, or the lancet dispense with the physician. Indeed a glance at the fluctuating and temporary nature of all earthly existence convinced him on broader and more metaphysical grounds, that there must be some Being, back of all this, before all this, to whom belongs necessary, unchanging, eternal self-existence. Moreover the Deity is constantly revealing himself to the understanding and almost to the senses of all classes of men by oracles and prodigies, and to the reason and conscience of eminently holy men by

more direct, spiritual communications.* So conclusive and so palpable to the mind of Plutarch was the evidence from these and the like sources, that he had no patience to argue the point at length with those who would not see it; and with all his devoutness, he never took the pains to write a treatise directly on the subject.

6. Revelation. God reveals himself to men, directly and indirectly: directly to the eminently wise and good, just as the favourites of kings receive their communications from their own lips; indirectly to most men, as the multitude learn the will of kings and commanders by proclamation, or the sound of the trumpet, or some other intervening, external sign. In direct revelation, the divine Spirit may be supposed to touch and move the human spirit, without the intervention of any bodily sense or material medium, as incident light is in contact with the reflected ray at the reflecting surface. Indirect revelations are communicated through the medium of signs, which constitute the basis of divination. These are referable chiefly to two classes, oracles and prodigies, kindred severally to the prophecies and miracles which constitute the external evidences of Christianity. Plutarch seems to entertain no doubt of the reality and trustworthiness of both these sources of revelation, as they existed among heathen nations.† Fraud has indeed fabricated false and wicked oracles, (and their cruelty and wickedness demonstrate their falsehood,) and superstition has multiplied pretended prodigies by misconstruing ordinary events. But the counterfeits do not disprove the genuine coin; they rather confirm it. The tests of a genuine prophecy are the definiteness of the prediction and the exactness of the fulfilment. There is no event so prodigious or unlooked for, but it may naturally come to pass at some time or other in the course of ages; and so a chance prediction might, perchance, meet an accidental accomplishment. But when a person not only foretells the event, but defines, how and when, through what means and by what person it shall come to pass, it is beyond the power of chance or human skill to conjure up such a prophecy and its fulfilment.‡ We might as soon believe that the writings of Epicurus were composed by a fortuitous combination of the letters of the

* In like manner Socrates appeals to revelation in proof of the Divine Existence. Xen. Mem., i, 4, 18. All the arguments in proof of a revelation, of course, go to substantiate the Divine Existence.

† The early Christian Apologists differed from each other on this question, some denying and others acknowledging an *inferior*, a sort of *natural* prophetic element in heathenism preparatory to Christianity, as Paul, perhaps, did. Tit. i, 12; Acts xvii, 23, 28.

‡ It is in just this particularity, and also in perspicuity, that the authenticated pagan oracles, that have come down to us, are deficient.

alphabet. As to his philosophy of inspiration, Plutarch supposes the deity to be its source, and, sometimes at least, an exhaling vapour its medium or occasion; and the inspiring exhalation ceasing, the inspiration may cease also—for none of the gifts of the gods are like the gods themselves, in their nature immortal. Again: the substance of the revelation proceeds from the deity, but the style and manner depends on the genius, character, and will of the priestess; nay, an evil demon may, sometimes, thrust himself in and utterly pervert the oracle,—so corruptible is all created good.

In his treatment of prodigies, Plutarch is less explicit and less satisfactory,* and we shall pass the subject with a bare allusion to a theory which he casually suggests, viz., that there is a mysterious sympathy between providence and those images and offerings which are consecrated in the temples, whereby they move conjointly to signify future events—in other words, that these sacred donatives are a sort of organs of the Deity, pervaded by his spirit, and instinct, as it were, with his life.

7. Divine Nature and Attributes. Starting from the idea of self-existence, or, which is the same thing, *real* existence, (for only that really *is*, which exists necessarily in and by itself,) Plutarch deduces from it unity, eternity, immutability, independence, entire purity, and the highest conceivable excellence. These attributes are implied, not only in the inscription (Ει) over the gate of the temple, but in the very names of the god at Delphi; for Apollo (not many) denies plurality, Jeios affirms unity, and Phœbus was the name given by the ancients to everything that is bright and pure. In like manner, in the names of Isis and Osiris, he finds shadowed forth knowledge and holiness, as divine attributes. After the example of Plato, he often calls God the Reason (ὁ νοῦς) and the Good Being (τὸ ἀγαθόν). Goodness or love to mankind (φιλανθρωπία,) and justice unlimited by time or place, he is especially fond of predicating of the Deity. Of the natural attributes, he speaks less frequently. Still there can be no doubt, that he attributed to the Deity omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. Or rather, he more accurately conceived of the Most High as existing independently of time and space, there being no past or future, nothing near or remote to him, since all things are alike present with, and exist in himself. A god subject to the same accidents and limitations from time and place as men—a god confined to a human form, a material body or any other outward circumstances—most of all a god without a soul, and dependent on

* Let the sceptic, or the believer, who would see and feel the difference between pagan prodigies and the Christian miracles, read Plutarch along with Paley's Evidences.

the caprice of men, like the idols of the besotted multitude, were no god at all. Self-sufficiency and self-perfection belong to the very idea of the Supreme Being. And from these result, or to these belong, the conception of unlimited power, infinite knowledge, absolute perfection, and entire blessedness.

8. Inferior Deities, or Superhuman Beings. Plutarch's doctrine in regard to the nature and rank or ranks of such beings, does not seem to be consistent with itself, and probably was not settled in his own mind. But he appears to have entertained no doubt, as to their real existence. Nor can we explain his language on this subject, as a condescension or accommodation to the popular belief. It is a part of his philosophy, that there must be, or may well be, intermediate beings between the supreme God and men, as a bond of union and a medium of communication between them; and they were alike erroneous in his view, who would have God to be the cause of nothing, and they who would have him directly concerned in everything. Whether they are immortal, like God, or die, like men, though after a longer existence; whether they are a permanently distinct class of beings, or may rise or sink into a participation of the divine or human nature according to their character and tendency; whether they are all good or some of them evil demons*—these are questions on which he is at variance with himself. When and where this doctrine of intermediate beings originated, whether in Persia or Egypt, Phrygia or Thrace, he does not know. In Greece, Homer used the names gods and demons interchangeably. Hesiod was the first to distinguish and define between them. Plato considered demons as a necessary link between God and man. Plutarch regards them as the agents of the divine government, whether in nature or providence, whether in special revelations and interpositions, or in the ordinary care and discipline of men; and he often uses language which reminds us strongly of that which the Scriptures employ in setting forth the ministry of angels.

9. Divine Agency. First and Second Causes. In nature, as in works of art, there are two kinds of causes which conspire to produce the effect—the efficient or final cause, and the physical or material cause. The latter may be wholly void of intelligence; the former must be an intelligent, rational being. Strictly speaking, the former alone is the cause, while the latter is only the instrument which the

* In the use of δαίμονες for *evil* demons, it will be seen how the way was prepared for the New-Testament sense of that word; while the old association of the *same name* with the *gods* of the heathen gave the early Christians a verbal advantage in their assaults on the old mythology: "The things which they sacrifice, they sacrifice to δαιμόνια, and not to God." 1 Cor. x, 20.

intelligent cause uses for the accomplishment of his ends. The artist is the proper cause or author of the painting or sculpture; the colours and brushes, the marble and chisel are only the instruments with which he works. So Reason or God is the proper cause of the universe, and matter, with its properties, is only the means which he uses. Still both may properly be called causes, since both are essential to the effect. Both are proper subjects of philosophical inquiry; and the freest investigation or the strongest affirmation of the one involves no denial or superseding of the other. In their tendency to partial and one-sided views, however, men are always prone to exalt one to the neglect or exclusion of the other. The ancient poets and divines confined their view to the first and most excellent cause, having on all occasions these well-known words in their mouths: "Jove the beginning, middle, source of all," but giving themselves no concern about physical causes. Their successors, on the other hand, who, for that reason, were called φυσικοί, or natural philosophers, stopped with the physical causes, and did not deem it necessary to ascend to the Divine Reason, as the efficient cause and proper author of all existence. The same mistakes are perpetually repeated in the explanation of omens and prodigies, oracles and prophecies, some deeming them wholly natural, others making them wholly supernatural, whereas the true philosopher will avoid both these extremes, and labour to assign to the natural and the supernatural each its several province. So far from believing fate to be the cause of all things, Plutarch does not allow that it is properly the cause of anything, since, like the laws of nature, it is only an established rule or mode of the divine agency. Evil, especially moral evil, does not proceed from fate, still less from God. If fate were its cause, it would be necessary; if God were its author, it would not be reprehensible. He seems to regard sin as the result of man's free agency, and inclines to consider it as connected in its ultimate source with an evil principle or power in the universe, according to the dualistic philosophy of the East. "For if nothing can come without a cause," he argues, "and good cannot be the cause of evil, then there must be an original source of evil as well as of good in the universe. And this is the opinion of the wisest and greatest part of mankind."

10. Providence. Moral Government. Providence is threefold, and may be thus defined:—The first and supreme providence is the intelligence or the will of the Supreme God, doing good to all beings and things, according to which primarily all divine things throughout the universe have been arranged in the best possible manner. The second is that of the secondary gods, who range through the heavens,

producing mortal existences in due order, and regulating all that pertains to the safety and preservation of the several species. The third is the providence and forethought of those demons who on earth are appointed the guardians and overseers of human affairs. The supreme providence is prior to nature, antecedent to fate, and, indeed, the most ancient of all things, except him whose will or intelligence it is, who is the Maker and Father of all. In the interpretation of God's providence and moral government over men, two extremes are to be avoided. The one is that of the superstitious, who turn all natural occurrences into prodigies, and construe every evil, that befalls, as a special punishment for some particular sin—who are paralyzed with fear, for example, at sight of an eclipse, as if God had withdrawn his favour, when, in fact, it is only themselves have lost their reason; and with correspondent weakness, they find the cause, perhaps, in something that they have eaten or drunk, or in the non-performance or misperformance of some outward ceremony. The other extreme is that of the atheist or mere philosopher, who, when he has found a natural cause for an event, forthwith jumps to the conclusion, that it has no final cause, no moral intention, no possible relation to punishment or discipline. The truly wise and pious man will recognise the perfect harmony of physical and final causes, will expect to see them co-operating in the divine government as they do in human affairs, will study to discern their mutual relation; and though he will meet, as he might expect, with many incomprehensible mysteries in providence, yet if he exercise sufficient candour and patience, he will find satisfactory evidence that God does deal with men in this world more or less according to their character; that he does, sooner or later, directly or indirectly, reward virtue and punish vice; that justice is often administered only with more manifest perfection because of its seeming imperfection and delay; and that moral discipline is, after all, the grand design, as it is also the great secret, of our checkered earthly existence. Evil, though not the necessary means of good, is overruled by all-seeing wisdom and all-controlling power. It calls forth the forbearance and compassion of God, and thus is the occasion of a new development of the divine perfections for the imitation of men, whose excellence consists in the knowledge and participation of the divine image. Moreover Providence uses the wicked as his executioners in the punishment or the restraint of other wicked men, or as his instruments in the accomplishment of a good which they do not intend, and when he has accomplished the end, then he cuts them off from the world.

Fortune is a part of providence, and is said to happen, because it falls in with our plans or wishes, and yet is not the result of

human purpose, knowledge, or agency.* Chance also, which Plutarch uses as a more comprehensive term than fortune, is comprehended in providence, and is called fortuitous, merely because its occurrence is unforeseen and its cause unknown to us.

As God's providence and man's agency conspire, so prayer and exertion should always go hand in hand; for God is the brave man's hope, and not the coward's excuse. Pray, and yet hold to the rudder; pray with your hand on the plough; pray, while you gird on your armour—these are precepts which are justified by sound philosophy not less than true piety, having received the sanction of the heroes and sages not less than the priests of antiquity.

With Plutarch, providence was no idle speculation. It was a deep conviction of his moral nature, which was ever present with him; and is not less manifest in the whole series of his biographies than in the most strictly religious of his moral essays. He was the Puritan historian and philosopher of his age. He saw the hand of God in nature and in history, and he wrote "the Magnalia" of Greece and Rome.

11. Worship. Piety. The Nature of Religion. So far as external service goes, Plutarch, as we might have presumed from his general doctrine touching the authority of law and custom in matters of religion, deemed it sufficient, and not only sufficient, but right and duty, to obey the same precept which Socrates inculcated and referred to the oracle as its original source, viz., honour the gods according to the laws of the state. For these, so far as they pertain to religion, he regarded, in the first place, as going back to a divine origin; and, in the second place, though they had been much perverted and grossly misunderstood, still the traditionary rites and institutions of all countries, in all their diversities, were more or less appropriate symbols of the pure and spiritual worship that should be rendered to the Deity. But all external services are little worth in comparison with the homage of the heart and life. The gods are most honoured by right views of their character, and best pleased with obedience to their will. The desire of truth, especially in what relates to the gods, is a sort of grasping after divinity, and a mark of more piety than any ritual purgation or temple service whatever. And though thank-offerings, especially for the blessings of knowledge and peace, (*war* trophies in the temples are of questionable propriety,) are acceptable when they proceed from a grateful heart, yet it is more becoming, especially for kings and princes, to con-

* The ancients, very generally, by the use of the words fortune or chance, meant to deny simply human forecast, not divine agency, e. g., *forte quadam divinitus.* Liv. i, 4.

secrate to the god the lasting monuments of justice, temperance, and magnanimity. Wise men should go to the gods for all the good things which they would enjoy; and, most of all, when we aspire after such knowledge of *them* as human nature can attain to, we ought to pray, that they themselves will bestow it upon us—truth being the greatest blessing that man can receive or God can give. In a word, virtue, holiness, true piety is likeness to the divine image, which consists chiefly in wisdom and goodness. Fasting and austere observances are to be encouraged, so far as they conduce to this end, to which they, doubtless, have a natural tendency. But to make religion consist in abstinence from meats and drinks, and mortification of the body; to wrap one's self in sackcloth and roll in the mire and groan because he has eaten this and drunk that, is a folly and absurdity which Plutarch is never weary of ridiculing—sometimes he sternly denounces it as the fruitful source of atheism. For men were not first made atheists by any defect in nature or providence. No; it was the uncouth actions and senseless passions of superstition —her canting words, her foolish gestures, her magic incantations, her fantastic processions, her foul expiations, her barbarous and inhuman penances—it was these, that gave occasion to many to say, It would be far better that there were no gods, than such as are pleased with these toys and trifles.

12. The Natural Character of Man. Means of Recovery. Touching the native character of man, our author is not consistent with himself. Sometimes he seems to teach, that souls at birth proceed directly from their Maker, and so partake of innate goodness. More frequently, however, and in better keeping with his whole creed, he holds, that souls are born into this life in punishment for the sins of a former existence, and in consequence of an earthly and sensual tendency, which sinks them down into a body of flesh and blood in spite of all the discipline to which they have hitherto been subjected. From the fallen and sinful state in which men are thus born, there is no recovery, but by a prolonged process of discipline and personal expiation carried on through a succession of transmigrations or earthly generations, with intervening seasons of purgation in another world. Of free forgiveness or vicarious atonement, he seems to have no conception. This world is thus turned into a sort of purgatory, as well as probation for the next. And the next, or invisible world, is much the same (only more severe) to all who have not already finished their probation but must undergo another metamorphosis, that is to all who have not reached a state of entire purification on the one hand, or, on the other, been proved hopelessly incorrigible.

13. A Future State. The immortality of the soul is demonstrated by the universal belief of it in all ages and nations, by inspired lawgivers and oracular responses, by offerings for the dead and evocations of departed spirits, by the testimony of those who have visited the unseen world in trances or visions, and most of all, by the providential care which the gods exercise over men, and which is altogether disproportioned to the value of their brief earthly existence. When the soul has passed through its season of trial, and completed its series of earthly generations, it enters upon a state of rewards and punishments which are everlasting. The good rise to the region of the sun and stars,* to a life with and like God, where God is their leader and king, where they hang on him wholly, behold him without weariness, and passionately admire and affect that divine beauty which cannot be uttered or conceived by men. The wicked sink into an abyss of woe, where he sometimes represents them as subjected to the extremest bodily tortures which justice can inflict or ingenuity invent, while, at other times, he eschews the idea of bodily inflictions, and describes them as plunged in utter mental darkness, sorrow, and despair.

Our readers are capable of reflecting for themselves upon this outline, and drawing their own inferences from it. Perhaps, however, we may be indulged in the remark, that it administers reproof to the advocates of both the extreme views which are so often and indiscriminately taken of pagan antiquity—to those who argue the sufficiency of the light of nature for all practical religious purposes, and those who decry natural theology as utterly devoid of truth or excellence, and thus unwittingly subvert the foundations of all religion. In the name of antiquity, in the name of humanity unenlightened and unbiased by the Scriptures, Plutarch bears witness to the truth of those fundamental doctrines which belong in common to natural and revealed religion, and are assumed as the basis of the evidences of Christianity. But he sheds not a ray of light on that darkest, deepest problem in theology, which has ever awakened the most profound solicitude in thoughtful, serious minds, viz., How shall a man be just with God? and the satisfactory solution of which is the characteristic glory of the Christian revelation. And on the subjects of the divine existence, providence, probation, and a future state, he testifies with much doubt and hesitation, and not unfrequently mingles hurtful error with uncertain truth. The false notion that matter is necessarily contaminating and the prime source of evil, mars the moral tendency of his ethical system. The gloomy

* The intermediate abode, to and from which the soul passes in its successive metempsychoses, Plutarch suggests, may be the moon.

doctrine of transmigration of souls, with its associated misapprehension of the doctrines of punishment and expiation, converts the universe into a dark and dismal purgatory, earth into a vast prison, and the bodies, not only of men, but of the lower animals, into so many dungeons for the incarceration and discipline of fallen spirits. When true, his disclosures of a future world want authority. The whole system is deficient in motive power. It wants especially the animating, inspiring, renovating power of hope and love for the elevation of the masses, whom it leaves sunk in almost helpless and hopeless degradation. On the whole, there is, perhaps, no lesson which Plutarch teaches us more effectually than this, (and what can teach this lesson more impressively than the doubts and errors of the wisest and best of pagan philosophers?) How unspeakably great are our obligations to the authoritative testimony of Him who came forth from the unseen world, and so could speak what he knew, and testify what he had seen of God and eternity!—who was not only in the beginning with God, but who was God, and therefore had the right, as well as the power, to promulgate the precise and only terms of reconciliation to rebellious men—who became flesh, and dwelt among us, full of *grace* as well as truth, and thus enabled men to *hear* and *see* and *handle* the *Word of Eternal Life.*

Art. IV.—BIRDS AND AUDUBON.

Ornithological Biography; or, an Account of the Habits of the Birds of the United States. By J. J. Audubon. Philadelphia and Edinburgh. 1835–1839.

A peculiar charm invests the lives of naturalists. The path of the military conqueror is blood-stained, that of the statesman involved and tortuous, while the pale legions of avarice usually beset the goal of maritime discovery, and associate the names of its heroes with scenes of anarchy and oppression; but the lover of nature, who goes forth to examine her wonders or copy her graces, is impelled by a noble enthusiasm, and works in the spirit both of love and wisdom. We cannot read of the brave wanderings of Michaux in search of his sylvan idols; of Hugh Miller, while at his mason's work, reverently deducing the grandest theories of creation from a fossil of the "old red sand-stone;" or of Wilson, made an ornithologist, in feeling at least, by the sight of a red-headed woodpecker that greeted his eyes on landing in America,—without a warm sympathy with the simple, pure, and earnest natures of men thus drawn into a life-devotion to nature, by admiration of her laws and sensibility to her

beauty. If we thoughtfully follow the steps, and analyze the characters of such men, we usually find in them a most attractive combination of the child, the hero, and the poet—with, too often, a shade of the martyr. An inkling of the naturalist is indeed characteristic of poets. Cowper loved hares; Gray, goldfish; Alfieri, horses; and Sir Walter Scott, dogs: but, when pursued as a special vocation, Ornithology seems the most interesting department of natural history.

Birds constitute the poetry of the animal creation: they seem, like flowers, the gratuitous offspring of nature; and although their utility, as the destroyers of baneful insects, is well known, we habitually associate them with the sense of beauty. Indeed, familiarity alone blinds us to the suggestive charm attached to winged creatures; and we can scarcely imagine the hopelessness that would brood over woods and fields, if deprived of the tuneful voices and graceful movements of the feathered tribe. The gift of aërial locomotion they enjoy, is a distinction which robes them with an attractive mystery, and leads us to regard them as creatures of less restrained volition than any other species; freedom of action is thus one of their less obvious charms, but one to which we instinctively refer a certain exemption from ordinary trials, and capacity of high pleasures: the chartered libertines of the air, ranging its vast expanse as inclination or necessity dictates, they seem to belong to a more highly-endowed order of animal life, and to spiritualize the principle of motion by grace, alacrity, and a power to counteract natural forces. The flight of a bird, attentively watched, is one of the most inspiring revelations of nature. The ease, rapidity, and grace with which it ranges the "upper deep," and the apparent caprice or unerring instinct that regulates its course, appeal at once to science and poetry, and the minstrel as well as the naturalist is warmed into observant admiration. Delicacy of organization and exquisite plumage add to the interest thus excited; and when we combine with these attractions that of a versatile musical endowment, it is not surprising that birds have created such enthusiasm in the explorers of nature, and such affection in untaught but susceptible minds. Animal spirits seem embodied in the swift, volatile, and gay tribe; and while they approach human nature in this regard, its holier sympathies are illustrated by the domestic habits, the attachments, and individuality of birds; and thus they become naturally linked with the most grateful associations of human life: so that in conversation, literature, and art, they occupy a more distinctive and significant relation than we award to any other order of creatures.

To the natural theologian there are few illustrations more pleasing

and available than those derived from the structure of birds: its adaptation to their habits yields the most useful hints towards the invention of a flying machine; the perforated membrane which encloses the lungs, through which air passes into the cavities of the breast, abdomen, and even into the hollows of the bones; the powerful muscles of the wings, the lightness and delicacy of the plumage,—increasing their buoyancy while protecting them from the weather,—the cleaving shape of the head and bill, and the rudder-tail, mark them for inhabitants of the air, of which they consume a larger portion in the ratio of their size than any other creatures; the magnitude of the brain, too, is proportionally greater; and the complexity and perfection of their vocal organs is a problem for science; while instinct asserts itself in their migratory and domestic habits, in a manner so remarkable that the history of birds has furnished more inspiration to story-tellers and poets than all the rest of the animal creation. In special adaptation the various modifications of beak and talons is wonderful; how different a feeding-apparatus, for instance, belongs to the woodpecker and the California fruit-eater. In the perfection of the senses, also, birds excel, and share the pleasures of sight and sound with man, indicating their enjoyment with an almost human expression. The minute and exquisite beauties of insects, visible to us only through the microscope, have given rise to the belief that the richest provision exists for the gratification of their sight. The act of singing, and the innumerable cadences and versatility of note they exhibit, suggest that the world of sound has for them an infinite range of significance. In variety of aptitude and vocation they also assimilate with the human species—some being, as it were, minstrels by profession, and others architects or hunters; and not until we enter into the labours of the ornithologist, can we imagine what numerous and modified species exist of birds of prey, and of passage—the climbers, the gallinaceous, the waders, and the web-footed. The wonderful process of ovation is yet another natural mystery revealed by birds, and Audubon used to speak of the rapture with which, when a boy, he hung over the newly-discovered nest, and looked upon the little, shining eggs, so carefully and snugly disposed. Independent of the sense of beauty and the kindliness of feeling to which birds minister, they seem to embody and express pleasure more directly than any other offspring of nature; her benign influence is singularly associated with them; the spontaneous and, as it were, vital joy that seems to animate their song and motions, brings the idea of enjoyment vividly to the heart—they seem to prophesy and proclaim happiness; and, accordingly, the misanthropes repudiate, while the cheerful welcome them. It would require a

degree of introspective attention rarely exercised to realize how much the familiar notes of birds act upon our moods; in the balmy stillness of a summer noon, the vernal air of a spring morning, or amid the gorgeous drapery of an autumn wood, the chirp, carol, or cry of birds breaks upon our solitude with an impression or a winsome effect kindling to the imagination and eloquent to the heart. "Lord," exclaims old Walton, "what music hast thou provided for thy saints in heaven, when thou affordest bad men such music on earth?" There appears to be a meaning in the sound beyond what reaches the ear; it links itself with the aspects of nature, with the spirit of the hour, or blends with the sad reminiscence or the hopeful reverie, like its echo or response.

There is, too, a metaphysical reason for the superior interest birds excite; they have great variety and individuality of character, and we instinctively apply their names to our acquaintances as the best and most available synonyms. Who has not encountered human beings selfish as the cormorant, loquacious and unoriginal as the parrot, vain as the peacock, gentle as the dove, chattering as the jay, volatile as the swallow, solemn as the owl, rapacious as the hawk, noble as the eagle, and so on through all the modifications of character? There are, indeed, two human attributes which birds possess in a striking degree—affection and vanity. There is a bird in Mexico with a most beautiful tail, that builds its nest with two openings, in order to go in and out without ruffling its feathers. The brilliant and varied costume of birds has suggested fabrics and patterns innumerable to more rational beings; and many of them, apparently, take as conscious delight in their array, and the display of it, and in their vocal accomplishments, to win admiration or sympathy, as the most accomplished coquette or gallant. In fact, although they seek prey and build nests, their ways are quite social, and they seem born to leisure like people of fortune; and it is this apparent immunity from care, this life of vagrant enjoyment,—as if mere flying about and singing were their destiny,—that renders birds, like flowers, so grateful to the mind and senses. The blue jay is a practical joker; the snow-bunting delights in a storm, and the white owl in moonlight, quite as much as any poet; the tailor-bird sews leaves together to make itself a nest with the skill of a modiste; the cuckoo is an adept in small imposture—the Yankee pedler of birds; the maternal instinct of the quail induces her to pretend lameness, and lead off urchins in search of her nest on a false track. There is an Indian bird of luxurious tastes, whose domicile is divided into several compartments, each of which it lights up at night with fire-flies. We cannot see the kingfisher intently gazing down upon the waters from a lofty tree, without

realizing the wonderful visual adaptation of its optics. It is attested by many travellers, that when a mule falls dead on the plains of South America, although not a bird is visible to the human eye, in a few moments flocks of vultures appear, having either scented or seen their prey from so vast a distance as to indicate an incalculable power of the visual or olfactory nerves. We cannot see a flight of crows without thinking of the ancient time, when their course was so anxiously watched by the augurs; or hear the first welcome-note of the robin, as he hops about the field before our dwelling, as if on a congratulatory visit at the advent of spring, without having the associations of childhood revived with the thought of that memorable English ballad which consecrates this bird to youthful affections.

Of the rude sculptured figures on Egyptian tombs, the most correctly designed are those of birds; and in that land of sunshine and mystery, the ibis was held sacred; while as effective accessories to the grand and monotonous landscape, most appropriately stands a solitary heron, apparently carved in bold relief against the twilight sky; or floating high above the traveller's head, is seen a symmetrical phalanx of flamingoes, their black wings and snowy bodies gracefully parting the ambient firmament. The hue of a Java sparrow's beak is inexpressibly cheery; the habit of the ostrich of burying her eggs in the sand and leaving them to be hatched by the sun, and the fidelity of the carrier-pigeon, are facts in natural history prolific of comparisons. The antique design of the doves at a fountain, is constantly repeated by mosaic and cameo workers; and on sword, banner, and signet, the king of birds remains the universal emblem of freedom and power, equally significant of American liberty and Roman domnion.

One of the most celebrated jurists in America was missed at dinner by his family, one day in the country; but, after diligent search, he was found in the hayloft, absorbed in watching a pair of swallows, and acknowledged that, accustomed as he was to technical and abstract investigations, the observation of animated nature proved a refreshment he could not have imagined. Few of us, indeed, can fail to have acquired a personal interest in birds, however we may have neglected their biography. A family with which we were domesticated abroad, had a pair of turtle-doves in the house, who flew about at pleasure, and exhibited no fear, except in the presence of strangers; one of them died, and we were surprised at witnessing no indications of the despairing grief ascribed to this bird when thus bereft. The anomaly was explained, however, when we noticed what an attachment the dove manifested towards a beautiful boy of six years; her favourite resting-place was in the profuse golden hair of the child;

here she would sit brooding, while the boy was at his sports or his book, swaying to and fro with his movements, or quietly nestling when he assumed a fixed position. Sometimes, when the sunshine fell upon the pair, in a picturesque attitude, the idea of a cupid with one of his mother's doves, or of an infant St. John with this living emblem of beatitude, irresistibly suggested itself. The child was seized with a brain fever, and, after a brief illness, died; and then the dove's plaintive cooing was incessant; she refused sustenance for a long time, and adopted a monastic life, in the high and dark folds of a window-curtain—abjuring her previous habits of sociability, and apparently consecrating her life to sorrow. Who that has watched the yellow birds swinging on the lithe sprays of an elm in a New-England village, the flight of blackbirds, in the autumn, round the shores of Lake Champlain, or the graceful sweep of the curlews on the Atlantic coast, and not thenceforth found them indissolubly associated with these localities? As I crossed the piazza of St. Mark, at Venice, for the first time, I noticed with surprise that the pigeons did not fly at my approach, and recalled the fact that they had been sacredly protected by the ancient government, and enjoyed prescriptive rights, which they obviously considered inviolable. It is a striking thought, when we contemplate it, that the eider down that pillows the head of beauty, or trembles at the breath of her whose fair bosom it covers, was torn from the wild sea-bird; that the graceful plume that waves over the warrior's crest once sustained the poised eagle among the clouds, or winged the ostrich on his desert path. With how many evening reveries and reminiscences of sentiment is the note of the whip-poor-will associated, and what an appropriate sound for the desolate marsh is the cry of the bittern! It is not surprising that tradition and poetry embalm the names of so many birds; from the superstition of the ignorant mariner to the appreciative love of the educated bard, they, though so often sacrificed, are yet endeared to man. The fables of the roc and the phenix are among their most remote memorials; mythology has wedded them to her deities; on tavern-signs they betoken good cheer, and on banners are national emblems. Burns uttered a natural human sentiment when he asks, in the song, the little birds o' bonnie Doon, how they can chant, and he sae fu o' care! One of the most exquisite metaphors in English poetry is that of Goldsmith, when he compares the good pastor's efforts to lure his charge to the skies to those of a bird tempting its offspring to fly; and next to it is that of Byron, in allusion to Kirke White's early death, comparing him to the dying eagle who sees that his own feather winged the fatal shaft. And another more tender and graphic image still is that of Dante in the episode of Francesca de Rimini:—

Quali colombe, dal disio chiamate,
Con l'ali aperte e ferme al dolce nido
Volan per l'aer dal voler portate:
Cotal useir della schiera ov'e Dido,
A noi venendo per l'aer maligno,
Si forte fu l'affettuoso grido.

Boccaccio's falcon and Sterne's starling, and the raven in Barnaby Rudge, are classic birds, since rendered by genius the expositors of noble and humorous sentiment. But in this, as in all other departments of nature, the most characteristic and feeling tributes emanate from the poets.

The graceful flight and instinct of the waterfowl—the very sentiment of the bird, and the impression it makes upon a contemplative mind, have been embodied by Bryant: the very rhythm of that favourite poem seems to coincide with its lonely and sustained motion when sweeping in majestic curves the gray twilight of an autumn day. The superstition attached to birds has been used with consummate art in two poems, the popularity of which indicates how successfully the natural and supernatural may be wrought and blended in verse; we need scarcely allude to Coleridge's Ancient Mariner and Poe's Raven.

The metre, images, and even the diction of Shelley's ode to a skylark echo the aspiring, joyous flight and melody of that favourite bird of the poets. Hans Andersen's juvenile story of the "Ugly Duck" touches felicitously a comic vein, that observers are well aware may be amply suggested in this field; witness the graphic humour of Irving's description of a rookery and a barn-yard fowl on a rainy day, in "The Stout Gentleman." For the peculiar sentiment that imaginative minds elicit from the song or appearance of birds, and the associations they awaken, we may refer to Milton's beautiful allusion to the nightingale, who "all night long her amorous descant sang," and the fine ode to the same melodious bird by Keats; to Wordsworth's ballad of "Poor Susan," Dana's "Beach-bird," and Sprague's "Swallows that flew in at the Church Window." These instances of poems suggested by "wanderers of the upper deep," are not, perhaps, so illustrative of the peculiar influence they exert upon human sympathies, as the casual allusions and incidental metaphors which continually present themselves in the standard poets. As ornithology is more generally studied, and the peculiar habits of these "aërial companions" of Audubon become more familiar, poetry will more definitely consecrate the subject; others of the species, besides the self-sacrificing pelican and the harmonious bulbul, will figure in story; and the bards will follow the sagacious example of

one of our own poets,* and by exact observation, render the characteristic advents of birds a means of effectively describing nature, as thus, in spring:—

"Then bursts the song from every leafy glade,
The yielding season's bridal serenade;
Then flash the wings, returning summer calls,
Through the deep arches of her forest halls;
The bluebird breathing from his azure plumes
The fragrance borrow'd where the myrtle blooms;
The thrush, poor wanderer, dropping meekly down,
Clad in his remnant of autumnal brown;
The oriole drifting like a flake of fire
Rent by the whirlwind from a blazing spire;
The robin jerking his spasmodic throat,
Repeats staccáto his peremptory note;
The crack-brain'd bobolink courts his crazy mate,
Poised on a bulwark tipsy with his weight;
Merry in his cage the lone canary sings,
Feels the soft air and spreads his idle wings."

AUDUBON'S career as an ornithologist began and was prosecuted with an artistic rather than a scientific enthusiasm. His father appears to have been an intelligent lover of nature, and took pleasure in walking abroad with his son to observe her wonders. These colloquies and promenades made a lasting impression upon his plastic mind; it is evident that the habits and appearance of animated nature at once enlisted his sympathies; the accidental view of a book of illustrations in natural history excited the desire of imitation, and he began in a rude way to delineate the forms, colours, attitudes and, as far as possible, the expression of the creatures he so admired. Chagrined, but never wholly discouraged, at the ill-success of his early attempts, he annually executed and destroyed hundreds of pictures and drawings, until long practice had given him the extraordinary skill which renders his mature efforts unequalled, both for authenticity and beauty. He artlessly confesses that finding it impossible to possess or to live with the birds and animals that inspired his youthful love, he became ardently desirous to make perfect representations of them, and in this feeling we trace the germ of his subsequent greatness. Thus the origin of Audubon's world-renowned achievements was disinterested. His love of nature was not philosophic, like that of Wordsworth; nor scientific, like that of Humboldt; nor adventurous, like that of Boone; but special and artistic,—circumstances rather than native idiosyncrasy made him a naturalist; and his knowledge was by no means so extensive in

* Holmes.

this regard as that of others less known to fame: but few men have indulged so genuine a love of nature for her own sake, and found such enjoyment in delineating one of the most poetical and least explored departments of her boundless kingdom. To the last his special ability, as an artistic naturalist, was unapproached; and while one of his sons drew the outline, and another painted the landscape or the foreground, it was his faithful hand that, with a steel pen, made the hairy coat of the deer, or, with a fine pencil, added the exquisite plumage to the sea-fowl's breast. For years he fondly explored woods, prairies, and the Atlantic shores, and drew and coloured birds and beasts, without an idea of any benefit other than the immediate gratification thus derived. It was not until his interview with Lucien Bonaparte in 1824, and the latter's unexpected offer to purchase his drawings, that he conceived the project of giving the results of his explorations to the world. Although, in pursuance of this intention, he embarked soon after for Europe with characteristic promptitude and eager hopes, the loneliness of his position and the want of means and influence depressed him on landing; but the instant and cordial recognition he met with from the active literary and scientific men abroad, soon confirmed his original resolution. Roscoe, Wilson, Jeffrey, Brewster, Herschel, and Humboldt successfully advocated his claims, and cheered him with their personal friendship; and, under such favourable auspices, his first contributions to ornithology appeared in Edinburgh. Indeed, notwithstanding the privations and difficulties he encountered, an unusual amount of sympathy and encouragement fell to the lot of Audubon. Compared with other votaries of a special object purely tasteful and scientific in its nature, he had little reason to complain. Of the one hundred and seventy subscribers of a thousand dollars each to his great work, eighty were his own countrymen; and his declining years were passed in independence and comfort in the midst of an affectionate and thriving family—the participants of his taste. His elasticity of temperament also was not less a distinction than a blessing; it supported his wearisome and lonely wanderings both in search of birds in the forest and in search of encouragement among men; and when the labour of years was destroyed, after a brief interval of mental anguish, it nerved him to renewed labour, so that in three years his portfolio was again filled.

Born the same year that independence was declared by the Americans, his father an admiral in the French navy, and his birthplace Louisiana, he was early sent to France for his education, where he received lessons in drawing from David, but pined, the while, for the free life and the wild forests of his country. On

his return, his father gave him a beautiful plantation on the banks of the Schuylkill, and he married; but neither agricultural interests nor domestic ties could quell the love of nature in his breast; and for months he wandered in search of objects for his pencil, unsustained by any human being except his wife, who seems to have realized from the first the tendency and promise of his mind. At length, in order to enjoy the opportunities he craved, and at the same time have the society of his family, Audubon determined to emigrate, and selected the village of Henderson, in Kentucky, for his new home. In the autumn of 1810 he floated down the Ohio, in an open skiff, with his wife, child, and two negroes, his mattress, viands and rifle, happy in the prospect of nearer and more undisturbed intercourse with nature, and intensely enjoying the pomp of the autumnal woods, the haze of the Indian summer, and the wildness and solitude around him. The locality chosen proved adequate to his aims; day after day, with his dog, gun, and box of pencils and colours, he made excursions, now shooting down a fresh subject, now delineating its hues and form; one moment peering into a nest, and at another scaling a cliff, for hours watching the conduct of a pair of birds as, unconscious that their doings were to be set in a note-book, they constructed a graceful nest, fed their young, or trilled a spontaneous melody; over streams, through tangled bushwood, amid swamps and in stony ravines, beneath tempest, sunshine, and starlight—the indefatigable wanderer thus lived; the wild-beast, the treacherous Indian, the gentle moon, and the lowly wild flower sole witnesses of his curious labours.

Audubon returned from Europe to prosecute his ornithological researches with fresh zest and assiduity; and his first expedition was to the coast of Florida, where he made rich additions to his portfolio among the seafowl of that region: he afterwards successfully explored Maine, the British Provinces, and the ice-clad and desolate shores of Labrador. The most remarkable and happiest era of his life was, doubtless, that employed in collecting the materials, executing the pictures, and obtaining the subscribers to his Birds of America; his wanderings previously have the interest of adventure, and the charm derived from the indulgence of a passionate love of nature; and his subsequent excursions and artistic labours, in behalf of the work on the Quadrupeds of America, begun in 1842, afford pleasing evidence of his taste and perseverance. But the period included by his ornithological enterprise, is more characteristic and satisfactory. He had a great end in view, and the wildest forest and most unfrequented shores, the highest and most cultured sphere of society, and the most patient and delicate limning were the means

of its realization; and it is when contemplating him in this threefold relation that we learn to appreciate the mingled hardihood, enthusiasm, firmness, and dignity so remarkably united in his character. In the woods, a genial companion, a single-hearted, kind, and generous friend, as well as a childlike enthusiast and manly sportsman; he stood before the council of an institution with his first delineation—the bald-headed eagle—or opened his portfolio to the inspection of an English nobleman in his lordly castle, with quiet self-possession, an independent air, and without exhibiting the least solicitude either for patronage or approbation. Arriving at a frontier village, after a tramp of months in the wilderness, his long beard, tattered leather dress, and keen eye made him an object of idle wonder or impertinent gossip; but none imagined that this grotesque hunter-artist enjoyed the honours of all the learned societies of Europe. His exultation at the discovery of a new species, and his satisfaction at the correct finish and elegant verisimilitude of a specimen, amply recompensed him for days of exposure or ill-success. On his journey from the South, he kept pace with the migration of the birds; and he proclaimed the Washington sea-eagle to his country and to the scientific world with the pride and delight of a conqueror.

His passion for rambling caused Audubon to fail in several business enterprises he undertook; and at one period he applied to Sully for instruction in portrait painting, but soon abandoned the idea. So faulty did Dawson, the engraver originally employed by the Prince of Musignano to illustrate ornithology, consider the early specimens of Audubon's skill as a draftsman, that he refused to execute them, and appeared to consider the pigments invented by the woodland artist as the most remarkable feature they presented. Although thus discouraged on every hand, we can readily believe his declaration, that he left America with profound regret, although his career abroad affords yet another striking evidence of that memorable and holy saying—"that a prophet is not without honour save in his own country." It is natural that a man who succeeded by virtue of toil and fortitude should repudiate the commonly received faith in mere genius; and we are not surprised that his settled view of the philosophy of life was patient self-reliance, and meditation on facts derived from personal observation, with unremitted habits of labour. To these resources he owed his own renown and achievements; and his high arched brow, dark-gray eye, and vivacious temperament marked him as fitted by nature to excel in action as well as thought; a destiny which his pursuits singularly realized. There was something bird-like in the very physiognomy of Audubon, in the shape and keenness of his eye, the aquiline form of the nose, and a certain

piercing and vivid expression when animated. He was thoroughly himself only amid the freedom and exuberance of nature; the breath of the woods exhilarated and inspired him; he was more at ease under a canopy of boughs than beneath gilded cornices, and felt a necessity to be within sight either of the horizon or the sea. Indeed, so prevailing was this appetite for nature, if we may so call it, that from the moment the idea of his last projected expedition was abandoned—in accordance with the urgent remonstrances of his family, mindful of his advanced age—he began to droop, and the force and concentration of his intellect visibly declined. Both his success and his misfortunes, therefore, proved the wisdom of Richter's advice to steadfastly and confidently follow the permanent instincts of character, however they may seem opposed to immediate interest.

The style of Audubon reflects his character with unusual emphasis and truth. He was one of that class of men who unite intellectual and physical activity in their natures so equally, that while their very temperament forbids them to be exclusively students, their intelligence demands a constant accession of new ideas. Professor Wilson and Baron Humboldt belong to the same species. No one can glance over Audubon's Biography of Birds, without being struck with the unusual animation and reality of the style. He writes with an ease and enthusiasm that makes portions of his work quite as entertaining and far more suggestive than a felicitous novel. Instead of a formal nomenclature or pedantic description, he digresses continually from the technical details which are requisite to the scientific value of his treatise, to charming episodes of personal adventure, sketches of local scenery and habits, and curious anecdotes illustrative of natural history or human character. The titles of these incidental chapters adequately suggest their aim and interest, such as "Hospitality in the Woods," "Force of the Waters," "the Squatters of Labrador," "Wreckers of Florida," "a Maple-Sugar Camp," "a Ball in Newfoundland," "Breaking up of the Sea," "Pitting of Wolves," "Long Calm at Sea," "A Kentucky Barbecue," &c. We are thus genially admitted to the knowledge of much that is characteristic and interesting, by spirited and graceful narratives. His artist's eye and his sportsman's zest give liveliness and a picturesque grace to the best of these interludes; they relieve the monotony of mere description, and also impart an individuality to the entire work, by associating the positive information it conveys with the fortunes and feelings of the author. His habit of naming newly-discovered birds for his friends is another pleasing feature. Thus genially is our view of nature enlarged, the attractiveness of romance given to a department of natural history, and one part of the world

made perfectly acquainted with the feathered tribes of another. We need not enlarge upon the amenities resulting from pursuits of this kind, and their encouragement by individuals of taste and wealth, —of the innocent and available gratification thus extensively yielded, or of the more liberal and pleasing views resulting therefrom. In a literary point of view, the style of Audubon, notwithstanding an almost unavoidable vein of egotism, in its clearness, colloquial facility, and infectious enthusiasm, proves how much more effectively intimacy with nature develops even the power of expression than conformity to rules; and vindicates completeness of life, animal and mental, as essential to true manhood even in literature.

This, in our view, is one of the most important lessons derived from such a career as that of Audubon philosophically considered. There is a cant of spiritualism, at the present day, which repudiates the vital relation of genius to material laws. In the view of this shallow philosophy to trace intellectual results in any degree to physical causes, is derogating from the essential beauty of mind. The class of persons who affect this extreme devotion to etherial systems, aim to sever body and soul while mutually alive, contemn physiology in their analysis of character, and recognise only the abstract in mental phenomena. This mode of reasoning is founded not less in irreverence than error. The most truly beautiful and significant phases of intellect, fancy, moral sentiment, and all that we deem spiritual in man, is born of its combination with the human. Indeed, the grand characteristic of life, considered in a metaphysical light, is that it is a condition which brings together and gives scope for the action and reaction of material influences on spiritual genius. The end is development, growth, and modification. As the rarest fruit owes its flavour and hues to qualities imbibed from earth and air, from rain and sunshine; so what we call the soul is the product of the thinking and sensitive principle in our nature, warmed, enriched and quickened by the agency of an animal organism,—the channel of nature,—by sensation, physical development, appetites, and sensations as well as ideas.

An author differs from other men only by the gift and habit of expression. This faculty, for which, in the ordinary purposes of convenience and pleasure, speech only is requisite, through genial cultivation redoubles its force, meaning, and beauty, and is capable of affording a kind of permanent utterance to what is most dear and important to man. It is obvious, therefore, that the more thoroughly an author's nature embraces the traits peculiar to manhood, the more efficient and satisfactory will his vocation be fulfilled. Hence the universal recognition of Shakspeare's supremacy in authorship;

it is because his range of expression included more of what is within and around life—more, in a word, of humanity—than any other single expositor. In general, authorship is partial, temporary, and its force lies in a special form. Writers devoted to abstract truth, like Kant and Jonathan Edwards, are not to be included in the proposition, as their appeal is not to the sympathies, but to the pure intelligence of the race. But the authors who really affect the mass, and represent vividly the spirit of their age, are not less eminent for genuine human qualities—for prevailing traits of temperament, appetite, and sensibility—than for superior reflective and imaginative gifts. It is, indeed, essential that they should possess the former in a high degree in order effectively to exhibit the latter. This is constantly illustrated in literature and art. With a fancy that scarcely approached the idealism of Shelley, Burns thrilled the hearts of his kind by virtue of an organization that humanized his genius. Landor is equipped with the lore of antiquity, and all the graces of classical diction to advocate his liberal opinions, yet while his elegant volumes adorn the libraries of scholars and men of taste, Dickens, comparatively ignorant and unrefined, by virtue of what may be called a more genial instinct, pleads for the oppressed in a million hearts. Jenny Lind sings many cavatinas with more precision and artistic power than Grisi, but her voice, uncharged with the sensuous life whose vibration is inevitably sympathetic, does not so seize upon the nerves or quicken the blood. The element of sensation as related to sound, form, and ideas is essential to popular literature. It is the peculiar characteristic of this department of art that it depends upon sympathy, which can only be awakened in large circles by addressing the whole nature, by winning the senses as well as the mind, stirring the heart not less than eliciting the judgment, and, in a word, making itself felt in that universal human consciousness which, to distinguish it alike from mere intellect or mere feeling, we call the soul.

The author who expects reception there, must write not only with his intelligence, his imagination, and his will, but with his temperament and his sensitive organism; he must, in a degree, fuse perception and sensation, nervous energy and moral feeling, physical emotion and aërial fancy; and then, at some point, he will be sure to touch the sympathy of others—not the scholar only, but the peasant. Accordingly we always find in the habits and idiosyncrasies of popular authors a clue to their success. There is an analogy between their constitution and their writing. The tone of the latter is born of the man, and forms his personal distinction as an author. Reasoning, rhetoric, and descriptive limning, considered as processes, do not differ according to the writer, they only vary in a certain spirit,

manner, or, more properly, tone; and when we analyze this, we shall find it given out by the individual character, by the particular union of moral and physical qualities that make up the identity of the author, and not originating in a pure abstract and spiritual emanation. Far from diminishing, this but enhances the interest of authorship; it renders it a great social fact, and a legitimate branch of human economy. It teaches us to regard authors as we regard men, by the light of character; and from their human to deduce their literary peculiarities instead of the reverse, which is the method of superficial criticism.

The popular basis of Audubon's renown, as well as the individuality of his taste as a naturalist, rests upon artistic merit. We have alluded to the instinctive desire he so early manifested not only to observe, but to possess the beautiful denizens of the forest and the meadow; and he candidly acknowledges that he was induced to take their portraits to console himself for not possessing the originals. Rude as were his first attempts to delineate birds, few portrait painters work in a more disinterested spirit: the motive was neither gain, nor hope of distinction, nor even scientific enthusiasm; for when Wilson called at his place of business, these primitive sketches were produced as the results of leisure, and the work of an unskilled amateur. It is evident, therefore, that a genuine love of the occupation, and a desire to have authentic memorials of these objects of his enthusiastic admiration, was the original cause of his labours with crayon and pigments; circumstances, an ardent temperament, and an earnest will gradually developed this spontaneous tendency into a masterly artistic faculty; he sketched, painted, and destroyed, copied, retouched, and improved, until he succeeded in representing perfectly the forms, colours, attitudes, and expression of the feathered tribe. The life-size of these delineations, their wonderful accuracy, the beauty of their hues, and the animation of their aspect instantly secured for the backwoodsman artist universal praise; but a minute inspection revealed yet higher claims: each plate, in fact, is an epitome of the natural history of the species depicted,—male and female, young and adult are grouped together, their plumage at different seasons, the vegetation they prefer, the soil, the food, sometimes the habits, and often the prey of each bird are thus indicated; and we take in at a glance not only the figure, but the peculiarities of the genus. This completeness of illustration—the result of vast study—united, as it is, with grace and brilliancy of execution, led the great naturalist of France to declare that our country had achieved a work unequalled in Europe. No lover of nature, whether poet or savan, can contemplate these exquisite and vivid pictures in a foreign

country, without delight and gratitude; for, without any exertion on his part, they introduce him to an intimate acquaintance with the varied and numerous birds that haunt the woods, sky, and waters between Labrador and Florida, in hue, outline, and action as vivid and true as those of nature; and their intrinsic value as memorials is enhanced by the consideration that a rapid disappearance of whole species of birds has been observed to attend the progress of civilization on this continent.

Art. V.—METHODIST PREACHING.

Characteristic Sketches of Summerfield, Cookman, Bascom, Fisk, and Olin.

We are not yet through with the subject of Methodist preaching. Our two preceding papers, though hazardously frank in their disregard of some favourite prejudices, have met with a reception, the cordiality of which has been the more refreshing because little expected It is quite natural that we should feel the flattery, and infer from it a license to encroach still farther on the good nature of our readers. If so, they must blame themselves as well as us.

After affirming, in our last article, that there were scattered all through our ranks able representatives of the great modern interests of Christianity, as well as of its ordinary pulpit instructions, we remarked that "our ministry has not been without a class of men pre-eminent even above these, for reputation at least —'men of renown' in the Church." Summerfield, Bascom, Fisk, and Olin, were named as examples.

The peculiar unity of our Church, resulting from its itinerant episcopacy, and the interchange of its pastors, has been highly favourable to the reputation of such men. They have been recognised as the common representatives and common favourites of the denomination. They moved extensively through its territory, not as foreign visitors, but as honoured members of the one great family, leaders in the common pastorate. In no other denomination of the land has this sentiment of fraternity been so prevalent and so characteristic. Besides its moral beauty, it has been of no little practical value; a great idea, a great deed, or a great man, has always had a wider sway among us than among other Churches. While the reputation of eminent preachers in more localized or more districted

communions has been analogous to that of leaders in the State legislatures, the fame of our distinguished preachers, and its moral power, has been analogous to the national fame and influence of our great Congressional leaders. With the increase and consolidation of the Church this advantage is disappearing—perhaps inevitably. It gave to the class of men referred to a standing among us, similar to that which the great preachers of the age of Louis XIV. occupied among the clergy of France. We may have hereafter as great men intrinsically, but they can hardly wield as extended a sway over the general mind of the Church.

We propose to attempt, in this article, characteristic sketches of some of our most notable preachers,—not elaborate estimates or finished portraits, but rapid drawings—"sketches," as our title says,—and not for the purpose of presenting them as pulpit models, but as pulpit studies, affording examples of both excellencies and defects, and at the same time not without interest as specimens of personal character.

SUMMERFIELD was the first of general fame, and, unquestionably, one of the very best. Fragrant still are the associations of that endeared name. A chaste style; fertility of good but not extraordinary thought, adorned frequently, however, by apposite figures; the facility of a remarkably colloquial manner, which made his hearers feel as if they had a sort of interlocutory participation in the discourse; and, above all, an indescribably sweet spirit of piety—the very personality of the speaker sanctified, and revealing itself in his tones, looks, and gestures—were the traits of this extraordinary man.

This manifestation of his personal characteristics had nothing, however, of egotism about it. It was not preaching himself instead of Christ, but Christ in himself, as well as in his subject; so that Christ was presented at once both "objectively" and "subjectively," as the Germans would say, and thus became "all in all." The fame of few men has depended less upon original talent, and more on personal dispositions, than that of Summerfield. Though the most transcendent in his reputation, he was, at the same time, the most imitable of our eminent preachers. Simplicity, placidity, meekness, and a colloquial manner, combined with good but not great ideas, certainly would seem to be of easy acquisition. Still the imitation of the excellencies of a model, however desirable, is often found exceedingly difficult. To copy a model entire is impracticable, and always results in absurd defects, for the moral idiosyncrasies of men give an individuality to their character and manner which must remain

inexorably distinct from all resemblances, as the differences of faces show themselves notwithstanding any similarity of features. Only such as are similar in these idiosyncrasies should think of imitating each other's excellencies. Henry B. Bascom would have become ridiculous with the pulpit manner of John Summerfield. Men, however, of tranquil dispositions, of neat style and ready flow of thought, ranking now only at mediocrity, might place his example before them with peculiar advantage. A deep consecration like his, a simple and direct aim to reach the heart rather than inflame the imagination of the hearer, the melting and outflowing of one's whole individuality in the discourse—these are not difficult to such men, and a better example of what success they can attain, is not on record than that of Summerfield.

The best judges, who were familiar with Summerfield's preaching, find it impossible to tell precisely in what its interest consisted.

We venture to repeat that the solution of the problem is to be found mostly, if not wholly, in what the French would call the *naturel* of the man—the beautiful compatibility between the preacher and his preaching—a harmony that revealed itself in his looks, his tones, his gestures, and all the subtler indications of verbal style, mental aptitudes, and moral dispositions. You have only to suppose him strongly characterized by other traits than those mentioned, to perceive at once that he must have been an entirely different preacher. Had he possessed the same intellectual capacities, but been *brusque*, or denunciatory, or satirical—had he been tinged strongly with moroseness, misanthropy, or self-conceit, his pulpit characteristics would have been different; he never could have won the peculiar fame which attaches to his memory; he would probably have gone down to the grave without public distinction. With a mind susceptible of all graceful impressions, a heart whose sensibility was feminine—yet with such femininess as we ascribe to angels, and think of as consistent with mighty though serene strength—he united the very sanctity of religion and a simplicity of purpose which saved him utterly from the affectations or artifices that might have marred his character, and quite changed the effect of his preaching.

Montgomery, the poet, expressed a just critical estimate of him when he said:—

"Summerfield had intense animal feeling, and much of morbid imagination; but of poetic feeling, and poetic imagination, very little—at least there is very little trace of either in anything that he has left, beyond a few vivid but momentary flashes in his sermons."

This "animal feeling," however, must be understood to have been

refined and intensified by divine grace, into the holiest moral affections; so that the sympathetic instincts of the natural heart became in him pure religious passions, and seemed such as might befit the bosom of a seraph.

His appearance in the pulpit was expressive of his character, and contributed much to the effect of his discourse. Though his face possessed nothing at first and near view remarkably striking or agreeable, yet when irradiated with the fervour of his feelings, it was angelically beautiful. The portrait which accompanied Holland's memoir is considered a good one, but it fails to represent the glowing life that played over his features and radiated from his eyes. The languor of disease could not mar this moral beauty; it rather enhanced it, by adding a delicacy which could not fail to associate with the hearer's admiration a sentiment of tender and even loving sympathy. His voice was not strong, but exceedingly flexible and sweet, and harmonized always with the vibrations of his feelings. His gestures did not violate the rules of the art, but seemed not the result of it. They were unexceptionably natural, and yet naturally conformed to the art. He was, in fine, so exempt from artifice, he so entirely surrendered himself to the occasion and its concomitants, whatever they might be, that he spontaneously fell into unison with them, and seemed naturally and immediately to acquire that mastery over them which the highest art cannot always command. This is the truest genius; genius is not independent of art, but it is its prerogative often to assume it intuitively, reaching its results without its labours. Labour is an important aid to genius, unquestionably; and the latter is seldom notably successful without the former; and yet the great characteristic of genius is its facility, the indolent ease, even, with which it accomplishes what art, without genius, reaches only through elaborate assiduity. Genius suffers more than it labours, but it suffers not so much in action as in reaction. Its sensibility is what gives it success, mainly, but often inflicts misery also.

Though in the delivery of his sermons there was this facility—felicity we may call it—in their preparation he was a laborious student. He was a hearty advocate of extempore preaching, and would have been deprived of most of his popular power in the pulpit by being confined to a manuscript; yet he knew the importance of study, and particularly of the habitual use of the pen in order to success in extemporaneous speaking. His own rule was to prepare a skeleton of his sermon, and after preaching it, write it out in fuller detail, filling up the original sketch with the principal thoughts which had occurred to him in the process of the dis-

course. The first outline was, however, in accordance with the rule we have given for extempore speaking, in a former article, viz., that the perspective of the entire discourse—the leading ideas from the exordium to the peroration—should be noted on the manuscript, so that the speaker shall have the assurance that he is supplied with a consecutive series of good ideas, good enough to command the respect of his audience, though he should fail of any very important impromptu thoughts. This rule we deem the most essential condition of success in extemporaneous preaching. It is the best guarantee of that confidence and self-possession upon which depends the command of both thought and language. Summerfield followed it even in his platform speeches. Montgomery noticed the minuteness of his preparations in nearly two hundred manuscript sketches.

He exemplified his own views respecting the use of the pen, as an aid to extempore style. Besides the large number of sermons and sketches just mentioned, filling seven post-octavo volumes, he left two considerable volumes, one "a counting-house ledger," filled with exegetical notes on the Scriptures, in such minute penmanship, and with so many abbreviations, that it is said they can scarcely be "deciphered without a glass."

A volume of his sermons and sketches of sermons has been published. They afford no criterion of the transcendent power of the preacher. The "skeletons" contained in this volume illustrate, however, his pulpit style; to such as heard him often they must recall the image and indescribable manner of the preacher, his facility of thought, his colloquial and abrupt style, the fervent variability of his feelings. They may be taken also as specimens of his outline preparations. Not only are the leading thoughts noted, but abundance of illustrative details also. The pithy Scripture allusions with which they abound are characteristic of his discourses; his own diction was sententiously Saxon, but its terseness and simple beauty were continually enhanced by remarkably apt Biblical phrases. His style was a mosaic of pertinent and beautiful texts. The quotation of a single word would sometimes terminate a climax with brilliant effect, or conclude an illustration with epigrammatic significance.

There was one respect in which Summerfield was a model for all public speakers, viz., in the case, as we have described it, with which he undertook his pulpit tasks. Doubtless he felt the usual anxieties of preparation, in the study; but having made his preparations, and committed them and himself to God in prayer, he seemed to enter upon his public duties disburdened of all care. There was no elaborate effort of thought or language—no fluttering after lofty flights. If, as we have said, preparation is the most essential con-

dition of success in extempore discourse, this facility, this self-possession, the result of preparation and of the absence of all egotistical aims, is assuredly the second. It may be affirmed that failure is next to impossible to him who acquires it as a habit. Who that has a suitable supply of thoughts, on a given subject, would expect to fail of an easy communication of them in his family circle, at the fire-side? The right language will come to him "of itself," and the right modulation, and, if the subject demands it, pathos, solemnity, or denunciation. How naturally does he assume the appropriate expression both of voice and gesture! Why can we not have equal facility in the pulpit? Mostly because of the restraints which our powers suffer from our egotistical anxieties, our attempts to do something great. Simplicity is an element of all true greatness. He that would be successful, especially in public speaking, should study his subject till, as we have above said, he feels that he has provided lessons which his hearers will respect, and then, unanxious about himself, simply intent on the task before him, enter directly and calmly into it. He will soon lose himself in his subject; language better than he could ever have elaborated in the study, will flow from his lips; his sincere and self-possessed spirit will be susceptible to the pathos, the severity, or the dignity which the different phases of his theme inspire; a natural and therefore beautiful compatibility will usually exist between his subject and his own mood, and not unfrequently the latter will be exalted by the former to the loftiest elevations of thought. This we again affirm was Summerfield's great pulpit characteristic.

What would have been the effect of years on the eloquence of Summerfield? The question occurs to us very naturally, and is a curious one at least. We so spontaneously associate his juvenile delicacy and beauty with the impression of his preaching, that we can hardly conceive of him as the same man, in middle life or old age. He was but about twenty years old when he began to preach, but twenty-three when he arrived in America, and only twenty-seven when he died. His personal appearance first excited the anxiety of the hearer, next won his sympathy, until he discovered in it at last, by the contrast of his mature and resplendent ability, only an additional reason for wonder and admiration. The circumstances under which his second appearance in public, after his arrival in this country, took place, very happily concurred to enhance this advantage. It was on the anniversary platform of the American Bible Society. A masterly address had just been pronounced by an eminent clergyman; murmurs of applause were audible in the assembly. Dr. Bethune, who was present, says:—

"The chair announced the Rev. Mr. Summerfield, from England.—'What presumption!' said my clerical neighbour; 'a boy like that to be set up, after a giant!' But the stripling came in the name of the God of Israel, armed with 'a few smooth stones from the brook' that flows 'hard by the oracles of God.' His motion was one of thanks to the officers of the society for their labours during the year; and of course he had to allude to the president, then reposing in another part of the house; and thus he did it:—'When I saw that venerable man, too aged to warrant the hope of being with you at another anniversary, *he reminded me of Jacob leaning upon the top of his staff, blessing his children before he departed.*' He then passed on to encourage the society by the example of the British Institution. 'When we first launched our untried vessel upon the deep, the storms of opposition roared, and the waves dashed angrily around us, and we had hard work to keep her head to the wind. We were faint with rowing, and our strength would soon have been gone, but we cried, "Lord, save us, or we perish!" *When a light shone upon the waters, and we saw a form walking upon the troubled sea, like unto that of the Son of God, and he drew near the ship, and we knew that it was Jesus; and he stepped upon the deck, and laid his hand on the helm, and he said unto the winds and the waves, Peace, be still, and there was a great calm.* Let not the friends of the Bible fear; God is in the midst of us. God shall help us, and that right early.' In such a strain he went on to the close. 'Wonderful! wonderful!' said my neighbour the critic; 'he talks like an angel from heaven.'"

"He talked like an angel," not merely because his thoughts were excellent, but because the visible man, clothed with physical delicacy and youthfulness, and glowing with moral beauty, seemed an embodiment of your ideal of an angelic apparition. Riper years would doubtless have modified this peculiar charm of his youthfulness; but we doubt that they could have marred the effect of his eloquence; we doubt it, for the good reason that his oratory was perfectly natural. Being natural it would have been permanent as his nature, taking new hues from the changes of life, but only such as being congenial with those changes would render it congruous with them—would sustain his beautiful naturalness. We suppose, therefore, that if Summerfield's eloquence had lost some of its juvenile traits in maturer years, it would have gained in riper and richer qualities, as good wine gains in zest, though it loses in sweetness by age. Emanating as it did from the very nature of the man, we can imagine it to have retained its essential charm uninjured though varied even in old age; and if John Summerfield had lived to hoary years, we can conceive of him only as the St. John of his day—the beloved disciple, who still saw the visions of God, and upon whose lips, as was said of Plato, bees from the flowers had shed their honey.

In private life Summerfield was, if possible, still more interesting than in the pulpit. He was fertile in conversation. He had a flowing but delicate humour, quite Addisonian in its character, always appropriate but never sarcastic. His extraordinary memory rendered him familiar with the names of all who were introduced to him, even children and servants—he seldom or never forgot them. Above all,

he had the happy faculty of introducing into all circles appropriate subjects of religious conversation. There was no cant about him, no overweening endeavour to impress the eager groups around him with a sense of his clerical scrupulousness, but an unaffected respectfulness, a confiding courtesy, which conciliated the listener and compelled him to look upon any devout remark as happily congruous to the occasion, and even felicitously befitting to the man.

An incurable malady reminded him that he must work while the day lasteth, for the night cometh. He was incessant in his labours, preaching often from five to ten discourses a week. Besides frequent addresses in which he was remarkably happy, he delivered about four hundred sermons in the first year and a half of his ministry. Throughout his brief but laborious career he bore about with him that "morbid feeling," of which Montgomery speaks, and which seems indeed a usual pathological accompaniment of genius.* His conversion was clear and decided, yet in his subsequent religious experience he was subject to severe inward conflicts, and Holland has justly remarked that "the light of spiritual illumination in *him* (whatever may have been the case in *others*) did not *uninterruptedly* shine 'brighter and brighter unto the perfect day;' but clouds and darkness frequently intercepted the rays of that Sun of righteousness which had so evidently arisen on his soul. Indeed, the Lord seems to have led his servant, not with the shadow by day, and the glory by night, of the pillar of cloud and fire, but *alternately*, amidst perpetual natural gloom, presenting to him the light of the flame that cheered the Israelites on the verge of the Red Sea, and the darkness behind that frowned upon the Egyptians their pursuers. But God who is 'love,' was equally present to him in the splendour and the terror—in the hidings as in the revealings of his face—and by that mysterious dispensation, we cannot doubt, led him, as the best mode of guidance, through the sea and the wilderness, over Jordan to Canaan and Jerusalem which is above."

This was his discipline—he needed it amidst the perilous flatteries of his success. It was probably one of the most effectual causes of that profound humility which was at once the protection and the charm of his saintly character. Could we read the inmost history of most of the mighty men of God in the earth, we should find that they have been summoned by him, to confront, like Moses, the fiery terrors of Sinai, or like Daniel, to call upon him from the lions' den, or like Paul, to bear with them to the grave the thorn in the flesh.

The youthful hero, wounded in the well-sustained conflict, retired at last to his tent to die. "*Well—yes—well—all is well.*" "I

* "Genius," says Heyne, the German, "is a disease, as the pearl is in the oyster."

want a *change*—a *change of form*—a change of every thing," he said feebly as the last struggle approached. "Al—though—sin—has—entered:" but his utterance failed in the quotation. Night came on; with increased energy he exclaimed, "All's perfection!" "*Good-night!*" were his *last words.*

GEORGE G. COOKMAN disappeared from our midst by a terrible disaster in the prime of his manhood, and at a period in his ministerial career when the star of his fame seemed about to culminate, and attract the gaze not only of the Church but of the nation. If he had not a reputation co-extensive with that of the other characters sketched in this article, none who knew him can doubt that it would have sooner or later ranked him with some of them, and beyond others, had it not been for the premature termination of his course.

He was born in 1800, at Hull, England, and came of a good old Wesleyan stock. His father, a man of wealth and of high respectability, was a Methodist local preacher, and his early domestic education tended to form the son for the work of his life. While yet very young he gave evidence of his peculiar capabilities for public speaking, on the platform of Sunday-school and juvenile missionary anniversaries. Some of these efforts of his childhood are said to have excited extraordinary interest.

In his eighteenth year the death of a young friend left a profound religious impression upon his mind, which resulted in his conversion. When about twenty-one years old he visited this country, on business for his father, and while at Schenectady, N. Y., received the impression that it was his duty to devote his life to the Christian ministry. He began there, we believe, his labours as a local preacher. In 1821 he returned to Hull, and entered into business with his father, exercising his talents meanwhile zealously in the Wesleyan local ministry. He continued in his father's firm during four years, but with a restless spirit; his ardent heart panted for entire devotion to Christian labours. So profound was his conviction of duty in this respect that it visibly affected him; and his father, prizing him with an Englishman's regard, as his eldest son, and the representative of his family, but perceiving that he "*must go*," gave him up, and bade him depart with God's blessing. Having witnessed the heroic labours and triumphs of the Methodist preachers on this continent, he resolved to join them, and forthwith took passage for Philadelphia. After labouring a few months in that city, as a local preacher, he was received into the Philadelphia Conference in 1826. He continued in the itinerant ranks, without intermission, the remainder of his life, labouring with indomitable energy, and

constantly increasing ability and success, in various parts of Pennsylvania, New-Jersey, Maryland, and the District of Columbia.

Mr. Cookman was slight, but sinewy in person, and capable of great endurance. His arms were long, and gave a striking peculiarity to his gestures. His eye was keen and brilliant, his craniological development good, but not remarkable, and his lean features were galvanic with an energy which, Englishman though he was, never allowed any obese accumulations to form beneath them. He had too much soul to admit of fatness; frown not, ye Falstaff captains in the armies of Israel! "Would he were fatter," said Cæsar of Cassius,—but Cæsar himself was lean, and he feared the leanness of Cassius, because it had meaning in it,—"he thinks too much." Cookman's agile movements scouted with defiance the morbid monster, and kept it ever in distant abeyance. Every nerve and muscle of his lithe frame seemed instinct with the excitement of his subject; even the foot often had its energetic gesture, and he took no little perambulatory range when the limits of the desk or platform allowed it. The latter was his favourite place; never did popular orator revel more in the licensed liberties of the platform. All his powers were brought out there, and lavished upon the occasion with absolute prodigality,—strong argumentation, dazzling imagery, satire, pathos, wit,—holding his hearers in a spell of close, clear thought, shaking them with resistless strokes of humour, melting them instanter into tears, or, by some energetic or heroic thought, throwing the whole assembly into tumultuous agitation, and provoking from it irrepressible responses. If at such times his manner tended to boisterousness it seemed compatible with the scene: it is not the zephyr but the mighty rushing wind that shakes and bends the forest.

There was in his voice a strenuous, silvery distinctness, and even music, which enhanced much the effect of his more powerful passages. In a large house, or at a camp-meeting, where he was usually the hero of the field, he could send its pealing notes, with thrilling effect, to the remotest hearer. The hall of representatives at Washington never echoed more eloquent tones, or more eloquent thoughts, than when he occupied its rostrum during his chaplaincy to Congress. He was peculiarly successful in these congressional ministrations. Notwithstanding the vast variety of character and prejudice concentrated at the national metropolis, during the legislative sessions, he was a universal favourite. All men about him felt that whether in the humble Methodist pulpit, or amidst the magnificence of the national capitol, he was *himself;* and men will generally, if not always, wave their personal prejudices in the pre-

sence of talent which stands forth before them in its simple genuineness, while few things can more effectually defeat real ability than attempts to exaggerate it by dissembling artifices. The trickery is not only morally ugly by its disingenuousness; but the popular sagacity, much keener than is commonly supposed, quickly perceives it, and takes an egotistical but honest pride in defying it. Mr. Cookman's sermons before Congress were thoroughly prepared; they were often truly great, but directly to the purpose, and stamped throughout with the honest, earnest individuality of the man. There was much of special adaptation in them. He was always apt in seizing on casual events for the illustration or enforcement of his subjects; but his congressional discourses were peculiarly distinguished by the success with which he availed himself of the exciting incidents of the place and season. These discourses had also a deep moral effect as well as oratorical interest. Several of his distinguished hearers, both in Congress and the executive department of the government, were awakened to a personal interest in religion by his powerful appeals.

He was characterized by a sort of chivalry, a martial predilection, which gave him real bravery, and combative promptness and energy. This was one of the strongest elements of his nature. The military events which stirred all Europe during his youth, doubtless had an influence on his forming character. It was affected by even an earlier influence, probably. "Mind is from the mother," says Isaac Taylor, and the characters of great men, especially, begin to form under the impressions of the maternal mind (let her that readeth understand) before their birth. The martial clangour that resounded among the continental States, and filled all the homes of England with loyal heroism, at the end of the last century, had possibly an effect on the *morale* of Cookman. Be this as it may, there was a military fire in him which nothing could extinguish, and which, sanctified by religion, gave an heroic and invincible power to his ministrations. It influenced his imagery and his very language. It revealed itself in his sermons, in his exhortations, his very prayers, and most especially in his platform addresses. The first of the latter that we open upon in his published "Speeches"* is an example. It marshals the different evangelical sects of the country into a general missionary conflict, and is full of chivalric spirit. His martial temper rendered his assaults on error formidably vigorous. He liked right well a manful encounter, and relished, with epicurean

* Speeches delivered on various occasions by Rev. George G. Cookman, of the Baltimore Annual Conference, and Chaplain of the Senate of the United States. New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 200 Mulberry-street.

zest, a pungent sarcasm, or a humorous thrust, that scattered in dismay sophistry or sceptical conceit.

He had good sense, and a good amount of it; but his imagination was his dominant faculty. It furnished him incessantly with brilliant illustrations. Besides the minute beauties with which it interspersed his ordinary discourses, it sometimes led him into allegories which might have entertained the dreams of old John Bunyan. The martial Bible-Society address at New-Brunswick, in 1828, to which we have referred; the mission ship, in his famous Baltimore-Conference speech of 1829; the widow and her daughters, in his American Sunday-School Union speech of 1831; and the personification of liberalism, (the prodigal son of the "Spy Bigotry,") in his New-York Sunday-school address of 1832, are examples. It can hardly be doubted that had he devoted himself to the production of some work in this rare and difficult department of literature, he might have become a worthy disciple of the glorious old dreamer of Bedford jail. This allegorizing mood, however, befits the poet better than the orator.

In his private life Mr. Cookman had many attractions. His piety was deep, and he was always ready for any good word or work; but his religion never interfered with his enjoyment of life. He relished good fellowship, enlivening conversation, and the entertainment of books. He adhered through life, we believe, to the primitive Methodist costume; it was not the most graceful for his lank person, but under this Quaker-like external primness he carried a large and generous heart—a heart which seemed ever juvenile in the freshness of its sentiments and the ardour of its aspirations.

On the 11th of March, 1841, he embarked in the ill-fated steamer, President, and was never heard of more.

Henry B. Bascom maintained an extraordinary reputation, as a preacher, down to the last year of his life. He entered the itinerant ministry in 1814, when yet in his teens. During fourteen years he pursued its laborious duties in various parts of the West, and through the next twenty years occupied honourable positions in our literary institutions, either as President or Professor. He was at last elevated to the Episcopal office in the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, but presided in only one annual conference, on his return from which he was stricken down by death, in the very maturity of his life and his promotion.

In person he was one of the noblest of men—substantially built, well proportioned, with full and manly features, a complexion of English ruddiness, and a highly intellectual cerebral development.

His medallion likeness, in plaster, by Messrs. Fowler, New-York, accurately as well as elegantly executed, is one of the finest examples of manly beauty extant. His voice was commanding, remarkably orotund, and even melodious, till affected by habitual snuff-taking.

The candid critic must find it difficult to delineate well his pulpit character. His *manner* in the desk was conformed to the rules of the oratorical art—strictly so. This fact secured him from the irregular violence of voice and gesture to which his impetuous feelings naturally tended, but at the same time rendered his manner factitious and elaborate, especially in passages of studied beauty, where the attempt at effect, however laudable, became too manifest. This was in fine a characteristic of Dr. Bascom's eloquence throughout; devoted as he was to the art, he did not attain that perfection in it by which its labour is concealed or rather superseded. "Nature," some one has said, "is the highest art," and to get clear of our factitious habits and become æsthetically true to nature, in anything, is perfection. Powerful as were some of Dr. Bascom's efforts, the intelligent hearer could hardly divest himself of the consciousness that he was listening to a proposed example of declamation, and he found his mind spontaneously holding his heart in abeyance, that the former might sit in critical judgment upon the performance, admiring or condemning it. While this was the case with severer minds, the multitude hung upon his discourse usually with more of wonder than of any other emotion. We say *usually*, for there were occasions in which his own excited emotions bore down all criticism, and swept along in a tumultuous current the feelings of high and low. At these times, in spite of his hyperbolic imagery and language, his noble voice assumed its fullest music, and fell into a slight *recitative*, which seemed no fault, but actually enhanced its effect. Some of the ancient writers on oratory speak of this manner as an excellence not uncommon in the classic eloquence. If we are not mistaken, Cicero somewhere alludes to it favourably. It may be founded in nature, in a tendency of the sensibilities, when intensely excited, to express themselves in ecstatic and musical tones, analogous to their tendency under such excitement to poetic measures in language. We find it still extant among the Quakers, and other sects, though in great exaggeration.

Dr. Bascom's intellect presented a singular combination of excellencies and defects. The poet and the dialectician were so mixed in him as not to allow of a distinct development of either, but produced, in his mental operations, such an habitual interplay of the logical and poetical powers as often to confound each other. A severe

critic would, we think, usually retire from his preaching, puzzled to discriminate the intrinsic thought and the overlaying imagery of the discourse, and yet compelled to acknowledge that there was a marvellous exhibition of both. He had little or no fancy, but an august imagination. Contrary to the wont of imaginative minds, he seemed always inclined to discuss subjects which admitted of elaborate argumentation; yet in conducting his argument he could not proceed with the measured pace of the logician, but must move with the flight of an archangel. Should the hearer divest himself entirely of the propensities of the critic, and give himself up to the poetry of the discourse, he would find himself more satisfied than if, on the contrary, he should sit in judgment on the process of thought alone, or attempt to comprehend both.

The poetic element was, we think, his chief distinction. The strict art with which he studied oratory was not, however, equally applied here; his imagination was often excessive. It lingered not among Hervey's "Reflections in a Flower Garden," but aspiring to a loftier flight, plumed itself among his "Starry Heavens." Many of these flights showed a Miltonian grandeur, but they were oftener exaggerated, and habitually too frequent. Some of his discourses seemed almost, from beginning to end, a series of elaborated figures, "chained lightning," and sometimes, perhaps, owed, like the latter, much of their apparent splendour to the surrounding obscurity. Jupiter, at the request of Semele, came to her arrayed in the thunders and lightnings of the god, but she was consumed at his approach; the plain good sense of popular assemblies is often baffled and confounded by displays of oratorical poetry, and, let us confess it, more so in the sanctuary than anywhere else.

Dr. Bascom was self-educated—a means of peculiar advantage to some minds, but to an exuberantly fertile one, like his, the occasion of a lax discipline and distorted growth. He emigrated early to the West; among its vast rivers, prairies, and mountain ranges, he studied the revelations of nature, and his mental character revealed the impression which those grand scenes made upon him. Whatever other defects he had he showed no effeminacy, no dilution of thought. His ideas were robust, his imagery rugged though luxuriant—all his conceptions seemed naturally to take a character of magnitude, if not magnificence, like that of the scenery with which he was conversant. His literary studies, pursued alone, and in his ministerial travels, could not compete with the influence of the grand associations which surrounded him. The latter formed his intellectual character; the former, though pursued assiduously, failed of

their usual chastening effect, so far at least as his pulpit efforts were concerned; and to the last year of his life his preaching retained its original characteristics, though its delivery was somewhat moderated by the use of manuscripts in the desk—an expedient very unwisely recommended by his medical advisers as a relief to a chronic inflammation of the throat.*

He had little of the ease and self-possession which we have recommended. He evidently entered the pulpit bowed under the burden of his task, and his discourse throughout was apparently an extreme effort. It was not unusual for him to spend most of Saturday night in walking his chamber floor, anxiously conning the next day's sermon. Such elaborate attempts often defeat themselves, and Mr. Bascom's failures were not unfrequent. His sermons seemed invariably delivered memoriter, though usually long enough to occupy two hours; if he did not purposely commit them to memory, yet their frequent repetition fixed in his mind their language as well as their train of thought. They were evidently prepared with the utmost labour. The paragraphs seemed often to be separate but resplendent masses of thought, written at intervals, and without very close relations. This defect added to the obscurity of the discourse as a whole, breaking up its continuity in the mind of the hearer. The elaborateness of his mental processes extended even to his language; it had something of the Latin pomp of Johnson, with the *bizarre* complexity of Carlyle, and often, as a consequence, presented sentences of striking peculiarity and force, notwithstanding its general defectiveness. He frequently coined words, or gave them new applications; the latter, however, were usually traceable to some subtle etymological authority, and sometimes were marked by beauty and pertinence. His published sermons will not endure; they have not come under the attention of the higher class of critics, and would not, we think, be passable at their bar. Some of his other productions, in which his poetical propensities had no room to play, show that if his education had been such as to effectually discipline his imagination, his real ability would have been greatly enhanced. His most important writings, besides those prepared for the pulpit, are his "Bill of Rights," written on behalf of the "reform" movement of 1828; the "Protest of the Minority," in the memorable General Conference of 1844; the "Report on Organization," at the formation of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South; and a subsequent elaborate volume in defence of the Southern Church, entitled "Methodism and Slavery."

* We believe that extemporizers suffer much less than sermon-readers from this ailment—and there are obvious reasons why this should be the case.

In social life Dr. Bascom was not readily appreciated, except by his familiar friends. To others he was taciturn or abrupt, and apparently frigid. There was about him that uneasiness which so often accompanies men of rare powers and marked individuality—the morbid effect usually, the honourable but not often honoured wounds of hard-fought inward conflicts. He suffered no little misconstruction in this respect, in addition to the suffering which the conscious defect itself inflicted. When Sir Humphrey Davy, by the special permission of Napoleon, visited Paris, at a time when the country was closed to Englishmen, he was conducted by the French savans with great courtesy and eclat to the principal scientific resorts of the city; but no sooner had he left it than a torrent of abuse overtook him for his "English hauteur"—the stolid pride with which he appeared to receive the attentions of the learned Parisians. His biographer explains the case. It was not pride but its direct opposite that affected the great English philosopher. His constitutional diffidence—not an uncommon trait of the highest and purest style of mind—embarrassed him so much that he knew not how to receive the polite attentions showered upon him; and while he was publicly condemned for his pride, he was secretly agonized by his self-depreciation. Dr. Bascom was an example of the same weakness, or virtue, as some would call it. To those who enjoyed his intimate acquaintance he revealed a nature full of generous frankness and cordiality. "To such," says one of his Southern brethren, "he was as simple as a child, open to suggestion and counsel, amiable and lovely as a friend."* "A warmer heart, and more noble feelings," says Bishop Andrew, "beat not in the bosom of mortal; there was a spring of kindest affection there which never run dry."

He died at Louisville, Kentucky, surrounded by old and endeared friends, on the 8th of September, 1850. When asked if his spirit was sustained in the final conflict by the grace which he had preached to others, his reply was, "Yes, yes, yes!"

Notwithstanding any critical detractions from the popular estimate of his intellectual character, those who have heard him in his successful efforts will remember the occasion as a privilege, an exhibition of magnificent mind—magnificent, though, like the grandeur of the mountain, made up of broken outlines, rough cliffs, dark ravines below and sunlit effulgence above.

We pass to another name which has become a synonyme among us for almost every trait of mental symmetry and moral beauty—WILBUR FISK. He also, like Cookman, came of a primitive Methodist stock,

* Dr. Wightman, Southern Christian Advocate.

and a strong ingredient of New-England Puritanism did not mar the composition of his noble nature. He began his ministry in 1818, when about twenty-six years of age. His pastoral labours extended through eight years; the remainder of his life, including some fourteen years, was spent in literary institutions of the Church. He may be pronounced the founder of the educational provisions of New-England Methodism—provisions which we believe are now more complete than in any other section of the Church, comprising a well-related series of one or more independent academies for each conference, and a university and theological school for them jointly. Dr. Fisk saw the absolute necessity of such institutions for Methodism, especially in the Eastern States, where the whole people were educated, and where education could not well be divested of sectarian influences, except in its most elementary forms. His successful plans have rescued the youth of the Church from the proselytism of other sects. They have already made a visible, an almost universal, impression on the character of New-England Methodism, especially of its ministers, a very large proportion of whom have spent more or less time in preparatory studies in its seminaries.

Wilbur Fisk's person bespoke his character. It was of good size, and remarkable for its symmetry. His features were beautifully harmonious, the contour strongly resembling the better Roman outline, though lacking its most peculiar distinction, the *nasus aquilinus*. His eye was nicely defined, and when excited beamed with a peculiarly benign and conciliatory expression. His complexion was bilious, and added to the diseased indication of his somewhat attenuated features. His head was a model not of great but of well-proportioned development. It had the height of the Roman brow, though none of the breadth of the Greek. The two portraits of him which have been given in this work recall his appearance well enough to those who were familiar with it, but can hardly afford an accurate impression to such as never saw him. The first of them, presenting him in the primitive ministerial costume of the Church, (which he doffed, we believe, in later years,) has too much of the languor of disease: there is an aspect of debility, if not decay, about it which did not belong to the original, notwithstanding his habitual ill-health. It is preferred, however, by many of his friends, to the second engraving—an English production, marked by ideal and somewhat pompous exaggerations, and not a little of that exquisite and unnatural nicety with which our English brethren are flattered in their published portraits. There is a bust of him extant; but it is not to be looked at by any who would not mar in their memories the beautiful and benign image of his earlier manhood by the dis-

figurations of disease and suffering. His voice was peculiarly flexible and sonorous: a catarrhal disease affected it; but just enough, during most of his life, to improve its tone to a soft orotund, without a trace of nasal defect. It rendered him a charming singer, and was an instrument of music to him in the pulpit. Without appearing to use it designedly for vocal effect, it was nevertheless an important means of impression to his sermons. Few men could indicate the moral emotions more effectually by mere tones. It was especially expressive in pathetic passages.

His pulpit manner was marked in the introduction of the sermon by dignity, but dignity without ceremony or pretension. As he advanced into the exposition and argument of his discourse, (and there were both in most of his sermons,) he became more emphatic, especially as brilliant though brief illustrations, ever and anon, gleamed upon his logic. By the time he had reached the peroration his utterance became rapid, his thoughts were incandescent, the music of his voice rung out in thrilling tones, and sometimes even quivered with trills of pathos. No imaginative excitement prevailed in the audience as under Maffitt's eloquence, no tumultuous wonder as under Bascom's, none of Cookman's impetuous passion, or Olin's overwhelming power, but a subduing, almost tranquil spell, of genial feeling, expressed often by tears or half-suppressed ejaculations; something of the kindly effect of Summerfield combined with a higher intellectual impression.

We cannot claim for Dr. Fisk genius, nor the very highest order of mind. Good vigour in all his faculties, and good balance of them all, were his chief intellectual characteristics. His literary acquisitions were not great. The American collegiate course in his day was stinted; after his graduation he was too busy to study much, and he was not a great reader. His resources were chiefly in himself—in his good sense, his quick sagacity, his generous sensibilities, and his healthy and fertile imagination. He possessed the latter power richly, though it never run riot in his discourses. It was a powerful auxiliary to his logic—an exemplification of Dugald Stewart's remark on the intimate relation between the imagination and the reasoning faculty in a well-balanced mind. Its scintillations were the sparkles that flew about the anvil on which his logic plied its strokes.

His sermons, if examined in print, would pass for good but "second-rate" productions, that is to say, they would rank below those of Chalmers, Channing, Robert Hall, or Olin; but if heard from his own lips in the pulpit, the hearer—even the educated and critical hearer—inspired with the preacher's manner and sensibility,

would be disposed to assign them to the "first-rate" class. His style, not being formed from books, was the natural expression of his vigorous and nicely-balanced mind; it was therefore remarkable for its simplicity and terseness, its Saxon purity and energy. You cannot find a meretricious sentence in all his published writings.

He was not a metaphysician nor a dialectician, and yet by natural disposition he was a polemic. This was a marked propensity of his mind; it was never abused into gladiatorship in the pulpit, but inclined him almost incessantly to theological discussion out of it. A jealous regard for the truth doubtless prompted this disposition; but we think it had a deeper foundation—that it was founded in his mental constitution. His polemical writings were not only in good temper, but examples of luminous and forcible argumentation. The sermon on Calvinism may be referred to as a specimen. That discourse, with his sermon and lectures on Universalism, his essays on the New-Haven Divinity, his discourse on the Law and the Gospel, his tract in reply to Pierrepont on the Atonement, &c., would form a volume which the Church might recognise as no ignoble memorial of both his intellectual and moral character. His travels in Europe, though containing some examples of elaborate reflection and picturesque description, was not a volume of superior claims—it had too much of the ordinary guide-book character.

That very significant and convenient word, *tact*, expresses a quality which Wilbur Fisk possessed in a rare degree. He was uncommonly sagacious in perceiving, and prompt in seizing, the practical advantages of his position, whatever it might be; hence his adroitness in controversy, the success of his platform addresses, his almost certain triumphs in conference debates, and the skill of his public practical schemes—excepting always those which were *financial*, in which respect, we think, he signally failed, a defect quite usual with men of genius, but not with men of his mental characteristics.

His moral character was perfect as that of any man whom it has been our happiness to know. His intimate friends will admit that there is hardly a possibility of speaking too favourably of him in this respect. After some years spent in personal relations with him, we are literally at a loss to mention one moral defect that marred the perfect beauty of his nature. We are aware that this is saying very much, that it is saying what cannot be said of one man perhaps in a million, but we deliberately say it of this saintly man. Serene, cheerful, utterly exempt from selfishness, pride, and vanity, tender yet manly in his sensibilities, confiding in his friendships, entertaining hopeful views of Divine Providence and the destiny of man, maintaining the purest and yet the most unelaborate piety—a piety that

appeared to believe and enjoy and do all things good, and yet to "be careful for nothing"—he seemed to combine the distinctive charms that endear to us the beautiful characters of Fenelon and Channing, Edwards and Fletcher of Madeley. His humility was profound, and surrounded him with an aureola of moral loveliness. It was not a burden of penance under which the soul heaved with self-cherished agony, still less was it a "voluntary humility"—an assumed, an affected self-abasement; but it seemed the spontaneous kindly and tender demeanour of his soul, it mingled with the cheerful play of his features, and gave a sweet suavity to his very tones. It was his rare moral character, more even than his intellectual eminence, that gave him such magic influence over other minds, and rendered him so successful in the government of literary institutions. All about him felt a sort of self-respect in respecting him; to offend him was a self-infliction which even the audacity of reckless youth could not brook.

Fisk lived for many years in the faith and exemplification of St. Paul's sublime doctrine of Christian perfection. He prized that great tenet as one of the most important distinctions of Christianity. His own experience respecting it was marked by signal circumstances, and from the day that he practically adopted it till he triumphed over death, its impress was radiant on his daily life. With John Wesley he deemed this important truth—promulgated, in any very express form, almost solely by Methodism in these days—to be one of the most solemn responsibilities of his Church, the most potent element in the experimental divinity of the Scriptures.* In his earlier religious history he had felt the influence of those temptations which have betrayed so many young men from our ministry into other communions, where better worldly auspices rather than better means of self-development or usefulness were to be found; but when he received the baptism of this great grace, his purified heart could not sufficiently utter its thankfulness that he had been

* Isaac Taylor, in his late work on Methodism, repels this doctrine as refuted by every man's consciousness. Knox, in a letter to Bishop Webb, says, "Their view of Christian perfection is, in my mind, so essentially right and important, that it is on this account particularly I value them above other denominations of that sort. I am aware that ignorant individuals expose what is in itself true by their unfounded pretensions and irrational descriptions; but with the sincerest disapproval of every such excess, I do esteem John Wesley's stand for holiness to be that which does immortal honour to his name. * * * In John Wesley's views of Christian perfection are combined, in substance, all the sublime morality of the Greek fathers, the spirituality of the mystics, and the divine philosophy of our favourite Platonists. Macarius, Fenelon, Lucas, and all of their respective classes, have been consulted and digested by him, and his ideas are essentially theirs. *Thirty Years' Correspondence. Letter XIX.*

providentially kept within the pale of a Church which clearly taught this pre-eminent doctrine. This alone was a denominational distinction sufficiently important and sublime to be set off against any drawback that Methodism might present. In a letter to a brother clergyman, he expressed, with overflowing feelings, his renewed love of the Church. "I thank God," he said, "that I ever saw this day. I love our Church better than ever. How glad am I that I never left it." There are two periods at which a Methodist assuredly feels no regret for his connexion with the denomination—when he learns by experience what is the meaning of its instructions respecting Christian perfection, and when death dismisses him from its communion to the Church triumphant.

On the 22d of February, 1839, in the forty-eighth year of his age, Wilbur Fisk received that dismission. His chamber had been for days sanctified as it were by the glory of the Divine Presence, and his broken utterances were full of consolation, and triumph over death. "Glorious hope!" was the last and whispered expression of his religious feelings.

STEPHEN OLIN stands forth with commanding prominence and an imperial mien, among the princes of our Israel. A brief biographical and characteristic sketch of this truly great man was given in our October number; at the risk of repeating what was there said of him, and has within the last year been abundantly said elsewhere, we here introduce his name again. His omission from our present list would be unpardonable, for he was a shining light, a full orb—if not the most notable, yet the most intrinsically great man, take him "all in all," that American Methodism has produced. So manifest and commanding were his traits, that this pre-eminence can be awarded him without the slightest invidiousness.

His character—moral, social and intellectual—was, throughout, of the noblest style. In the first respect he was pre-eminent for the two chief virtues of true religion—charity, and humility. With thorough theological orthodoxy he combined a practical liberalism which we fear most orthodox polemics would pronounce dangerous. There was not an atom of bigotry in all the vast soul of this rare man. Meanwhile, it could be said of him as Rowland Hill said of Chalmers, "The most astonishing thing about him was his humility." He was the best example we have known of that childlike simplicity which Christ taught as essential to those who would enter the kingdom of heaven, and Bacon declared to be equally necessary to "those who would enter into the kingdom of knowledge." Like Fisk, he was a personal example of St. Paul's doctrine of "Christian

perfection" as expounded by Wesley. Respecting the Methodistic hypothesis of that doctrine he at first entertained doubts; but as he advanced in life, and especially under the chastening influence of affliction, it became developed in his own experience. "I sunk into it," he remarked to the writer, in substance. "My children, my wife, my health, my entire prospect on earth, all were gone—God only remained; I lost myself as it were in him, I was hid in him with Christ—and found, without any process of logic, but by an experimental demonstration, the 'perfect love that casteth out fear.'" He was never obtrusive in the avowal of this great truth, but ever ready to give, with all lowliness and meekness, a reason of the hope that was within him. The marvellous grace that imbued and, we were about to say, glorified his very greatness with unsurpassed humility, was owing, in a great measure, to his faith in this sublime idea of Christianity.

He had defects, unquestionably; but so far as they took a moral tendency, no effort of charity was requisite in order to attribute them to his continual physical infirmities. Some of our most interesting and precious personal recollections of him are connected with instances of such apparent defects. The virtues which accompanied them seemed rather to gain than lose by the contrast, as precious gems are beautified by their inferior settings.

His social character was beautiful. If he could not indulge the *persiflage*—the sheer inanities which inferior minds may deem the appropriate relaxation of social conversation—yet was he ever ready, for not merely the cheerful remark, but the exhilarating pleasantry: his familiar friends will never forget this charming trait. Nor were these buoyant intervals rare or brief. Frequently through a prolonged but always fitting conversation, would this play of sunshine illuminate his presence, and with it would intermix, congruously, often most felicitously, the radiant play of thought or the happy expression of Christian sensibility—never, however, the meaningless twaddle of weakness. A truer and more forbearing friend could not be found. His domestic affections were warm, and the circle of his family was a sanctuary full of hallowed sympathies and enjoyments.

It would require a more capable hand than ours to estimate his intellectual dimensions. His scholarship was, we think, more exact and thorough within his professional sphere, than varied or comprehensive beyond that limit. We speak of *scholarship* as distinguished from general information. At his graduation he was considered the "ripest scholar" who had been examined in his college. He was conservative in his views of classical education, and very decidedly

opposed to the "modernized" system of training attempted and abandoned at Harvard, and now experimenting at Brown University. A high and finished classical discipline was his ideal for the college over which he presided; and that institution has sent out, under his superintendence, as thorough students as have honoured the education of the land.

While he was a genuine scholar within his appropriate sphere, he possessed also a large range of general intelligence, though, as we have said, without that devotion to any favourite department of extra-professional knowledge, which often relieves and adorns the professional life of studious men by becoming a healthful and liberalizing counterpart to their stated routines of thought. We are not aware that he was addicted to the national literature of any one modern people, to the speculative philosophies which with so much fallacy have also developed so much mental vigour and splendour in the continental intellect of Europe, or to any one department of the elegant literature of our own language. We know not that he had more than a casual acquaintance with these, derived mostly from Reviews. With the current history of the world in politics, science, and especially religion, he had, however, more than the usual familiarity; a remarkable memory, tenacious of even statistics and names, doubtless gave him in this respect an advantage over most intellectual men.

The *original* powers of his mind were, however, his great distinction. And these, like his person, were all colossal—grasp, strength, with the dignity which usually attends it, a comprehensive faculty of generalization, which felt independent of details, but presented in overwhelming logic grand summaries of thought. This comprehensiveness, combined with energy of thought, was the chief mental characteristic of the man; under the inspiration of the pulpit it often and indeed usually became sublime, we were about to say godlike. We doubt whether any man of our generation has had more power in the pulpit than Stephen Olin; and this power was in spite of very marked oratorical defects. His manner was ungainly; his gestures quite against the elocutionary rules; his voice badly managed, and sometimes painful in its heaving utterances; but the elocutionist is not always the orator. While you saw that there was no trickery of art about Dr. Olin, you felt that a mighty, a resistless mind was struggling with yours. You were overwhelmed—your reason with argument, your heart with emotion.

When he began his discourse, your attention was immediately arrested by the dignity and sterling sense of his remarks. You perceived at once that something well worth your most careful attention

was coming. Paragraph after paragraph of massive thought was thrown off, each showing a gradually increasing glow of the sensibility as well as the mental force of the speaker. By the time he had fairly entered into the argument of the sermon, you were led captive by his power; but it would be difficult to say which most effectually subdued you, his mighty thoughts or his deep feeling. You seldom or never saw tears in his own eyes, but they flowed freely down the cheeks of his hearers. Ever and anon passages of overwhelming force were uttered, before which the whole assembly seemed to bow, not so much in admiration of the man, as in homage to the mighty truth. Such passages were usually not poetic, for he was remarkably chary of his imagery; but they were ponderous with thought—they were often stupendous conceptions, such as you would imagine a Sanhedrim of archangels might listen to uncovered of their golden crowns.

At suitable periods of the sermon, which usually occupied from an hour and a half to two hours, he would pause briefly to relieve his voice and his feelings. The mental tension of his audience could be perceived, at such times, by the general relaxation of posture, and the simultaneous, heaving respiration; but as soon as, with a peculiar, measured dignity, he resumed the lofty theme, all eyes were again fixed, all minds again absorbed.

Effective as was his preaching usually, it was not always so. His ill health sometimes spread a languor over his spirit which no resolution could throw off. We have recorded, on another occasion, an instance, which furnishes to our clerical readers too good a lesson to be omitted here. We spent a Sunday evening with him after he had failed, as he thought, in a sermon during the day. He referred to it with much good nature, and remarked that his history as a preacher had taught him to expect the blessing of God on even such efforts. He proceeded to relate an instance which occurred during his ministry in South Carolina. He preached at a camp-meeting where a Presbyterian clergyman, who was to address the next session of his synod in Charleston, heard him. The Presbyterian doctor repeated not only the text, but, substantially, the sermon before his clerical brethren, giving, however, full credit to its Methodist author. So remarkable a fact could not fail to excite great interest among the people of Charleston to hear the latter.

He at this time occupied the Methodist pulpit of that city, and the next Sunday evening his chapel was crowded with the elite of the community, including several clergymen. He preached long, and, as he thought, loudly and confusedly; in fine, he felt, at the close of the discourse, confounded with mortification. He sank, after the

benediction, into the pulpit, to conceal himself from view, till the assembly should be all gone. By-and-by he espied some eminent individuals apparently waiting in the aisle to salute him. His heart failed. Noticing a door adjacent to the pulpit he determined to escape by it. He knew not whither it led, but supposed it communicated with the next house, which had once been a parsonage, as he recollected having heard. He hastened to the door, got it open, and, stepping out, descended abruptly into a grave-yard, which extended beyond and behind the former parsonage. The night was very dark, and he stumbled about among the tombs for some time. He reached at last the wall which closed the cemetery in from the street, but found it insurmountable. Groping his way to the opposite side, he sought to reach a back street by penetrating through one of the gardens which belonged to a range of houses there. It was an awkward endeavour in the darkness, and among the graves; but at last he found a wicket-gate. He had no sooner passed through it than he was assailed by a house-dog. Having prevailed in this encounter, he pushed on and reached the street, with some very reasonable apprehensions that the neighbourhood would be alarmed by his adventures. He now threaded his way through an indirect route to his lodgings, passed unceremoniously to his chamber, and shut himself up for the night, but slept little or none, reflecting with deep chagrin on the strange conclusion of the day. On the morrow he hardly dared to venture out; but while yet in his study Mr. ——, one of the first citizens in Charleston, and a leading officer in a sister denomination, called at the house; he was admitted to the preacher's study with reluctance; but what was the astonishment of the latter to hear him say that the sermon of the preceding evening had enabled him to step into the kingdom of God, after many years of disconsolate endeavours, during which he had been a member of the Church. The same day a lady of influential family came to report the same good tidings. Other similar examples occurred that morning; and this failure was one of the most useful sermons of his ministry.

His style was somewhat diffuse and always elaborate, too much so for elegance. Johnson used to insist that his own pompous Latinism was an effect of the magnitude of his thoughts; its fantastic collocation, even in the definitions of his dictionary, stand out, however, inexorably and grotesquely against the fond conceit; the critics pronounce his verbiage a result of his early study of Sir Thomas Browne. False, in part, as was the great author's apology, it was also, in part, true. He had a magnitude, and Roman-like sturdiness of thought, which demanded capacious expression, though the demand was exaggerated, and thus became a characteristic fault, as

well as a characteristic excellence. Dr. Olin's style was affected by a similar cause, but not to such a faulty extent. The defect was perceptible in his ordinary conversation, and quite so in his extemporaneous sermons. In some of his later writings, however, like Johnson in his Lives of the Poets, he seemed to escape the excesses while he retained the excellencies of his style.

Dr. Olin was gigantic in person. His chest would have befitted a Hercules; his head was one of those which suggest to us superhuman capacity, and by which the classic sculptors symbolized the majesty of their gods. Though of a very different craniological development, it could not have been less capacious than that of the noted American premier; and, crowning a much more lofty frame, must have presented, with vigorous health, a more commanding indication. His gigantic structure was, however, during most of his life, smitten through and through with disease and enervation. The colossal head seemed too heavy to be supported, and appeared to labour to poise itself. The eye, somewhat sunken in its large socket, presented a languid expression, though relieved by a sort of religious benignity which often beamed with feeling.

This great man must be added to the long and melancholy catalogue of self-martyred students. His infirmities commenced in his college life; they were exasperated by his labours as an instructor in a Southern climate; and were the burden of his later years, almost to the exclusion of any continuous labours. During these years his usefulness was confined mostly to occasional discourses, most of which have been published; to the quiet but inestimable moral power which the mere official presence of such a man cannot fail to exert over any responsibility to which he is related; and last, but not least, to the ministration of example under circumstances of suffering and personal religious development.

He was frankly independent in his opinions, and not without what would be called strong prejudices—no uncommon accompaniment of powerful minds. He was decidedly conservative on most subjects, though early inclined to political liberalism. On the rife question of slavery he shared not the strong moral sentiment of the North, yet he lamented the institution as calamitous. The Fugitive Slave Law he deplored as a necessary evil, and was favourable to its enforcement. He inclined to stringent institutions of government in both Church and State, but at the same time deemed our own Church polity susceptible of many liberal improvements, in order to adapt it to what he considered the demands of the times. He wished to see the period of our ministerial appointments prolonged. He was especially interested in the intellectual improvement of our

ministry, and was one of the warmest friends of theological education among us; before a theological school was begun in the Church he wrote home from London, where he witnessed the experiment among the Wesleyans, a public letter, urging the subject upon the attention of the Church, and enclosing a considerable donation towards it. He believed this, indeed, to be the capital want of Methodism in our day, and never disguised the conviction amidst any prejudice to the contrary. He entertained sublime views of our missionary resources, and longed and laboured to see its energies amply brought out and applied to this great work, especially in the foreign field. The evangelization of the world he deemed an achievement quite practicable at this day to Protestant Christendom. Some of his discourses on the subject were signal efforts of intellect and eloquence. One of the best papers which it has been our privilege to give in these columns from his pen was on missions.

On the night of the 15th of August, 1851, it was our mournful privilege to stand in a small and silent circle by the death-bed of this good and great man. The Herculean frame lay helpless and heaving in the last struggle. "I hope in Christ," (pointing with his finger upward;) "most certainly, in Christ alone. I believe I shall be saved, though as by fire," were among the last utterances of the dying sufferer. Early the next morning he was no more among men.

Five of the most notable men of our denominational pulpit have thus passed in review before us—two of foreign, three of native birth. Others might be selected from the dead, and there are among the living those who will take rank with such as we have recorded.

We have endeavoured to render each sketch suggestive of its appropriate lessons, and need not prolong our article by very minute comparative remarks. Olin was unquestionably the greatest, but Fisk the most perfect man in the series. The former had both the largest and strongest intellectual grasp, the latter more versatility and practical skill. Olin had the highest, the philosophical genius; and if his health had allowed him a productive life, he would have taken rank where by the title of his genius he really belonged—among the first men of his day: Fisk had talent and tact rather than genius; he was the practical though not the technical logician in both speculation and in life. Olin had very little of the detail of practical logic, but in him the higher logic, the faculty of generalization, was predominant; it gave grandeur to his habitual conceptions, though it could not take those minute cognizances of events or truths which afforded Fisk an habitual mastery over any position in which he found himself placed, and gave more perfect proportions to the

development of his character. Cookman had neither the philosophic comprehensiveness of the one nor the practical skill of the other, but more mental alertness and energy than either. Olin could have best planned the destinies of a state; Fisk could have planned best the movements of its army; Cookman could have best executed those movements. Cookman had much of Bascom's imagination. His nature was too hardy, too Saxon, to admit of any resemblance to Summerfield. His allegorical skill was all his own. Summerfield's position in the group hardly admits of comparison. He had none of Olin's intellectual breadth, little of Fisk's tactical skill, not much more of Cookman's energetic vivacity, or of Bascom's imagination. His distinction was almost entirely one of temperament, a temperament to which was subordinated, in the happiest manner possible, all his powers of intellect and of expression. His soul was not in his head, but in his heart, if we may so speak. Never was the power of a public speaker more pure, more anomalous. It was not the power of logic proceeding from the intellect, it was not poetic power proceeding from the imagination, nor did it flow from the passions; it was a moral magnetism, a gentle suasive effluence from the inmost life of the man. His biographer, though he claims for him justly a second-rate kind of "genius," declares the "predominating" qualities of his mind to have been "*good sense* and *good taste*." Undoubtedly this was the case; but these qualities do not solve the problem of his power. There are thousands of men who have "good sense and good taste," but who have no such power. It proceeded, we repeat, from the peculiar and sanctified temperament of the man, his "intense animal feeling," as Montgomery somewhat equivocally calls it, and his "good sense and good taste" were but its regulators.

In dismissing these estimates we claim for them only the credit due to disinterested honesty. A better proof of their fidelity can hardly be given than the fact that they will be unsatisfactory to men of extreme prejudices for or against the characters sketched.

Art. VI.—M'COSH ON THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

The Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral. By Rev. James M'Cosh. New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1851. Pp. 510, 8vo.

Never have we felt a more intense desire to get hold of any book, than that which stands at the head of the present article. Several causes conspired to work in us this vehement desire. In the first place, the subject of which it treats, though interesting to but few laymen, possesses for our minds the greatest of all conceivable charms. Besides the intrinsic grandeur of the subject,—involving, as it does, every great question pertaining to the nature and destiny of man,—the fact that many of the most vigorous years of our life have been earnestly devoted to the consideration of it, has given it an additional value in our eyes, as well as an increased power of fascination over our hearts. Secondly, from the reviews we had seen of the book, we expected to find in it the results of original, independent, profound thinking, and not the mere repetition of repetitions, as is too often the case with works on the divine government. Weary of reading books on such a subject, which, to borrow from old Burton, authors had made not otherwise than apothecaries make medicines—namely, by pouring them out of one bottle into another—we hoped to regale ourselves with something as fresh and racy, as it was just and profound. Coming, as it was said to do, from one who had equalled the giant intellects of the past,—a Butler, a Cudworth, and a King,—in sounding the depths, and solving the mysteries of the universe, we were prepared to hail the work with delight, and to revel in it as in a paradise of thought. In the third place, we had written a book on the same subject ourselves, (still in manuscript;) and hence the desire to compare our own views with those of an author who had shot up into so great and so sudden a reputation, may be more easily conceived than expressed. We made haste to get the book, we devoured it with avidity, and we formed our judgment of its merits. This judgment we now propose to lay before the reader.

We do not mean our judgment of its merits in all respects. The excellence and beauty of the style, though these are unquestionably very great, are scarcely worthy of serious consideration in a work of this nature. They form a relative, not an absolute, perfection; they may seduce into error, as well as illuminate and adorn the pathway to truth. Supposing the work to be sound, supposing it to present correct views of the divine government, still we can entertain

no doubt, that the secret of its success is to be found in the elevation and beauty of its style. For such is the littleness and weakness of the human mind, that it busies itself about almost anything rather than with the transcendent glories of the divine government. Indeed, it will hardly look into these at all, unless it be led on and beguiled by "the concord of sweet sounds," or drawn forward by the powerful fascination of poetical imagery. But serviceable as these things have no doubt been to the author, we shall pass them over in silence. The only image in the book which shall engage our attention, is the image which it presents of the divine government, and the glory of God therein reflected. Its great merit, if any it have, must here be found; and here accordingly we shall seek it.

The author proposes to set before us the divine government, not in detached parts and parcels merely, but as one entire, connected, and harmonious scheme. This is very well. Indeed, nothing short of this could meet the fundamental wants of the human mind. If we would understand any complex thing, we must examine, not only the parts of which it is composed, but also all the relations which they sustain to each other, as well as to the design of the whole. We may be perfectly acquainted, for example, with the materials, the form and structure, of every wheel and chain and spring of a watch; and yet remain wholly ignorant of the nature of a watch. To grasp this idea we must go farther, and determine how all the parts of a watch stand related to each other, and how they all jointly and harmoniously co-operate to accomplish its final result—the admeasurement of time. The same is true of every other complex thing or system, of every other work of skill. It is true of the earth, of the solar system, of the entire material globe, including all the stars of heaven. It is also true of the individual man, of society, and of the entire spiritual universe.

This idea, which we find in Butler, is very happily and variously illustrated by Mr. M'Cosh. He is about to apply it to the magnificent arrangements of the divine government. Tremendous task! Yet arduous as it is, he certainly possesses one qualification for its accomplishment; for he is deeply impressed with the sublime unity of the Cosmos, the beautiful harmony of the world, the divine concourse of all things in the one grand unutterable purpose of Almighty Love. But this impression, even when most deep and earnest, must first exist as a blind instinct, or as a dark feeling but half-illuminated, before it can unfold itself, like the leaves of a flower, to the sweet dawnings of the great outer universal day, which, as yet, has fallen but in broken and refracted streams of glory upon this lower world. We must first see through a glass darkly, before we can see face to

face; we must first walk by faith, before we can be admitted to the bright vision; and hence, we must first be haunted with the dim shadows of the mighty world, flitting on all sides around us, ere we can behold the infinite unclouded splendours of that image of himself, which was by God originally stamped upon the created universe. How far this sense, this instinct, this feeling, this faith,—call it what you please,—has unfolded itself in the mind of our author, and become a steady light to reflect an image of the divine glory, we shall now proceed to examine. We shall mark, if possible, the precise point of development it has reached, and determine how far, if at all, he has left other ethical writers and philosophers behind him. In one word, we shall endeavour to determine how far, and in what respects, he has cast the clear light of reason into the depths and mysteries of the world, beyond the points at which others have left us to walk by faith, and not by sight.

The author insists, that the most perfect unity and harmony pervade the entire world of God, and its government. If this be so, (and we most cheerfully concede it,) then just in proportion as any philosophy truly and adequately represents the world, as constituted and governed by God, will it also possess a corresponding unity and harmony in itself; and, on the other hand, just in proportion as it is disfigured by incongruities and contradictions will it be unfit to represent the divine constitution and government of the world. A philosophy of "the divine government" approaches to perfection, just in proportion as it exhibits the principles of the internal make and constitution of the world in their true lights and just proportions, and in relation to the grand end towards which they are, by their mutual interworking, continually conducting the stupendous scheme of all things. A philosophy which should set things before us truly, and in a clear light, would constitute the very perfection of human thought, the final result of human investigation, the glorious transfiguration of human knowledge. Let us now see whether Mr. M'Cosh has marched boldly, and steadily, and triumphantly along the line of such a philosophy, or whether he has not occasionally halted and hobbled by the way.

The first point to be settled, is the end for which the world was created. If we fix the end wrong, everything will be seen amiss, and nothing fully comprehended. To a mind possessed with the notion that a watch is designed to measure the temperature of the atmosphere, it would be utterly impossible to render its mechanism intelligible. In like manner, if we entertain a wrong view respecting the final cause or end of the world, all its arrangements must needs seem to be out of joint, and all our efforts to comprehend the wonderful

harmony pervading them, must prove utterly abortive. Now in regard to this first and all-important point, we are happy to be able to agree with our author. In this respect we do not entertain a doubt, that he stands upon higher and better ground than that occupied by most of those who have undertaken to grapple with the mysteries of the universe. Indeed, the attempts of Archbishop King, of Leibnitz, and of Edwards, to solve the stupendous problem of evil, were destined, we have long believed, to prove failures, from the fact that they had misconceived, or else occasionally lost sight of, the final cause or end of man's creation.

The final cause of man's creation may be viewed in relation to God, in relation to the universe, or in relation to man. Now it is in relation to man himself, that we consider this final cause or end of his creation, when we say it has been so often misconceived. According to Archbishop King, the happiness of man is the final cause or end of his creation. "Man was created," says he, "in order that he might be crowned with supremest joy and blessedness." If so, why is he not happy? Why this frightful flood of evils, which overflows all, and overwhelms so many in hopeless and eternal misery? Has God missed of his object? Has his eternal and most beneficent purpose been frustrated? These are questions, to which the philosophy of Archbishop King returns no satisfactory answer. It leaves us precisely where it found us, to walk by faith and not by sight.

He tells us, it is true, that such are the inexorable necessities arising from the nature of matter, that God could not make all men happy.* But this is not so clear. After all he has said in favour of this position, which is as old as philosophy itself, its truth seems more than questionable. The creation of beings possessed of bodily organs, who should be susceptible of pleasure, and yet forever free from pain, implies no contradiction; and consequently such beings might have been produced by the infinite wisdom and power of God, and placed above the reach of all pain and suffering. The old plea about the refractory nature of matter brings no light and satisfaction to our minds. It brought no light and satisfaction to such minds as Reid, and Stewart, and Butler, and Kant, and others almost without number; all of whom, though perfectly aware of that plea, have pronounced the great problem of evil to be still involved in unsearchable clouds and darkness.

Nor has Leibnitz met with better success. The argument of Bayle, against which he broke a lance, remained as firm and unshaken as if it had been touched by a child merely, and not assailed by a giant. If God were infinite in power and goodness, says Bayle,

* King's Origin of Evil; preface 4, 6.

he would be both able and willing to prevent sin,—then sin would have been prevented. Sin exists, however; and hence God must have been either unable or unwilling to prevent its existence. If unable, his power is limited; and if unwilling, his holiness is not infinite. To this argument, which has, in all ages, been the great stronghold of atheism, Leibnitz has not, we say, made a satisfactory reply.

He admits that God could very easily cause virtue to exist in the breast of a moral agent, considered as an individual; but if we take into consideration the whole universe, God could not prevent all sin, and cause virtue to reign everywhere, without doing more harm than good. Hence his very goodness determined him to permit the existence of sin. This is the doctrine which is repeatedly set forth in his great work, the *Essais de Theodicée.*

But how can this doctrine be made out? The contrary seems very clear. If God should make me perfectly holy, and consequently perfectly happy, this would clearly be for my good. If he should do the same thing for another individual, it would as clearly be for his good; and so on *ad infinitum.* Now, how such a proceeding could be for the good of each and every individual moral agent in the universe, and yet not for the good of the whole, is more than we are able to conceive. On the contrary, we must believe, that what is for the good of each and every part must be for the good of the whole. We say, then, that God does not permit sin because, on the whole, it is for the good of his creatures it should be permitted. Holiness is everywhere, and in all cases, better for them than sin.

The doctrine of Leibnitz subordinates holiness to happiness, the higher good to the lower. It represents God as setting a less value upon the holiness than upon the happiness of his creatures. He permits sin, according to Leibnitz, to raise its hideous head in his dominions, that he may bring good out of it. What good? Moral good? This, it is conceded, might be secured by the omnipotence of God. Why, then, permit the unholy thing in order to attain an end, which might be attained without it? Is it natural good? This must be the meaning; for the author could scarcely intend, that God does not shut all moral evil out of the world for fear of introducing a greater moral evil. No; he permits sin, because its prevention would not conduce to the highest good, or happiness, of his creatures. This, we repeat, is to subordinate holiness to happiness, the higher to the lower good, and to turn the moral world upside down.

There is a still more frightful subordination of virtue to pleasure, of holiness to happiness, in the scheme of President Edwards. According to his scheme God not only permits sin, he actually chooses sin, and brings it to pass, with a view to the good of his creatures!

What good is it, we ask, which, according to the philosophy of Edwards, God cannot produce by other means, that he must have recourse to the sins of his creatures in order to accomplish his purposes? We can conceive of no such good. It is certainly neither the holiness, nor the happiness, of the created universe; for these, we are assured by Edwards himself, God can cause to exist whenever and to whatever extent he pleases. What other good is there then, higher and greater, than the perfect holiness and happiness of each and every moral agent in the universe, which God has in view, and the pursuit of which is to justify the introduction of moral evil into the economy of the world? To our weak faculties, to our human modes of conception, the very existence of such a good seems an utter impossibility. If it exist at all, or can exist, we must believe it on the mere assertion of the philosopher in opposition to the dictates of our own reason; and if we believe the pursuit of this unimaginable good to be the motive which induces God to permit sin, or bring it to pass, we must again sacrifice the clearest convictions of our own minds to mere human authority. But were it not better to begin and end by simply reposing our faith in God, than to make so great a display of philosophy, and attempts at explanation, and then conclude by resting our belief on the authority of man?

The views of King, and Leibnitz, and Edwards all proceed on the greatest-happiness principle. They exalt happiness to the high position of the *end*, and sink holiness to the subordinate rank of *a* means. Nay, they place holiness side by side with sin, as a means of the highest good. Not so Mr. M'Cosh. In his opinion, as well as in our own, a likeness to God, who is "glorious in holiness," is the end of man's creation, and should be the aim of all his endeavours; while happiness occupies the subordinate rank of *a* means. Happiness is attached to virtue, in order that men may become good; virtue is not enjoined in order that men may be happy. This constitutes one difference between the philosophy of our author and that of most others who have undertaken to justify the ways of God to man. "So far as Dr. Brown," says he, "conceives that, in the infliction of suffering, God has reference to the encouragement of virtue and the discouragement of vice, his views are clear, and solid, and consistent. He has discovered that there is a greater evil than mere pain, and a greater good than mere pleasure; and that the pain which exists in the world, cannot be explained, except in its relation to the greater good and the greater evil. Instead of the "greatest-happiness" principle, he might have seen what we may call the "greatest-morality" principle; and the idea, if prosecuted, would have conducted him

to a firm resting-place, from which he might have contemplated the full character of God, and his dealings towards a world, which would have been seen by him as fallen. But when the grand reconciling truth was just dawning upon his mind, he turns to another truth which has but sufficient importance to distract his attention.*

The production of the greatest possible amount of holiness is, then, the first great end for which God created, and still governs, the world. Such is the position of the author, and in this position we heartily concur with him. But let us see how he prosecutes this idea, so as to find a firm resting-place. Let us see if he has really made such a use of this "grand reconciling truth," as to bring the phenomena of the moral world into an agreement with the perfections of God, or even to harmonize one portion of his system with another?

If God aims at the production of the greatest possible holiness, why does sin exist? If such be the purpose of the Almighty, why is not holiness everywhere seen? why is sin permitted to reign, and to mar the glory of the divine purpose? In regard to this question, at which so many centuries have laboured in vain, the author does not carry us one inch beyond the speculations of a Leibnitz, or an Edwards, or a King. Indeed, his views are more vague, more unsettled, more vacillating, and more contradictory, than are those of any of his distinguished predecessors. Here the "grand reconciling truth" is of no use to him. He finds no resting-place, but wanders up and down amid shadows as dark as night, and contradictions as clear as noon-day.

When he grapples with the difficulty, he gives us the solution of Archbishop King, which has been a thousand times repeated, that "a condition of things, in which such disobedience was impossible, may presuppose either that no freedom of the will has been given, or that it is being interfered with." P. 78. Having presented his views of the origin of evil, he concludes, that "there is nothing unreasonable in the idea that there may be a fallen world somewhere." He ceases to wonder, at least for the moment, that sin should exist; and finds that a fallen world is, after all, a thing which might be very reasonably expected to present itself somewhere in the dominions of God. But this removal of his wonder is not permanent. It seems to have been charmed away by the force of words, rather than solved by the application of principles. Hence it returns upon him in all its power, and we hear him declare: "Let the problem be: given a God of infinite power and wisdom, to determine the character of the world which he would fashion, and man's solution

* Book i, chap. ii, sec. 2.

would present a very different world from the actual one. True, the problem is confessedly of too high an order for human intellect to solve it correctly; *but every approximation which he makes, only impresses him the more with wonder, awe, and fear, when he compares the results at which he arrives with the actual results, as we must believe them,* of heavenly intelligence and love, in the existing world in which we are placed." P. 36. Thus he comes, along with Archbishop King, to a conclusion, which he declares so exactly corresponds with the actual condition of this world, that we should cease to wonder; and yet he as confidently asserts, that every result at which the human mind can arrive, when compared with the actual result, only impresses it the more with wonder, awe, and fear!

We have long been accustomed to suppose that the great difficulty pertaining to the moral government of the world, arises from the existence of sin rather than the existence of pain. Our author is on both sides of this question. In the first place, he is decidedly of the opinion that the great and almost only difficulty arises from the existence of sin. "There may be a difference of opinion," says he, "as to whether a satisfactory explanation can be given of the origin of evil, or whether there can be any other than the one already hinted at; but moral evil being supposed to exist, it is of the last importance to show that the other apparent evils flow from it. After the permission of sin, says Leibnitz, is justified, the other *evil in its train presents no difficulty,* and we are now entitled to resort to the evil of sin, to give a reason for the evil of pain. Moral evil being presupposed, it may now be shown that physical evil in no way reflects on the character of God." Pp. 80, 81. This is his opinion on one side.

Here it is on the other: "Two evils exist in the world; the one physical, and the other moral—the evil of pain and the evil of sin .... The existence of these two evils forms the grand mystery of the universe; nor have all the ingenious theories which have been constructed, been successful in removing the difficulties which press upon the subject. Of these two evils, physical evil is the one which seems to bear hardest against the divine government. Not that it is the worst of the two, but it is the one with which God has the most immediate concern. The blame of the moral evil may undoubtedly be cast on the individual who commits it. To deny this, were to deny the possibility of free-agency and responsibility on the part of the creature. It is surely possible for God to give free-agency to an intelligent creature, and such a free-agency as implies accountability; and the creature, when so endowed, cannot throw the blame of the sin he commits upon another. But the infliction

of pain proceeds directly from God; and the blame of it, if blame there be, must lie upon him. He who would justify the ways of God to man, must be careful to defend the divine government at the point at which suffering is inflicted." P. 269. Now we are to believe, first, that the evil of sin is the great problem to be solved; and if we can only account for the existence of this, the other evil will present "no difficulty." We are to believe, in the second place, that the difficulty arising from the existence of pain, is far greater than the other! We are to believe, not only that the difficulty arising from the existence of sin has never been clearly or satisfactorily solved, that it has never ceased to baffle the human intellect, but also that it may be, and has been, brushed away by a few bold dashes of the author's pen; while the "no difficulty" still remains the grand difficulty, toward which all who would justify the ways of God to man should direct their exertions! Is it not beginning to become apparent, that if we would follow the author very closely, we must walk by faith, and not by sight?

These are not all the inconsistencies into which the author falls, in relation to the subject of evil. The attempt of Dr. Thomas Brown to explain the existence of natural evil, by showing the good effects which result from opposing one evil to another, is clearly refuted by Mr. M'Cosh. Indeed, when the question is, Why does God permit any pain or natural evil to afflict mankind? it is absurd to answer, that one evil is necessary to counteract another. Why is not all evil excluded? If we answer this question by saying, that one evil is very useful to prevent the bad consequences of another, we certainly talk at random, and very wide of the mark. Mr. M'Cosh could see this in regard to natural evils, and he triumphantly explodes the attempts of Dr. Brown to explain or justify their existence. Yet this is precisely the course which he himself adopts to explain the existence of moral evils. Vanity and ambition, envy and evil-speaking, says he, are often attended with good consequences. Nay, in an evil world like this, all the malignant passions, all the evil principles of our nature, subserve wise and beneficent purposes.* All this may be very true; but what does it signify, when it is admitted that "these passions would be unmingled evils in a world where sin was otherwise unknown?"† If no sin existed, there would be no need of "principles that are evil" to counteract it. To this reasoning about moral evils, we may then apply his own language in regard to Dr. Brown's views of natural evils. "Acknowledging, as all must," says he, "that there are incidental advantages arising from the existence of suffering in the present dispensation of things,

* Book iii, chap. iii, sec. 3. † Ibid.

there is the other problem starting to view, Why is there such a constitution of things? Why the need of one evil to counteract another? It is the existence of so many evils that is the grand mystery in the world; and it is not cleared up by showing that one evil is incidentally or intentionally the prevention of another." P. 39. It is a pity, that these very sensible and just remarks did not occur to the author, in relation to his own views of the existence of moral evils, as well as in relation to Dr. Brown's vindication of the permission of natural evils.

The truth is, that the philosophy of Mr. M'Cosh leaves him afloat upon a dark sea, over which he is driven and tossed about by various contending winds of doctrine. Now he sees an unsteady and flickering light in one direction, now in another; and hastily pursuing these, he follows no determinate course, but is seen veering in all directions. One wonders how it is possible that such a mind can, on such subjects, so often abandon itself to mere conjectures, when a few severe self-questionings might easily suffice to demonstrate that they partake more of the wildness and incoherency of dreams, than of the sublime unity and harmony of the actual world. Only listen to him for a moment. "It might be interesting to know," says he, "what are the means which God employs in the government of those worlds in which there is no taint of evil. Can we be wrong in concluding that the main instrument, whatever may be the subsidiary ones, is a grand internal principle by which the creature is swayed—being an imperative sense of duty, and the love of God reigning in the soul and subordinating all things to itself? This, *we must believe, is the bond, stronger than the gravitation drawing the planets to the sun, which holds the pure intelligences in their spheres, and joins them to the grand centre of all wisdom and life.*" Now, the appalling *fact* set forth in the very next sentence, should have cured him of the pleasant dream.

"But whatever may be the means which God employs in the government of other intelligences," says he, "it is obvious, even at the first glance, and further inquiry deepens the conviction, *that this is not the way in which he rules the world in which we dwell.*" Now if such be the very perfection of a moral government for other worlds, why has it not been also adopted for our world? Has God forsaken the inhabitants of the earth, or designedly adopted an imperfect mode of government for them? If so, the author should have essayed to give us, not "*the* method," but the *methods*, of the divine government. He should have told us, that there is a perfect and all-glorious moral government for other worlds, but an imperfect and inglorious government for this; indeed, this is precisely

the thing which he has told us in effect. In conclusion, if "we must believe" that God sways the pure intelligences of other worlds in the manner described by our author, why should not those pure intelligences also feel constrained to believe, that such is the method according to which the same wisdom and love governs our world? Such a conjecture would evidently be as valid as that of the author; and yet it would be most clearly a dream.

We are told in another place, as we have seen, that God does not thus absolutely sway us to obedience and love, because it would interfere with our free-agency. Pp. 77, 78. Why, then, should not the same mighty, irresistible swaying be excluded from other worlds as well as from this, because it would interfere with the free-agency of their moral and accountable inhabitants? We can see no unity of principle, no harmony, in the philosophy of Mr. M'Cosh; we trust that there is a greater unity, and a more glorious harmony, in the great world whose image he has undertaken to set before us.

In regard to that *quæstio vexatissima*—liberty and necessity—no two persons in the whole history of philosophy, are more clearly and unequivocally on the different sides of it, than is the author under consideration. He is as rigid a necessitarian as Hobbes, and as staunch a libertarian as Clarke. Edwards does not surpass him, in fixing every act of the will beneath the stern dominion of producing causes; Coleridge goes not before him, in denying the influence of motives, and asserting the self-determining power of the will. It may seem strange, that any author, and especially that one of so great a reputation, should be so clearly and so strongly on both sides of the question; but, strange as it may seem, the fact may be easily established by a reference to his writings.

First, he is a rigid necessitarian. "It is, we hold, with all philosophers who have deeply studied this subject, a fundamental principle of our very constitution, which leads us upon the occurrence of any given event, to say it has a cause. And this principle leads us upon the occurrence of a phenomenon to look for something producing it, whether the phenomenon be material or mental." This principle which leads us, on the appearance of any phenomenon, to look out for a *cause producing* it, he proceeds to apply to the thoughts and feelings, "the wishes and volitions," of the human mind. P. 281. The author's notion of causation is very different from that of Hume and Brown, which he expressly combats. By cause, he means that which operates to produce its effect. All the acts of the will, then, are produced by the operation of causes. "We are led by an intuition of our nature," says he, "to a belief in the invariable connexion between cause and effect; and we see numerous

proofs of this law of cause and effect reigning in the human mind as it does in the external world, and reigning in the will as it does in every other department of the mind." Pp. 286, 287. Here, as well as in various other places, we are plainly told that the same law which reigns in the material world, and constitutes the fixed mechanism of nature, also reigns in the human will, and produces all its volitions. There is nothing in Hobbes, nor Kames, nor Crombie, nor Collins, nor Spinoza, which more strongly asserts the most rigid scheme of necessity in regard to human volitions, than does the above language of our author. Accordingly we may, without the least injustice, rank him with the stern defenders of that iron scheme of destiny.

Secondly, he is a staunch libertarian. "True necessitarians," says he, "should learn in what way to hold and defend their doctrine. Let them disencumber themselves of all that doubtful argument derived from man being supposed to be swayed by the most powerful motive." P. 294. "Nor have necessitarians," says he, "even of the highest order, been sufficiently careful to guard the language employed by them. Afraid of making admissions to their opponents, we believe that none of them have fully developed the phenomena of human spontaneity. Even Edwards ridicules the idea of the faculty or power of will, or the soul, in the use of that power determining its own volitions. Now we hold it to be an incontrovertible fact, and one of great importance, that the true determining cause of every given volition, is not any mere anterior incitement, but the very soul itself, by its inherent power of will." Pp. 293, 294. Again, he does not take the assumption of Edwards, that motives sway the will. "The truth is," says he, "it is not the motive, properly speaking, that determines the working of the will; but it is the will that imparts the strength to the motive. As Coleridge says, 'It is the man that makes the motive, and not the motive the man.'" P. 280.

One more extract on this side of the question, and we are done:—

> "We rejoice to recognise such a being in man. We trust that we are cherishing no presumptuous feeling, when we believe him to be as free as his Maker is free. We believe him, morally speaking, to be as independent of external control as his Creator must ever be; as that Creator was, when in a past eternity there was no external existence to control him."

Now, no advocate of the freedom of the human will, of its self-determining power, has ever gone beyond this, even in the moment of his greatest enthusiasm. Hence, we may safely rank Mr. M'Cosh among the warmest supporters of the freedom of the human will, and of its freedom in precisely that form which has always proved

the most obnoxious to other necessitarians. He fights under the banner of Hobbes, and Collins, and Edwards, as well as under that of Clarke, and Reid, and Coleridge.

Such inconsistencies seem the more incredible, because they proceed from one who aspires to exhibit, in his philosophy, a representation of the great harmonious system of the world itself. We naturally suppose that these things, which appear so repugnant to other philosophers, must be joined together and harmonized in his mind, by some secret link, of whose existence we have not been informed. We should certainly endeavour to search out and find this secret bond of union, if we were not happily relieved from the labour by the author himself. "We can produce the separate proofs of the two separate truths advocated by us," says he, in relation to the law of cause and effect, and the freedom of the will. "Should it be demanded of us to reconcile them, we answer, that we are not bound to offer a positive reconciliation of them. We point to the two objects; but we are not bound to show what is the link that connects them." Now, if the author himself is not bound to reconcile his own doctrines, we certainly may be excused from any such attempt. We are, indeed, glad that we are not bound to reconcile them; that we are not bound to show how the will can be "self-active," and yet have all its acts produced by the operation of causes; or how it can be under the same law which constitutes the mechanism of nature, and yet be as free as the unmoved Mover of the heavens and the earth, above and beyond whose almighty power there is, and can be, no controlling cause.

But, in our opinion, the author *is* bound to answer the demand for a reconciliation of his doctrines. If he had merely undertaken to give us "separate truths," in detached parcels, and not a harmonious system of truth, we might have been content with his performance as fulfilling his promise; but he led us to expect that we should see in his work, not only the various principles and laws of the divine government as they are in themselves, but also as they are in their relations to each other. Having invited us to behold the goodly spectacle of a harmonious system of truth, more beautiful in the mutual relations and adaptations of its various parts, than even in its separate features; we are not satisfied to be turned off with this huge compound of the mere fragments and disjointed elements of truth, as discordant as the tongues about the tower of Babel, and all over bristling with apparent contradictions.

In refusing to reconcile his doctrines, the author asks,—

"Is it required of us, in any other department of philosophy, to point out the bond which unites two truths, established on independent evidence, before

the mind gives its assent to them? We do not require the physical investigator to point out the connexion between mechanical and chemical combinations, before we believe in their existence; we only require him to furnish us with the separate evidence of the existence of each." P. 284.

This is all we require of the physical inquirer, provided he does not set out with the promise to show us the connexion, which he afterwards finds himself unable to point out. But this only by the way. The two cases are not parallel. There is no apparent contradiction between the existence of mechanical and chemical combinations; and hence each may be easily believed upon its separate evidence, though we see no bond of union connecting them. Not so with the doctrines of liberty and necessity, as maintained by our author. In the estimation of philosophers of all ages, and of all sects, they stand out in direct and irreconcilable opposition to each other. Indeed, the idea of liberty, as defined by him, is a direct and flat denial of his own doctrine of necessity; for it consists in the absence of motives, or causes, to sway the will.

The difference between the two cases may be exhibited in a single illustration. If a witness should tell us, for example, that he had seen elks in a forest of oak-trees or of elm-trees, we should certainly believe him, without requiring him to show the connexion between the presence of elks and the existence of either oak-trees or elm-trees; but if he should, in one part of his story, tell us, as a certain traveller is said to have done, that he had seen immense forests in which the trees were nowhere more than two feet apart, and, in another portion of his narrative, that he had seen elks running through those forests whose antlers measured twelve feet from point to point, we should certainly not be quite so ready to yield our assent to his testimony. And if we should ask him how it was possible for elks with such antlers to run through such forests, and receive the answer of the aforesaid traveller, that "that is no look-out of mine,—the elks must see to that themselves," we should still not be entirely satisfied of the truth of the narration.

We are aware that, in maintaining both the scheme of necessity and of liberty, while he refuses to reconcile them, Mr. M'Cosh merely follows the fashion which seems to be set by the Calvinistic writers of the present day. This mode of dealing with this very intricate subject has, of late, frequently fallen under our observation. We shall, therefore, bestow rather more attention upon it than it would otherwise deserve.

"It is absurd," says Mr. M'Cosh, "to represent the one doctrine as setting aside the other." Here we have the assertion of the author for it, that it is absurd to represent liberty as setting aside

necessity, or necessity as setting aside liberty. Yet this absurdity, according to the author's own showing, has been commonly committed by both necessitarians and libertarians. P. 235, note. He, however, escapes this absurdity, at least in his own estimation. It were well, indeed, if he had done so in reality; for, whatever may be thought of others, it were certainly a very striking absurdity, in one who maintains both doctrines, to make the one exclude the other. Yet this has been done by Mr. M'Cosh. He not only plants himself on the doctrine of liberty, and makes it exclude that of necessity; but he also plants himself on the doctrine of necessity, and makes it exclude that of liberty. Both of these positions may be clearly established.

First, he plants himself on the doctrine of liberty, and excludes that of necessity. In his zeal on the libertarian side of the question, he denies that the will is swayed by the most powerful motive. The doctrine of Edwards, and other necessitarians, on this subject, he expressly repudiates, on the ground that they do injustice to the spontaneity of the human will. Now what does Edwards mean by the most powerful motive? As quoted by Mr. M'Cosh himself, Edwards says: "When I speak of the strongest motive, I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to *produce* a particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together." P. 279. By the term the *strongest* motive, then, Edwards means, as he here informs us, to designate the cause, or causes, which produce a particular act of volition. To deny his doctrine, then, that the will is swayed by motives, as Mr. M'Cosh does, is to deny that the acts of the will are produced by causes. But this is precisely to deny Mr. M'Cosh's own doctrine of necessity. Everywhere, in the writings of Edwards, the words *motive* and *cause* are used as convertible terms; and hence to deny that motives operate to produce volitions, is to deny that causes operate to produce them. Hence, it is clear that Mr. M'Cosh, from the overflowing abundance of his zeal in favour of the self-determining power of the soul, has rejected and denied the scheme of necessity.

In the second place he plants himself on the scheme of necessity, and excludes the freedom of the human will. If every act of the will has a producing cause, it is certainly very difficult to conceive how it can be free. Accordingly, Hobbes found the freedom of man, not in the will or mind itself, but in the external sphere of the body. No matter how we come by our volition, says he, an external act is free provided it flow from our will. This definition of liberty, as consisting in a power or opportunity to do a thing, *if we will*, without any regard to how we came by our will or volition, was, as is

well known, afterwards adopted by Locke and Edwards. Leibnitz, in his *Nouveaux Essais*, has clearly shown that this definition allows us no freedom of the will at all, but merely "elbow-room." This idea of liberty, it is hardly necessary to add, is perfectly consistent with the most absolute scheme of fate that can possibly be conceived. "No matter how we came by our volitions," it says, we are free, provided nothing hinders our volition from producing its external effect, though our volition should be produced by the strongest motive of Edwards and Hobbes, or by the producing cause of Mr. M'Cosh, or by the direct efficiency of the Almighty, according to the scheme of the younger Edwards; yet are we free, provided our bodies are free to follow their impulses. This, we repeat, is not the freedom of the mind, but of the body. Its most perfect type is to be found where Hobbes finds it,—not in the world of mind, but that of matter,—in the stream of a river, which, says he, is free to flow down its channel, though impelled by gravity, but not free to flow across its banks!

Now notwithstanding Mr. M'Cosh's zeal for the inherent self-determining power of the will, yet when he comes to view the subject from the platform of necessity, he too finds the freedom of the will in the absence of external restraints on the body. He says,—

"If it be alleged that the circumstance that volitions have a cause renders the agent no longer responsible for them, we forthwith demand the proofs. If it be replied that the conscience says so, then we meet the assertion with a direct contradiction. The conscience clearly announces the responsibility of intelligent and voluntary agents, but it attaches no such condition to responsibility. No doubt it says, *that if actions do not proceed from the will*, but from something else—*from mere physical or external restraint*—then the agent is not responsible for them; *but if the deeds proceed from the will*, then it at once attaches a responsibility to them. Place before the mind a murder committed through pure physical compulsion, brought to bear on the arm that inflicts the blow, and the conscience says, Here no guilt is attachable. But let this same murder be done with the thorough consent of the will, the conscience stops not to inquire whether this consent has been caused or no."—P. 287.

Here the question started was, whether we can be accountable for our volitions, for the acts of our wills, if they are caused; and it is shifted—how silently and how completely!—from an accountability for the acts of the will themselves, to an accountability for the external acts or bodily motions, flowing from these internal acts or volitions. Thus, he finds freedom and the basis of responsibility not in the will itself, but in the external sphere of the body.

Again he says,—

"If any man asserts, that, in order to responsibility, the will must be free—that is, *free from physical restraint*, free to act as it pleases—we at once and heartily agree with him; and we maintain that in this sense the will is free—as free as it is possible for any man to conceive it to be."

Thus, viewing the subject from the platform of necessity, he entirely shuts out and excludes the freedom of the will itself, and substitutes in its place that false notion of liberty which was so long ago set up by Hobbes, and so triumphantly demolished by Leibnitz. Hence we find him guilty of three things:—1. Of holding and maintaining both liberty and necessity; 2. Of making liberty exclude necessity; and, 3. Of making necessity exclude liberty.

We shall now take leave of Mr. M'Cosh. We might point out other inconsistencies in his work, almost without number; but such a task would be more tedious than profitable. Having exposed the great central contradictions of his work, which are fraught with so many minor inconsistencies, we feel no desire to weary ourselves, or to wear out the patience of the reader, by descending to a critical examination of the vast multitude of particulars in which he is at war with himself.

We do not deny that the book possesses merit. It gives us many "separate truths," as well as many separate errors; and these truths are sometimes presented in impressive and beautiful lights. But a system of truth it does not give us. The author is indeed a good writer, rather than a great thinker. He most lamentably fails to give us anything approximating to the coherency and beauty of a system. His view, or, rather, his manifold views, of the divine government, are about as fit to represent the order and harmony of the moral world, as framed and ruled by God, as are the wild babblings of madmen to represent the sweet strains of the angelic hosts.

One reason of this discord is, that the author has, in various directions, dared to depart from the old landmarks of Calvinism, while he has resolutely held on to them in others. He has sought for truth, not merely in the writers of his own school, but in the great world of letters and of things; and hence the many cross lights which have disturbed his vision, and prevented him from taking a consistently Calvinistic view of the universe. In his opinion, the "intellectual and spiritual clearness" of President Edwards, in questions pertaining to the divine government, approaches "nearer the angelic than has been the attainment of any in these latter days." Be this as it may, it is certain that, in all matters pertaining to the system of Calvinism, no man ever had so profound an insight as President Edwards. He understood, in every particular, not only what was necessary to lay and secure its foundations, but also to build it up into one coherent and harmonious scheme of doctrine; and in our opinion, Mr. M'Cosh has in no one instance departed from Edwards without introducing an element of discord into the bosom of Calvinism. Without intending it, he has indeed

aimed many lusty blows at his system. The foreign and heterogeneous elements which he has thus introduced are, we have no doubt, in most instances true; and they are, for that very reason, the seeds of dissolution which must ultimately work the utter ruin and overthrow of the entire fabric of Calvinism. The Calvinists of the present day, if they did but know it, instead of bestowing such indiscriminate and unbounded praise upon those who may undertake to defend their cause, have some reason to exclaim, "Save us from our friends!"

ART. VII.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) "*A New Harmony and Exposition of the Gospels*, by JAMES STRONG, A. M." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1852; 8vo., pp. 569.) In point of external finish—paper, printing, binding, and graphic illustration—this is by far the finest book that has yet been issued from the Methodist Book Concern. And the gem is worth the setting. The book is a noble example of the application of genuine learning, unwearied industry, and critical sagacity to that highest of all objects to which the wit of man can apply itself—the illustration of the Christian Scriptures. In the brief notice we can now afford to give, it is impossible for us to characterize this great book as it deserves: a fuller notice will be given in our next number, and, in the mean time, we can do little more than state the contents and scope of the work.

The basis of the entire book is a new *Harmony* of the four Gospels. In this part of the work, Mr. Strong accords, in the main, with Robinson, so far as the arrangement of *events* is concerned: but in this, as in everything else, he is clearly a man *nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri;* and while he has consulted all the harmonizers, he has slavishly followed none. A marked and novel peculiarity of this part of the work is the arrangement of the Harmony upon the page,—Mr. Strong's method completely combining all the advantages of the methods exemplified in Newcome and Townsend. The difficulties of such a combination are very great, and Mr. Strong has shown great tact and skill in getting over them.

The next feature of the work is the *Exposition*, which consists of a free version directly from the Greek text. There is much novelty also in the execution of this part. Many *paraphrases* of the sacred text have been attempted; but this is *not* a paraphrase: few words more than those of the text itself are employed, and the style is straight-forward and modern, and, on that very account, all the more striking, even to the casual reader. By this ingenious, but difficult mode of procedure, Mr. Strong has succeeded in producing what he sought, namely, "an exegetical manual, which, while adapted to ordinary readers, should yet not be unworthy the perusal of persons of higher attainments." It is a commentary, without the complexities, involutions, and digressions, which make most commentaries so difficult of perusal.

Besides the Harmony and Exposition, we have, still upon the face of the page, a small, but compact, body of *Notes*, containing such needful illustrations and explanations as could not find place in the body of the Exposition. The topics requiring fuller consideration are treated in two Appendixes, which treat of the general chronology of the life of Christ, and give also a minute investigation of the topography of ancient Jerusalem. Each of these is a treatise in itself. The third Appendix gives a general Index and Analysis of the Gospel History, which is, in fact, as our author expresses it, "a commentary in miniature."

The Illustrations, nineteen in number, are partly lithographs, tinted in the finest style of the art, partly steel, and partly wood engravings, all executed in the very best manner.

The book, as a whole, is an honour, not merely to our denominational literature, but to the Biblical literature of the age. And, what is of more importance, it will form, both for critical students and for common readers, an invaluable help to a better understanding of the sacred Scriptures. We need not bespeak for it a wide circulation: that it will be sure to obtain on the strength of its merits alone.

(2.) KIRWAN'S name is a terror, if not to the Pope, at least to Archbishop Hughes; and his new volume, entitled "*Romanism at Home; Letters to the Hon. R. B. Taney,*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 272,) will not at all tend to quiet the nerves of either Pope or Archbishop. His former "Letters" were confined mainly to the unscriptural *doctrines* of Popery; the present volume treats, in the same thorough and trenchant style, of its "external arrangements, its government, its despotism, its legends, its relics, and its influence on the moral, social, and political interests of the world." In order to do justice to this aspect of the subject, Kirwan visited Rome, and saw for himself much of what he describes in this volume. It is a terrible picture, but no less true than terrible. Our young ministers should read this book as an introduction to their *study* of Romanism,—a study which every American minister will find necessary within the next twenty years.

(3.) IN the present number of this Journal (pp. 450–456) DR. OLIN'S style of preaching is characterized at some length, and brief allusion made to the forthcoming edition of his works. We take great pleasure in welcoming the first two volumes under the title, "*The Works of Stephen Olin, D. D., LL. D.*, late President of the Wesleyan University." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 2 vols., 12mo., pp. 422, 475.) The first volume is wholly made up of Sermons and Sketches of Sermons, and affords ample proof of the massive intellectual power of the author, notwithstanding the fact that but one of the sermons in the volume was prepared for publication by himself. The first sermon here given happens to be the first that we ever heard him preach—at Wilkesbarre, Pa., during the session of the Oneida Conference of 1843. The text is John xiv, 1, "Let not your heart be troubled: ye believe in God, believe also in me;" and the scope of the discourse is, that faith in God, with-

out faith in Christ, is adapted to awaken, not to calm our fears—to trouble the heart, not to comfort it. The impression of the spoken discourse can never be effaced from our minds: its clear, logical force; its affluence of thought; its overwhelming earnestness; and the enormous power of its delivery, all combined to make it the most impressive sermon we have ever heard from mortal lips. And we find all the substance of the discourse reproduced here; indeed, in this, as in other instances in the collection, we are surprised to find that Dr. Olin's manuscripts were left in so perfect a condition. And—as we must sum up in a sentence all we have now to say with regard to this volume—it is our judgment that no sermons printed since Robert Hall's, can compare with these in fulness, breadth, comprehensiveness, and in force of style. The *second* volume is devoted to the discussion of topics connected with Christian Education, and also to Missionary and other Addresses. It contains seven lectures on the Theory and Practice of Scholastic Life; four Baccalaureate Discourses; and thirteen Addresses and Essays. In finish of style, as well as in interest and novelty of topics, this volume surpasses the other; and we should gladly see it placed in the hands of every college student in the land. It should, perhaps, be printed separately for this purpose. We must now leave this great work—advising all our readers to buy it and read it; and hoping soon to return to it in an extended article, of which the lamented author will form the subject.

(4.) "*A Manual of Grecian Antiquities*, by CHARLES ANTHON, LL. D." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 437.) This volume is of the same size and plan with the "Manual of Roman Antiquities" by the same author, recently published. It gives, in a brief and compact introduction, geographical and historical outlines of ancient Hellas; and then treats of the antiquities under the four heads of the Heroic Age, Sparta, Creta, and Athens. A vast body of information is condensed into this volume, which is certainly the best school-manual upon the subject.

(5.) THE practical writings of JOHN ANGELL JAMES bid fair to rival in quantity, if not in excellence, those of Richard Baxter. The last is now before us in the shape of "*Pastoral Addresses, chiefly on the Subject of Christian Duty.*" (New-York: Carter & Brothers, 1852; pp. 408.) The book is made up mostly, we should judge, of week-night lectures to the congregation, and is marked by the earnestness of feeling and diffuseness of style that characterize Mr. James's writings.

(6.) "*The Economy of Methodism illustrated and defended, in a Series of Papers*, by T. E. BOND, Sen., M. D." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1852; 8vo., pp. 391.) This work is valuable not merely in the polemical aspect indicated by its title, but also as a contribution to the history—or rather to the useful materials for the history—of the Methodist Episcopal Church. It contains, I. Dr. Bond's "Appeal to the Methodists, in opposition to the changes

proposed in their Church government," published originally in 1827, and which has been for many years out of print; II. His "Narrative and Defence of the Proceedings of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Baltimore City Station;" and, III., a number of miscellaneous articles, chiefly from the pages of the "Itinerant," relating to the controversy on lay delegation and kindred topics. The Appendix touches briefly upon the recent movement in Philadelphia in favour of lay delegation. The book, with the whole subject, will call for a full review hereafter.

(7.) THE second volume of "*The Life and Works of Robert Burns*, edited by Robert Chambers," (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 317,) continues the biography down to 1788. On the plan of the book, and its excellent execution, we have spoken in another place.

(8.) "*Songs in the House of my Pilgrimage*" (New-York: Carter & Brothers, 1852; pp. 315) is a book of poetical pieces, one for every day in the year, selected with a design to present daily to the Christian's mind some precious promise of the word of God to comfort the afflicted and encourage the trembling soul. It is a good design, and is well executed.

(9.) MR. JACOB ABBOTT is the benefactor *par excellence* of the children of this generation. He has just commenced the issue (or the reissue) of a series entitled "*Marco Paul's Adventures in the Pursuit of Knowledge*," which will be as popular, no doubt, as the Franconia stories. Two books of the series have already appeared, "*Marco in New-York*" and "*Marco on the Erie Canal*," (Harper & Brothers: 1852,) both of which blend instruction with amusement in that skilful way in which no writer for children has excelled Mr. Abbott. Two drawbacks, however—sad ones too—attend all his otherwise faultless writings for children: one is, that he is often careless enough to use New-England words and phrases without any indication to the youthful reader that they are provincialisms; and the other is, that the books are printed in the miserable Websterian orthography instead of English.

(10.) "*An Exposition of some of the Laws of the Latin Grammar*, by GESSNER HARRISON, M. D., Professor of Ancient Languages in the University of Virginia." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 290.) This is not a *mere* school-book, but a substantial and most acceptable contribution to philological science—adapted, at the same time, for use in college classes. The work is made up mainly of Dr. Harrison's lectures to his own classes in the university, and aims "to set forth a rational arrangement and explanation of some of the more prominent phenomena in the inflections and syntax of the Latin language." It is, in fact, a commentary upon the Latin grammar, exhibiting the results of the later philological inquiries—many of which are beyond the reach of most teachers, as well as pupils, in this country—in a perspicuous and satisfactory form. The book abounds in acute distinctions

also, of Dr. Harrison's own. We should be glad to give a minute account of the work did our limits allow; but we must content ourselves with urging all teachers of the Latin language to get and study it for themselves, and with expressing the hope that the work will speedily find its way into the higher classes of all our American colleges.

(11.) ONE of the most successful of the many useful compilations which the late Rev. DANIEL SMITH has presented to the public is "*Gems of Female Biography.*" (New-York: Lane & Scott; 18mo., pp. 430.)

(12.) "*Novelties of the New World*" (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1852; pp. 324) is a pleasant book for youth, made up of the most remarkable adventures and discoveries of the first explorers of North America. It is uniform with "Plymouth and the Pilgrims," by the same author.

(13.) IT is said that the manuscripts of PRESIDENT EDWARDS, if all published, would be more voluminous than the works of any of the copious writers of the seventeenth century, with the possible exception, perhaps, of Baxter, of eighty-volume memory. His unpublished MSS. were committed, some three years ago, to the Rev. Tryon Edwards, who found among them a series of Lectures delivered by Edwards in 1738, to the people of his charge in Northampton, written out in full, apparently with a design for publication. They are now issued under the title "*Charity and its Fruits; or, Christian Love as manifested in the Heart and Life,*" (New-York: Carter & Brothers, 1852; pp. 530,) forming a complete exposition of 1 Cor. xiii.

(14.) "*The Church-Member's Manual*, by WILLIAM CROWELL," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1852; 12mo., pp. 272,) is an enlarged reprint of a work with the same title, published some years ago. It gives a perspicuous account of the doctrines, discipline, and usages of the Baptist Church.

(15.) ROMANISM has, if possible, more of the persecuting spirit now than ever. Multiplied illustrations of this spirit are afforded in a "*Memoir of the* REV. W. H. HEWITSON, by the Rev. JOHN BAILLIE." (New-York: Carter & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 374.) Mr. Hewitson was a youthful minister of the Free Church of Scotland, who went to Madeira for the recovery of his health, and there laboured, with great zeal and prudence, in teaching the simple gospel of the Son of God. The malignity of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Madeira and his satellites against Dr. Kalley, is a well-known story; and Mr. Hewitson was baited and persecuted in the same way. He subsequently laboured as a missionary in Trinidad, and afterward entered upon regular pastoral work in Scotland. Throughout his brief career (he died 1850, aged thirty-eight) he lived in holy communion with God, and toiled for his Master with consuming energy. The book is a precious record of Christian love, zeal, faith, and triumph.

(16.) "*Bronchitis, and Kindred Diseases*, by W. W. HALL, M. D." (New-York: J. S. Redfield; 12mo., pp. 350,) is a very sensible statement of the causes of the ailments named in its title. It is intended for ordinary readers —not to enable them to cure themselves, but to aid them in securing such habits as will prevent disease. Its general circulation would be a national benefit.

(17.) ONE of the most interesting and instructive of the many volumes to which the disappearance of Sir John Franklin has given rise, is the "*Arctic Searching Expedition*, by SIR JOHN RICHARDSON." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 516.) In the spring of 1848 Sir John was assigned to take the command of a searching party, to go by boats and overland to Fort Confidence, to winter there, and then to trace the coast between the Mackenzie and Coppermine rivers, and the shores of Victoria and Wollaston Lands. The expediiton discharged its duty—without discovering any traces of the missing voyagers—and Sir John returned in the autumn of 1850. The record of an expedition so full of toils, perils, and novelties, could not but be attractive; and Sir John tells his story simply and well. The appendixes give much new information as to the geography, climate, &c., of the hyperborean regions of North America. A map is necessary to the completeness of the work.

(18.) "*The Principles of Courtesy*, by G. W. HERVEY," (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 300,) is an attempt to set forth the elements of the duty of *Christian* politeness:—or, rather, to set forth the laws of courtesy, without inculcating pernicious opinions, or appealing to unworthy motives,—errors into which writers on etiquette commonly fall. It treats, first, of the spirit of courtesy; secondly, of the forms of courtesy in religious society; and, thirdly, of the forms of courtesy in secular society—a bad division, as all secular society ought to be Christian, and will be, before the millennium comes.

(19.) "*Living or Dead*, by Rev. J. C. RYLE," (New-York: Carter and Brothers; 18mo., pp. 360,) is a series of home-truths, practically put to the hearts and consciences of Christians and those who should be Christians. The writer has an admirable hortatory style, vivified throughout by a profoundly earnest spirit.

(20.) "*The History of Palestine, from the Patriarchal Age to the Present Time*, by JOHN KITTO, D. D." (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1852; 12mo., pp. 426.) This is not to be regarded as an abridgment of Dr. Kitto's larger work, *The Pictorial History of Palestine;* it is designed, and has been written, expressly for use as a text-book in schools, and as a manual of the subject on which it treats. In a copious introduction, of 125 pages, we have the historical and physical geography of Palestine, with an account of the customs and usages of the Jews. The history proper is then exhibited in eight chapters, bringing it down to the restoration of Syria to the dominion of the Porte.

The book has over 200 illustrative wood-cuts. We know no single volume so well deserving the name of a *manual* of the history and geography as this—with the single and almost fatal drawback, that it has *no Index*.

(21.) PUTNAM'S "Semi-monthly Library for Travellers and the Fireside" continues to appear with praiseworthy punctuality. Among the recent issues are, "*Claret and Olives; from the Garonne to the Rhone*, by ANGUS B. REACH;" a "*Journey to Iceland, and Travels in Sweden and Norway*, translated by CHARLOTTE FENIMORE COOPER;" "*Up the Rhine*, by THOMAS HOOD," 2 vols. Mr. Putnam has also commenced a new series of books in Popular and Practical Science, in a form similar to that of the semi-monthly Library, of which we have received "*The Solar System*, by J. R. HIND,"—a descriptive treatise upon the Sun, Moon, and Planets, including an account of all the recent discoveries. It is really marvellous that books of such value can be got up in such a style for twenty-five cents a volume.

(22.) AMONG the new volumes of Bohn's Libraries are "*Humboldt's Cosmos*, Vol. IV., translated by E. C. OTTE and Dr. PAUL, with an Index;" "*Sir Joshua Reynolds' Literary Works, with Memoir of the Author*, by H. WILLIAM BEECHEY, Vol. II.;" "*Cicero's Orations*, literally translated by C. D. YONGE, M. A., Vol. III.;" "*Sir Thomas Browne's Works*, edited by S. WILKIN, F. L. S., Vol. III.;" "*Oersted's Soul in Nature, and other Works*, translated by the MISSES HORNER;" "*The Chess Tournament*, edited by H. STAUNTON, Esq.;" "*Rome in the Nineteenth Century*, fifth edition, 2 vols.;" "*Neander's Church History*, Vol. VII., with Index." An abundant supply of these valuable series is always kept on hand by Bangs Brother, & Co., Park-Row, New-York.

(23.) "*Miscellany; consisting of Essays, Biographical Sketches, and Notes of Travel*, by the Rev. T. A. MORRIS, D. D., one of the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church." (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Power, 1852; 12mo., pp. 390.) This volume consists of three parts,—Part I. Essays; Part II. Biographical Sketches; Part III. Notes of Travel. Most of the papers here presented have appeared at different times in various periodicals; and Bishop Morris has done an acceptable service to the Church, and especially to its youth, in gathering these "words of wisdom" into a less perishable form than that in which they were originally sent forth. They are marked throughout by the sobriety of judgment, clearness of thought, and chaste expression which characterize all the writings of the author.

(24.) "*New Rhetorical Reader and Elocutionist*, by WILLIAM H. GILDER, A. M." (New-York: J. C. Riker; 12mo., pp. 336.) This is, in our judgment, the best book of its class that has yet appeared in this country. The Introduction sets forth the essential principles of elocution with great brevity, yet amply enough for purposes of practical instruction. Then follows a judi-

cious selection of passages in prose and verse, the staple of which consists of extracts from the standard writers of the language, while a new feature is introduced in the shape of excerpts from writers less known, but yet, in the main, deserving of a place in such collections. We are glad to see among them the names of Olin, Fisk, Emory, Winans, Cookman, and a number more of the best writers and speakers in our own Church. We commend the work to teachers, believing that they have only to examine it carefully to be convinced of its eminent adaptation for use in American schools.

(25.) SEVERAL lives of Wesley have appeared in Germany, but the first, to our knowledge, written in the German language on our own soil, is "*Das Leben und Wirken des Johannes Wesley und Seiner Haupt-Mitarbeiter, bearbeitet nach den besten englischen Quellen, von* WILHELM NAST." (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Power, 1852; 12mo., pp. 300.) The work is not designed as a complete history of Methodism, nor as a full biography of Wesley, but rather as a sketch of the historical development of Methodism. The "sources" spoken of in the title-page are mainly Watson's "Life of Wesley," Jackson's "Centenary of Methodism," and Larrabee's "Wesley and his Coadjutors;" the substance of which books—so far at least as might be of special interest to German readers—is translated and condensed into the volume before us. We trust it will obtain a wide circulation among the German people, not only in this country, but also on the other side of the water.

(26.) THE "*Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution*, by B. J. LOSSING" (New-York: Harper & Brothers) is rapidly approaching completion—the twenty-fourth number having made its appearance. Our readers who wish at once to gratify the tastes, improve the minds, and cherish the patriotic feeling of their children, should put this book, by all means, into their hands. When the work is completed, we hope to give an estimate of it more in accordance with its merits than its fragmentary mode of publication has heretofore allowed us to offer.

(27.) WE have received a copy of the *seventh* edition of "*A Practical Manual of Elocution: embracing Voice and Gesture*, by MERRITT CALDWELL, A.M." (Portland: Sanborn & Carter, 1852; 12mo., pp. 357.) The value of this work as a text-book for school and college use, is now not a matter of question; it has been proved by years of experience. No book on the subject, issued either before or since the present work, approaches it, in our judgment, in a clear and practical exposition of the theory and practice of elocution. We renew our hearty recommendation of the book, not only to teachers, but also to ministers and students of theology.

(28.) SCHMITZ'S "*Elementary Latin Grammar and Exercises*" (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea; 18mo., pp. 246) is an abridgment of the larger grammar by the same author, and is intended for the use of beginners. The book is clear and systematic, but has few of the *helps* to memory needed by young pupils.

(29.) HUDSON'S edition of "*The Works of Shakspeare*" (Boston: James Munroe & Co.) is going on to completion: we have received the second, third, and fourth volumes since our notice of the first. We are prepared to renew our declaration of confidence in Mr. Hudson's capacity to produce an edition that will be the best in all respects for general use. The notes and prefaces in these three volumes bear ample testimony to his taste and judgment, while the text is one on which all readers may rely as approaching quite as near to accuracy as that of any extant edition. And in the mechanical qualities of type, paper, size, and form of volumes, this edition will have nothing to be desired in point of neatness and convenience.

(30.) MAYHEW'S "*London Labour and the London Poor*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers) has reached the eighteenth number, and continues the searching inquiry into the condition of the working classes of London, which Mr. Mayhew has been so long and so strenuously pursuing. No one could imagine, without reading this book, how much interest may be thrown by a man of genius about a subject which, in other hands, would offer nothing but material for the dullest and the driest statistics.

(31.) "*The Way to do Good*, by JACOB ABBOTT," (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 402,) is the third and last of the "Young Christian" series, of which we have before spoken twice. Mr. Abbott's graphic pen, which charms all youthful readers in the simple beauty of his stories and histories, is equally at home in writing of practical religion. The present well-known volume sets forth with ample power of expression and illustration the excellence, the beauty, and the bliss of a life of Christian usefulness.

(32.) "*Meyer's Universum*," (New-York: H. J. Meyer,) consists of a series of views of the most remarkable places and objects of all countries. The work has been established in Germany for many years, and has had a very wide European circulation. Mr. Meyer has now commenced an American edition in monthly parts, each containing four steel engravings, with description and historical text by European and American writers, under the editorship of Mr. C. A. Dana. It will be sold at the very low price of twenty-five cents a number.

(33.) ACCURATE information with regard to the Holy Land, is now more accessible than ever before, and new stores are constantly accumulating from the researches of careful travellers. The latest information will be found embodied in "*The Land of Promise*, by JOHN KITTO, LL. D.," (New-York: Lane & Scott; 12mo., pp. 334,) which gives a topographical description of the principal places in Palestine, and of the country eastward of the Jordan. Every place of interest and importance is described as it *now* appears; and the attempt is made to combine the accuracy of scientific description with the vivacity of a book of travel. It is illustrated by a physical map of Palestine, and by numerous woodcuts.

(34.) "*The Howadji in Syria*, by GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS," (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 304,) is, like the "Nile Notes" of the same author, a series of *poetical* pictures, rather than a book of travel. Its dreamy, exaggerated, and voluptuous style, harmonizes well with the Eastern life which it depicts. But its sweets are too sweet, and cloy from their rich abundance.

(35.) "*Revival Miscellanies, containing eleven Revival Sermons, &c., selected from the works of the* Rev. JAMES CAUGHEY, by Rev. R. W. Allen and Rev. D. Wise." (Boston: J. P. Magee; 12mo., pp. 442.) The sermons in this volume are earnest and faithful exhortations; but have no other merit. Appended to these are a number of loose essays, fragments of letters, &c. The work may have currency, and be useful for a time, especially in quarters where Mr. Caughey (who is styled *in the title-page* "The Eminently Successful Revivalist") is personally known.

(36.) THE fourth volume of Mr. Putnam's Home Cyclopedia is the "*Hand-Book of the Useful Arts*, by T. ANTISELL," M. D. (New-York: G. P. Putnam, 1852; 12mo., pp. 690.) The work includes Agriculture, Architecture, Domestic Economy, Civil Engineering, Machinery, Manufactures, Photogenic, and Telegraphic Art, and affords in a clear and comprehensive form for popular reference, a dictionary of all terms used in the application of science to the useful arts. It also gives summary statements of all the most valuable European and American patents of recent times. The work is admirably printed, and is illustrated by a number of very fine woodcuts. The volumes of the series can be had separately, but none of our readers who may purchase the "Home Cyclopedia" as a whole, will see occasion to regret it.

(37.) THE "*Family and School Monitor, and Educational Catechism*," (New-York: G. Savage; 18mo., pp. 176,) gives a large amount of valuable instruction in the form of question and answer.

(38.) "*The Chain of Sacred Wonders*, by S. A. LATTA, M. D.," (Cincinnati: 8vo.,) is still published in quarterly numbers, as we learn from the first number for 1852, now before us. No number for 1851 except the first reached this office. In the present number the sketches are carried down to the "Meeting of Moses and Jethro, the priest of Midian."

(39.) THE "*Report of the Pennsylvania Hospital for the Insane*," for 1851, shows that the institution is in most excellent order, under the admirable management of Dr. Kirkbride.

(40.) "*God in History*, by JOHN CUMMING, D. D.," (New-York: Lane & Scott; 12mo., pp. 129,) embodies a number of facts illustrative of the presence and providence of God in the affairs of men. It is written in the flowing style characteristic of Dr. Cumming.

(41.) Of the following pamphlets, essays, sermons, &c., we regret that we are unable to give anything more than the titles:—

Address delivered by the Hon. Daniel Webster in Faneuil Hall, May 22, 1852, at the request of the City Council of Boston.

Catalogue of the Officers and Students of the New-York Conference Seminary, Charlotteville, Schoharie County, N. Y., during the first term, 1851–52.

Thoughts on Entire Sanctification, by Rev. H. Mattison.

A Discourse on the Horrors of the Liquor Traffic, both Wholesale and Retail, delivered in Wesley Chapel, Indianapolis, Sept. 14, 1851, by Rev. B. F. Crary, A. M.

Obituary Addresses delivered on the Occasion of the Death of Augustus Neander, by the following eminent Men of Berlin: Neander's Decease, by S. Rauh, Licentiate of the University; a Discourse delivered in his Dying Chamber, by Dr. Frederick Strauss; a Discourse delivered at his Grave, by Dr. F. W. Krummacher; a Discourse delivered on the Day of his Burial, July 17, 1850, in the Hall of the Berlin University, by Dr. Carl Immanuel Nitzsch. Translated from the German, by the Rev. H. M. Harman, A. M. To which is prefixed a Sketch of the Life of Neander, by the Translator.

Freedom of Thought, the True Mean.—An Address delivered before the Philomathean Society of Troy Conference Academy, West Poultney, Vt., on the Evening of July 15, 1851, by James Strong, A. M., formerly Teacher of Languages in that Institution.

Catalogue of the Officers and Students of the North-Western Virginia Academy, Clarksburg, Va., for the Academical Year 1851–2.

Report of the Superintendent of the Township of Waterford, in the County of Camden, N. J.

Catalogue of the Officers and Students of Providence Conference Seminary, East Greenwich, R. I., for the Academic Year 1851–2.

Constitution and Rules of the Waterford Township Association of Teachers. Instituted, August, 1851.

Catalogue and Circular of the Officers and Students of the Wesleyan Female Institute, Staunton, Va., 1851–2.

Adaptation of Religion to Female Character.—A Discourse to Young Ladies, delivered in the First Presbyterian Church, Richmond, Va., Feb. 29, 1852, by Rev. T. V. Moore.

Warning Words to Young Men.—A Discourse delivered in the First Presbyterian Church, Richmond, Va., Feb. 29, 1852, by Rev. T. V. Moore.

A New Theory of the Apocalypse, as Corroborated by Daniel's Numbers, by Rev. S. S. Ralston.

Thirty-First Annual Report of the Board of Direction of the Mercantile Library Association, of the City of New-York.

Third Annual Report of the American and Foreign Christian Union, presented at their Anniversary, held on Tuesday, May 11, 1852, in the Broadway Tabernacle, New-York.

Art. VIII.—LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Theological.

EUROPEAN.

We have received a copy of one of those elaborate works in special departments of Church History which Germany alone produces, entitled, "*Die Bussordnungen der abendländischen Kirche*, von Dr. F. W. H. Wasserschleben, Prof. d. Rechte a. d. Univ. Halle." (Halle, 1851; 8vo., 726 pp.) After an historical Introduction, showing a most thorough survey of the whole subject in its original sources, all the Penitentials and Canons relating to penance in the British, Irish, Anglo-Saxon, Frankish, and Spanish Churches, are given at length. It is a repertory, in fact, of penitential law—not in abstracts, but in a reprint of the original documents themselves.

The new "*Polyglotten Bibel zum praktischen Handgebrauch*" (Bielefeld, Velhagen und Klasing) is carried on in the last number up to Jeremiah. It contains the Hebrew, Septuagint, Vulgate, and Luther's version in parallel columns, and will be, when completed, one of the cheapest and most convenient Polyglotts extant.

The *Journal des Débats* announces a discovery which, for the present at least, seems to set a long-agitated literary question at rest. As many of our readers well know, the authorship of the famous work commonly ascribed to Thomas à Kempis, "*De Imitatione Christi*," has been disputed for nearly four centuries. A small library has been written on the theme,—especially by French and Netherland antiquaries,—and the tendency of opinion in France, at least, has been to give the merit of this celebrated production to John Gerson, Chancellor of the University of Paris, who died in 1429. Kempis was an excellent copyist; his copy of the Bible—the labour of fifteen years—was thought a masterpiece of calligraphic art; and it has been inferred by M. Barbier and M. Leroy that he was merely employed in transcribing the work of Gerson. This inference has been drawn mainly from the name and date of an ancient manuscript of the "*De Imitatione*" preserved in the library at Valenciennes. But, as we learn from the *Débats*, M. Malou, bishop of Bruges, has found a manuscript in the library at Brussels which bears the name of Thomas à Kempis, ten years older in date than the one at Valenciennes,—and M. Muller, Bishop of Munster, has discovered several old MS. copies, one of which is of the same date as the Brussels MS., and also bears the name of Kempis. "Thus," says our contemporary, "the pious recluse of the fifteenth century, Master Thomas of Mount St. Agnes and canon of Utrecht, called Thomas à Kempis from the name of Kempen, the place of his birth, is now re-established as the true author of this celebrated and inimitable work." With this decision Belgian antiquaries will, of course, be satisfied. The controversy was one of dates and names; and the attempt to encumber it, as M. Barbier did, with comparisons of style and thought was of little use. Almost every writer has his one best book. —*Athenæum.*

We have received the sixth volume of Neander's *Allgemeine Geschichte der Christlichen Religion und Kirche.* (Hamburg, Perthes, 1852; 8vo., 805 pp.) This volume, which constitutes the eleventh part of the whole History, is edited from Neander's posthumous papers by R. F. T. Schneider, a pupil and friend of the lamented author. It embraces the *sixth* period of the History, viz., from the time of Boniface VIII. up to the Council of Constance, and so embraces a time of deep interest to the Church, covering the preliminary and preparatory steps to the great Reformation, the movements of Wiclif in England, and of Huss and his followers in Bohemia. The work, of course, will be found very different in finish and accuracy from the volumes prepared for the press by Neander's own hand; but the editor appears to have performed his difficult task intelligently and conscientiously.

We have received, but have not had time to examine, two new works on Job, viz., *Philologisch-historischer Kommentar zum Buche Hiob*, von Dr. E. J. Magnus, Breslau (Halle, 1851; 8vo., 448 pp.); and *Das Buch Hiob, verdeutscht und erläutert von* Lic. Konstantin Schottmann. (Ber-

lin, 8vo., 507 pp.) The latter has a copious Introduction of 150 pages.

We have also received *Der Prophet Hosea, erklärt und übersetzt von* Dr. August Simson, Licent. d. Theol. in Königsberg. (Hamburg, 1851; 8vo., 350 pp.)

The second volume of *Theologie*, von L. J. Ruckert, Professor in Jena, (Leipzig, 1851; 8vo., 610 pp.,) contains the historical part—the life and work of Christ, and the Christian life.

The first series of Kitto's *Journal of Sacred Literature*, 7 vols. 8vo., can now be had at the reasonable price of 31*s.* 6*d.*, bound in cloth, bringing the price to about $9 here.

The apocryphal Acts of the Apostles have been collected into a volume by Professor Tischendorf, under the title, *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha, ex triginta antiquis codicibus vel nunc primum eruit vel secundum atque emendatius edidit* C. Tischendorf, (pp. lxxx and 276, Lips., 1851.) "In this volume Professor T. has edited thirteen works professedly containing accounts of the actions of certain of the apostles. Seven of them have never before been printed; the rest appear now, with the benefit of a new revision of the text from MS. authorities."—*Journal of Sacred Literature.*

The second volume of Dr. Candlish's "*Contributions towards an Exposition of the Book of Genesis*" (Edinburgh, 1852) extends from Gen. xvii to xxviii. This work, of which the first volume appeared a number of years ago, is not a commentary upon the language of Genesis, verse by verse, nor yet a series of expository lectures, but an attempt to "unfold those views of the divine government and of the history of man, which the general strain of the narrative, in its obvious interpretation, suggests."

The *Congregational Lectures* have now reached fifteen volumes, and it is proposed by Messrs. Jackson and Walford, London, to republish them in neat octavo volumes, four at a time, the subscription for which shall be twelve shillings sterling. For the information of our readers we give a list of the whole series, as originally issued:

I. Christian Ethics; or, Moral Philosophy on the Principles of Divine Revelation. By Ralph Wardlaw, D. D.:—II. The Causes of the Corruption of Christianity. By Robert Vaughan, D. D.:—III. The Christian Atonement: its Basis, Nature, and Bearings; or, The Principle of Substitution Illustrated, as applied in the Redemption of Man. With Notes and Illustrations. By the Rev. Joseph Gilbert:—IV. Divine Inspiration; or, The Supernatural Influence exerted in the Communication of Divine Truth, and its Special Bearing on the Composition of the Sacred Scriptures. With Notes and Illustrations. By Ebenezer Henderson, D. D.:—V. Holy Scripture Verified; or, The Divine Authority of the Bible Confirmed by an appeal to facts of Science, History, and Human Consciousness. By George Redford, D. D., LL. D.:—VI. On the Relation between the Holy Scriptures and some parts of Geological Science. By John Pye Smith, D. D., F. R. S., F. G. S.:—VII. The Connexion and Harmony of the Old and New Testaments; being an Inquiry into the Relation, Literary and Doctrinal, in which these two parts of the Sacred Volume stand to each other. By William Lindsay Alexander, D.D.:—VIII. The Theology of the early Christian Church, Exhibited in Quotations from the writers of the First Three Centuries. By James Bennett, D. D.:—IX. The Existence of Evil Spirits Proved, and their Agency, particularly in relation to the Human Race, Explained and Illustrated. By the Rev. Walter Scott, President and Theological Tutor of Airedale College, Bradford, Yorkshire:—X. The Sacraments: an Inquiry into the Nature of the Symbolic Institutions of the Christian Religion, usually called the Sacraments. By Robert Halley, D. D. Part I., Baptism:—XI. The Doctrine of Original Sin; or, The Native State and Character of Man Unfolded. By the Rev. George Payne, LL. D.:—XII. The Revealed Doctrine of Rewards and Punishments. By Richard Winter Hamilton, D. D., LL.D.:—XIII. The Ecclesiastical Polity of the New Testament Unfolded, and its Points of Coincidence or Antagonism with Prevailing Systems Indicated By the Rev. S. Davidson, D. D., LL. D.:—XIV. The Work of the Spirit. By William Hendry Stowell, D. D.:—XV. The Sacraments: An Inquiry into the Nature of Symbolic Institutions of the Christian Religion. By Robt. Halley, D. D. Part. II., The Lord's Supper.

A cheap and uniform edition of the principal works of the late Rev. E. Bickersteth is announced by Seeleys, London. It will be comprised in sixteen volumes fcp. 8vo., and sold at $2. Four volumes will be issued every six months. The works to be embraced in the series are the following:—

Christian Truth; a Family Guide to the Chief Truths of the Gospel:—The Christian Student; Designed to assist Christians in general in acquiring Religious Knowledge:—A Scripture Help; Designed to assist in reading the Bible Profitably:—A Treatise on the Lord's Supper. In two parts:—A Treatise on Prayer; Designed to promote the Spirit of Devotion:—The Chief Concerns of Man for Time and for Eternity:—Family Expositions of the Epistles of St. John and St. Jude:—The Christian Hearer; a Treatise on Hearing the Word:—Family Prayers. A complete course for Eight Weeks; with Additional Prayers, suited to Various Occasions:—The Signs of the Times in the East; a Warning to the West:—The Promised Glory of the Church of Christ:—The Restoration of the Jews to their Own Land; in connexion with their Future Conversion and the Final Blessedness of our Earth:—A Practical Guide to the Prophecies:—A Treatise on Baptism; Designed as a help to the due improvement of that Holy Sacrament:—The Divine Warning to the Church, at this time, of our Enemies, Dangers and Duties, and as to our Future Prospects.

In answer to numerous questions, we state again that Clark's "Foreign Theological Library" is still publishing,—four volumes a year, subscription price one guinea per annum, amounting, in New-York, to seven dollars. Subscriptions are received by Mr. John Wiley or by Mr. G. P. Putnam, Park Place, New-York. The volumes already published (omitting Neander's Church History, which is copyrighted in this country) are Hengstenberg on the Psalms, 3 vols.:—Hagenbach's History of Doctrines, 2 vols.:—Gieseler's Ecclesiastical History, 2 vols.:—Olshausen on Gospels and Acts, 4 vols.:—on Romans; on Corinthians; on Galatians, Ephesians, Colossians, and Thessalonians; on Philippians, Titus, and First Timothy:—Havernick's Introduction to the Pentateuch:—Hengstenberg on the Apocalypse, vol. i.

Messrs. Bagsters (London) have lately published a new work designed to aid those who wish to acquire, by private study, a sufficient knowledge of Greek to read the New Testament in the original, under the title of the "*Analytical Lexicon to the Greek New Testament.*" In this work every word in the New Testament is grammatically explained and referred to its root. It is in one volume 4to., uniform with the Hebrew Analytical Lexicon, and sold at twenty-five shillings sterling.

"*Babylon and Jerusalem*" (18mo., 116 pp.) is a letter, addressed to Ida, Countess of Hahn Hahn, whom our readers will remember as a novel-writer of repute in Germany—and as a lady of more notoriety than good women generally desire. After a life of worldliness, when her novels began to pall upon the popular taste, and she found herself upon the dreary side of forty, destitute of *excitements* and of support, she turned Catholic. The first fruit of her conversion was a book entitled, "From Babylon to Jerusalem,"—and the little work before us is a reply to it. Keen, sharp, almost Pascal-like in its irony, it is yet everywhere respectful and even indulgent. The translator attributes it to Dr. Nitzsch, of Berlin.

Of the new edition of Dr. John Owen's works (publishing by Johnstone and Hunter, Edinburgh, in 16 vols. £3 3), volumes i, ii, v, vi, viii, ix, x, xiii, xiv, and xv, have already appeared. The six volumes [vols. iii, iv, vii, xi, xii, and xvi] in progress complete the Miscellaneous Works, and will be delivered in the course of 1852 and 1853.

The same publishers announce Owen's "Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews," and "Theologoumena," &c. To appear in 8 vols., demi 8vo., price to subscribers £2 2, payable 1st January, 1853, and 1st January, 1854—the volumes to be issued in the course of 1853 and 1854.

The materials for the early Ecclesiastical History of England are abundant, but few of them have been presented to the English reader. It is proposed to publish by subscription all the extant writings from Bede, inclusive, down to the date of Foxe's Acts and Monuments, on the plan of publication pursued by the Parker and other societies—three volumes of 400 pages each to be furnished annually, at the rate of £1 (stg.) a year. The series will embrace the following authors, with others: viz., 1. Gildas; 2. Nennius; 3. Bede: Ecclesiastical History and Minor Historical Works; 4. Asser; 5. Ingulf; 6. Florence of Worcester; 7. Eadmer; 8. Simeon of Durham; 9. William of Malmesbury; 10. Ordericus Vitalis; 11. Henry of Huntingdon; 12. Richard of Hexham; 13. John of Hexham; 14. Richard of Devizes; 15. Benedict of Peterborough; 16. Brompton; 17. Gervase of Canterbury; 18. Hoveden; 19. Ralph de Diceto; 20. Gi-

raldus Cambrensis; 21. Roger of Wendover; 22. Matthew Paris; 23. Hemingford; 24. Avesbury; 25. Higden; 26. Matthew of Westminster; 27. Thomas Walsingham.

To which must be added the Saxon Chronicle, and portions of various other documents, bearing upon the History. Subscriptions should be addressed to Messrs. Seeleys, 54 Fleet-street, London.

We continue our summaries of the contents of the leading European Journals of Theology:—

The *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* for April, 1852, is thus analyzed in the British Quarterly. The number opens with a long and learned dissertation, by Bleek, on the age and authorship of the latter half of the book of *Zechariah*, chapters ix to xiv. The controversy has employed the pens of De Wette and Hävernick, Hengstenberg and Umbreit, and the prophecies in question have been attributed by some to Zechariah, by others to some prophet or prophets who wrote previous to the time of the exile. Dr. Bleek advocates the latter view. The second paper is an essay, by Luthardt of Erlangen, on the reciprocal relation of "faith" and the "word of God," as exhibited in connexion in John vi, 29. It contains some acute and suggestive remarks, though the positions advanced appear here and there open to question.—Next we have a brief article from Umbreit, on the change of the name *Saul* to *Paul;* and next *A Word from France.* M. Sardinoux, professor of theology at Montauban, has translated into French Dr. Ullmann's work on the Nature of Christianity, and the latter returns the courtesy by here rendering into German the substance of M. Sardinoux's introduction. The French professor points out the inadequacy of the many contrivances whereby his countrymen have sought for the last half-century to strain social renovation. The French people resemble some luckless alchemist, ever sanguine though ever disappointed. About them lies in heaps their costly and useless apparatus—the implements of the never-realized projection, most of them in fragments, all in disorder. The laborious enthusiasts are scorched by their own furnace, scarred by the explosion of their choicest preparations. What can M. Sardinoux say? He reiterates the truth that the gospel only can bring healing. He speaks earnestly, though in general terms. Napoleon has fixed, for a time at least, that balance which used to waver with every mind, and determined it after the old and barbarous fashion of the Gallic conquerors of Rome—by throwing the sword into the scale. M. Sardinoux observes that Christianity had in the cradle to contend with two enemies, the Jewish and the Pagan error; that Paul was her champion against the first, John against the second. These two serpents would seem to have been rather driven away than strangled by the infant Hercules. The former revived in the pageant of the mass and the power of the hierarchy; the latter lives again in the infidelity of the time. The Gnostic follies of the second century, with their mythology of abstraction, their pseudo-intellectualism, and their immoral tendencies, have all been paralleled or outdone by the socialist theories and sceptical dogmatism of the nineteenth. M. Sardinoux thinks that we must exhibit Christianity in the spirit of John to counteract this evil, as Luther maintained it after the type of Paul to destroy the other. There is some truth in this; but, as for France, she has more to dread, we think, from popery than from scepticism, and lacks a Paul even more than a John. Popery is the royal mistress now of the continental despots, the intriguing courtesan who guides in secret the politics of tyranny. All those in France who have any of the old Roman spirit in them, will see in Jesuitism the Sejanus of the modern Tiberius who occupies the throne of France, who lives environed by his legions, prescribes to a senate of automata, and whose only faith is universal suspicion, his sole instrument universal terror.—The *Systematic Theology* of Martensen, a Danish professor, is reviewed at great length, and very favourably, by Schöberlein. Dr. Martensen is already known to us by an able little volume on Master Eckart. In that work, modestly entitled, "A Historic Study," Martensen takes a more favourable view of the opinions of this mystic than that entertained by Dr. Schmidt in a paper which appeared some years ago in the *Studien und Kritiken.* From what we have read of Eckart, we are inclined to think that he should not be classed, as Martensen would place him, with Tauler. Allowance should be made for the apparently pantheistic expressions of a poetical philosophy or religionism. But the matter and manner of Eckart are scientific and metaphysical to a remarkable degree for the class to which he belonged. Unlike such men as Xenophanes, Novalis, or our own Sir Thomas Browne, who wrote poetical rhapsodies on philosophical questions, Eckart is argumentative and self-possessed, and there is not so large a deduction to be made in his case from the fervour or the fancy of occasional expressions. In his theology, which would appear to be in many respects a work of much value for Germany, Dr. Martensen has marked out a path for himself, somewhat similar to that of Twesten, as a corrector of the prominent defects of Schleiermacher's system. He handles religion more as a question of truth, and less as one of individual experience. While his system has inevitably a speculative character, he is careful to part off the respective domains

of theology and philosophy. In his view of evil he approaches too nearly to the doctrine of Schelling, though his estimate of sin as a whole appears to us more adequate than that of Schleiermacher. His theology is strongly imbued with what may be termed the Trinitarian type, which has of late found much favour in Germany among men of very opposite opinions. All is arranged according to a supposed threefold development of the Divine Nature, and on the subject of the "Immanent," as distinct from the revealed, Trinity, Martensen loses himself, like many before him, in a maze of words.—A posthumous work of Vinet's, entitled *Pastoral Theology, or, The Theory of the Evangelical Ministry*, is reviewed by Dr. Kienlen. From the brief outline given, it would appear to be all that might be expected from the reputation of this first of modern French theologians. The book ought not to remain long without finding an English translator. —Kling reviews the *fourth Evangelical Church-day*, held at Elberfeld in Sept., 1851. The number closes with an article on the programme of the *Hague Union for the Defence of the Christian Religion* for 1851.

Kitto's Journal of Sacred Literature, for April:—I. Romanism as it is: II. Gregory of Nazianzum: III. The Rephaim: IV. Alford's Greek Testament: V. On the Nature of a Miracle: VI. Recent Travels in Palestine: VII. Elijah's Coming: VIII. The Last Blessings of Jacob: IX. The Epistle to Diognetus: X. Israel after the Flesh: XI. Remarks on 1 Chron. vi, 16–38, and Rev. xxii, 8, 9.

North British Review, for May:—I. Prospects of British Statesmanship and Policy: II. Phrenology—its Place and Relations: III. Village Life in England: IV. Romanism and European Civilization: V. Life and Chemistry: VI. King Alfred: VII. Binocular Vision and the Stereoscope: VIII. Memoirs of Dr. Chalmers.

Prospective Review, for May:—I. Life and Letters of Niebuhr: II. English Liturgies, Ancient and Reformed: III. German Letters on English Education: IV. Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli: V. The Reform Act of 1832: VI. The Soul in Nature.

Theological Critic, for April:—I. Greg's Creed of Christendom: II. Remarks on Henderson's Translation of Isaiah: III. Gottschalk and the Predestinarian Controversy of the Ninth Century: IV. Romans ix, x, xi: V. The Evidence of the Genuineness of the Gospels: VI. Newman's Lectures, addressed to the Brothers of the Oratory: VII. The Cycles of Egyptian Chronology: VIII. 1 Tim. iv, 7–10.

Eclectic Review, for April:—I. India and our Supply of Cotton: II. Works of J. Fenimore Cooper: III. Wilkinson on the Connexion of the Human Body with Man: IV. Merivale's Imperial Rome: V. Patent Law Amendment: VI. Longfellow's Golden Legend: VII. Science and Religion: VIII. Roebuck's History of the Reform Ministry. *May*:—I. History of Maynooth College: II. Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament: III. Lord Holland's History of the Whig Party: IV. Representative Men: V. Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Rattlesnake: VI. Howitt's Literature and Romance of Northern Europe: VII. The Life of Lord Jeffrey. *June*: —I. Life and Letters of Niebuhr: II. Miss Kavanagh's Women of Christianity: III. Memoirs of Margaret Fuller: IV. Dr. Hooker's Rhododendrons: V. Local History and Public Libraries: VI. Bancroft's History of the American Revolution: VII. The Visible Heavens: VIII. Deans and Chapters.

Christian Remembrancer, for April:—I. Tartary and Thibet—Budhism: II. Caswall's America: III. Perrone on the Immaculate Conception: IV. Margaret Fuller Ossoli: V. Paley's Supplices of Æschylus.

Our English brethren are taking a hint from American publishers. A new "Foreign Evangelical Review" is announced, to be published quarterly, and to consist chiefly of articles from the Reviews and Magazines of the United States. It will contain 224 pages, and be sold at about fifty cents a number.

Among the books in theology and kindred subjects recently announced on the continent of Europe are the following:

Synopsis evangeliorum Matthæi, Marci, Lucæ cum locis qui supersunt parallelis litterarum et traditionum evangelicarum Irenæo antiquiorum. Ad Griesbachii ordinem concinnavit, prolegomena, selectam scripturæ varietatem, notas, indices adjecit *Rud. Anger*, Phil. et Theol. Dr., utriusque in acad. Lips. Professor, &c. Lipsiæ, 1852. 314 pp., 4to.

Lehrbuch d. Kirchengeschichte zunächst für höhere Lehranstalten. Von *Hnr. Kurtz*, Dr. der Theol. und ord. Prof. an der Univ. Dorpat, u. s. w. Mitau, 1852. 244 pp., 8vo.

Die Waldenser im Mittelalter. Zwei historische Untersuchungen von *A. Will.*

Dieckhoff, Lic. und Privatdoc. der Theol. z. Göttingen. Göttingen, 1851. 420 pp., 8vo.

Specimen e litteris orientalibus, exhibens Librum Genescos, secundum arabicam pentateuchi samaritani versionem, ab *Abu-Sa:ido* conscriptam, quod —— ex tribus codicibus edidit *Abrah. Kuenen*, Theol. Dr. Lugd. Bat., 1851. 189 pp., 8vo.

Ueber Micha den Morasthiten und seine prophetische Schrift. Ein monographischer Beitrag zur Geschichte des alttestamentl. Schriftthums und zur Auslegung des Buches Micha. Von Dr. *C. P. Caspari*, Lic. u. Lect. der Theol. an der norwegischen Universität. Christiania, 1851. 180 pp., 8vo.

Geschichte des Priszillianismus. Ein Versuch von *Joh. Matth. Mandernach*, Priester der Diöcese Trier. Trier, 1851. 112 pp. 8vo.

Beiträge zur Erklärung des alten Testamentes. Drei Abhandlungen. Von Dr. *Laur. Reinke*, Prof. 1. Die Schwierigkeiten und Widersprüche mancher Zahlangaben in den Büchern des alten Testamentes und deren Entstehung und Lösung. 2. Ueber das Recht der Israeliten an Canaan und über die Ursache seiner Eroberung und der Vertilgung seiner Einwohner durch die Israeliten, und die verschiedenen Erklärungsversuche darüber. 3. Ueber das Gelübde Jephta's Richt. xi, 30–40. Münster, 1851. 532 pp., 8vo.

Commentarius perpetuus in prioris Pauli ad Corinthios epistolæ caput quintum decimum. Cum epistola ad *Winerum*, theologum Lipsiensem, auctore *Wess. Alb. van Hengel*. Roterodami, 1851. 271 pp., 8vo.

Versuch einer vollständigen Einleitung in die Offenbarung des Johannes, und die apokalyptische Litteratur überhaupt. Von Dr. *Fr. Lücke*. 2. verm. u. verb. Auflage. 2. Lief. die Einleitung in die Johanneische Apokalypse, enthaltend 1. Abthlg. Bonn, 1851. 343–566 pp., 8vo.

De evangeliorum apocryphorum origine et usu. Disquisitio hist. critica, quam præmio aureo dignam censuit societas Hagana pro defendenda religione christiana. Auctore Dr. *C. Tischendorf*, Prof. Hagæ Comitum. (Lugduni Batav., 1851. 231 pp., 8vo.

Among the works in Theology and kindred subjects recently announced in Great Britain, are the following :—

Dissertation on the Origin and Connexion of the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke. With a Synopsis of the Parallel Passages in Greek and English; and Critical Notes. By James Smith, Esq., of Jordanhill, F.R.S., &c., author of the 'Voyage and Shipwreck of St. Paul,' &c. :—A History of the Christian Church; for the use of Students in Theology, and general readers. Part I.—To the Reformation. By Rev. James C. Robertson, M.A. 2 vols., 8vo. :—A Memoir of the Rev. W. B. Johnson, Missionary of the Church Missionary Society at Regent's Town, Sierra Leone. Compiled from his own Journals and Correspondence. In one volume, fcp. 8vo. :—Nuns and Nunneries. Sketches, compiled entirely from Romish Authorities. In foolscap 8vo. :—Hippolytus and his age; or, Doctrine and Practice of the Church of Rome under Commodus and Alexander Severus. By C. C. J. Bunsen, D.C.L. 3 vols., post 8vo. :—A Handbook of Hebrew Antiquities. For the Use of Schools and Young Persons. By the Rev. Henry Brown, M.A., Prebendary of Chichester; edited by the Rev. T. K. Arnold, M.A., Rector of Lyndon, and late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 12mo. :—Eight Essays on Various Subjects. By the Rev. S. R. Maitland, D.D., F.R.S., and F.S.A. Small 8vo. :—Eruvin; or, Miscellaneous Essays on the Nature, History, and Destiny of Man. Second edition :—The Life of Cardinal Wolsey. By George Cavendish, his Gentleman Usher. New edition, reprinted from Dr. Wordsworth's Ecclesiastical Biography, with the addition of numerous Historical and Biographical Notes. 4to. :—Letters on the Church of Rome, addressed to the Rev. Emmanuel Farant, D.D., and L.L.D., Chaplain to the King of Sardinia, and Italian Missionary to England. By the Hon. and Rev. Baptist W. Noel, M.A. Fcp. 8vo. :—Lectures delivered before the Young Men's Christian Association, at Exeter Hall, during 1851–52. Fcp. 8vo. :—Rationale Apocalypticum; or, a Systematic Exposition of the Revelation: with Historical Proofs and Illustrations. To which is appended an Analysis of the principal Modern Commentaries from Mede downwards, including a Practical Examination of Mr. Elliot's "Horæ Apocalypticæ." By the Rev. Alfred Jenour. 2 vols., 8vo. :—The Eclipse of Faith; or, a Visit to a Religious Sceptic. Post 8vo. :—Count Arensberg; or, the Days of Martin Luther. By the Rev. Joseph Sortain, B.A. Trinity College, Dublin. 2 vols., post 8vo. :—Progress of the Reformation in Ireland. A Series of Letters Written from the West of Ireland to a Friend in England, in September, 1851.

By the Earl of Roden. Second edition. Fcap. 8vo.:—The Resurrection of Life: an Exposition of 1 Cor. xv, with a Discourse on our Lord's Resurrection, by John Brown, D. D. 8vo.:—The Triple Crown; or, the Power, Course, and Doom of the Papacy.

AMERICAN.

We are glad to see it announced that a new and complete edition of the works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, edited by Prof. Shedd, of the University of Vermont, is in the press of Harper and Brothers. It is to be issued in six or eight handsomely printed volumes.

The *Thirty-third* Annual Report of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church (1852) is a well-filled document of 252 pages. It is by far the most thorough and complete Report that has yet been issued, thanks to the energy and skill of the corresponding Secretary, Dr. Durbin. Illustrations, in the form of maps and plates, are not wanting; and the statistical tables at the end are very full. We should be glad to give an abstract of this excellent Report, did our limits allow; but we must content ourselves with expressing the hope that it will be scattered broadcast among the Churches, and do its work in stirring up the people to new zeal in the great cause of Christian Missions.

The first number of the "*Presbyterian Quarterly Review*" givesp romise of a valuable journal. It contains seven articles:—I. "Our Church and Our Review," defining the position of both, and showing in the wants of the one the call for the other: II. "The Mission of the Presbyterian Church," which, according to the writer, may be summed in four principles: 1. Religious Liberty in contrast with ecclesiastical power; 2. A living Calvinism in contrast with a rigid dogmatic system, enforced in the *ipsissima verba* of the formularies; 3. A cooperative Christianity, in contrast with an exclusive ecclesiasticism; and 4. the aggressive, in contrast with the exclusively conservative type of Christianity. Art. III. is an Introduction to the Book of Daniel; IV. is an explanation and brief vindication of Geology; Art. V. (the ablest in the number) is an examination of the doctrine of "Development" as taught by Newman and Möhler, in its application to Romanism; Art. VI. is an earnest address to the Laymen of the Presbyterian Church on their relations to the Church and to the Ministry; and Art. VII. contains notices of books. We welcome this Review into the ranks of quarterly journalism, and wish it all possible success.

We continue our summaries of the contents of the American Theological Journals:—

Evangelical Review, (Gettysburg, Pa.,) for April:—I. Martin Luther, in Pictorial Representations, &c.: II. Theories of Inspiration: III. The Influence of Physical Temperament on the Expression of Religious Feeling: IV. The Necessity and Authority of Apostolic Tradition: V. The Importance of Properly Developing the Resources of the Lutheran Church in America: VI. Works of Melancthon: VII. Journal of a Voyage by Rev. Dr. Muhlenberg.

Brownson's Quarterly Review, (Boston,) for April:—I. The Existence of God: II. The Two Worlds, Catholic and Gentile: III. Austria and Hungary: IV. Paganism in Education: V. Reason and Revelation: VI. Protestantism and Government.

Christian Examiner, (Boston,) for April: I. The Andover and Princeton Theologies: II. Murray's and Latham's English Grammars: III. Conditions of Social Progress: IV. The New Exodus: V. The Procession of the Holy Ghost: VI. Juvenile Depravity and Reformatory Schools: VII. The Rev. William Ware: VIII. Life and Letters of Niebuhr.

Bibliotheca Sacra, (Andover,) for April:—I. India as a Field of Inquiry and Evangelical Labour: II. The Grotian Theory of the Atonement, from the German: III. Life of Zuingli, continued: IV. Writings of Richard Baxter: V. Observations on Matthew xxiv, 29–31, and the Parallel Passages in Mark and Luke, with Remarks on the Double Sense of Scripture: VI. The Practical Element in Christianity: VII. Remarks on the Idea of Religion from the German.

Biblical Repertory, (Princeton,) for April:—I. Works of John Owen, D. D.: II. Early Christianity in the British Isles: III. National Literature, the Exponent of National Character: IV. The Prophet Obadiah, Expounded by Charles Paul Caspaln: V. The Jews at X'ae-fung-foo: VI. Lectures on the

Evidences of Christianity: VII. Bristed's Five Years in an English University: VIII. Parrhesia, or Christian and Ministerial Freedom of Speech.

Christian Review, (New-York,) for April:—I. Life and Writings of Andrew Fuller: II. The Method of the Divine Government: III. Recent German Works on Latin Grammar: IV. The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit's Presence in the World, Examined: V. Administrations of Washington and Adams: VI. Customs, Manners, and Religion of Nicaragua, in Central America: VII. Moses Stuart: VIII. Baptism for the Dead.

Church Review, (New-Haven,) for April:—I. Modern Theories of Social Progress: II. Western Church Missions: III. Syriac Biblical Literature: IV. Letter on the Confirmation of Converts from Rome: V. Type of Church Life: VI. The Church and the Times: VII. Stephen's Lectures on the History of France: VIII. American Ecclesiastical History—Humphrey's History of the Propagation Society, &c.

Quarterly Review of the Methodist E. Church, South, (Richmond,) for April:—I. Remarks, Exegetical and Doctrinal, on Gal. iii, 6–21: II. Power of the Soul over the Body: III. Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D. D.: IV. Hannah More: V. Relation of the Church to Missions: VI. The Divine Government: VII. Sketches and Skeletons.

Mercersburg Review, (Mercersburg, Pa.,) for April: I. Protestantism and Romanism: II. Philosophy of Persecution: III. The Synergistic Laws of Spiritual Life in Man IV. The Heidelberg Catechism: V. Latin Pronunciation: VI. Systematic Benevolence: VII. A Word of Explanation.

Southern Presbyterian Review, (Columbia, S. C.,) for April:—I. The Harmony of Revelation and Natural Science—The Final Conflagration: II. Pronunciation of Greek: III. The Character of Moses: IV. Remarks upon the Will, with some Strictures upon the Opinions of M'Cosh: V. Analogy of the Southern Language of Europe with the Latin: VI. The Unity of the Human Race.

Theological and Literary Journal, (New-York,) for April:—I. Genesis and the Theological Theory of the Age of the Earth: II. The Sabbath and its Modern Assailants: III. Progress of the Nineteenth Century: IV. Metaphysical and Gospel Truth and Error: V. The Figurative Character of the Sacred Writings.

Universalist Quarterly, (Boston,) for April:—I. Progress, as exhibited in the Government of Ancient Greece: II. Importance of Universalism in Religious Culture: III. Cranmer and the Anglican Church: IV. The Soul in the Future State: V. Tyre, Commerce, and Prophecy: VI. Justification by Faith, and Justification by Works: VII. Washington; or, Greatness.

Classical and Miscellaneous.

EUROPEAN.

The Messrs. Grimm have recently announced their German Dictionary; and the favour with which it has been received may be gathered from the fact of its sale to the 20th of April having exceeded 7000 copies; the first part, consisting of 120 pages, contains about half of letter A, printed in royal 8vo., double columns.

The Leipsic Catalogue of publications for the half-year ending Michaelmas last (fair of St. Michael) comprehended 3860 titles, and 1163 in preparation; that of the Easter book-fair of the last six months, publications 4527, representing the issues of 903 publishers,—one contributing 113, and another 95.

Among the works in Philology and general Literature recently announced on the continent of Europe are the following:—

Gesammelte Abhandlungen aus dem classischen Alterthume. Von *C. W. Göttling*, Prof. zu Jena. 1 Bd. Halle, 1851. 405 pp.

Die vier Elemente der Baukunst. Ein Beitrag zur vergleichenden Baukunde, von *Gottfr. Semper*, ehemal. Director der Bauschule zu Dresden. Braunschweig, 1851. 108 pp., 8vo.

Thorvaldsen's Leben nach den eigenhändigen Aufzeichnungen, nachgelassenen Papieren und dem Briefwechsel des Künstlers. Von *Just. Mt. Thiele*. Deutsch unter Mitwirkung des Vf. von *Hnr. Helms*. 1. Bd. Mit d. Portrait Thorvaldsen's nach Eckersberg. Leipzig, 1852. 351 pp., 8vo.

Geschichte der Erziehung, des Unterrichts und der Bildung bei den Griechen, Etruskern und Römern. Aus den Quellen

dargestellt von Dr. *J. H. Krause.* Halle, 1851. 453 pp., 8vo.

De l'éducation. Système théorique et pratique d'émulation et de discipline, &c., par *M. Depau*, chef d'institution. Paris, 1852. 8vo.

Mythologie der Skandinavier und Deutschen mit Bezugstellen aus deutschen und nordischen Dichtern. Von *A. J. Weidenbach.* Frankfurt a. M., 1851. 456 pp., 8vo.

Among the new works recently announced in Great Britain are the following:

Lieut. Sherard Osborn's Stray Leaves from an Arctic Journal. Post 8vo.:—Mr. Samuel Laing's Notes on the Political and Social State of Denmark and the Duchies of Holstein and Sleswick. 8vo.:—China during the War and since the Peace. By Sir John F. Davis, Bart., late Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary in China. 2 vols., post 8vo., with Maps and Wood Engravings:—The Life of the Rev. W. Kirby: Chiefly from his Journals and Letters. By the Rev. John Freeman, M. A. 8vo. With Portrait and View of Barham Parsonage:—Dr. Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases classified and arranged to facilitate the Expression of Ideas and assist in Literary Composition:—Memoirs of the Whig Party during my time. By Henry Richard Lord Holland. Edited by his son, Henry Edward Lord Holland. Vol. I. Post 8vo.:—The Life of Marie de Medicis, Queen of France, Consort of Henry IV. By Miss Pardoe, author of "The City of the Sultan," &c. 3 vols., 8vo.:—Thirty-five Years in the East. Adventures, Discoveries, Experiments, and Historical Sketches, relating to the Punjab and Cashmere. By John Martin Konigberger, late Physician to the Court of Lahore. 2 vols., 8vo.:—Niebuhr's Lectures on Ancient History: Comprising the History of the Asiatic Nations, the Egyptians, Greeks, Carthaginians, and Macedonians. Translated from the German by Dr. L. Schmitz. 3 vols., 8vo.:—On the Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics. By G. Cornewall Lewis, M. P. 2 vols., 8vo.:—Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England. By W. Whewell, D. D., Master of Trinity College, Cambridge:—Leaves from the Note Book of a Naturalist. By W. J. Broderip, F. R. S. Reprinted from *Fraser's Magazine*:—Meliora; or, Better Times to Come. Edited by Viscount Ingestre, and containing Papers by Rev. T. Beames, Hon. F. Byng, W. Beckett Denison, Rev. C. Girdlestone, Viscount Goderich, Montague Gore, Dr. Guy, Rev. Dr. Hook, H. Mayhew, Rev. C. G. Nicolay, Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne, Rev. J. B. Owen, Martin F. Tupper:—The Six Colonies of New-Zealand. By W. Fox:—Handbook of the Religion and Mythology of the Greeks: with a Short Account of the Religious System of the Romans. From the German of Professor Stoll, by the Rev. R. B. Paul, and edited by the Rev. T. K. Arnold, M. A.:—Political Elements; or, The Principles of Modern Legislation. By Joseph Mosely, B. C. L.:—African Wanderings; or, an Expedition from Sennaar to Taka, Basa, and Beni-Amer; with a particular glance at the Races of Bellad-Sudan. By F. Werne, author of "Expedition in search of Sources of the White Nile." Translated from the German by J. R. Johnston. 16mo.:—Varieties of Mankind; or, an Account of the Distinctive Characters of the principal Races of Men. By W. B. Carpenter, M. D., F. R. S., F. G. S., Examiner in Physiology in the University of London. With numerous Engravings on Wood. Being Dr. Carpenter's Article on the Varieties of Mankind, reprinted, with Alterations and Additions, from "Todd's Cyclopædia of Anatomy and Physiology:"—Notes on Public Subjects, made during a tour in the United States and Canada. By Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, Esq., author of "The Political Experience of the Ancients." Post 8vo.:—Lives of the Earls of Essex, 1450 to 1646. 1. The Earl Marshal of Ireland.—2. The Favourite.—3. The General of the Parliament. Founded upon Letters and Documents chiefly unpublished. By the Hon. Capt. Devereux, R.N. 2 vols.:—My Home in Tasmania, during a residence of nine years. By Mrs. Charles Meredith, author of "Notes and Sketches of New South Wales." With Illustrations. Post 8vo.

We continue our summaries of the principal Reviews of Great Britain:—

Quarterly Review, for April:—I. Sir Roger De Coverley: II. Horace Walpole's Garland: III. Diary of General Patrick Gordon: IV. Recent Epics: V. Comparative Anatomy: VI. Bohemian Embassy to England, &c., 1466: VII. Cannon, Musket, and Rifle: VIII. California *versus* Free Trade: IX. George III.—Grenville and Rockingham Papers—Lord Mahon's History, Vol. V. and VI.: X. Lamartine's History of the Restoration: XI. Lord John Russell and the Earl of Derby.

Edinburgh Review, for April:—I. Tronson du Coudray; Nouvelles Causes Celebres: II. National Education: III. The Temporal Power of the Pope, Farini: IV. Athenian Architecture—Penrose: V. Industrial Investments: VI. J. Knoxe's Liturgy: VII. Mallet du Pan: VIII. Roebuck's History of the Whigs: IX. Squier's Nicaragua: X. Lord Derby's Ministry and Protection.

Dublin Review, for April:—I. Philosophic Researches on Christianity: II. Scipio de Rici: III. The Leeds Experiment in Anglicanism: IV. Scandinavian Literature—The Royal Mirror: V. Are Heroes always Heroic: VI. Mignet's Mary Stuart: VII. Worsaae's Account of the Danes and Norwegians in England, Scotland, and Ireland: VIII. Dr. Newman's Lectures on the Present Position of Catholicism in England: IX. Lady Theologians.

English Review, for April:—I. Alison's Marlborough: II. Modern Latin Versification: III. Dr. Newman and Protestant Prejudice: IV. Archer Gourney's Poems: V. National Defences—Colonel Chesney: VI. Price on the Anglo-Catholic Theory: VII. Works of Eliot Warburton.

Irish Quarterly Review, for March:—I. History of the Streets of Dublin: II. D'Israeli's Biography of Bentinck—Free Trade and no Trade: III. Mitford's Literary Recollections: IV. Maturin: V. Sam Slick's American Humour: VI. Irish Church History.

Westminster Review, for April:—I. The Government of India: II. Physical Puritanism: III. Europe—its Condition and Prospects: IV. A Theory of Population, deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility: V. Shelley and the Letters of Poets: VI. The Commerce of Literature: VII. Lord Palmerston and his Policy: VIII. Early Quakers and Quakerism: IX., X., XI., XII. Contemporary Literature of England, America, Germany, and France.

A NEW MONTHLY.

THE subscribers will issue in July the first number of a new monthly publication, to be entitled THE NATIONAL MAGAZINE, *devoted to Literature, Art, Religion, and General Intelligence.* Its denomination as "National" is not designed to limit it to native productions or national topics, but to express its adaptation to the national tastes and to a national circulation. It will consist largely of choice selections from the current periodical literature of the parent country and of continental Europe; but it shall be characteristically American in its sentiments, and will abundantly represent our indigenous literature.

Assuming that a "progressive" spirit, practical predilections, and the religious sentiment, are characteristics of the American mind, and that these are not incapable of union with the best æsthetic tastes, it will be the aim of this periodical to combine, with such articles as the popular mind usually relishes with most avidity, an elevated literary tone, a critical appreciation of art, the discussion of great practical questions, and a just recognition of religion—religion without dogmatism and without sectarianism. Nothing shall appear in it which can directly or indirectly offend the general Christian sentiment, or render it unwelcome to the purest religious family. On the contrary, it will endeavour to enhance its literary and other attractions by a pervading religious spirit. It is, in fine, the design of the publishers to make it acceptable alike to the lovers of elegant but healthful literature, to the domestic circle, and to the literary man in his study.

It will be embellished with numerous engravings—most of them illustrative of real scenes or facts.

Besides an abundant miscellany of Essays, Sketches, Translations, Poetry, &c., original and selected, it will comprise departments of Literary News, Art Intelligence, Book Notices, Religious Information, and General News, prepared thoroughly by skilful hands.

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It will be published at the commencement of each month, and contain ninety-six pages per number, making two volumes per annum, of nearly six hundred pages each. It will be the largest monthly of its price in the United States.

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CARLTON & PHILLIPS.

The first number is in press, and will be out shortly. Its contents are—

Periodical Literature. Editorial.
Sketch of Stephen Olin. (Engraving.)
Sketch of Dr. Lyman Beecher. (Engraving.)
Milton. (Five engravings.)
Greek Schools of Philosophy. (Two engs.)
The Jews' Wailing-Place at Jerusalem. (Engraving.)
Poem—The Child in Heaven.
Sketch of Sterling—Religion of Carlyle.
Poem—An old Idea newly Clad.
Be not too Fastidious.
The Armenian Church and Mount Ararat.
Autobiography of a Shilling.
Romantic Fables and Popular Superstitions.
Grundtvig and his Song of Praise.
Peter Cartwright—A Character.
The Beacon-Fire of the Tyrol.—Founded upon fact.
Bob Multiform—The "Ne'er do Well."
Zezides; or, Devil Worshippers.
Cap of Liberty.
Thomas Moore—His Character as an Author.
Poem—Be Strong: A Word to the Fearful of Heart.
The Schoolmaster in Georgia.
History of the Pearl.
Marriage Ceremonies.
Hartley Coleridge.
Dust Showers and Red Rain.
Control of Temper.
Monomaniacs—Ludicrous Examples.
Synchronistics—The year 1618.
The Daughter's Marriage.
Lieutenant Holman, the Blind Traveller.
Herschell, Rosse, and the Telescope.
Mrs. Frye.
Murillo—Extraordinary Tuition Scene. (Eng.)
Art Intelligence.
Literary Record.
Religious Summary.
Scientific Items.
Editorial Notes.

THE

METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1852.

ART. I.—THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF CREATION.

"IT seems to be established that the stratified rocks, above the primary, contain petrified relics of both plants and animals. The thickness of these fossil-bearing rocks is from three to seven miles, measuring from the surface of the earth towards its centre. Through this entire mass of rock organic remains are unequally but profusely distributed. The number of their distinct species amounts to nearly ten thousand. These organic remains exist in quantities incalculably great; in some instances, mainly constituting entire mountains. They vary in size from the skeletons of huge monsters to those of animalculæ so small that forty thousand millions are contained in a single cubic inch. The less complex and perfect tribes of animals and plants predominate in the lower strata, and those of a higher organization, approaching, as to structure, the types now existing, occupy the formations near the surface of the earth. The general order in which they occur, ascending from below, is fish, reptiles, birds, mammalia. Some specimens of each type, however, are found in all the higher formations. The races, both vegetable and animal, preserved in the fossil state, are, with few exceptions, now extinct; and finally, a remarkable circumstance, no traces of the human being, either of his person or his arts, have been discovered in the fossiliferous strata. These facts are supposed to be established.

"The deductions derived by geologists from these premises are, that there has been a series of distinct creations on earth, occurring at intervals indefinitely long. At first, animals and vegetables, of the simplest organization—shell-fish and mosses being the prevalent types—were created, destroyed, and imbedded in the growing rock; then a higher order of life was brought into existence—reptiles and cone-bearing trees predominating. These in turn became extinct and petrified. Upon these a third and yet higher creation was superimposed, and was in its turn entombed, to give place to another and

more perfect system, until at last the earth, as it now is, was formed of the wrecks of all the earlier creations, and man, made a little lower than the angels, was ushered into existence. It is further held, that the first and second verses in the book of Genesis, relate to the earlier and imperfect creations, and the narrative which follows, of God's work in six days, describes the formation of the world as it now exists, with its firmament, its dry land and waters, and all their teeming tribes. 'Such is the latest theory of the creation. It is undoubtedly a splendid hypothesis; but we must be pardoned if we hesitate to adopt it, in the present unsettled state of the science. We must be allowed to subject both the facts and the theory resting on them to a severe and almost a sceptical scrutiny."*

The above long quotation is given because it contains a very recent, perspicuous, and, to a good degree, correct summary of "the facts, and the theory resting on them," as they are now taught; but especially is it given because it closes with an acknowledgment of that *hesitancy* and even scepticism with which both the facts and the theory are received by the mass of eminent theologians. The prevailing theory, as to the record in Genesis, would perhaps be more accurately expressed as follows:—

1st. That "the first verse is a simple announcement of the great fact, that God originally, *in the beginning*," at *some* "point in the flow of infinite duration," brought *into being* the materials of the universe.†

2d. That the long lapse of ages, during which the fossiliferous rocks were deposited, is passed over in silence.

3d. That "the second verse describes the state of the earth, previous to its being filled up for its present races,"‡ and that the remainder of the record gives an account of six literal days' work, which God employed about six thousand years ago, in fitting up the earth to its present condition, and in furnishing it with its present inhabitants.§

It is the purpose of this article to show that the Mosaic record is a literal account of the origin of the present order of things, in which every word is used in its ordinary, obvious meaning. To prove this, we shall endeavour to show:—I. That the word "beginning" does not refer to the origin of matter, but to the beginning of the Human Dispensation. II. That בָּרָא, [bah-rah, create,] in most passages where it occurs, *cannot* mean "to make out of nothing:"—that in no passage has it necessarily that meaning; and that probably it is

* Dr. E. P. Humphrey's Address, at Centre College, Ky., pp. 6, 7.

† Dr. Stowe. Dr. J. Pye Smith, Scrip. and Geol., pp. 227, 228. ‡ Dr. Stowe.

§ Hitchcock's Geol., p. 296, and others.

used in that signification nowhere in the Scriptures: and III. That the fossiliferous rocks of the geologist were deposited during periods antecedent to the "beginning," mentioned in the Mosaic record, and hence cannot present facts in conflict with those given in the Scriptures.

I. We are, first, to show that the word "beginning" does not refer to the origin of matter, but to the beginning of the Human Dispensation.

It is true, that most theologians, acquainted with the facts of geology, give a kind of assent to the correctness of the hypothesis quoted above from Dr. J. Pye Smith, and others; but it is generally a very reluctant assent—an assent, the heartiness of which is intimated when they say, "It is better to accept this explanation than to admit a disagreement between science and revelation." But when they would point out, in detail, the coincidences between this theory and the sacred record, they find they "*must not be too particular about it.*" The most familiar passage which seems to conflict with the theory interposing millions of years before the creation of heaven and earth and that of the existing races, is that giving the reasons for the observance of the Sabbath-day: Exodus xx, 11, "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day," &c. If this passage had been written by one who had in his mind the truth of the above theory, we might expect it to run thus, "For, though God created the heaven and the earth millions of years ago, yet in six days he created all that in them is, and rested the seventh day," &c.; or rather, we should expect allusion to be made to that work only which he performed in *the six days after which he rested*, in commemoration of which we are commanded to sanctify the Sabbath.

The explanation commonly given of this apparent disagreement (not between science and revelation, but) between theory and the Scriptures, is, that the account of the creation given by Moses in the fourth commandment is much briefer than that given in the first of Genesis; and "that when a writer describes an event more than once, his briefer description is to be explained by his more extended account; so that the fourth commandment is to be explained by the fuller description in Genesis of the same event."* Still, if "the heaven and the earth" were not created during the time of the six days' creation, and had no connexion with the rest of the seventh, it would seem natural that Moses, for the sake of brevity, as well as consistency, would make no allusion to it, when enforcing that rest. The fact, therefore, that Moses *does* mention that work in this con-

* Hitchcock's Geol., p. 296.

nexion, is evidence that it was (at least) a part of the six days' labour, which wound up with the Sabbath.

But there is another passage to which this explanation will apply with still less plausibility. In Exodus xxxi, 17, God commanded Moses to say of the Sabbath, "It is a sign between me and the children of Israel forever; for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day he rested and was refreshed." Here is a case in which the statement is *so brief*, that in urging the observance of the seventh day, the work which, *according to the theory*, was really performed on the six days, from which the seventh was a rest, is not even hinted at, while that accomplished ages before, and hence having nothing to do with the "rest," is given in full! This is certainly the most remarkable instance of brevity on record!

These three passages, written under the guidance of inspiration, by the same pen, are here quoted together, that their mutual bearing may be more fully seen:—

"*In the beginning* God created the heaven and the earth." Gen. i, 1.

"*For in six days* the LORD made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested," &c. Exod. xx, 11.

"*For in six days* the LORD made heaven and earth, and on the seventh he rested and was refreshed." Exod. xxxi, 17.

It is difficult to perceive how there can be a difference of opinion as to the general scope of these quotations. The phrases in the first and third, "the heaven and the earth," and in the second, "the heaven and the earth, the sea, and all that in them is," are clearly summary expressions, comprehending the same particulars, viz., the whole work of recorded creation; and it is equally clear that this whole work was accomplished in the "six days." It results that "in the beginning," of the first, and "in six days," of the second and third, are synonymous expressions; the "beginning" referring not to the first creative act merely, but to that series of acts extending through six days, which, as a whole, is termed the "beginning" of the Human Dispensation. Thus every creative act, from the command, "Let there be light," to the formation of the crowning glory of the sinless world—the mother of our race—was performed "in the beginning."

Such is the uniform testimony of Scripture. Our Saviour, speaking of the institution of marriage, and of the permission of divorce for trivial causes, says, (Matt. xix, 8,) "at *the beginning* it was not so." "But from the *beginning of the creation* God made them male and female," &c. Mark x, 6. The "*beginning*," and the "*beginning of the creation*," refer to that spoken of in Genesis i, 1, and are explained by the Saviour to include the creation of man—the last of the six days' work.

Again: when forewarning the disciples of the tribulation which was to come upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem and Judea, he says, (Mark xiii, 19,) "In those days shall be affliction, such as was not from the *beginning of the creation which God created* unto this time, neither shall be." The utmost stretch of time, throughout which suffering existed, to which might be compared those afflictions of which the Saviour spoke, could have no earlier date than the birth of the human family, and the Saviour dates that birth from "the *beginning* of the creation which God created."

In like manner Isaiah, in his answer to the question, Who is the true God? says, (xl, 21, 22,) "Have ye not known? have ye not heard? hath it not been told you from *the beginning?* have ye not understood from the foundations of the earth? It is he that sitteth upon the circle of the earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers; that stretcheth out the heavens as a curtain, and spreadeth them out as a tent to dwell in." "Beginning" is used, obviously, in allusion to that word in Gen. i, 1, when "the foundations of the earth" were laid, and in the same signification. But from that same "beginning" the human family had heard of God, which makes it contemporaneous with the creation of Adam. A similar confirmation is found in 2 Pet. iii, 4, and elsewhere.

The history contained in the first and second chapters of Genesis gives internal evidence of the correctness of this interpretation. The Scriptures were not divided into chapters by divine authority. Indeed the division of the Old Testament was made only about six hundred years ago, and in many cases these divisions impair the sense. Dr. Stowe says, "The first chapter of Genesis, and the *first three verses of the second* are one document—and very probably the oldest written document in existence. The division of chapters here is notoriously wrong; what are called the first three verses of the second, belong indubitably to the first."

The first chapter, from the second verse to the end, contains a statement of the special work of each of the six days; and then, *as a conclusion to these details*, the second chapter proceeds, "Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them. And on the seventh day God ended" [ceased from] "his work which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made. And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it." "*Thus*"—that is, in the manner detailed above—"the heavens and the earth were finished;" in other words, "The preceding record gives the *successive steps* by which God accomplished the great work of which the first sentence—'In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth'—is a summary announcement."

The succeeding verses (the fourth and fifth) confirm this position. "These are the generations of the heavens and of the earth when they were created, in the day that the LORD God made" [created] "the earth and the heavens, and every plant of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew," &c. Bush says the term "generations" is nearly equivalent to *occurrences, incidents, remarkable events;* and the phrase, "These are the generations of the heavens and of the earth when they were created," is equivalent to, "The preceding is the narrative of the remarkable events connected with the 'creation of the heavens and the earth,' referring to the account given in the first chapter."* The remaining clause, "in the day that the LORD God made the earth and the heavens, and every plant of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew," implies that the "day" in which God created the heavens and the earth, was the *same* "day" [here a period of six days] in which he created the plants, herbs, and animals, and not *two* "days" *separated by millions of years*, as the theory requires.

This view of the subject does not make the word "beginning," in Genesis, refer to a period so remote in the past as does that under review; yet *it is the starting point in recorded history*, beyond which there is no chronicle of events—no era in the eternity of God, from which to date the registry of his work. Thus, when in the Scriptures immeasurable antiquity is asserted of the second person of the Trinity, he is said to have been "*in the beginning*," that is, *from before the beginning;* for there was no earlier point in the annals of time, by referring to which his great antiquity could be asserted. "In the beginning was the Word!" but the beloved disciple did not *stop* here in his defence of the Divinity of the Saviour, else his Godhead would have still been subject of cavil; but he proceeds, and rising in a glorious climax, he says, "And the Word was with God, and *the Word was God.* ALL THINGS WERE MADE BY HIM, AND WITHOUT HIM WAS NOT ANYTHING MADE, THAT WAS MADE."

So that this passage, taken in connexion with those above, cannot be quoted as evidence in favour of the theory; it only shows that the epoch referred to as the "beginning," is the *starting point of recorded history*, and hence the most remote point in antiquity to which historical reference could be made.

But there is another position, from which, if this passage (Gen. i, 1) be viewed, the same sense will be clearly presented. "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." "In the begin-

* Notes p. 51.

ning" *of what?* The historian does not state. The answer, then, must be ascertained by an examination of the context, according to the laws of interpretation. The word "beginning" is repeatedly used in the Scriptures, and almost always in sentences of this elliptical form. What it is the beginning of, is seldom stated in terms. But it is not, on that account, the less certain what is to be supplied. Thus, John viii, 25, "Then said they unto him, Who art thou? And Jesus saith unto them, Even the same that I said unto you from the *beginning*:"—xv, 27, "And ye also shall bear witness, because ye have been with me from the *beginning*:"—xvi, 4, "And these things I said not unto you at the *beginning*, because I was with you." In these quotations the reader cannot be mistaken as to the time referred to as the "beginning." It is so inwrought with the theme of Christ's conversation, that all who heard would supply the ellipsis without being aware of it—the beginning of his public instructions.

Acts xi, 4.—Peter had, in consequence of a vision at Joppa, gone, contrary to Jewish custom, to preach to the Gentile, Cornelius, at Cesarea. When he returned to Jerusalem, those "of the circumcision contended with him. But Peter rehearsed the matter from the *beginning*, and expounded it by order unto them, saying, I was in the city of Joppa, praying," &c. Peter did not "rehearse" the matter from the creation of the material universe. He was accused of going, contrary to law, to the uncircumcised, and the burden of his effort was to lay before them the circumstances that justified that act. The beginning of these was the vision at Joppa, and there he began. Compare Acts xi, 15; xxvi, 5; Luke i, 2, &c. In all such passages the thought to be supplied is inseparable from the theme of the speaker, and it must be equally so in the first of Genesis.

What, then, was the theme of Moses? Was it the displays of Almighty Power throughout the universe of matter? What a stupendous theme for the pen of the inspired historian! But he does not enter upon it; or if he does, he sweeps the starry round more swiftly than the flight of thought, and with one dash of his pen the survey is completed! Even Moses could not have exhausted so sublime a subject in one short sentence. He did not attempt it. He had before his mind the ignoble career of apostate worms of dust. The points to be elucidated were, *their origin, primeval innocence, fall, continued apostasy,* and *redemption.* In other words, his theme was the *Human Dispensation,* as exhibiting the amazing condescension and mercy of God; and no other subject is alluded to, except as it may be connected with this. The "*beginning*" *of this Human Dispensation, then,* is the point of his depar-

ture; and it is safe to assert, that the man has never yet lived, whose mind, on the first reading of the account, was not involuntarily impressed with the belief that the first sentence referred to a period inseparable from the six days of creation; and that opinion has never left the mind until it has been driven thence by something extraneous to the Bible.

By what process has this opinion become unsettled in the minds of Christians? That process consisted of three steps, as follows, viz.:—

First: The early Christian fathers reasoned themselves into the belief, that the Human Dispensation and the material universe had a contemporaneous origin.

Second: That when the Human Dispensation was about to be ushered in, it was indispensable that the *materials* of that universe, that was to minister to man's happiness, should be *first called into existence.* Hence the first act in this great enterprise of Jehovah was, (they concluded,) to make matter out of nothing, and of course the word (בָּרָא "create") used by Moses to express that first act, must mean "to make out of nothing." These two steps were taken many centuries ago, and the conclusion of the second—to wit, that "create" means "to make out of nothing"—has been received and taught as a fundamental article of Christian faith; and still continues to be so held and taught, although the first, from which this was merely a corollary, is now generally rejected.

Third: The third step was not taken until geology had taught the world that this earth had existed during unnumbered years before the introduction of our race. As it had now become a cardinal doctrine, that the introductory declaration of Scripture announced the making of all things out of nothing, this new truth, discovered by science, led directly to the carrying back of the "beginning" of Gen. i, 1 to the origin of matter, and thus separating it from the succeeding parts of the record.

Considering the circumstances of the case, the taking of the first and second steps towards this conclusion is not matter of astonishment. Before astronomy had revealed the nature of the heavenly bodies, and the immense magnitudes and distances of the fixed stars, men had no means of knowing the true insignificance of our race, and the earth we inhabit, when compared with the universe of God. The Scriptures, which were given to teach, not science, but our relations and duties to God and one another, are silent on the subject. The religious world knew of God, and of angels, but *they* were *spiritual* beings, and had no need of a material place of abode; and of all intelligences known to the fathers, our own race was the only one of

any dignity having bodies formed of dust, and hence the only one that needed a home like this earth. All the inferior animals were, as they supposed, created to minister to our comfort; and there was, therefore, no propriety in their being brought into existence until about the time their lord was commissioned to enjoy and rule over them. As the dead matter of the universe was of still less dignity than the inferior animals, and could, as was supposed, be of no service, until "he for whose sake all nature stands" was ushered into being, there was no conceivable reason why matter should be brought into existence until the beginning of the Human Dispensation.

The necessary conclusions were, that man was the head of all sublunary things;—the earth, as his dwelling-place, was the centre of all worlds;—that the sun, planets, and fixed stars, revolved around us in twenty-four hours, while the earth stood immovably fixed;—that as they are for our pleasure and benefit, they were brought out of nonentity just when our race was about to need them, (for why should they exist sooner?) and when we should be finally removed to the spirit-world they would cease to be.

These conclusions were incorporated into our system of faith, and their rejection denounced as damnable heresy. They thus became entwined with all sacred things, were made to minister to devotional exercises, and were dwelt upon as affording forcible illustrations of our obligations and responsibilities. Such sentiments are even yet uttered when our "feelings" speak the language that has been taught them, our intellects not perceiving that they contradict all our philosophy. In one of Watts's most impressive songs, we sing—

> "We, for whose sake *all nature* stands,
> And stars their courses move."

When these views first took possession of the Christian heart, it was not known that many of those "stars," supposed to move their courses for *our sakes*, are burning suns of far greater magnitude than that which gives light and heat to our system; nor that they give light and heat to systems of worlds more magnificent than our own. It had not been suspected that many of those "twinkling flames," whose uncertain light scarcely makes a distinct impression upon our vision, are so remote, that the struggling rays by which we now perceive them, started on their lonely journey thousands of years before Adam talked with God in Paradise; and that in those distant realms of Jehovah's empire, they make the heavens of many a peopled planet glow with life and beauty:—or they would not have given our lost and ruined race a place so high in the scale of God's intelligent universe. But with these limited views of the works and

government of God, they fixed the beginning of our race at the beginning of TIME, and handed that opinion down to us, mingled with so many doctrines truly divine, that we even yet tremble at the thought of rejecting it. This was the first step. The second was "like unto it." For if *all nature* stands for our sakes, why should it be brought into existence until just when we were about to need it? The preparatory act would be to call matter out of nothing, and בָּרָא "create," in Gen. i, 1, must mean to "make out of nothing."

II. This brings us to the second general division of the subject, in which we propose to show that בָּרָא bah-rah, "create," in most passages where it occurs, *cannot* mean "to make out of nothing;" that in no passage has it necessarily that meaning; and that probably it is used in that signification nowhere in the Scriptures.

God *created* our first parents. Gen. ii, 7, "And the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." Gen. ii, 21, "And the LORD God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept; and he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof." Gen. ii, 22, "And the rib which the LORD God had taken from man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man."

Such was the process by which God made man (not out of nothing, but) out of the dust of the ground; yet the *forming* of man *in this way*, is called a work of *creation*, as follows:—Gen. i, 27, "So God *created* man in his own image, in the image of God *created* he him; male and female *created* he them." Gen. v, 1, 2, "In the day that God *created* man, in the likeness of God made he him; male and female *created* he them; and called their name Adam, in the day when they were *created*."

Speaking to the Israelites of his leading them out of Egypt with a mighty arm, God says, (Deut. iv, 32,) "Ask now of the days that are past, which were before thee, since the day that God *created* man upon the earth, whether there hath been any such thing as this great thing is," &c. Addressing Cyrus, God declares, (Isa. xlv, 12,) "I have made the earth, and *created* man upon it: I, even my hands, have stretched out the heavens," &c.

In none of these quotations can the word בָּרָא mean to make out of nothing. The same is true in the following, where it means "to beget," "to be born," &c.:—Mal. ii, 10, "Have not all one Father? hath not one God *created* (begotten) us? Why do we deal treacherously, every man against his brother?" Ezek. xxi, 30, "I will judge thee (O Ammonite!) in the place where thou wast *created*,

(born,) in the land of thy nativity." Ezek. xxviii, 13, "Thou (king of Tyre) hast been in Eden, the garden of God: the workmanship of thy tabrets and of thy pipes was prepared in (Tyre) in the day thou wast *created* (born)." Ezek. xxviii, 15, "Thou wast perfect in thy ways from the day that thou wast *created*, (born,) till iniquity was found in thee."

To distinguish a people by separating them from the nations of the earth and conferring peculiar blessings upon them, is called *creating* them. Thus:—Isaiah xliii, 1, "But now thus saith the LORD that *created* thee, O Jacob, and he that formed thee, O Israel, Fear not: for I have redeemed thee." On this passage Dr. J. A. Alexander remarks, "The doctrine taught is, that their segregation from the rest of men, as a peculiar people, was an act of sovereignty," &c. Yet this "segregation" is called a *creation*. Isa. xliii, 5–7, "Fear not: for I will say to the north, Give up; and to the south, Keep not back: bring from far my sons, and from the ends of the earth my daughters; even every one that is called by my name: for I have *created* him for my glory, I have formed him; yea, I have made him." On this text Dr. J. A. Alexander remarks, that "the distinctions drawn by some between *created*, *formed*, and *made*, are more ingenious than well founded. It seems to be rather an exhaustive accumulation of synonymous expressions." Of course, neither can here mean "to make out of nothing."

Again: Psa. cii, 18–22, "This shall be written for the generation to come; and the people which shall be *created* shall praise the LORD. For he hath looked down from the height of his sanctuary; to loose those that are appointed to death, to declare the name of the LORD in Zion, and his praise in Jerusalem, when the people and the kingdoms are *gathered together* to serve the LORD." The *gathering together* of the people and kingdoms, is here called a *creation*.

To make, form, or cause, by governing the laws of nature in the ordinary providence of God, is called *creating*. Thus:—Psa. civ, 24–30, "O LORD, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all; the earth is full of thy riches. So is this great and wide sea, wherein are things creeping innumerable, both small and great beasts; there is that leviathan, whom thou hast made to play therein. These wait all on thee, that thou mayest give them their meat in due season. That thou givest them they gather; thou openest thy hand, they are filled with good; thou hidest thy face, they are troubled; thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they are *created*, and thou renewest the face of the earth." The LORD is here said to *create* animals, when under a kind Providence they *multiply* rapidly.

In Isa. xlv, 6, 7, God makes known to Cyrus that he is Jehovah, and that there is none other; and in allusion to the doctrines of the Zendavesta, held by Cyrus, that there were two co-eternal principles, whose emblems were "light" and "darkness," which managed the affairs of the universe, he says, "*I* form the light, and *create* darkness; *I* make peace, and *create* evil; *I*, Jehovah, do all these things."

The word is used in the same sense in Isaiah xli, 20; xlviii, 7; lvii, 19; Amos iv, 13; Num. xvi, 30; and in a similar signification in Isa. iv, 5; liv, 16; lxv, 17, 18; Exod. xxxiv, 10, (translated, "*have* not *been done*;") Psa. li, 10; Jer. xxxi, 22, in none of which is it possible that it can mean "to make out of nothing."

Thus, in the fifty passages in which this word בָּרָא occurs, in a large majority it cannot possibly mean "to make out of nothing," and a careful examination of the few remaining passages shows that it is not probable it has that meaning anywhere.

These few remaining passages are the following:—Gen. i, 1, "In the beginning God *created* the heaven and the earth." Genesis ii, 4, 5, "These are the generations of the heavens and of the earth when they were created, in the day that the LORD God made the earth and the heavens, and every plant of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb," &c. Psa. lxxxix, 11, 12, "The heavens are thine, the earth also is thine; as for the world and the fulness thereof, thou hast founded them. The north and the south thou hast *created* them." Psa. cxlviii, 3, 4, 5, "Praise ye him, sun and moon; praise him, all ye stars of light; praise him, ye heavens of heavens, and ye waters that be above the heavens: let them praise the name of Jehovah; for he commanded and they were *created*." Isa. xl, 26, "Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath *created* these things, that bringeth out their hosts by number." Isa. xlii, 5, "Thus saith God, Jehovah, he that *created* the heavens, and stretched them out; he that spread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of it," &c. Isa. xlv, 18, "For thus saith Jehovah that *created* the heavens; God himself that formed the earth and made it; he hath established it, he *created* it not in vain, he formed it to be inhabited." The meaning which create has in one of these passages, it has in all; for all refer to the same act.

As this word is employed in nearly fifty other instances in the Old Testament in the sense of *make, form, establish, collect, renew*, &c., when the materials were already in existence, it should not be taken in a different sense in those just quoted, unless the connexion requires it. Yet there is nothing in either of them to show that it is used out of its ordinary signification. Indeed there is evidence to the contrary. Thus, in Gen. ii, 4 *created* is used as synonymous

with *made;* and we have shown above, (page 502,) that the clause, "These are the generations of the heavens and of the earth, when they were *created*," is equivalent to, "The preceding is the narrative of the remarkable events (i. e., *creative acts*) connected with the creation of the heavens and the earth." These remarkable creative acts were the causing of light to shine upon the surface, the causing the atmosphere to separate the clouds from the waters, the collecting of the waters and causing dry land to appear, the production of grass, herbs, and trees, causing the sun, moon, and stars to be visible, the creation of fowls and fishes, and finally, of beasts, creeping things, cattle, and man. *These*, then, were the remarkable *creative acts* which had been narrated, in no one of which had something been made out of nothing. Yet we are taught that *these acts*, taken collectively, *constituted* that great work which is called "The creation of the heavens and the earth."

In Isa. xlv, 18, "*created*" is used interchangeably with "*formed*," "*made*," and "*established*," as having no higher meaning. In Isa. xlv, 12, God says, "I have *made* the earth, and *created* man upon it." If either was made out of nothing at the time referred to, it was the earth; for man was formed of the dust of the ground.

These synonymous expressions are often used in such connexions as to have the appearance of a climax. Thus, in Isa. xli, 20, "That they may see, and know, and consider, and understand together, that the hand of the LORD *hath done* this, and the Holy One of Israel hath *created* it." Of this Dr. J. A. Alexander says, "There is a climax in the last clause,—he has not only *done* it, but *created* it." But the principles of language would much more require a climax in the following: Isa. xliii, 6, 7, "I will say to the north, Give up; and to the south, Keep not back; bring from far my sons, and from the ends of the earth my daughters, even every one that is called by my name; for I have *created* him for my glory, I have *formed* him, *yea, I have made him.*" This has much more the emphatic form of a climax than the other; yet Dr. A. says of it, "It seems to be rather an exhaustive accumulation of synonymous expressions." If so, a just regard to the laws of language, used by the same writer, would seem to require that the expression used only a few pages before, should have the same explanation.

The creation is often referred to by the prophets, as illustrating the wonderful power of God; yet they always speak of it as a work in which he employed old materials: thus, Psa. cii, 25, "Of old hast thou *laid the foundations* of the earth, and the heavens are the *work of thy hands.*" Psa. civ, 5, "Who *laid the foundations* of the earth, that it should not be removed forever." Prov. iii, 19, "The LORD

by wisdom *hath founded* the earth; by understanding he *hath established* the heavens." Isa. xlviii, 12, 13, "Hearken unto me, O Jacob, and Israel, my called: I am he; I am the first, I also am the last; my hand also *hath laid the foundation* of the earth, and my right hand *hath spanned* the heavens; when I call unto them, they stand up together."

At this point it would be improper to neglect the researches of Gesenius into the "primary and native signification" of Hebrew words, and his deductions thence "in logical order, of the subordinate meanings and shades of sense, as found in various constructions, and in the usage of different ages and writers." Of בָּרָא, translated "create," he says—"בָּרָא I. Primary meaning, '*to cut*,' '*to cut out*,' '*to carve*,' '*to form*,' by cutting or carving. For the notion of *breaking, cutting, separating*, which is *inherent* in the radical syllable בר, see under פָּרַד. The *same notion* belongs also to the softer syllable בר; compare בָּרַר to *separate*, to *sever out*, בָּרַח to *cut*, to *cut asunder*, בָּרַשׁ *to cut, to cut in*, whence (an Arabic word, meaning axe,) בָּרַח *to cut, to hew*, hence בְּרוֹשׁ cypress or pine, (the name seems to come from the idea of *cutting* up into boards, plank, &c.;) בָּרַד to *scatter*, בָּרַךְ pr. to *break*: also חָבַר to *cut*, to *cut up*, to *divide*." [Under פָּרַד (parad) to break off, to break in pieces, to separate by breaking, (compare the English word "to part,") he gives a long list of kindred words, as above, showing that the primary force of the biliteral בר is always that given above.] II. "'To form,' 'to create,' 'to produce;' compare (an Arabic word,) 'to smooth,' 'to polish,' then 'to form,' 'to create.' Spoken of the creation of the heavens and the earth, Gen. i, 1; of men, Gen. i, 27; v, 12; vi, 7. Specially of Israel, Isa. xliii, 1, 15; Jer. xxxi, 22: *Jehovah hath created a new thing in the earth, A woman shall protect a man.* Compare Num. xvi, 30; also Isa. lxv, 18, *Behold I create* Jerusalem a rejoicing, i. e., cause her to rejoice. III. To *beget*, to *bring forth*, whence בַּר a son. IV. To *feed*, to *eat*, to *grow fat*, from the idea of cutting up food." From all which it is clear, that there is nothing in the native signification of the word בָּרָא, create, that would lead us to attribute to it the meaning, "to make out of nothing."

The above results are obtained from an extensive and careful comparison of words containing the biliteral radicals בר and פר: in which it is seen, that all words having the former, involve in their primary meaning the idea of *cutting*, separating, forming, fashioning, making by cutting, trimming, &c.; and that those having the latter radicals, involve the idea of *breaking*, separating, forming, fashioning, making by *breaking*, &c.

These conclusions in reference to בָּרָא "create," are confirmed in a remarkable (not to say unexpected) manner, by a process entirely independent of the above.

The Hebrew verb has a common, or ground form, to express the simple idea of the verb, and modified forms to express modifications of the meaning. These modified forms are called, by some grammarians, conjugations, by others, species, &c. One of these forms, expressing a modified sense of the verb, is called the Piel. Verbs which are transitive, (בָּרָא is transitive,) in the simple (kal) form, have, in the Piel species, the additional idea of intensity. Thus:—

Simple, or kal form.	Piel, or intensive.
קָטַל to kill,	קִטֵּל to kill *with violence*, to *murder*.
שָׁבַר to break,	שִׁבֵּר to *dash in pieces*, to *shiver*.
זָבַח to sacrifice,	זִבֵּח to sacrifice *frequently*.
סָפַר to tell,	סִפֵּר to tell *incessantly*, to narrate.

Now certainly the idea "to make out of nothing" is the most *intense* form of the idea "to make," and hence if the Hebrew language contains a word which ever means "to make out of nothing," we would find that meaning expressed in the highest sense in the Piel species. We would, therefore, expect to find the simple or kal form of בָּרָא "to make;" the Piel, "to make out of nothing." On the contrary, we find the Piel of this verb to mean "*to cut down*," "to cut down" with the purpose of *destroying*. It is repeatedly used in this sense in the Scriptures. Thus:—Joshua xvii, 15, "And Joshua answered [the sons of Joseph,] If thou be a great people, then get thee up to the wood-country, and *cut down* for thyself there, in the land of the Perizzites." Joshua xvii, 18, "But the mountain shall be thine; for it is a wood, and thou shalt *cut* it *down*," &c. Ezek. xxiii, 47, "And the company shall stone them with stones, and *cut* them *down* [despatch them] with their swords." The word in the original, that is translated in these quotations "*cut down*," is the intensive from of בָּרָא, and hence the native meaning of that word must be simply "*to cut*."

As materials are brought into shape, and articles made, formed, or fashioned, by cutting, trimming, smoothing, &c., the transition was easy from the native meaning, ("to cut,") to the secondary meanings, "to make," "to form," "to fashion," "to remodel," "to renovate;" and these meanings were prevalent when Moses wrote the Pentateuch. But we have no evidence that it ever had the

meaning "to make out of nothing" attributed to it, till after the books which compose the Holy Scriptures had all been written.

This truth will become more manifest by considering a peculiarity of the Hebrew poetry, which has not yet been alluded to. The characteristic, which, more than anything else, distinguishes the poetic and descriptive part of the Old Testament from all other writings, is the frequency with which the important thoughts are *repeated*,—expressed over and over again in different words,—until all the different modes of expression are, as it were, exhausted. Thus:—

Psa. i, 1, "Blessed is the man
That walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly,
Nor standeth in the way of sinners,
Nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful."

Here the same thought is dwelt upon and repeated three times in different words. The remarkable tendency to this style, in the poetic writings of the Old Testament, will be seen in the following examples, selected almost at random:—

Psalm ii, 4, "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh:
The LORD shall have them in derision."

" vii, 14, "Behold, he travaileth with iniquity,
And hath conceived mischief,
And brought forth falsehood."

" vii, 16, "His mischief shall return upon his own head,
And his violent dealing shall come down upon his own pate."

" viii, 4, "What is man, that thou art mindful of him?
Or the son of man, that thou visitest him?"

" xxi, 8, "Thy hand shall find out all thine enemies;
Thy right hand shall find out those that hate thee."

" xxvii, 1, "The LORD is my light, and my salvation; whom shall I fear?
The LORD is the strength of my life; of whom shall I be afraid?"

" xxx, 11, "Thou hast turned for me my mourning into dancing:
Thou hast put off my sackcloth, and girded me with gladness."

2 Sam. i, 20, "Tell it not in Gath!
Publish it not in the streets of Askelon!
Lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice;
Lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph."

Isaiah liv, 4, "Fear not; for thou shalt not be ashamed:
Neither be thou confounded; for thou shalt not be put to shame."

" lvii, 4, "Against whom do ye sport yourselves?
Against whom make ye a wide mouth, and draw out the tongue?
Are ye not the children of transgression?
Are ye not the progeny of falsehood?"

Isaiah lviii, 6, "Is not this the fast that I have chosen?
To loose the bands of wickedness?
To undo the heavy burdens?
To let the oppressed go free?
And that ye break every yoke?"

Job iii, 3–5, "Let the day perish wherein I was born . . . .
Let that day be darkness . . .
Neither let the light shine upon it.
Let darkness and the shadow of death obscure it;
Let a cloud dwell upon it;
Let the blackness of the day terrify it."

In the English language there is nothing like it. The thought that, in the mind of the inspired writer, struggled for utterance, comes forth and is presented in every imaginable light, is clothed in all the variety of which the richest language is capable, so that it is impossible that we should fail to perceive it in all its force and fulness.

The application is anticipated. The creation, as recorded by Moses, is often a theme of the inspired poets. Whenever they would dwell upon the grandeur of his throne, the glory and majesty of his being, his omnipotence, the sublimity of his mighty acts, the scenes of creation pass in review, and no word is left unemployed that could add to the completeness of the description, as the reality was viewed by the eye of inspiration; yet, strange to tell, in no one instance is the thought that, as a part of that work, God made all things out of nothing, even hinted at: nor is there a sentence that can be wrested into an allusion to such an act, without manifest torture. We who have the idea of his making all things out of nothing, would no more think of showing forth his power, without referring to that greatest of all manifestations of it, than of presenting his plan of salvation without the cross of Christ. It would be the alpha and omega of our discourse; and the only conceivable reason why it was not made equally prominent by the prophets is, that they attributed no such meaning to the word "create." The full force of this remark can be felt by those only who have examined the Old Testament scriptures, in reference to this thought. The following examples will call to mind others of similar character:—

Job xxxviii, 1, "Then the LORD answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said, . . Gird up now thy loins like a man; for I will demand of thee, and answer thou me. Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Declare, if thou hast understanding, . . Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner-stone thereof; when the morning-stars sang together, and all the

sons of God shouted for joy? Or who shut up the sea with doors, . . . and said, Hitherto shalt thou come, but no farther; and here shall thy proud waves be stayed? Hast thou commanded the morning since thy days, and caused the day-spring to know his place?" &c.

How appropriately would the doctrine in question have been stated here, if it had been a part of traditionary revelation, at the time of Job! Also in the following:—Psa. xxiv, 1, 2, "The earth is the LORD'S, and the fulness thereof; the world, and they that dwell therein: for he hath *founded* it upon the seas, and *established* it upon the floods." Psa. xxxiii, 3, 6–9, "Sing unto him a new song; . . for . . by the word of the LORD were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth. He gathereth the waters of the sea together as a heap; he layeth up the depth in store-houses. Let all the earth fear the LORD; let all the inhabitants of the world stand in awe of him: for he spake and it was done; he commanded and it stood fast." Psa. lxxxix, 11, "The heavens are thine; the earth also is thine: as for the world and the fulness thereof, thou hast founded them." Psa. xc, 1, 2, "LORD, thou hast been our dwelling-place in all generations. Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God."

In all these varied presentations of the creation, there is still no allusion to that work as being a making *out of nothing*.

Again: Psa. cxix, 89–91, "Forever, O LORD, thy word is settled in heaven, thy faithfulness is to all generations; thou establishedst the earth, and it abideth; they continue this day according to thine ordinances." Psalm cxxxvi, 3–9, "O give thanks to the LORD of lords, for his mercy endureth forever; to him who alone doeth great wonders; to him that by wisdom made the heavens; to him that stretched out the earth above the waters; to him that made great lights, the sun to rule by day, the moon and stars to rule by night: (chorus,) for his mercy endureth forever." Psa. cxlvi, 5, 6, "Happy is he that hath the God of Jacob for his help, whose hope is in the LORD his God; which made heaven, and earth, the sea, and all that therein is." Prov. iii, 19, "The LORD by wisdom hath founded the earth; by understanding hath he established the heavens." Prov. viii, 25–30, "Before the mountains were settled, before the hills, was I brought forth; while as yet he had not made the earth, nor the fields, nor the highest part of the dust of the world. When he prepared the heavens, I was there; when he set a compass upon the face of the depth; when he established the clouds above; when he strengthened the fountains of the deep; when he gave to the sea

his decree, that the waters should not pass his commandment; when he appointed the foundations of the earth; then I was by him, as one brought up with him."

It is amazing that in this multifold description of the creation, there is no allusion to "making out of nothing," if that had been revealed.

Isa. xlv, 9, 11, 12, 18, "Wo unto him that striveth with his Maker! Let the potsherd strive with the potsherds of the earth. Thus saith the LORD, the Holy One of Israel; I have made the earth, and created man upon it; I, even my hands, have stretched out the heavens, and all their host have I commanded. For thus saith the LORD that created the heavens, God himself, that formed the earth and made it; he hath established it, he created it not in vain, he formed it to be inhabited." Isa. xl, 12, 15, 18, 21, 22, "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance? Behold, the nations are as a drop of a bucket, and are counted as the small dust of the balance; behold, he taketh up the isles as a very little thing. To whom then will ye liken God? Have ye not known? have ye not understood from the foundations of the earth? It is he that sitteth upon the circle of the earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers; that stretcheth out the heavens as a curtain, and spreadeth them out as a tent to dwell in." Isaiah li, 12, 13, "Who art thou that forgettest the LORD thy Maker, that hath stretched forth the heavens, and laid the foundations of the earth?" Jer. x, 6–12, "Forasmuch as there is none like unto thee, O LORD; thou art great, and thy name is great in might. Who would not fear thee, O King of nations? But the stock is a doctrine of vanities. Silver spread into plates is brought from Tarshish, and gold from Uphaz, the work of the workman, and of the hands of the founder; blue and purple is their clothing; they are all the work of cunning men. But the LORD is the true God, he is the living God, and an everlasting King: at his wrath the earth shall tremble, and the nations shall not be able to abide his indignation. He hath made the earth by his power, he hath established the world by his wisdom, and hath stretched out the heavens by his discretion." Zech. xii, 1, "The burden of the word of the LORD for Israel, saith the LORD, which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him." Job xxvi, 6, 7, "Hell is naked before [Jehovah,] and destruction hath no covering. He stretcheth out the north over the empty place, and *hangeth the earth upon nothing.*"

O why did he not, in this exhibition of the omnipotence of Jehovah, say that he had *made* the earth *out of nothing*, as well as that he *had hung* it *upon nothing?* Simply because it had not been revealed to him.

It is certainly supposable that that (to us) incomprehensible state of things—when Jehovah sat enrobed in solitary majesty, amid limitless nonentity, shrouded in blackness of darkness, and terrific silence—would pass unnoticed in the pages of revelation. But when the fiat of Omnipotence pealed through the abyss, and the universe burst into existence, flinging a new-born radiance throughout the realms of night, a scene was enacted upon which, if revealed in the visions of the holy seer, he would have delighted to dwell. With overwhelming sublimity would such an event have been portrayed by the writer of the following:—

"God came from Teman, the Holy One from Mount Paran. His glory covered the heavens, and the earth was full of his praise. His brightness was as the light; before him went the pestilence, and burning coals went forth at his feet. He stood and measured the earth; he beheld and drove asunder the nations; and the everlasting mountains were scattered, the perpetual hills did bow: his ways are everlasting. The mountains saw thee, and they trembled; the overflowing of the water passed by; the deep uttered his voice, and lifted up his hands on high. The sun and moon stood still in their habitation; at the light of thine arrows they went, and at the shining of thy glittering spear." Hab. iii, 3–6, 10, 11.

To sum up the argument, we say that the word בָּרָא bah-rah, "create," does not mean, in Genesis i, 1, (or in any other passage,) "to make out of nothing;" because,

1st. It cannot have that meaning in any of the succeeding cases of the record, as all agree.

2d. In the many descriptions, in different parts of Scripture, of the work recorded in the *first verse*, it is in every instance described as a work performed on materials already in existence.

3d. Researches, into the primary and native signification of the word, show that this idea does not belong to its primitive meaning, and there is no evidence that it ever became a secondary one.

4th. That remarkable characteristic of the Hebrew poetry—by which important thoughts are repeated many times by the use of synonymous terms and phrases, or by circumlocution—gives not a solitary example (although creation is often the theme) in which this scene is dwelt upon, in terms of any kind conveying the idea of "making out of nothing." This omission certainly would not have occurred, had this idea been in the mind.

As these views require a modified translation of several other words, we here give the first three verses.

Gen. i, 1. In the beginning [of the Human Dispensation] God reorganized the atmosphere and the dry land. 2. For the land was desolate and waste, [i. e., not habitable;] and darkness was upon the face of the deep; [i. e., the atmosphere permitted no light to penetrate to the surface;] and the Spirit of God was brooding upon the face of the waters. 3. And God said, Let there be light; and there was light: [i. e., Let the atmosphere permit the light to penetrate to the surface; and it was so.]

In the above, "atmosphere" is used for "heaven;" "dry land" for "earth;" "for" takes the place of "and;" "desolate" is used for "without form;" "waste" for "void." A few references will show that these are the ordinary meanings of the words thus translated.

1. Atmosphere. All agree that the firmament, spoken of in the sixth, seventh, and eighth verses, which separated the clouds from the waters beneath, was the atmosphere; and in the eighth verse, God calls this firmament "heaven," thus defining the use of the word heaven in the first verse. In conformity with this definition, this word שָׁמַיִם *shamayim*, is used in that signification generally in the Scriptures. In the following passages it is translated "air:"—Gen. i, 26, 28, 30; ii, 19, 20; vi, 7; vii, 3; ix, 2. Deut. iv, 17; xxviii, 26. 1 Sam. xvii, 44, 46. 2 Sam. xxi, 10. 1 Kings xiv, 11; xvi, 4; xxi, 24. Job xii, 7; xxviii, 21, etc. In an equal number of cases it is translated "heaven," but generally having the meaning of "atmosphere," as "fowls of heaven," etc.

2. Dry land. It is doubted whether the word אֶרֶץ, ehretz, is ever used in the sense of "earth" as a globe. It occurs in the Old Testament near one thousand seven hundred times, and almost always in the sense of "land;" as the *land* of Egypt, the *land* of the Philistines, etc. E. g., Gen. x, 10, "And the beginning of his kingdom was Babel, in the *land* of Shinar;" xii, 1, "into a *land* that I will show thee." This word occurs with this signification, two hundred and eight times in Genesis alone. Wherever the whole globe is intended, some other word is added, as "the earth and the sea," or "the earth and the waters under the earth." Indeed, Moses gives this definition to the word when he says, verse 10, "And God called the dry land אֶרֶץ, earth.

3. For. We translate ו, the first word in the second verse, "for" instead of "and," as giving the reason why the atmosphere and dry land were refitted,—the land, because it was desolate and uninhabitable, needed reorganizing; and the atmosphere, because it was impervious to light.

Dr. Stowe says, "The Hebrew ו may be translated by any word that will translate the Greek μὲν, δὲ, καὶ or γὰρ." That γὰρ "for" is one of its ordinary meanings, will be seen from the following:—Gen. xx, 3, God informs Abimelech, in a dream, that he should not take Sarah, "*for* she is a man's wife." Psalm vii, 9, "O let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end; but establish the just: *for* the righteous God trieth the hearts." Psalm lx, 12, "Through God we shall do valiantly: *for* he it is that shall tread down our enemies." Psalm lx, 11, "Give us help from trouble: *for* vain is the help of man." Isa. xxxix, 1, "At that time Merodach-baladan sent letters and a present to Hezekiah: *for* he had heard that he had been sick," etc.

4. Desolate and waste. The word תהו, tho-hoo, occurs nineteen times in the Scriptures; and is generally used in describing the desolation of a country or city after it has been destroyed and laid waste.

Isa. xxiv, 10, "The city of *confusion* is broken down: every house is shut up, that no man may come in:" [i. e., the city is become "desolate;" every house, etc.] It is also used in the description of the terrible desolation of Edom, in Isa. xxxiv, 11; in Deut. xxxii, 10, "in the *waste* howling wilderness;" Job vi, 18, "The paths of their way are turned aside; they go to *nothing*, and perish;" [i. e., they go to *ruin*, and perish.] It is clear that the Jews understood these words in the same way: for in the Targum of Onkelos, this clause is translated, "and the earth was *waste* and empty;" and in that of Pseudo-Jonathan, "the earth was confusion and emptiness, *destitute of the sons of men and bare of all cattle.*"

Thus it is seen that every word is used in its "ordinary, obvious meaning;" and a very few words will serve to show the harmony that is, by this literal interpretation, introduced between Scripture history and the facts of geology.

Geology proclaims that the earth had existed millions of years before the Mosaic era. Scripture grants it, claiming only that it needed reorganization, in consequence of a state of desolation brought about by a series of general convulsions, similar to many of those revealed in geological history.

Geology proclaims that the inhabitants of the pre-Adamite earth received light and heat from the sun, to which their eyes and constitutions were adapted as are ours; and that changes of season and difference of climate originated from the same or similar causes, producing a succession of growths in the trees, the falling of the autumn leaf, and the division of the earth into zones of different temperature. Scripture grants it, claiming only that in consequence of a

temporary confusion of the elements, clouds and darkness filled the air, shrouding in impenetrable gloom all beneath it. The New Testament also testifies that the strong language of the narrative requires nothing more. In 2 Peter iii, 5, 6, and 7, it is said, "For this they (scoffers) willingly are ignorant of, that by the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water; whereby the world that then was, being overflowed with water, perished: but the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire," etc. Here the heavens and the earth (obviously the atmosphere and dry land) which were of old, are represented as having *perished* by the flood; and the heavens and the earth which are now, are, by implication, in the above sense, a new creation.

Geology claims that *death* has always reigned among the tribes of earth. The Scriptures, in reference to the inferior races, as we believe, do not deny it. The whole earth was not an Eden: but a garden, with fruits and fountains, was specially prepared for our first parents, surrounded by an impenetrable enclosure, protecting them, as we may suppose, from the thorns and briers that bloomed, and the ferocious beasts that prowled without; and when they had forfeited life, by transgression, they were banished thence, to take their chances of life and suffering with the rest of animated creation.

If the foregoing views are correct, the theory of the days being indefinite periods, as lately revived by Mr. H. Miller, and a kindred one more recently proposed by Dr. Anderson, are alike unnecessary. The parallelism in the order of the geological and the Mosaic creations, is no argument in favor of indefinitely extended days. It may be rendered probable, that if the earth were made desolate a thousand times, and a thousand times repeopled by the direct, creative power of God, the different races and families would, at each renewal, be introduced in the same general order.

We have been deeply impressed with the belief, that when the *true* meaning of the original words in which Scripture history was recorded should be definitely ascertained, the obvious teachings of that history, when interpreted literally, will be found to conflict with no development of science. We have here endeavoured to aid in ascertaining those *true meanings*, and in establishing this substantial harmony. We hope that we have been able, at least, to make suggestions which others may employ in the discovery of important truth. In the mean time we should be careful, not unnecessarily to magnify the importance of those truths as to which there is apparent uncertainty. We have an abiding faith, that in His own good time, and in that time when it will best subserve His purposes of

mercy towards us, He will make it plain. Nor should we have our eye so fixed upon the few, non-essential points of obscurity, as to become neglectful of the broad day-light of heavenly truth, shining cloudless all around us. For truly the Sun of Righteousness has risen to his meridian glory, not merely casting a bewildering glimmer upon unavoidable dangers, but illuminating with celestial brightness the angel-guarded pathway to realms above.

Nor will it be improper for us to remember, while the way of salvation is so plain that the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err therein, that yet multitudes of the most pleasing lessons recorded in the Scriptures contain allusions which, if not explained from sources external to the Bible, would lose all their force and beauty. How much, for example, would have been lost, in the instructive parable of the ten virgins, had we not from other sources learned the custom prevailing among oriental tribes as to the reception of the bridegroom, upon which the fitness of the parable depends! Or when we read that the "man without a wedding garment" stood "speechless" in the presence of the king, how imperfectly would we have comprehended the lesson designed, had we not read in profane authors that *he should have been* adorned from the royal wardrobe! And in the touching scenes of the last Passover, had we not learned from history their peculiar posture at table, how strange would have seemed the allusion to "the disciple whom Jesus loved leaning on his breast at supper!"

While, therefore, we should not neglect those lesser lights of history and science, including geology, which, by their clear reflection, enable us to obtain more full and just views of the meaning of words, and the force of collateral teachings in many parts of Scripture, we should never forget that, as to the great doctrines of the Cross, we have "a more sure word of prophecy, whereunto we do well that we take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day-star arise in our hearts."

Art. II.—HANNAH MORE.

A New Memoir of Hannah More: or, Life in Hall and Cottage. By Mrs. Helen C. Knight. 12mo. New-York, 1851.

Goethe tells us: "So much are we inclined to the material and the earthly, that we should try to read, hear, see or say something each day, of the beautiful and the ideal,"—intimating that this contemplation has an elevating and refining tendency. He spoke, however, merely of culture in taste and art, and of its results in this life only. But to those who realize that earthly things are "passing away," how infinitely superior seems the contemplation of the holy and divine, even such manifestations of them as we have around us, in men and women on the earth! The study of the lives and conversation of eminent Christians, whether we enjoy the privilege before or after their death, may thus form one of the highest means of moral culture. And if the *mind* is refined by the contemplation of the beautiful, what can be more beautiful than a holy walk and conversation? Again, we may learn from the lives of the good and the pure what holy aims they cherished, and the steps of their progress in securing them, and so make their experience a guide for ours.

The history of Hannah More is a beautiful development of a healthy, vigorous, and life-giving piety. Whether we look upon her in the intellectual and fashionable circles of London, in her happy home at Barley Grove, or among the poor of Cheddar, we must see and feel how perfectly "strength may be perfected in weakness." Archbishop Leighton says, that "the grace of God in the heart of man is like a tender plant in a strange, unkindly soil:" in Hannah More we see the tender plant grow in beauty and strength, until, like the tree of life, it "bears twelve manner of fruit, with leaves for the healing of the nations."

Nearly twenty years have passed since the publication of Mr. Roberts's "Life and Correspondence of Hannah More." That work was prepared with very little judgment, and less of artistical skill; but the charm of its subject, and especially of the correspondence, which occupied so large a part of it, was sufficient to give it a wide circulation. But a more portable book, and something more like a *biography*, was needed; and the want has been to some extent supplied by the book before us. Mrs. Knight shows a good deal of skill in the selection and grouping of her incidents; her style, though destitute of the ease and grace which nothing but practice in writing

can give, is yet lively, spirited, and, in the main, perspicuous; and, what is of more importance, she holds in her hands the only clue to the history of Hannah More, in a just estimate of spiritual religion and of its fruits in human life. We shall make use of her volume, at pleasure, in the details of the sketch which follows.

Hannah More was born in 1745, in the little hamlet of Fishponds, about four miles from Bristol. Her father, Jacob More, was a high Churchman and staunch Tory, but a man of piety and learning, which were turned to good account in the education of his own children and those of his neighbours, for he was the faithful master of the village school for many years. It seems that in early life he had expected to inherit the fine mansion and estate of Wenhaston, but by a law-suit had lost it all. This mishap, however, seems to have been well nigh forgotten in his happy country home, with his beloved Mary and five daughters around him. He was a man of strong, mind and sense, but had a great horror of (what *we* should call "Blue-stockings," and *he*) female pedants. He strove, then, to make these daughters, not learned ladies, but strong, healthy-minded women, fit for usefulness, wherever and however God might lead them: not fearing, however, in his dread of pedantry, as Sydney Smith says the "most of mankind" do, that "if you once suffer the women to eat of the tree of knowledge, the rest of the family will soon be reduced to the same aerial and unsatisfactory diet." The good father stopped far short of this; for he not only suffered, but encouraged his daughters to partake of the precious fruit—only taking care that it should be at proper seasons, and in proper measure. In removing from his native town to Stapleton, he unfortunately lost the greater part of his books; but this deficiency was in some measure supplied by his wonderful memory, which enabled him to give oral histories of Greece and Rome to his little auditors. A pleasant, beautiful picture, must that happy household have presented, assembled round the evening fire. The good mother, seated by the round table, looks often from the knitting at the animated face of the father, as he tells of the great battle or glorious victory of some favourite hero; while the steady Mary, the useful Betty, witty Sally, sprightly Hannah, and even the lamb of the flock, who sits on the good man's knee, are listening with earnest, eager attention. Is it strange that Mrs. More should tell us, after the lapse of perhaps half a century, that "the *conversation* of an enlightened parent constitutes the best parts of a child's education." How much would parents accomplish if this good example were followed more frequently in these days! Not only would the mind, but the heart be trained; love for home and home friends would grow with the growth, and strengthen with the

strength. The boy would appreciate and love these quiet social hours better than the child, and the man more than the boy.

Mrs. More (the mother) seems to have been an excellent housewife, and a sensible, though not at all a brilliant, woman. She had great influence with her husband; and it was by her suggestion, seconded by the earnest entreaties of Hannah, that each new study was commenced. Thus he was induced, after much consideration, to teach Hannah "a little Latin;" but a few weeks trial served to "frighten him with his own success," and he wished to lay it aside immediately. Very differently thought his pupil; delighted with her success, and much interested in the new study, she enlisted the willing mother on her side, and the zeal of the one, assisted by the plain good sense of the other, carried the point. This love for the language continued with her even in extreme old age. Mary, (the oldest,) when about twelve, was sent to an accomplished teacher in Bristol to learn French. The steadiness and energy, which ever distinguished the woman, may now be seen in embryo in the child; as three times a week, in sunshine or rain, she takes her solitary four miles walk, to get the knowledge which is in the evening or on the morrow to be distributed among the little ones. Hannah was her brightest and most eager pupil, and thus was laid the foundation for the intimate acquaintance with French which she afterwards acquired. As the family grew older, its increasing wants outgrew the Dominie's straitened means, when the elder sisters proposed adding to the family income by establishing a boarding-school in Bristol. Mary, Eliza, and Sarah undertook this difficult task, and, under the patronage of Mrs. Gwatkin and other influential friends, they succeeded admirably. These friends assisted and directed their zeal. That their zeal should have been tempered at all by wisdom, is the more surprising when we remember that Mary (the eldest) was scarcely one-and-twenty at the time.

Years afterwards, Sally gave Dr. Johnson the following account of the commencement of their career as teachers: "I will tell you how we were born with more desires than guineas, and how; as years increased our appetites, the cupboard at home began to grow too small to gratify them; and how, with a bottle of water, a bed and a blanket, we set out to seek our fortunes; and how we found a great house, with nothing in it; and how it was likely to remain so, till, looking into our knowledge-boxes, we found a little learning a good thing when land is gone; and at last by giving a little of this learning to those who had less, we got a good store of gold in return; but, alas! we wanted the wit to keep it." At the age of twelve Hannah became a pupil in the now flourishing school; and her rapid

progress in all things good, speaks well for her instructors. She seems to have enjoyed *these* days keenly,—and what wonder? Her careful and affectionate sisters guarded her from all boarding-school ills, while the best society in Bristol, young as she was, welcomed her ever gladly. Sir James Stonehouse, whose writings for the sick are known even on this side of the water, was one of her warmest friends and admirers; one who could say years after, when the fame of her intellectual and moral superiority was spread far and wide—"Ah, I always said that child was a great genius." Her conversational powers even then were remarkable: it is told that she could make her physician (Dr. Woodward, an intelligent and cultivated man) so far forget both his time and his patient, as to make a long visit, and only remember, as he was hastening down the stairs or out of the front door, that he had quite forgotten to ask the sick girl how she was. Even her games were intellectual; Shakspeare conversations, in which no talk was allowed except in the language of the great master, took the place of Blind-man's buff, and the like, at her parties. And she tells us, in after life, "it was wonderful how well the conversation was kept up." Those days, however, were before the Edgeworths and Trimmers, the Mary Howitts and Abbotts had arisen to bless and comfort childhood: books for the young were almost unknown; but the Pilgrim's Progress and Shakspeare were read oftener, and with better relish. At Bristol she enjoyed opportunities of culture not only from books, but from society. When she was but sixteen, the elder Sheridan delivered a course of lectures there on "Eloquence," which she attended, and which "made so strong an impression upon her young imagination, that her feelings could find utterance only in a copy of verses." A friend presented these to Mr. Sheridan, who soon sought her acquaintance and discerned her dawning talent. Another friend was soon after gained in Ferguson, the astronomer, who imbibed so strong a confidence in her taste, that he is said to have submitted most of his writings to her for correction. She herself, however, in later years seemed to think that she owed most of her improvement at this period to a literary linen-draper, named Peach, with whom she formed a close acquaintance. With all these aids and stimulants, her courage grew as well as her capacity, and at seventeen she wrote a pastoral drama, called "The Search after Happiness," which speedily ran through three editions. The "Inflexible Captive" appeared about a year afterwards, and several other poetical works followed. These were all well received, and have *some* merit, which lies, however, chiefly in their high moral aim. Though much more popular on their first appearance than her prose works, they lived

their day, and are now almost forgotten, while the more substantial prose is still held in esteem. These dramas were written for school performance. In those days, acting plays formed one branch of boarding-school education, and many of these were far from being either of an elevated or refined tendency. The "Search after Happiness," was certainly a great improvement on those then in use, and, as it took their place in many instances, we may say it did its share of good.

By this time, such success had crowned the efforts of the sisters, that they determined to enlarge their domain, and accordingly planned and built a large and convenient house; but even it would not contain the number of applicants,—sometimes twice as many as they could admit, presenting themselves. The father, (the mother had died some time before,) now an aged man, was comfortably established in town near them, where he could enjoy, in turn, his library, his garden, and his children. His was, indeed, a green old age; now could he see the fruit of the good seed early sown in the minds of his children. It was at this time, when Hannah was about twenty-one, that was begun and ended her experience in love, as the term is usually understood. The Misses Turner, who had been educated at the school, had long been Hannah's most intimate friends, and, by their persuasions, she was frequently induced to accompany them to Belmont, the seat of their cousin, Edward Turner, which was situated a few miles from Bristol. He seems to have been a man of fine taste, and not a little cultivation, of both mind and manners. No wonder, then, that a girl of fine appearance, and able to sympathize with him in all his intellectual pursuits, should have interested and finally engaged his affections, though he was a bachelor over forty. It is certain that he won her love, and asked her hand: but they were never married. How or what brought about this unexpected termination of what promised so fair, we cannot say. The *blame* is usually given to the gentleman. At all events, the one experiment sufficed: she never tried it again. Mr. Turner, however, continued to regard her with the highest esteem. His first toast at dinner, whether alone or in company, at home or abroad, was ever Miss Hannah More, and, at his death, he bequeathed to her a thousand pounds, as a slight token of regard. Dr. Langhorn offered himself to her, some years after, and, though a rejected suitor, remained a warm friend until his death.

We have now glanced at her childhood, and that dangerous period, early womanhood. Even at this age, when the world and its pleasures look so bright, while the bloom of youth and beauty were on her cheek, she was enabled to resist those influences which, by leading her into

fashion and folly, would have destroyed her taste and love for the intellectual and the holy. And herein lies one of the chief objections against what are called "fashionable pleasures." The stomach, accustomed to dainties, will not relish substantial and wholesome food, and bad health and a ruined constitution are the consequences. Hannah More avoided, in great measure, though not entirely, these snares. How? She was a Christian—a very imperfect one then, it is true; but yet *on the way* to the kingdom of God.

We must now follow her to London, where she appeared first in the year 1773, and was most cordially received in the brilliant literary circle which made this period so remarkable, as the favourite of Johnson and Sir Joshua Reynolds, the intimate friend of Garrick and Edmund Burke; having the esteem and confidence of men so opposite in all moral characteristics as Porteus (afterward Bishop of London) and Wilberforce, on the one hand, and Sheridan and Walpole on the other. She had a strange and unusual opportunity, as she writes to her sister in 1773, to "know something of the hurry, bustle, dissipation and nonsensical flutter of town life," as well as of the most brilliant literary circles. Never was woman more flattered and favoured: little wonder if her head had been quite turned. But, fortunately, she was made of "sterner stuff" than the sex (aye, or the other either) usually are, and was as much *improved* as injured by it all. Her raptures, when first introduced to a "live author," she often laughed over in after years, when her sisters would remind her of the time she was so anxious to see Dr. Johnson as to wish for a hiding place in some of his favourite places of resort. The desire did not long remain ungratified; for she had the pleasure of meeting him very soon after, at the house of Sir Joshua Reynolds. As he was handing her up stairs, Sir Joshua prepared her for the possibility of his being in one of his taciturn moods. She was agreeably surprised, however, when he came to meet her, with good humour in his countenance, accosting her with a verse of a Morning Hymn which she had written at the request of Sir James Stonehouse. He continued (wonderful to say!) in this pleasant humour all the evening.

Of her first visit to the Leviathan in his own house, she says,—"We have paid another visit to Miss Reynolds. She had sent to engage Dr. Percy, (Percy's collection,—now you know him,) quite a sprightly modern, instead of a rusty antique, as I expected. He was no sooner gone, than the most amiable and obliging of women (Miss Reynolds) ordered the coach, to take us to Dr. Johnson's *very own house;* yes, Abyssinia Johnson! Dictionary Johnson! Rambler's, Idler's, and Irene's Johnson! Can you picture to your-

selves the palpitation of our hearts as we approached his mansion? The conversation turned upon a new work of his, just going to the press, (the Tour to the Hebrides,) and his old friend Richardson. Mrs. Williams, the blind poet, who lives with him, was introduced to us. She is engaging in her manners; her conversation lively and entertaining. Miss Reynolds told the doctor of all our rapturous exclamations on the road. He shook his scientific head at Hannah, and said, "She was a *silly thing*." When our visit was ended, he called for his hat, (as it rained,) to attend us down a very long entry to our coach; and not Rasselas could have acquitted himself more *en cavalier*. We are engaged with him at Sir Joshua's, Wednesday evening. What do you think of us?"

The friendship thus begun was not a transient feeling, but an affectionate regard, which continued unabated on both sides until the death of Dr. Johnson. In the following year her sister Sally alludes to the affection between Johnson and Hannah thus: "If a wedding should take place before our return, don't be surprised,—between the mother of 'Sir Eldred' [one of Hannah's late productions] and the father of 'Irene'—nay, Mrs. Montagu says, if tender words are the precursors of connubial engagements, we may expect great things; for it is nothing but 'child,' a 'little fool,' 'love,' and 'dearest.'" Johnson often spoke afterwards of the interest and esteem he felt for all the sisters, founded upon an appreciation of their talents and characters. There was perhaps nothing about them which struck his mind more forcibly than the love and harmony which subsisted between them. Upon one occasion he thus speaks of it: "What! five women live happily together! I will come and see you; I love you both, I love you all five. I never was at Bristol; I will come on purpose to see you. I have spent a happy evening, and am glad I came. God forever keep you. You live lives to shame duchesses." But though returning warmly the kind feelings of all her distinguished friends, it was to Garrick that Hannah's heart clung most strongly. He and his accomplished wife held the first place in her affection; and from her introduction to him, in early womanhood, till extreme old age, her feelings of love for him knew no ebb. Only a few weeks before her death, and more than fifty *after his*, she spoke of him most tenderly and affectionately.

Much as she enjoyed the "conversation" and cultivation of the society in which she moved, her eyes were not blinded to the follies common even in this refined circle. A fashionable lady's dress in our own day is foolish and unreasonable enough, but surely it is sensible and beautiful compared with the absurd costume which then prevailed. We find Miss More speaking thus of it in one of her

home letters, dated 1775. "I am going, to-day, to a great dinner; nothing can be conceived so absurd, extravagant, and fantastical as the present mode of dressing the head. Simplicity and modesty are things so much exploded, that the very names are no longer remembered. I have just escaped from one of the most fashionable disfigurers; and though I charged him to dress me with the greatest simplicity, and to have only a very distant eye upon the fashion, just enough to avoid the pride of singularity, without running into ridiculous excess, yet, in spite of all these sage didactics, I absolutely blush at myself, and turn to the glass with as much caution as a vain beauty just risen from the small-pox, which cannot be a more disfiguring disease than the present mode of dressing." Again she says, speaking of the head-gear of some ladies who had just left her, "I hardly do them justice when I pronounce that they had among them on their heads, an acre and a half of shrubbery, besides slopes, grass-plots, tulip beds, clumps of peonies, kitchen gardens and green-houses." Nor was this curious taste confined to the gay metropolis; for, even in the country, she finds ladies "with large quantities of fruit on their heads," and others with long "perpendicular caps, hung with four or five ostrich feathers of various colours." Garrick struck a strong blow at this fashionable folly, by appearing one evening on the stage, his cap decorated with a profusion of every sort of vegetables, and a huge carrot hanging down on each side.

But to return to Hannah More, in London. Let us now pay a visit with her to the Blue-Stocking club, and have what Mrs. Knight calls a "Peep at the Blues." This club was a literary assemblage which met at Mrs. Montagu's, or Mrs. Vesey's. The strange name of *Bas Bleu*, which has since become the family name of literary or pedantic women, was suggested, it is said, by the hose of one of its most admired *male* members, Benjamin Stillingfleet. The club "was composed of persons distinguished for wit and talent, who met, without ceremony or supper, to enjoy each other's society without cards or dancing." Elizabeth Montagu, a most prominent member, was one of the most elegant women of her day,—a widow, with an ample fortune, who had, in youth, possessed rare beauty, of which traces were evident, even in her old age. Her splendid mansion in Berkeley-square, was frequented by a distinguished society, which her wit and grace were fitted to adorn. She was an author too. Her essay on Shakspeare, which appeared in 1769, was much admired; Cowper spoke of it in the most flattering terms; but we know her best by a volume of letters which are charmingly communicative. One of her most loved friends was Elizabeth Carter, also a literary

woman, and a great favourite with Dr. Johnson. Let no parent despair of a dull child, after Elizabeth Carter; for she is said to have been so exceedingly stupid that even her father gave up teaching her, thinking it a hopeless task. But *she* was faithful and industrious, and at last conquered; for she became a really learned woman. The fishermen at Deal where her country house was situated, called her the "Almanac maker," respectfully enough—to make an almanac being, in their opinion, the highest achievement of intellect. This, with Johnson's high opinion of her acquirements, will surely be proof positive. Another of the coterie was Mrs. Chapone, whose "Letters to the Young" were once thought indispensable to every young lady's work-table, and are even now to be found in out-of-the-way nooks. Mrs. Boscawen, and the enthusiastic and accomplished Mrs. Vesey, were also members; and all these, with Reynolds, Burke, Johnson and Garrick, must have formed a goodly company. Miss More's home letters at this period are very interesting, both for their freedom and vivacity, and for the details which they contain of her intercourse with these great and gifted men.

During the interval between her first and second visit to the metropolis, she wrote several poems—Sir Eldred of the Bower, The Bleeding Rock, and others—which were all well received: better, indeed, in our opinion, than they deserved. It is not as a poet that Hannah More commands our respect, but as an industrious, Christian woman. Her "better life" we have not yet arrived at, though we have followed her through thirty years of her stay upon earth. Yet even now we often find her speaking of the "wearisomeness of fashionable life," of her dislike of public amusements and of plays, "unless, indeed, when Garrick plays;" and hereafter we shall hear her speak not only of the wearisomeness of them all, but of their sinfulness and vanity. She herself wrote several plays, which were performed with great success; but, in after years, she spoke in terms of the most unqualified disapprobation of such amusements. Even at this time she saw and felt their injurious tendency; but fancied that the play and play-house might be purified and refined so as to make a harmless, if not improving amusement. With this vain hope were her plays written.

Her industry at this time was truly remarkable. Even during her stay with the Garricks in London, when society made so many inroads upon her time, she was accustomed to read four hours a day, and often to write ten. Of her popularity with the public we may judge by the success of a little poem, written after her return to Bristol and addressed to Dragon, Garrick's favourite dog. She had not thought of publishing it, and manuscript copies were handed around

among her friends, till at last she was induced to print it, when one thousand copies were sold in a single week. The ode is certainly a very sensible and witty one, to be addressed to a dog; but, doubtless, as Mrs. Knight says, what Dragon failed to appreciate, his master would. Garrick, for many years the prince and pride of the British stage, was now about to leave it forever, and she refers very happily to this event in the ode:—

> "How wise! a short retreat to steal,
> The vanity of life to feel,
> And from its cares to fly;
> To act one calm, domestic scene,
> Earth's bustle and the grave between,
> Retire, and learn to die."

During the following summer we hear of her in Norfolk, "hunting up old friends of her father's, visiting country cousins, eating brown bread and custards, and thoroughly appreciating all the good sense that fell in her way." A change this, from the elegant town circle she had so lately left; yet she seems to have enjoyed it well, and esteemed most highly the "plain people" who surrounded her. An extract from one of her letters speaks well on this point, and gives us a good homely truth besides. "I have long ago found out, that hardly anybody but frugal, plain people, do generous things. Our cousin Cotton, who, I dare say, is often ridiculed for his simplicity and frugality, can yet lay down £200, without being sure of ever receiving a shilling interest, for the laudable purpose of establishing a minister, to whom he is still a very considerable contributor. This is commonly the case; and I am apt to conceive a prejudice against everybody who makes a great figure, and to suspect those who *talk* generously."

In 1777 we find her writing again, and, at the earnest solicitations of Garrick, she resolved to try her powers in drama. "Percy" was the fruit. Garrick wrote the prologue, and the success of the play was complete; it ran for twelve nights with crowded houses, and yielded the author £700. Her delight at its success is natural; though this same success was a sad encouragement to the growth of a certain kind of vanity, of which the good Hannah was never destitute, and which peeps out obviously enough in her letters of this period. But, perhaps, we should rather be surprised to find so few displays of this kind, when we remember the circumstances and temptations which surrounded her. She was an "almost Christian" in a dream, from which the death of Garrick awakened her. This event took place in 1779; her love for him was excessive, and his death was a sudden and awful blow to her. She immediately went to London,

to be with the one, (perhaps the *only* one,) whose grief was greater than her own. Her *serious* thoughts at this time we learn from her letters, in which we frequently find such passages as the following: "His new house is not so pleasant as Hampton, or so splendid as the Adelphi; but it is commodious enough for the wants of its inhabitant; and, besides, it is so quiet that he will never be disturbed until the eternal morning. May he then find mercy!" And again, after the last solemn scene was over, and she had seen his body laid in the grave, she says, "And this is all of Garrick! yet a very little while, and he shall say to the worm, 'Thou art my brother; and to corruption, Thou art my mother and my sister.' So passes away the fashion of this world."

Mrs. Knight tells us a few particulars of his early life: how from poverty and obscurity he raised himself to wealth and eminence in the world; of his entering, when about nineteen, the newly-opened seminary of "Samuel Johnson, which, after a few weeks' trial, was abandoned by both master and pupil;" and how the two went *together* to London, and at last made for themselves great names. She refers also to the noble nature of Garrick, to his unfailing generosity and benevolence, which never allowed him to turn a deaf ear to the cry of the needy—heart, hand and purse were always open to them. She dwells also upon the regret, which every pious mind must feel, that all this nobleness, both of mind and heart, was not turned to a better account, than that of the mere *amusement* of the passing hour. In every social circle he was the admired of all; in his profession, he undoubtedly stands first; and yet we can but say of him, "Alas, poor Garrick!"

After his death, Miss More wrote two plays, "The Fatal Falsehood," and "The Inflexible Captive," which were her last dramatic productions. She became convinced soon afterwards of the vanity of attempting to make these amusements profitable; nay, more, she saw fully the sin of them, and laid them aside forever. *Her opinion* on this subject is worthy of regard: for she had enjoyed both the opportunity and the capacity of perceiving the effects of the theatre. "I think there is a substantial difference between seeing and reading a dramatic composition; and that the objections which lie so strongly against the one, are not, at least in the same degree, applicable to the other. While there is an essential and inseparable danger attendant on dramatic exhibitions, the danger in *reading* a play arises solely from the improper *sentiments* contained in it. It is the semblance of real action which is given to the piece by different persons supporting the different parts, and by their dress, tones, and gestures, heightening the representation into a kind of enchantment;

it is the pageantry, the splendour of the spectacle, and even the show of the spectators—these are the circumstances which fill the theatre, produce the effect, and create the danger. These give a pernicious force to sentiments, which, when read, may merely explain the mysterious action of the human heart, but which, when thus uttered and accompanied, become contagious and destructive. These, in short, make up a scene of temptation and seduction, of over-wrought voluptuousness and unnerving pleasure, which ill accords with a desire to be enlightened by the doctrines, or governed by the principles of the gospel of Jesus Christ. What the stage might be under another and an imaginary state of things, it is not very easy for us to know, and, therefore, not very important to inquire. Nor is it the soundest logic to argue on the possible goodness of a thing, which, in the present circumstances of society, is doing positive evil, from the imagined good that thing might be conjectured to produce in a supposed state of unattainable improvement; for, unfortunately, nothing can be done until not only the stage itself has undergone complete purification, but until the audience shall be purified also. We must first suppose a state of society in which the spectators will be disposed to relish all that is pure, and to reprobate all that is corrupt, before the system of a pure and uncorrupt theatre can be adopted with any reasonable hope of success: there must always be a harmony between the taste of the spectator and the nature of the spectacle, in order to produce pleasure; for people go to a play not to be instructed, but to be amused."

In 1780 and 1781 we find her again at Hampton, cheering Mrs. Garrick with her society, and assisting her to read and arrange the private letters of the departed master of the mansion; his list of correspondents had been very extensive, and many a name of eminence was there whose owner, like Garrick, now slept in the dust. In writing home, she speaks of this employment (which, though sad, brought with it the reward of wholesome reflection) thus,—"I have been reading the friendly correspondence of all the men who have made a figure in the annals of business or literature for the last forty years: for I think I hardly miss a name of any eminence in Great Britain, and not many in France. It is not the least instructive part of this employment, to consider where almost all of these great men are now! The play-writers, where are they? and the poets, are their fires extinguished? Did Lord Bath, or Bishop Warburton, or Lord Chatham, or Goldsmith, or Churchill, or Chesterfield, trouble themselves with thinking that the heads which dictated these bright epistles would so soon be laid low? Did they imagine that such a nobody as I am, whom they would have disdained to reckon 'with

the dogs of their flocks,' should have the arranging and disposing of them?"

From the death of this dear friend till Hannah's retreat to Cowslip Green, we notice an effort, manifest both in her life and letters, to detach herself from the world and its amusements, to which she was now beginning to feel that too much of her time had been devoted. During this interval, she was a great deal with her widowed friend at Hampton; where she wrote several poems, "Belshazzar" and "Sensibility" among them: the latter being, perhaps, the best verse Miss Hannah More produced. During the summer of 1782 we find her again with Dr. Johnson. She met him at Oxford, "sad, sick, and disconsolate." The loss of a much-loved friend, (Mr. Thrale,) "one whose eye, as Johnson himself said, for fifteen years had scarcely been turned upon him, but with respect and tenderness," had overwhelmed him with sadness. "For such another friend," he says, "the general course of human things will not suffer me to hope." And again most mournfully: "In our walk through life, we have dropped our companions, and are now to pick up such as chance may offer, or travel alone." Alas, the great man knew not *then*, "the Friend that sticketh closer than a brother;" else his pilgrimage to that house with many mansions, in the quiet land of rest and reward, would not have seemed so wearisome and so dark. With this knowledge and love in his heart, as friend after friend departed from him, "looking unto Jesus," he might have said, "*Thou* wilt *never* leave or forsake me." But he left for a death-bed what should have been the work of a life time—this very "looking unto Jesus;"—for a death-bed of physical agony was reserved his solemn question,—"What man can say that his repentance has not been such as to require being repented of?" and when the morality and good inculcated in his writings was urged upon him, still his reply was, "How can I tell that I have done enough?"—a fearful question this, that *we* may not answer. Of justification by *faith*, he seems to have had no just conception; and when Mr. Winstanley presented unto him the "Lamb of God," as he who taketh away the sin of the world, he seized upon the blessed truth with earnestness; and we can hope that it proved a savour of life unto his soul. His physician, Dr. Brocklesly, tells us: "For some time before his death, all his fears were calmed and absorbed by the prevalence of his *faith* and his trust in the merit and propitiation of Jesus Christ." Here we see the difference between nominal and real Christianity. This great and mighty man of genius, on his bed of death, could have been taught by the most humble and ignorant of Christians; for how many such are there, who can say, "*I know* that my Redeemer liveth." Happy, glorious way to im-

mortality, in which a wayfaring man, though a fool, may walk as confidently and safely as earth's brightest favourite. Johnson's death, however, we hope, was that of the righteous.

Hannah's father died also in 1783, and that too when she was away from him at Hampton; nor does she seem to have heard of his illness till the sad news of his death arrived. Here was another earthly bond unloosed. In the same year Dr. Kennicott, one more well beloved friend, was taken from her. Dr. Johnson's death occurred *after* these, though we have mentioned it first.

During the summer of 1784, while Miss More was with her sisters at Bristol, she became acquainted with the extraordinary person known as the Bristol milk-woman, Ann Yearsley. She found her in the most abject poverty and misery; amidst all of which, however, she had written a large amount of poetry, which bore evident marks of genius. Her ignorance, too, was extreme; her library consisted of a Bible, and a copy of Milton. Miss More at once began the task of training her untaught mind; and having made her a comfortable home, she corrected and arranged her poems, and, after writing in her favour to many influential friends, she circulated her poems among them; thus obtaining for the woman's use, subscriptions which amounted to quite a respectable sum, £500, or more. This she placed in the funds under the trusteeship of Mrs. Montagu, to be used solely for her. For thirteen months her time was chiefly engaged in this most charitable undertaking. Ill rewarded, however, were all her pains; the woman turned out unworthy and ungrateful; but her benefactor had at least the satisfaction of knowing, that she had done *her* duty. This unfortunate example of ingratitude did not harden her heart against the needy and the suffering; to such she was ever kind and generous—generous not only with this world's goods, but also with the instruction which should prepare them for another.

We have frequently remarked the earnest desire of Hannah More's heart, for a higher and more religious life. These aspirations were now assuming a more practical and enduring shape. In 1785 she had reached her fortieth year, and had written little but poems, whose tendency was *moral* indeed, but nothing more. Her life and conversation heretofore had not been entirely unprofitable; but she felt in looking back upon it, as if she had done nothing. From her retirement to Cowslip Green (in 1786) until her death, we see a different being from the accomplished woman we have heretofore been regarding: from this time her accomplishments and intellectual gifts were used solely in the service of God. To fit herself for her great work, was now her earnest endeavour; and she begins with

her own heart. Her correspondence with several pious friends, but especially her letters to Rev. John Newton, tell us well of the trials and difficulties which beset her path. As with most Christians, trifles, and what might well be called "innocent pleasures," impeded her progress more than aught else. In her letters to Mr. Newton, we often find such passages as the following, and how many of us might truly say the like:—

"The care of my garden gives me employment, health, and spirits. I want to know, dear sir, if it is peculiar to myself to form ideal plans of perfect virtue, and to dream of all manner of imaginary goodness in untried circumstances, while one neglects the immediate duties of one's actual situation? Do I make myself understood? I have always fancied that if I could secure to myself such a quiet retreat as I have now really accomplished, I should be wonderfully good; that I should have leisure to store my mind with such and such maxims of wisdom; that I should be safe from such and such temptations; that, in short, my whole summers would be smooth periods of peace and goodness. Now, the misfortune is, I have actually found a great deal of the comfort I expected, but without any of the concomitant virtues. I am certainly happier here than in the agitation of the world, but I do not find that I am one bit better; with full *leisure* to rectify my heart and affections, the disposition unluckily does not come. I have the mortification to find that petty and (as they are called) innocent employments can detain my heart from heaven as much as tumultuous pleasures. If to the pure all things are pure, the reverse must be also true, when I can contrive to make so harmless an employment as the cultivation of flowers stand in the room of a vice, by the great portion of time I give up to it, and by the entire dominion it has over my mind. You will tell me that if the affections be estranged from their proper object, it signifies not much whether a bunch of roses or a pack of cards effects it. I pass my life in intending to get the better of this; but life is passing away, and the reform never begins. It is a very significant saying, though a very odd one, of one of the Puritans, that "hell is paved with good intentions." I sometimes tremble to think how large a square my procrastination alone may furnish to this tesselated pavement."

The good man's reply was most excellent, worthy of being offered to every one in like manner perplexed and in earnest. This correspondence was, doubtless, the means of much good to her, and her advancement is very evident. Her first production in her country home was a little volume called "Thoughts on the Importance of the Manners of the Great to General Society." It appeared anonymously; and we may judge of the merit of the work from its being attributed first to Mr. Wilberforce, and then to the Bishop of London. It was not long, however, before the true author was known, and much applauded by the pious and thoughtful. It was a direct attack upon many evils prevalent in the higher circles. On this subject she was well fitted to write: her acquaintance with fashionable life was neither slight nor superficial; moreover, her own mind was not led astray by its tinsel and glitter. This little book was but the *introduction*, however. Mr. Newton says, "It is like the morning spread upon

the mountains, the harbinger of advancing day." She herself says, "In this little book I have not gone deep; it is but a superficial view of the subject; it is confined to prevailing practical evils. Should this succeed, I hope, by the blessing of God, another time to attack more strongly the *principle*. I hope it may be useful to myself at least, as I give a sort of public pledge of my principles, to which I pray I may be enabled to act up." Of that numerous class which we may call negative Christians—those who know of God without serving him, acknowlege without *believing* on him—she writes clearly and well, showing fully their danger and guilt. The employing of hair-dressers on Sunday, teaching servants the *untrue* "not at home," and other like customs, she talks of vigorously, yet in a kind as well as firm tone. The book sold well, seven large editions disappearing in a few months; and we hope it did good also. In two years after she sends forth another, and equally excellent volume, treating of the same subject as its predecessor, only striking deeper, more at the root. We may learn a little of its character from the name it bore, "Estimate of the Religion of the Fashionable World." We have spoken of her *poetical* works having lived *their* day, which is now gone by; but very different are her later productions. These lose nothing by age, and might now be read with as much interest and profit, as though they were the work of yesterday. Much good might be done in this country, by a new edition of some of them, well circulated and well read.

She was at this time enjoying the intimacy of two of earth's purest spirits, the Rev. John Newton and William Wilberforce. The influence of the first, we have seen, was exerted to make her a more earnest and devoted Christian. We will now look at the second —and before we regard their friendship and its effects, let us glance for a moment at the *man*. A fine intellect, a kind heart, an ample fortune, and a seat in Parliament, are advantages—we had almost said snares—not often bestowed upon a man of six and twenty; yet all these and more, were given to William Wilberforce. His first distinct religious convictions were received from reading Doddridge's Rise and Progress of Religion, which accidentally fell in his way while travelling on the continent. Surprised at his own ignorance and folly, thus fully displayed to him, he cried, "I will search the Scriptures, and see if these things are so." Meeting in them a confirmation of all his fears, he began to search also for the *hope* set before him, and ere long was rewarded, for he found the truth, and received it into a willing heart. Mrs. Knight says of him at this period, "Wilberforce soon appeared a changed man, a living epistle of the grace of God, known and read of all men. In his con-

secration to the service of his Divine Master, there was no reserve, or compromise: he gave up himself and his all: 'Henceforth let me do with all my might, while the day lasts,' was the sleepless endeavour of his life."

Many were the good things which he accomplished; but the great work of his life was the abolition of the African slave-trade: this he undertook in 1787, when about twenty-eight years of age. The subject had been privately discussed for several years, and many agreed that it *ought* to be abolished; but how? Where was the man strong enough, to stand forth calmly and resolutely against the fearful odds in the British Parliament? Burke had thought of it; but he dared not undertake it. Wilberforce was the man with this stout heart and firm arm. Work he found to do; and he did it with his might. The length and severity of the struggle we know, and its glorious issue too. Well may British freemen look proudly on the name of Wilberforce; a beautiful and peaceful household word it has now become. Miss More sympathized strongly in this battle for the oppressed—we find the feeling in her letters, where, after talking of the "champion," whose zeal she says was sleepless, she dwells upon the justice of the cause. She even published a poem, which she called "the Slave Trade." We should call her an abolitionist, for her whole heart seems with him and his friends. As the twelfth of May (when the question was to be brought before the House of Commons) approached the excitement increased,—"the fate of Africa now trembled in the balance." The eloquence of Wilberforce on that day surprised even his warmest admirers; his appeal was, indeed, masterly: so fully did he display the justice of his cause, that he carried all before him. Pitt, Burke, and Fox followed where they had feared to lead, and supported him manfully.

But to return to Miss More, whom we find next at Rosedale, the seat of Mrs. Montagu; thence, after a pleasant excursion on the Wye with Mr. and Miss Wilberforce, she returns home. Very shortly after, the same little party are together at Cowslip-Green, rambling over the hills and cliffs, and enjoying country life in perfection. There was one part of the neighbourhood the strangers had not visited; and from the disappointments which had followed every effort, the sisters almost feared Mr. W. would "never get to Cheddar." These were bold romantic cliffs at about ten miles' distance from the cottage, and from their wild beauty added much to the scenery, and were the resort of all travellers in that region. At length, however, a morning was given to Cheddar, and the sisters, particularly Patty, looked anxiously for their guests' return, when running into the parlour she inquired triumphantly, "How he liked the cliffs?" "Very

fine," he replied, "but the poverty and distress of the people are dreadful." "This was all that passed," said Patty, in relating the circumstance. "Wilberforce soon retired to his room, and dismissed even his reader. I said to Hannah and his sister, that I feared he was not well. The cold chicken and wine put into the carriage for his dinner, was returned untouched. He appeared at supper, seemingly refreshed with a higher feast than we had sent with him. The servant, at his desire, was dismissed, when immediately he began: 'Miss Hannah More, something must be done for Cheddar!' He then gave us a particular account of his day, of the inquiries he had made respecting the poor; there was no resident minister, no manufactory, nor did there appear any dawn of comfort, either temporal or spiritual. The method and possibility of assisting them was discussed till a late hour; it was then decided, in a few words, by Mr. Wilberforce's exclaiming: 'If you will be at the trouble, I will be at the expense.' Mr. W. and his sister left us in a day or two. We turned many schemes in our head every possible way; at length those measures were adopted, which led to the formation of the different schools." Here we see how Mr. Wilberforce's friendship was turned to good account. This was "a word spoken in season, and behold how good it was!" These industrious Christian sisters needed naught else; the *suggestion* of the duty was all they required, and speedily both heart and hand were busy with the new work. The population of this region was in the lowest state of degradation and misery. living in the caves and fissures of the rocks, and earning a miserable subsistence by selling roots and minerals to the travellers who chanced to pass that way. Truly it needed a missionary spirit to enter these abodes of want and woe; and what made the task more difficult, these wretched beings themselves were unwilling to be enlightened —civilized we might say. Sunday schools were established among them; then week-day schools, for spinning, knitting and sewing. A faithful woman and her daughter were engaged to attend to the schools, and nurse and visit the sick. Under the blessing of God, by their labours, Cheddar became civilized, nay, more, Christianized, in a few years: and now these labourers must look for other fields. These were to be found near at hand, and Shipham and Axbridge felt their kindness. All this time Wilberforce was not unmindful of the pecuniary means necessary to carry out these reforms. We find him writing to the sisters thus: "I have more money than time, and if you, or your sister, will condescend to be my almoner, you will enable me to employ some of the superfluity it has pleased God to give me to some good purpose. Sure am I that they who subscribe attention and industry furnish articles of more sterling and in-

trinsic value. Besides, I have a rich banker in London, Mr. Henry Thornton, whom I cannot oblige so much as by drawing on him for purposes like these. I shall take the liberty of enclosing a draft for £40; but this is only for a beginning." Here was a rich man, laying up treasure in heaven. Right joyfully did the sisters accept this offer; and the use they made of it, we shall see hereafter. About this time the elder ones gave up their school, and retired to a comfortable house in Bath, where "they might spend their old age in quiet and peace." They were well rewarded for their twenty years' exertions, both in honour and profit, and now they could command all the comforts, and even many luxuries, so much enjoyed in old age. Mrs. Knight says, "Henceforth the sisters had two homes—sometimes at Cowslip-Green, sometimes at Bath; and the fraternal tie was strengthened and hallowed by the hearty co-operation of each other in holy purposes and useful plans."

Of the extent of their labours we may form some idea from what Miss Hannah tells us of the teachers merely whom they employed to *assist* them: "The teaching of the teachers is not the least part of the work, having about thirty masters and mistresses, with under-teachers; one has continually to bear with the faults, the ignorance, the prejudices, humours, misfortunes, and debts of all these poor, well-meaning people. I hope, however, it teaches one forbearance, and it serves to put me in mind how much God has to bear from me. I now and then comfort Patty in our journeys home at night, by saying, If we do these people no good, I hope we do some little good to ourselves."

Their energy and faithfulness might well put to the blush those who shrink from engaging in Sunday-schools *now*, when a few minutes' walk takes one to an orderly class in a decent and commodious building. They had, in the beginning, to collect their scholars, and build their school-house, and then commence at the root of everything, in forming them. They visited every Sunday at least two or three parishes, riding from ten to thirty miles, and enduring thirteen hours' exposure to the weather, which, when extremely inclement, sometimes compelled them to pass the night at some of the villages: and all this they continued for upwards of twenty years. What examples are these to the Christian women of these days! How much charity and long-suffering are displayed in these labours of love! Now were Miss Hannah's longings for a "better life" satisfied—nay, not *satisfied*, for that were impossible on earth—and still she wished for more to do, and the ability to accomplish it. "Pray for me, (she writes to a friend,) that I may be able to do *more* and *better*." At this time, the good

work had been carried through three parishes; even Mendip, which was most remote from Cowslip-Green, was rejoicing and prosperous.

Her intimacy and correspondence with Mr. Newton, continues full of interest. He spent one happy week with the sisters at the Green, when their pleasure was equalled only by his own. We can well believe Hannah when she says, "My chief earthly pleasures are of the social kind; few others when they are past are pleasing in the retrospect, but friendship founded in grace is always delightful. An interchange of hearts, and even of looks, with those who have joint communion in the objects and blessings of the gospel, is worth more than all the glittering things the world can offer." She was, indeed, blessed in her friends.

Her next important publications were a series of tales of a political character, advocating conservative doctrines, and intended as an antidote to the democratic sentiments which were prevalent at the time. These tales appeared in monthly numbers, and attracted so much attention, that more than a million copies were sold. Finding it so successful, she thought the same popular style might succeed well in advocating temperance and religion; and thence sprung the plan of the Cheap Repository. This was a publication to furnish a story, a ballad, and a tract, every month, to be sustained partly by subscription, in order to enable the poorest cottager to take it. The plan was very successful, not only in their own parishes, but in all parts of England. Patty and Sally lent valuable aid; the one in distributing, and the other in assisting her to write the tracts. Her friends in London too were much interested. Bishop Porteus kept a table in his library always covered with them, that they might at least be made the subject of conversation; and the Earl of Oxford was equally anxious for their circulation. "Thank you a thousand times for your most ingenious plan," wrote he to Miss Hannah; "may great success reward you! How calm and comfortable must your slumbers be, on the pillow of every day's good deeds!"

During the winter of 1794, she again visited London, and here, amidst the fascinations and snares of fashionable life, we find her keeping a close watch over her heart that she might retain the Christian spirit that years of self-denial had given her. Her journal says, in one place, "I see the need of doing the duty of every day in *its* day. When I look back on the past week, I see cause of mourning over my vanity and folly. Sloth and self are getting strong dominion, and much time wasted that I had devoted to improvement. Let these continual discoveries make me humble." Again she says, "Much kindness, literary and elegant society: but the habits

of polished life, even of virtuous and pious people, are too relaxing. Much serious reading, but not a serious spirit; good health with increased relaxation of mind: thus are the blessings of God turned against himself."

The tracts in the Cheap Repository are most excellent as well as popular; perhaps none of her writings have more merit. The Shepherd of Salisbury Plain is one, and a happy specimen of her skill in this department. The ballads were of the same character; of these Mrs. Knight gives a fine example, in the Two Weavers, or, Turn the Carpet. We cannot wonder, as we read, at their unprecedented popularity.

In 1797 we find Wilberforce, just after his marriage, making a second visit to Cowslip-Green; and again at Cheddar too, which eight years before he had visited under far different circumstances. Where want, misery, and ignorance then prevailed, industry, contentment and neatness now reigned. Schools and churches were both attended and respected now, by the same people who had then refused to hear of such dangerous innovations; and better than all, there were earnest and true Christians among those who were then no better than the heathen who have never heard of God. No wonder that the soul of this sincere servant of God "swelled with joy and gratitude," as he beheld the blessed improvement.

On the New Year's day of 1798, Hannah More renewed her dedication of herself to her Heavenly Master, even more earnestly than ever. In her daily writing we find, "Let me now give myself away with a more entire surrender than I have ever yet made." During the past year she had lost many friends; yet had many left to love and to flatter still. Of flattery she seems much afraid. We often find her writing thus: "Am I tempted to vanity? Let me recall to mind the shining friends I have lost this year,—eminent each in his different way,—yet he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than either." Horace Walpole was one of these, whose correspondence and friendship had continued unchanged for twenty years. Her labours this year were extended to Wedmore—a large and very ignorant parish—where she met with much opposition; the farmers objecting much to what they called her interference, and opposing all her efforts so strongly, that many a less determined spirit would have given up in despair. But she was enabled by God's grace to withstand it all, and was successful at last. About this time, she published "Strictures on Female Education"—a work of such discrimination and good sense that we should wish to see it in every father's library or mother's work-table. Mrs. Knight quotes some excellent passages, which are strong enough to do good, even in the

small quantities her space would allow her to give. About this time she had some difficulties relating to her schools, of a more discouraging nature than all the opposition she had yet experienced. It seems that the curate (whose name was Bere) of one of the parishes, had charged the master of the school in operation there, with being a Methodist, and also with teaching these doctrines to his pupils. So far as we can learn this was *inferred*, because he sometimes prayed extemporaneously, and encouraged the people to talk among themselves of God's goodness to them; in other words, to tell their religious experience. Great recommendation as this seems to us, it was a fearful fault in the estimation of these good Churchmen, and the man was accordingly dismissed—scarcely with Miss More's *approval*, but certainly with her consent. Mr. Young (the accused teacher) was a man of uprightness and integrity, and had been in her employ for more than ten years. We should not have expected, that one so discriminating and sensible as she usually was, would have consented to injure one whose conduct both her judgment and her heart approved; we can only cover it with the charitable reflection that the wisest and best of human beings may sometimes err. As she could not procure another suitable teacher, the school was disbanded and scattered, which cost her many tears. Yet even in her farewell address to these pupils, after speaking of the sorrow she feels at not being able to meet them, as she had formerly done, regularly, she says of this man, whose enemies could accuse him of nothing worse than "Methodism;" "I earnestly request that though you treat him as a kind friend and neighbour, you do not, either by many or by few, resort to him for instruction." Alas for poor humanity, when even Hannah More's heart contained so much of bigotry and intolerance. Bating this one paragraph, the address is a capital one, full of kindness and love both to God and man. But her troubles ended not with the dismission of the teacher and the closing of the school. It seems that the rector, finding on examination that Mr. Bere (the curate) had shown a very unchristian spirit in the matter, deprived him of the curacy, all of which Mr. Bere accused Miss More of having brought about on account of her dislike to him. He persecuted her for years, charging her with all sorts of injustice and wickedness—Jacobinism, disloyalty, and even French infidelity were added to Methodism. Hard charges, indeed, to be made against one who had so long laboured against *all* these things; yet for three years this persecution continued. During this time, too, she had a most distressing illness, which confined her to the house for more than seven months. Nothing shows more conclusively her truly Christian spirit than the manner in which she endured these trials. At one time, when things

were at their worst, she writes, "These calumnies are of too dreadful a nature to be borne, except from a full conviction that it is the will of God, who is pleased thus to exercise me for my purification. Who knows but in the final issue of things I may have reason to think these bad men are my best friends, having never before tasted anything but dangerous prosperity or unmerited praise?" And again she says, "If it pleases God thus to put an end to my little (how little!) usefulness, I hope to be enabled to submit to his will—not only to submit to it, because I cannot help it; but to *acquiesce* in it, *because it is holy, just, and good.*"

In 1801, she removed to Barley-Wood. This was a much larger and more beautiful mansion than the cottage at Cowslip-Green, situated on a rising ground near Torrington, and commanding a fine view of "hill and valley, hamlet and green." The sisters resolved to have but one home hereafter; and accordingly the house in Bath was given up, and all removed to Barley-Wood. "Lord, grant," says Hannah, "that this prove a blessing to us all, and draw us nearer to him; make us thankful that our lot has fallen in so pleasant a place, that we have a goodly heritage; but let us not take up with so poor a portion as *this* life, or anything in it."

Her journal at this time is full of spiritual life; we now find records of her earnest striving after "a closer walk with God." The year 1806 was an eventful period for England; for during its course Wilberforce accomplished the great work to which he had devoted "the prime of his life and the strength of his manhood." The abolition of the slave-trade had been gaining ground slowly but steadily with the British public; and now, nearly twenty years after his introduction of the subject to the House of Commons, we find its advocate, earnestly as ever, labouring in its behalf. The first reading of the bill took place in the House of Lords on the 22d of February. Can we wonder, that when the vote was taken, and stood seventy-two to twenty-eight, he exclaimed, from the fulness of his thankful heart, "O Lord, let me praise thee with my whole heart?" And again, when a month later, having passed both houses, the king's sanction had made it *law*, he says, "What thanks do I owe the Giver of all good, for bringing me, in his gracious providence, to this great cause, which at length, after nineteen years of labour, is successful."

At Barley-Wood, too, there was rejoicing, though the mistress lay on a bed of suffering; her pain was almost forgotten, in joy that the oppressed and enslaved, on British soil, should evermore be free.

Shortly after this, the Bishop of London, (Porteus,) her friend

and counsellor in many a trying hour, was laid in the grave. She erected a cenotaph to his memory on her grounds at Barley-Wood, bearing the inscription, "To Beilby Porteus, late Lord Bishop of London. In grateful memory of long and faithful friendship. H. M." Mrs. Montagu, too, had gone, and Mrs. Boscawen, and Elizabeth Carter. Well may Mrs. Knight say, that "dead leaves strewed her path;" yet of all these could she say, "Blessed are the dead that die in the Lord." Her spiritual and intellectual force seems still fresh and vigorous, though her age is more than threescore years.

"Practical Piety," written in 1811, is full of energy and life. In 1809, she had published what was perhaps the most popular of all her works, "Cœlebs in Search of a Wife," which ran through ten editions in one year. So well is it known, that we need not dwell upon its merits. Of "Practical Piety" we can say nothing finer and better than the following from Mrs. Knight:—"This book cannot be too highly recommended: it should be in every library, as well as in every heart: it is a book for our serious and thoughtful moments, when we desire to inquire calmly and seek sincerely for that obedience which is 'perfect and entire,' wanting nothing: it discourses earnestly of our duties and dangers as professed servants of God: it deals candidly and plainly, telling us what we are, and what we must be: it shows that no superficial obedience can stand in place of an entire surrender of the whole being to the service of God: it allows no partial standard or low estimate, or sluggish action in the Christian life."

"Christian Morals" appeared in 1812, and soon passed through eleven editions. And "now," says Mrs. K., "there is sorrow in Barley-Wood: they who have comforted others, need themselves comfort. Mary, the first-born of the sisters, is not; for God took her. During five days of suffering, no murmur or complaint escaped her lips; calmly she talked of 'going home,' and picked out the poor men who should bear her to her narrow cell. The sisters gathered round her dying bed. It was Sunday morning when she breathed her last. 'How blessed to die on Easter-Sunday—to descend to the grave when Jesus triumphed over it!'" said Hannah; and thus they could console each other. This was in April, 1813. In the summer we find her with Patty again, among the few London friends that were left. They passed a day with Mr. Wilberforce, in his happy and elegant home—where Hannah seems to admire him more than ever. During this excursion she visited Mrs. Garrick, whom she had not seen for several years, and who was now over ninety. They found her at Hampton. "Alas!" says Hannah, tear-

fully, "what wit, what talents, what vivacity, what friendship, have I enjoyed in this place! Where are they now? I have been mercifully spared to see the vanity and emptiness of everything that is not connected with eternity; and seeing this, how heavy will my condemnation be, if I do not lay it to heart!"

In 1815, she wrote an essay on the character and writings of St. Paul. During the same year she mourns another "vacant chair"—Elizabeth, or Betty, the household name, has gone to her reward. "Of diligent hand and pleasant memory, a large circle mourn her loss."

Again, within the year, the grave is opened for yet another sister. Sally, the "*life*" of the household, was the third taken. In her illness her sufferings were extreme—but her faith was unwavering. Once, when she had lain long insensible, a favourite verse was said, when she suddenly exclaimed, "Can anything be finer than *that?* it makes one's face shine." "Talk of the cross to me," she says, "the precious cross, and the King of love." "Blessed Jesus!" were her last words. Hannah and Patty are now all that remain—the former seventy-three, and the latter an invalid. The circle is broken, and sadly, but with resignation, is the breach mourned. Yet is the interest of both in life and friends undiminished. Willing to depart, they were also willing to remain; and never were they forgetful of their duty to this world, while their hearts and highest hopes were in the next. Here was old age more beautiful than youth; for it was divested of all that usually makes it seem sad and repulsive.

In the spring of 1818, Hannah wrote a small work, which appeared in twelve papers—"Moral Sketches of Prevailing Opinions and Manners, Foreign and Domestic," to which were added her "Reflections on Prayer." The first edition sold in one day.

The Wilberforces made a short visit to Barley-Wood in 1819, and with them Miss Patty paid her last visit to Cheddar. After a long walk, she came late to her sister's bedside (for Hannah was then sick) to say, "Good-night. Our Wilberforce and I have had such a nice hour's chat," said she, cheerfully; and that night the pains of death awakened her. "I love my sufferings," she says; "they come from God, and I love everything which comes from him." Very soon after, the God of her love took her to himself. The remaining sister's affliction at parting with, as she herself says, "her chief earthly comfort, companion, counsellor, and fellow-labourer," was indeed extreme. Yet in resignation she says, "I bless God she was spared to me so long; that her last trial, though sharp, was short; that she is spared feeling for *me* what I now feel for *her;* and

though I must finish my journey alone, yet it is a very short portion of my pilgrimage which remains to be accomplished." She regained after this a measure of health and strength again, though her friends feared she would not survive Patty many days; and this time was employed usefully and carefully, and not a moment wasted. Sometimes she was writing tracts, and again Bible verses and Rhymes for the Young; but ever doing something, and that for good. Her mind remained wonderfully clear, even till the last, and was always kept busy in planning or doing some useful work. When unable to write, she could knit; and by disposing of these "labours of the knitting-needle," she made up quite a respectable sum for the cause of missions. The winter of her life is surely upon her now, for she is more than eighty, and yet she is happy and useful. "I bless God," she says, "I enjoy great tranquillity of mind, and am willing to depart and be with Christ, when it is his will; but I leave it in his hands who does all things well." One more earthly trial has she before she departs, and *that* in leaving Barley-Wood. The mansion was large, and needed a mistress; this she was not, and could not be, confined almost entirely to bed: and after suffering much from the ingratitude and wastefulness of those she had employed to do these things for her, she acknowledged that a "situation less cumbered with care would suit her better," and accordingly removed to a convenient house in Windsor-Terrace, Clifton. Five years longer, till 1833, did she live here in contentment and peace, and then joyfully exchanged this life for a better, on the 7th of September. She left a handsome fortune, having accumulated by her pen alone $150,000, which was bequeathed to different charitable institutions. The good she did we cannot calculate, for her labours of love were truly *incalculable*, and yet she always felt that while life lasted her work was not yet done.

What an example is this for us, for *all* Christians! Constant activity in a good cause is what is required from every one. Upon what good deed can we pillow our head as the close of day brings the hour of repose? *One* good deed a day? Surely that were very little! but if we begin there, not many days will we be satisfied with only one; others will come, till by hours and minutes, rather than by days, we number them. All this of course we mean by God's grace; for without it "we can do nothing."

ART. III.—THE THEORY OF REASONING.

The Theory of Reasoning. By SAMUEL BAILEY. Second Edition. London. 1852.

THERE are two objects, by one or the other of which a periodical should be always governed in the selection of publications for review. Its aim should be, to keep its readers informed, on the one hand, of the new accessions made by works of genius to existing knowledge, as well general as local; or, on the other, of the real condition of the particular sciences, as best attested by the reception of compilations upon the subject, in those countries especially the most looked up to, by that of the critic, as complete models.

No doubt the former of these walks of criticism, which might be termed analytical, is, from the higher simplicity of the task, the more attractive to the reviewer, and, from the mere novelty of the topics, the more agreeable to the public. But the other—which we name historical—is far the more instructive, both from its easier accessibility for frequent inculcation, and the greater variety of common aspects which it may open for self-comparison. In short, to know the actual state of a particular art or science is a strict prerequisite to the ability of recognising any new accessions; and so, of course, the analytic object presupposes the historical.

The latter, moreover, not only thus supplies the basis for ascertaining the precise portion of originality, whether absolute or relative, in the creative works of science and imagination, but gives, at the same time, the means of gauging, in productions the most ordinary, the mental merits of their native country, for emulation or for avoidance. And in serving as this double measure, the second method of the reviewer has, besides, a positive and direct value of the highest order; for while its rival can yield, at best, but a more or less correct analysis of an individual idea or system, the latest compend of actual knowledge, surveyed historically, that is, *philosophically*, may give a synopsis of the entire national civilization.

This aggregate of high advantages must therefore be a valid apology for honouring with a critical notice the "Theory of Reasoning" of Mr. Bailey. We may fairly look for a sure criterion of the utmost forwardness of British intellect, in this most recent of its essays on what Lord Bacon styled the "science of sciences." That the book can, in fact, be neither much below, nor much above this high-water mark of the nation, may be indicated, in advance, by two circumstances. Not above; for the copy before us is of the second edition within the year of publication. Not below; for Mr. Bailey

belongs to the "extreme left" of English opinion, as represented by the school of Bentham in its extension by the two Mills. In the spirit of this school, accordingly, his book is hard-headed and hair-splitting; as in the spirit of the national intellect, it is merely critical and crudely confused. Thus, on the same subject, Mr. John Mill presents a mere digest or compilation, when he promises a "*System* of Logic." And Mr. Bailey gives not even this, with his higher label of "*The* Theory."

In the first chapter, he proposes to designate, for the purpose of correction, the "intellectual operations which go under the name of Reasoning." From all such, he begins with excluding not only perception and memory, but imagination, which, however, has rightly been often accounted a sort of reasoning; while, on the other hand, several processes which are universally so regarded—such as judgment, reflection, generalization—are entirely unconsidered in his catalogue. Here, already, is something ominous on the very threshold of the treatise, and in the fundamental matter of delineating the subject.

But passing over his mode of attaining it, the definition is as follows: "The determination of the mind to something beyond its actual perception or knowledge, is obviously what is termed reasoning." (P. 3.) He proceeds to add, that "there is, however, another mental operation to be noted, which consists, not in our being led to believe, or in our inferring from what we perceive or know, something else neither perceived nor known; but in our being led to discern some fact, not directly manifest, through the medium of some other fact or facts in which it is implied." Now this is not "another mental operation," but the very same; or it merely differs in pursuing a new direction. In the former, the fact inferred is external to the fact known; in the other, it is, on the contrary, internal to it. The intellect, as it were, looks in the one case outwards, in the other, inwards. But the *looking* is the same process in both the cases; and the cases are our old acquaintances, styled induction and analysis.

Besides, the mention of these familiar names may remind the reader of a third direction which the mind assumes in reasoning, and which logicians call synthesis. This seems overlooked entirely, in fact as well as name, both in the programme and whole volume of Mr. Bailey; except that he mentions, quite incidentally, (p. 23,) a certain "mixture of the two preceding," inductive "in reality," and analytical "in form." But this allusion is worse than silence; for it evinces the author's omission to be due not merely to that affectation through which small reformers shun old names, but to a perfectly honest ignorance of the true nature of synthesis, which he thus con-

siders as a bastard *mixture*, a casual confusion of the normal methods, while characterizing it as what it truly is, their quite legitimate combination.

Be that as it may, the species of reasoning are, according to Bailey, but the two described. And these, moreover, he new-names, (as a matter of course,) the former by the term contingent, the latter, the demonstrative. Or, adopting the really nugatory explanations of the Scotch school, (for Mr. Bailey is still at this school, and not in one of its highest "forms,") he styles them, respectively, the instinctive and the intuitive.

Against the instinctive and contingent (simply inductive) species of inference, there may be urged, the author anticipates, one objection: "that it would dignify nearly every intellectual act with the name of reasoning." (P. 25.) We ask the reader to take note of this significant concession; he will hereafter find the fact which it recognises as a stumbling-block, to be, on the contrary, a confirmation of the true theory of logic. Meanwhile the author attempts to remove it from his devious way by the desperate aid, or perhaps to hide it by the dubious mist, of a simile. The colours of the rainbow, says he, though well contrasted towards the middle of the bands, can be distinguished by no precise lines of separation, yet no one doubts that there are seven different colours; and so, though other acts of intellect may not be separable from contingent inference, it does not follow that they are not heterogeneous. But this pretended answer, besides being negative, refutes the purport of the argument. For the prismatic colours in their broadest contrasts are but effects of mere appearance; in reality they are but so many summary modifications or progressive degrees, in *one* and *the same* action of undulation. And just so with the reasoning process, whether contingent or demonstrative, in relation to the mental acts which all *assume*, indeed, to differ from it, but which difference the present writer fails thus ludicrously to establish.

But let us set him on his legs once more, and suppose his subject circumscribed, the specific nature of contingent reasoning is described as follows: "A determination of the mind by present facts, conjoined with experience or knowledge, to believe some fact past, absent or future." (P. 27). Still creditably sensible that this dim description needs light, he seeks to distinguish the basis of "knowledge" from the "act of inference," in this wise: "We *know*," it may be said, [i. e., although a "future fact,"] "that the stone we hold in our hand will sink when thrown into the water; we do not *infer* it." To this objection he first replies, that the same may be affirmed with equal truth of the usual examples in logical treatises. When it is

argued, for instance, "that Peter is mortal (i. e., will die) because he is a man, and all men are mortals, is not my knowledge or belief that Peter is mortal, exactly on a level with my knowledge or belief that a stone will sink in water?" (P. 27.) Yes, undoubtedly; but that is doubling, instead of solving, the difficulty. This difficulty, after "worse confounding it" by various other illustrations, he resolves, at last, into the following curious predicament:—"Whether, when I make sure that the same stone which I saw sink in the water yesterday, will sink again when thrown into the water to-day, I *know* the stone will sink, or I only infer it? and this, when maturely considered, seems to be a question of *terminology* and not of *fact*." (P. 29.) So, then, to *know* and to *infer* differ only in mere nomenclature!—a conclusion quite in the teeth, it will be seen, of what the author proposed to prove, as well as, manifestly, of the truth of the case.

For this confusion of the two things is absurd, and the difference between them quite simple. Keeping to the same example of the stone thrown into water, we "infer" the *fact* that it will sink; we "know" the *relation*, the natural law which makes its unobstructed sinking necessary, and which is thus what authorizes as well as inspires the act of inference. What a writer upon logic, who waddles weakly through several pages of equally clumsy argument and expression, only to show his utter ignorance of a point so plain and so fundamental!

This distinction suggests, at the same time, the true solution of another difficulty, no less fundamental to the science of reasoning than it seems to be puzzling to the writer before us; as also, indeed, to all others, without exception, to this day. Mr. Bailey names it the *cogency* of contingent reasoning; thus restricting to one alone of his two divisions of the general process, what appertains alike to both, or rather to all, the modes of reasoning. This error is aggravated, and was possibly caused, by the further logical confusion of treating the question as to the *force* of reasoning, before coming to define its nature,—that is to say, discussing the property before determining the subject,—a ὕστερον πρότερον which has been rectified in the spontaneous order of these remarks, and which is worth noting as characteristic of both the author and his country.

But *such* and *as* he takes it, what does this cogency consist in? What is our guarantee for the absolute truth of a fact of inference? The author answers, after much, but not very steady, disquisition, that no authority is even possible on the subject. "The only question is, Does the reasoning, when clearly expressed, produce conviction? or, in other words, Do the facts, when presented clearly to the

mind, determine it to believe that which is expressed in the conclusion? *If they do, we have reached an ultimate fact, or law, or principle of our mental constitution, beyond which it is impossible to go.*" (P. 17.) Here is a result which, it must be owned, is nearly peremptory, if not perspicuous. We had thought these expedients of an "ultimate fact, &c," were gone out of fashion with the Scotch metaphysicians. But then the Scotch metaphysicians have not gone out of fashion with Mr. Bailey—except, perhaps, as to the multitude of the equally "ultimate" facts.

In general, this "ultimate fact" is but a cover for proximate ignorance, even as all facts appear to be ultimate to savages and children. In the present case, the ignorance is known, less learnedly, by the name of instinct, which is, therefore, what the author assigns as the sole sanction of the reasoning process. But then instinct would be the higher faculty, (as sung, in satire, the witty poet,) and the brutes of course, possessing it in fuller perfection, the nobler animals. Thus, too, would instinct be the guide of reason, instead of the reverse; not even the "blind leading the *blind*," but the blind leading the *seeing!* In short, reason would be thus the cause, not the corrective, of human error. But not to be rigorous with so loose a thinker, let us pass from the import of his language to his express terms.

According to these, we see the sole condition, either possible or requisite, to render valid even opposite inferences is "clear expression." We put aside the consideration, that this alleged standard of clear statement must prove as variable, almost, as the individual readers, and could not, therefore, be the basis of a test, or rule of any sort. For argument's sake, however, let us assume it to be possible, that the same terms could be clear alike to all minds, and try the result by the familiar passage (selected with all due reverence) wherein the Saviour, in allusion to bread and wine, says: "This is my body, this is my blood." What could possibly exceed this affirmation in "clear expression?" Yet let us hear how different readers, in even a number not more than three, would be found to agree in their several inferences from the statement.

The first, a Roman Catholic, is (to keep to our author's terms) "determined by it to believe" the real presence of his God, in certain portions of bread and wine, after consecration by the priest; and from this "fact," he again infers or is determined to believe, that by partaking of these substances he sanctifies his soul. The next, a Protestant, is, on the contrary, "determined by it to believe" that the bread and wine, however consecrated, are still but bread and wine, and that their efficacy, though indubitable, is merely emblem-

atic. Our third reader, a gross materialist, admitting equally the fact of efficacy, is "determined to believe," on his part, that the bread and wine will do him good; only not by sanctifying his soul, or by symbolizing his redemption, but simply by satisfying or gratifying his palate. It is clear that two, at least, of the three inferences must be wrong. And yet, according to the author, they would all be equally legitimate, might each appeal decisively to an "ultimate fact or law;" which is termed, respectively, Church authority, private judgment, or natural appetite.

Mr. Bailey joins the crowd of metaphysical logicians in their condemnation, more just than intelligent, of the famous paradox of Hobbes, to wit, that human truth was a thing of language, and dependent on clear expression. But his own principle, or rather negation of all principle, as just exposed, comes, in effect, we have seen, to the same thing. In fact the same failure to recognise the scientific laws of mind was the precise source of error in Hobbes too; the difference was, that this sturdy thinker had the logic and the courage to see and stand by the strict corollaries of his mistake.

This common error respecting the "cogency" or efficient cause of correct inference, did not impose, however, upon Hume's sagacity, although he thought the thing inexplicable. Mr. Bailey, in essaying to answer him with such crudities as the above, cites his admirable statement of the point to be resolved, and we cannot do better than here present it to the observation of the reader, in preparation for our own attempt at solution.

After remarking, (says Mr. Bailey, p. 18,) that from the fact of having been formerly nourished by eating bread, it does not necessarily follow that we shall be nourished by eating other bread, he (Hume) proceeds:—"At least it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a certain step taken, a process of thought and an inference which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same: *I have found that such an object has been always attended with such an effect*, and '*I foresee that other objects which are in appearance similar will be attended with similar effects.*' I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other; I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. [N. B. Here is the error.] But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. *What that medium is, I must confess passes my comprehension;* and it

is incumbent on those to produce it who assert that it really exists and is the original of all our conclusions concerning matters of fact."*

To this rational challenge, Mr. Bailey has no better to reply than that "the explanation is needless, and totally uncalled for, and cannot possibly be given." And then, in proof, he cites *seriatim* the leading fathers of the Scotch school, who all came, in fact, (but in despair, and for the reason above suggested,) to the same convenient, but merely negative, conclusion.

The "medium" demanded by Hume and denied by all subsequent philosophers was above supplied, in the rectification which introduced this long discussion, we mean the distinction between fact and relation. Taking Hume's example, the *relation,* known in this case by the name of nutrition, between my body and the substance termed bread, is agreed to be the same, *essentially,* at all times and for all breads. It is from this then, in reality, and whether conscious of the law or not, that we always, last as first, infer a future *fact* of nourishment; for if previous facts were necessary, the inference could have never *begun.* Suppose the materialist above imagined to have enlightened his natural appetite by a scientific knowledge of the laws of chemistry and physiology, he would make such inference distinctly upon the same authority, on all occasions. It would not be because the present objects bore the *name* of bread and wine, not even because they wore the usual appearance of those substances; but because of possessing certain properties which had a chemical or vital affinity, a natural *relation,* to the elements of his body, and of which relation the inferred nourishment was a direct consequence, whenever drawn.

What seems to maintain among unprejudiced writers, so universally, this singular oversight, is the tacit assumption, that one of two things must needs be necessary;—either that the inference is from a particular fact or facts of experience, or from a general conception of principle. These in fact are the antagonist views that divide the British logicians, as led respectively by John S. Mill and Dr. Whewell. Neither dreams of a *tertium quid,* although they thoroughly refute each other. Thus the doctor rightly urges—as Hume, before him, above evinced—that the past occurrence of a fact, in even numberless conjunctures, can never warrant us in predicting its recurrence; and that, therefore, if we do so, as is agreed on all hands, it is in virtue of a mental principle extraneous to all instances. To which the Mill school reply, with equal force, that any such principle or concert can be but the summary expression of the actual

* Sceptical Doubts. Part II.

facts experienced; and then, that the superstructure can be no firmer than its foundation. So that both, we see, alike leave logic, science, truth, morals to the arbitrary standard of human language or conception—as were respectively the just conclusions, but absurd doctrines, of Hobbes and Hume.

The true principle or cause of inference is, quite accordingly, behind them both. It is no other than the fixed *relation* between the fact occurring and the mind perceiving, and which, depending on a law of nature, will be always of course made actual under similar conditions, whether we are conscious of it or not. This new solution, which places certitude beyond the shifting soil of metaphysics, or rather recognises it where it has ever operated, on the broad and solid ground of general law, will be still more clear when we come, in the sequel, to sketch a theory of the reasoning process that shall take away this "difficulty," with all the others of our author, "at one fell swoop."

This author next passes to his second species of reasoning, termed demonstrative; of which he says that—"whenever the mind discerns one fact to be implied in another, or the exclusion of a fact to be implied in another fact, it reasons demonstratively, whether they are facts of quantity or otherwise." (P. 34.) It is true, there is no difference as to the nature of the facts; the old distinction between moral and mathematical evidence was a mere prejudice of incomplete conception. But why, then, does the author, in admitting this illusion, make a corresponding difference in the processes of method, referring the one to instinct, the other to intuition? Apparently because he does not very well know what he is doing. Accordingly this intuition—his occult principle of demonstration—is but the instinct as just explained, under a new condition of complication. What he calls instinct being the perception, as we have shown, of a *relation* where one of the terms or abutments (the fact *inferred*) is in the mind, intuition is the same perception with the second term rendered objective, and the connection thus made palpable that links the consequent and antecedent. The cases might both be aptly imaged, or possibly instanced, in a physical line—of which we know that, presented end-wise, it can convey to the visual organ but the impression of a seemingly isolate and inherent point; while, if shifted aside, by whichever end, into angularity with the eye's axis, its linear nature and linking necessity become more manifest in that proportion. Even so is it with instinct and intuition; they, in short, are but, respectively, the mind's reaction upon those impressions, and consequently must be equal as well as opposed. That is to say, instinct is this seemingly resolute and inherent impression of a point as

reflected outwards into a particular fact; and intuition, the like reaction or reflection of the linear image into the visible connective of relation. And so the difference between them is, that, in the case of instinct, or contingent reasoning, the inference is from a single fact or term to the relation; and the procedure from the relation, thus obtained, to its other term, is the mode of inference called intuition or demonstration.

We can equally now resolve the specific characters of difference assigned empirically, by the author, to those two processes, to wit, that whereas the one is a mode of reasoning from facts *present* to a fact absent, the other reasons from a *present* fact to a fact "implied," and thus equally *present*. The explanation is, that, in the first and simpler mode, the *facts* alone impress the mind—their mutual relation, though the agent of inference in this case too, being unperceived, save in its rude reflection of mere physical resemblance; in the second and more forward form, the *relation* is the thing attended to—one of the facts being unobserved, but of course implied in the relation; not as our author and indeed all others have it, in another fact, which is absurd. For, though the arch *implies* its two abutments, the converse is by no means necessary; and still less necessary or even possible, that one abutment should "contain" its opposite. And so once more we see the real principle and purport of the reasoning process to be quite the same—with the sole difference of a mental change of view—in the so-called demonstrative species as in the contingent.

The higher conclusiveness or "cogency" ascribed to the former method is then the consequence of its proceeding from relation to relation, and by the evolution of an intermediate term; whereas the procedure of its predecessor is from term to term, and by the observation of an intermediate relation. But the first, because the simplest of all relations to be observed, is that of the whole to its parts—of the container to the thing contained. Hence the axioms and terminology of the famous syllogistic system—a system ranked by Mr. Bailey as a sort of sub-species of his demonstrative form, and which he here goes on to expound to us no less uncouthly than all the rest.

He begins, for example, by transforming the old and admirable name into the clumsy designation of *class-reasoning*. This avowedly was suggested by the unjust allusion of the "container," which was thought to be in all things a class. It would be nearer the truth, as just explained, to call it, on the contrary, '*individual-reasoning*, as the inference is always from single wholes to wholes. But *relation-reasoning*, as distinct from *fact-reasoning*, would be the accu-

rate term, if it were not cumbrous; and this, accordingly, is etymologically the precise import of the term *syllogism*, which means the conjunction of two propositions, that is, of two *relations*, to infer a third.

Then again the same peculiarity pervades his notion of the mode of inference—unless you count it an extenuation that indeed he shares it with all his betters. Mr. Bailey, however, forfeits this mitigation by a special pretension to having untied the hardest knot of the syllogistic system. This knot, so often tugged at, since Bacon, Locke, and Campbell, is the famous and fatal objection of the *petitio principii*. Against this mortal attack, even Mr. Mill has made no better defence than the half evasion, that the syllogism is not at all a mode of *inference*, but of interpretation. Undeterred, however, by the difficulty which thus constrained his latest model to admit and to evade the alleged assumption of the conclusion, Mr. Bailey rushes into it, in the following flatfooted fashion:—

"But the objection is, that the major premiss not merely implies but *contains* the conclusion; that the conclusion is in reality a constituent or integrant part of the major premiss, without which the latter would not be completely true. This allegation, it must be confessed, *cannot be contradicted*. The force of the reasoning in a demonstrative syllogism, or an enthymeme with a major premiss, depends altogether on the fact expressed in the conclusion forming an *integrant part* of the general fact expressed in the major proposition, and consequently no new or *unknown fact* can ever appear as the inference. The essence of the conclusion, in such cases, consists in asserting that the subject of it does form an integrant part of the major premiss." (Pp. 39, 40.)

The essence of a conclusion consisting in an *assertion!* But passing over, as of common occurrence, this gross inaccuracy of expression, the question before us, in fact, resolves itself into the "essence" of the assertion, in which, on the contrary, consists the conclusion of a syllogism. Does this essence declare the subject (minor term) of the proposition to be "contained in," an "integrant part of," the predicate (or major term?) Our author, we see, thinks the affirmative undeniable. Mr. Mill, with more cautious vagueness, says the same thing. And so, in short, do writers of all shades, to Archbishop Whateley himself, who, while making the syllogism the type of all inferences, holds the major premiss to "contain" the conclusion. But here is a direct contradiction—namely, that of our being said to *infer* what was already affirmed as known. Hence, accordingly, the modern onslaught on the "Aristotelian logic," led in France by Descartes and in England by Bacon and Locke, and of which the din is but just dying away, through its protracted reverberations by the monkey chattering of the Scotch metaphysicians. Hence, the plea of "confession and avoidance" (as the lawyers style it) put in by Mill, who admits there would be contradiction, if in-

deed the syllogism did *infer;* but insists its function to be, not to reason, but to *read* the record of a previous inference. While Mr. Bailey characteristically "splits the difference" in this wise: "Whether the declaration or recognition of such a *contained* fact is to be termed an inference or not, seems to be a question of phraseology." (P. 41.) With Mr. B., we see, most difficulties appear to be questions of phraseology—to resolve themselves at last, like Virgil's ghosts, into thin air. Indeed, his whole book is a question—a puzzling question—of phraseology. And to make things worse, the phraseology is neither accurate nor abundant.

Well, the cause of this long conflict, confusion, and contradiction being thus reduced to the single notion, never questioned to this hour, that the conclusion of a syllogism is *contained* in the major premiss—it would follow, thence alone, that the conception must have been erroneous. But if, beside, we should pretend to have above supplied the true one, will our presumption be perhaps considered as going too far? Let the competent reader decide, after being reminded, briefly, of the preceding and quite incidental explanation of the syllogism. We called it a reasoning upon *relations.* But a relation, it is evident, *implies* its terms, but does not "contain" them. And this is true, of course, though the terms should be other relations, in turn; as they always are inevitably in the last analysis. The simplest subject of a proposition, even not excepting a proper name, is in this predicament, no less really than the whole sentence; it is only relatively to the present assertion, to the *relation* it in part supports, that we view it, for the time, as a *fact* or term—another recurrence of the distinction above established. The conclusion, therefore, in a syllogism, (which expresses the relation *between* the major and minor terms,) cannot well be "contained" in either; and less, if possible, could one of the terms, as is also said, "contain" the other. It is precisely the same absurdity as (to recur to our physical image) if one were to conceive the arch to be *contained* in its abutment, or one abutment to be contained in the other. In the mental as in the masonic bridge, the truly necessary order, not still of *inclusion* but of *implication*, is directly the reverse; that is to say, to either of the abutments *from* the arch; or, *by* the arch, from one abutment to the other.

It should be added, that what mainly led to so universal, though gross an oversight, was the modern misconception of the *historical* point of view, from which alone the syllogistic system, like every other, can be read aright. The syllogism is Logic or Method in its infant stage of language. But language, in the semi-barbarous ages of mankind, is the accredited basis of truth. It is so even still, with

the vast majority of the most civilized nations, as evinced in the popular influence of words.* The divine doctrine, that makes the "Logos" or *Word* the fountain of all truth, is pregnant also with deep human philosophy. *Qui cadit in* LITERA, *causa cadit*, was a well-known maxim in the ancient administration of *justice*, and was consequently but an echo of the same sentiment respecting *truth*. We all remember how prone, in Homer, the very gods are to verbal quibbling—a fact which commentators and mythologists have crudely construed into lying and cheating, for want of discerning, like indeed their betters, that to keep the *letter* and to keep the *truth* were things identical in the infant ages in question. And, in fine, the names in the Latin idiom, (i. e. *verbum* and *verum*,) as, we doubt not, in most others, are the same in etymology. The syllogism, therefore, being the application of the reasoning art to the *words* of *language*, must have been a process of real *inference* in times when words were things and truths.

But when, by a natural reaction, the distinction between things and terms came, in progress of modern ages, to be carried to antagonism, the syllogism shared the fate—and for the fault—of its verbal basis. Experience having shown, at last, that the terms of popular language did not always square exactly with the physical truths of nature, the cognate method of reasoning also was thence denounced as futile. It inferred, it was urged, "no new truths"—meaning in the *new sense* of this word; whence it was further assumed to be no *inference* at all. But, on the one hand, it never pretended, as we now perceive, to infer *such* truths; whereas, on the other, it still infers what it ever did and always will infer, that is, the symbolical truth of words, of names, of terms.

Nay, so confounding is the effect of this historical transformation, that even Mill, as we have seen, denies all inferential efficacy to the syllogism, while recognising it, quite to the contrary, as the proper method of interpretation; for the definition of interpretation is, precisely, *inference of words* or *terms*. And, accordingly, the great Bacon—whose denunciation of the syllogism was as ignorant, we are bound to presume, as that of the hollowest of his echoes—did *he* not designate the boasted induction or analysis of his New Organum (and with profound truth) the *interpretation* of nature? And was he too not thus denouncing, under title of the syllogism, the very process he was heralding, at the same moment, as the true method? The fact is no less certain than suggestive of sad reflection. In truth, the syllogism is the same *analysis*, applied to the symbolic

* See, on this point, a sermon or rather dissertation of Dr. South, entitled "*The Fatal Imposture and Force of Words.*"

world of language, which was "instaurated" first by Bacon into the physical world of nature, and which still awaits the consummation of a third and final institution, in the truly positive or logical world of science.

After all this strange *imbroglio* of absurd error and incompleteness pervading the notions on the subject of the greatest minds of the modern world, we need not wonder that Mr. Bailey has overlooked, as already remarked, this third section, or rather application, of the true theory of the reasoning process. But he does still worse, perhaps, or more misleads than by thus failing to recognise it; he, moreover, mistakes it for a casual mixture of his contingent and demonstrative species, and under the name (to crown the confusion) of induction, but induction mongrelized by a further amalgamation with observation and experiment! We ask the reader to dwell a moment on this topsy-turvy state of things, as being a just but a still inadequate representation of the ripest views of British intellect on this radical subject of the "science of sciences;" and then, to pass from the distressing spectacle, the designations above restored will lead him out into the path of order which we strive to open through the author's book. The reasoning processes which he denominates contingent and demonstrative, we have shown to be no other than simple induction and analysis. And it was further shown, (and for the first time, we think,) that both these terms refer, in reality, to one and the same inferring process, but under different points of view: that the first is an inferring of relation through its terms; the second, the inferring of the terms through their relation; and that each, moreover, is an induction and an analysis, at the same time—induction applied to terms involving analysis of relations, or analysis of relations indirectly inducting the terms. Hence, the inferential efficiency and analytic character which we have vindicated for the syllogistic system. Or, to sum up all in a still more clear and comprehensive designation, the reasoning process, in its primary stage, (whether called inductive, contingent, or otherwise,) is an inference from *wholes* to *wholes;* in the second stage (styled analytic or demonstrative or intuitive) it is an inference from *wholes* to *their parts;* in the third (which is well distinguished by the name synthetic—that is, *putting together*) the inference proceeds generally from *parts* to *wholes:* thus completing, we see, the circuit of scientific comprehension.

Well, the place of Mr. Bailey and of the foremost of his countrymen, in their conception of the theory of method, is now palpable. It is still, at best, but at the second stage. The third they do not take any account of, except by throwing its fragments into a final chapter, under the title of anomalies or "mixtures;" just as the physicists of

the middle ages, and the grammarians up to the present, dispose of the forms and phenomena which they respectively cannot explain, by rejecting them to the end of the book, under the name of "monsters" and of "heteroclites." In Mr. Bailey's book, accordingly, this monstrous supplement to his monstrous theory is headed, quite characteristically, in this wise: "THE RELATION OF OBSERVATION, EXPERIMENT AND INDUCTION TO THE REASONING PROCESS AND TO EACH OTHER." Whence, by-the-by, it seems that neither of the three former operations, not even the far-famed induction itself, is here considered a process of reasoning, since nothing can bear a *relation to itself*. We shall, however, doubtless find the contrary, on looking into the contents of the chapter. But before doing so, we shall be better employed in confronting the results of the foregoing explanation of the part of words in the process and history of logic with some of the flounderings of our author, or rather, of our author's authorities, in a chapter here thrust in with his habitual incongruity, and entitled, "*The Relation between Reasoning and Language.*"

He is fully convinced that this relation is in no sense a thing of necessity—although he might be asked how, otherwise, it had its rise so universally. That the reasoning process actually is (and, to him, has therefore *always* been) quite independent of the aid of language, he would now think beyond dispute, if the contrary had not been so recently and so respectably reiterated by Archbishop Whateley as follows: "Logic is entirely conversant about language," or, "is wholly concerned in the use of language." Again, the "syllogism is an argument so expressed, that the conclusiveness of it is manifest from the mere force of the expression, i. e. without considering the meaning of the terms." These expressions Mr. Bailey rightly interprets to "declare, virtually, the reasoning process to be impossible without language, and moreover, to be so much an affair of mere words, that we can reason without attaching any meaning to the words employed." (P. 101.) And then he proceeds to "examine these two extraordinary positions."

The former he thinks a "strange mistake;" and he brings the proof to its strongest test of geometrical reasoning. Here, at least, he can himself reason, he assures us, with the utmost ease, and without attaching even names or letters to the angles of his figures. And in confirmation of the feasibility of this he cites a passage of Hobbes himself, who, although *plusquam nominalis*, made such a concession as the following: "A man that hath no use of speech at all, such as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb, *if he set before his eyes a triangle*, and by it two right angles, such as are the corners of a square figure, he may, by meditation, compare and find that the

three angles of *that* triangle are equal to those two right angles *that stand by it.*" (*Leviathan*, part 1, ch. 4.) But both the writers are mistaken in assuming the alleged instances—either the personal one of Mr. Bailey or the supposed one of Hobbes—to be cases of reasoning, in the strict sense, without language. They would only be reasoning without *speech*, which is but one species of language. The triangles or other figures are a language too, but of another sort—are *signs* as appropriate to the eye, as verbal sounds are to the ear—and if not classed, in fact, in the general category of alphabetic signs, it is because of their wide divergency in simpleness of form, which still maintains the rude illusion of a difference in kind, although but proportional to the extreme simpleness of the conceptions represented. This identity of nature will be better recognised in the fundamental stage of the alphabet, known as hieroglyphic or pictured characters. To reason by the aid of figures, or of any other material signs, is therefore still to reason by the instrumentality of language; and so the argument of Mr. Bailey not only fails thus far, but, seeing he could not push it farther, must be held to turn against his position—to prove that language is indispensable to reasoning.

As to Hobbes, we should more than hesitate to implicate him, to the same extent, in this palpable *petitio principii*. He does not use, it is worth observing, in the passage cited, the word reasoning; he speaks but of meditation and comparison; and this the comparison of two particular figures set before the eye—as witness the terms which we have italicized in the quotation: and this great writer is notoriously without a second in the English language for saying, precisely, neither more nor less nor other than he means. So that even should comparison be held a synonym with reasoning, the process here intended being restricted to the *present* figures, and consequently not inferring any others, not *generalizing*, the concession made to Bailey's position,—that *general* reasoning may proceed without language,—would, after all, be of very equivocal value. But as, moreover, we now perceive that the two particular figures compared are to be regarded as still of the nature of language, (a truth undoubtedly unknown to Hobbes, to his double discredit, as philosopher and disputant,) the case is truly a refutation *à fortiori*.

Quite accordingly, Mr. Bailey, but two or three pages after, turns about, in fact, to combat the very same doctrine in Dugald Stewart, who, he says, "goes even to the extreme nominalism of asserting, that without the use of signs all our thoughts must have related to individuals; forgetting that since a sign must signify something, if we could think only of individuals, signs of individuals would be the

only signs that could be invented." (P. 105.) This he doubtless deemed a pretty *reductio ad absurdum*. But the clench is again as fallacious as usual. Stewart was certainly wrong in supposing that all our thoughts, or *any* one of them, could, in *any* contingency, have "related to *individuals*." But his critic is no less so, in admitting the same thing of the signs. Both thoughts and signs, it was shown above, relate alone and always to *relations*; what seems to us, through an illusion of conception, an individual, is but a relation, or, rather, an aggregate of relations, in the state of term, that is, of substrate to a special relation directly thought upon or designated. Even the simplest of our sensations, not to speak of *thoughts*, is in this predicament; it is a relation, with its organic seat and our mental consciousness for two terms. Relations, then, "not individuals," being, from the first, the objects signified, and running all of them, as all admit, by their very nature, into one another, it does not follow from the mere event of our transportation from one to one of the mind's extension of the more simple into more general relations, that the transit has been effected without the vehicle of signs or words. Quite the reverse is, we see, the plausible presumption.

On the second of the alleged paradoxes,—to wit, "that the conclusiveness of an argument may be manifest from the mere force of the expression, *without considering the meaning of its terms*,"—Mr. Bailey remarks more justly as follows: "To employ language in reasoning without attaching some meaning to the signs employed, seems to me, I confess, a sheer impossibility; and there is to my understanding a marvellous inconsistency in saying, that the conclusiveness of an argument may be manifest from the mere force of the expression, without considering the meaning of the terms. Expression can have no force but from its meaning. Language, in as far as it has no meaning, has no strength: it is a mere noise—a nullity." (P. 107.) No doubt it is; but no such language could have ever come into existence; and even had it, it would not be language, and is therefore quite beside the question. This question hinges, then, upon the nature, not the existence, of the meaning. And Mr. Bailey, therefore begs it, in assuming the non-existence of *any* meaning in the words of language, as distinguished from the "things" of nature. While, on the other hand, it is conceded him, no less fallaciously, by Archbishop Whateley, and all the other recent apologists of the syllogism, who allow tacitly that all our meaning can refer alone to individual "things," yet at the same time insist that we reason through a certain "force" in the mere *terms*. What is the key, then, or the catastrophe, to this veritable comedy of errors? It is no other

than the revolution, above explained, in this point of view, from the ancient basis of the reasoning process to the modern. The former we saw, historically as well as necessarily, consisted of language, which passed then for a sort of transfiguration of the realities of nature. Its terms being, therefore, not as now, symbolical, but *representative*, they were properly reasoned upon as real values, carrying all meaning within themselves; and so the syllogism, which infers "by agreement or disagreement" among the *names*, or, as Aristotle has it, the *dictum de omni et de nullo*, was a complete type of the logical system *at this epoch*, and in *this hypothesis*. And, for thus much, it is valid still. Only give like names to like things, and unlike to unlike, and your conclusions will be infallible, and by the mere *force* of the terms; that is to say, through the phonetical relations of the sounds, assumed to have been pre-adjusted to the physical relations of objects. This assumption is made instinctively or by necessity, in all cases, during the ages of the formation of languages; and it always leaves, in most, a certain value to the words, which, as in gold, is independent of the objects symbolized: for words, moreover, or other signs, are an emanation of natural laws, and therefore concordant with the general system of phenomena. From this double source proceeds the "force" or meaning *felt* by Whateley and his fellow-advocates of the syllogism, but so little apprehended by them, that they tacitly join their adversary, in transferring *all* meaning from the terms to the "things." And they do so, of course, in consequence of the same unconscious change of view.

Now this change of mental bearing was effected in this way:— When, in process of ages, the counter-work of language grew, as it were exterior to the physical world, mankind were enabled, by this vantage position, to turn attention to material nature, to bring the spy-glass of observation and the batteries of experiment to bear upon its internal recesses; and they were led to it by the growing discrepancy, resulting from the march of experience, between the import of established words and the accession of new phenomena. The consequence of this transposition was not less natural and necessary. As men forgot, during the growth of language, the ground of nature whereon they stood, and saw all knowledge, truth, significance, but in the symbols *before* their eyes; so this counter-world of language, when it came in turn to be the platform, was similarly overlooked as beneath their feet or *behind* their eyes, and the physical world, now placed in front, was the sole seat of all significance! For it is thus that man, in the perversity of his short-sightedness, or one-sidedness, is com-

monly insensible to things that serve him the most fundamentally in the present, and ungrateful to his best benefactors in the past. His neck is no sooner freed from the yoke of corporeal slavery, than he denounces the despotism that had rescued him from savage slaughter. And language, to which alone he owes the little development of his reasoning faculty, is stigmatized as a "senseless jargon," that has ever deluded and still degrades it! This senseless proscription of the "terms" of language as in opposition to the "things" of nature, is in fact the expression, in the subject of method, of the great illusion of the modern "stand-point." Nor did the crusade against the syllogism commence with Bacon, as is commonly claimed; he had only the merit, or the fortune, of being the organ of its *crisis*. The pretension that he or any other single intellect or single age, could produce such a transformation, as that explained, in the human mind, will be one day laughed at as in the same category with the miracle of St. Denis, who made a pilgrimage with his severed head under his arm: it is, however, but a natural part, and thus a proof additional, of the general error. On the contrary, Descartes and Bacon were but the extreme or secondary consequences of the great controversy of the middle ages between the Nominalists and the Realists.

Of these two sects, so much descanted upon and so little understood, the latter, or Realists, maintained the ancient and more concrete conception of terms. They might be called the Sadducees of scholasticism. Witness their verbal materialism in their notion of "species" and "universals." Is it not strange that this famous doctrine, so flippantly harped upon by the herd of logicians, should have never yet suggested to one of them the above theory of the syllogism? We now can answer, it is not strange; it is the normal result of a general oversight, or, to speak more strictly, of the general ignorance of the true *historical* point of view, rather than, doubtless, the incapacity to take it intellectually. The precise nature of the "universals" has been conceived no better than that of the syllogism. For instance Mill, among the latest and most enlightened of logical authors, repeats the silliness of imputing to intellects so acute as the scholastics, the nursery notion of a universal man, a universal horse, a universal tree. The thing *effectually* intended by a "universal," or specific essence, was the relation or set of relations which made a number of individuals bear a more complete and constant likeness, each to all, among themselves than any one of them appeared to offer to any other description of objects; and this virtual import will be sanctioned by the ripest decisions of science. But the actual conception of the primitive intellect was of course differ-

ent. All *relation* being an abstraction, it could not then be apprehended unless subjected to the senses by materialization. This incarnation, in fact, was furnished by words or names. And as the extension of the name and the generalization of the abstraction went on spontaneously and reciprocally together, the things became so intertwisted as to pass, for ages, as the same "essence."

But when, as explained, the human mind, from the counter-platform of language, could turn about to contemplate objectively the several groups of individuals, and saw the objects all isolated, and, moreover, often at variance with the specific essences imposed upon them, superficially; then was broken the equilibrium, and thence arose the following dilemma: either the things or the names must contain the essence called a species. But it cannot be the things, said one sect, for we see them vary from the type alleged; it must therefore be the names: and so far was this conclusion from having been *meant*, as is now imagined, for a *reductio ad absurdum* of the syllogism, that, on the contrary, it was the schoolmen's warrant for its really inferential virtue; and that of Hobbes, in going still further and making words the seat of *truth*. But no, cried the opposite sect, the essence still is in the things alone; for if some of these appear to change their essence, it does not prove that they had not any, but simply that the wrong one had been attributed. And this, indeed, was the sounder doctrine, or rather, direction; for at least it pointed to the true essence in the common aggregate of like relations. But the latter notion, completely abstract, was not to be reached save through a sort of compromise with the sensible substances, things or names, with which the mind had been hitherto conversant; and so the "real essence" had still to sojourn in a state of *substance*—a "second substance"—supposed to "inhere" in the *first* substances, called individuals. This short historical analysis may serve to rectify the current accounts of the great controversy between Nominalism and Realism, while it was also indispensable to a correct estimate of its lineal successor, to wit, the conflict now before us between the so-called Things and Terms.

Whether considered as seats of truth, then, or as subjects of inference, it is now clear that these extreme positions are both alike fallacious, in a strict and absolute respect; while, on the other hand, considered historically, that is, relatively to their points of view, they were both alike entitled to be so regarded for the time. For both have been representative of the real phenomena of nature, though the "things" less incompletely as well as unconsciously. But the things are no more identical with those phenomena than are the names which had been indicated, from the subjective side, by words; they, too,

are, in fine, but terms, the *objective* terms, of the same relations; and in which relations alone resided both truth and inference from the beginning, although of course not to be recognised till this abstract basis could be seen itself.

Logic, then, or, more properly, method, proceeds progressively upon three bases, each successively dependant or superposed on the preceding, and all referring, but from different aspects, to the same aggregate of natural laws. The aspects have already been characterized as looking, the first, from wholes to wholes, the second from wholes to parts, the third from parts to wholes. The correlative bases, or instruments of survey, are in the same chronological order: first, language or terms; second, matter or things; third, method or relations. For, though the process be, in all, methodical, it is disguised in the former cases, and fully developed in the last alone, as well in nature as in name.

Now, of these three essays of the human mind to reduce to system, that is, to unity, the infinite multiplicity of nature, the first and earliest—proceeding *by words*, and from *wholes to wholes*, or *superficially*—is what was anciently, as etymologically, meant by LOGIC. And such is still, of course, the philosophical, because the historical, acceptation. Accordingly, this definition would explain, as if by magic, at once the opposite misapprehensions of the friends and adversaries of the syllogism, and the justness of the criticism above adventured upon both. Thus, for instance, in the matter of inference, we see how plain is the illusion which led the one party to claim all for, and the other to deny everything to, the syllogism. The former and traditional sect, observing names apply to things as wholes, thought them consequently applicable to the parts; for as the thing "contains" all its parts, why not the term do so too? and then all science being but of wholes or parts, of course all inferences might be by words or terms. The fallacy lurked in the assumption that, in this sense, all the parts were either equal to, or even included in, the whole; whereas, at least in physical objects, the rude and aggregate exterior could alone have been seized upon by popular language. It is true, it would be otherwise in *artificial* wholes or aggregates; and here, accordingly, the syllogism had been normal always, and is so still. For this verbal stage of the reasoning process is daily resorted to as indispensable for laying the foundation in even the most positive of our sciences, though only known perhaps by the name of grouping or nomenclature. And those who understand the service which it has rendered to the special sciences, wherever as yet applied with the requisite skill and comprehensiveness—as, for instance, to botany by Linnæus, and to

chemistry by Lavoisier—such alone may conceive the indebtedness of general knowledge to the maligned syllogism, even when it wrought upon a basis of aggregates for the most part fantastical. But this unreality of the subject-matter was turned ignorantly against the process—as if just reasoning and sound inference could not deal in visions the same as in realities, or that arithmetic was less a science when applied to counters than when to coins. And to this fault of inferring, or aggregating individual objects of an ideal nature, as parts of wholes, which were now discerned to be quite imaginary, was superadded the correlative charge of deducing contents that were imaginary, or even of failing to draw the true ones from the natural objects of the real world. As the former charge was impertinent, the latter was absurd, the logical system being never intended to make an analysis of physical bodies, but simply to aggregate, that is, to *induct* them, as individual wholes.

This exploration of the various substances of physical nature in their latent properties, composed the second and counter-circuit of the reasoning process. Its direction, as already defined, was accordingly from wholes to parts; and, no less suitably, its ground and instruments were matter. In other words, matter came, not to supersede, but to supplement, the substrate of language, as the internal and *objective* term of the general aggregate of sensible relations. For the notion called matter is, in reality, but a method, an hypothesis; and the materialists, who think of refuting the truth of religion with this objection, should learn to see that they stand themselves upon no different foundation—as in fact was shown them by Hume and Berkeley, though but from the empirical point of view. Here, on the contrary, the methodic character of matter results deductively; and is, moreover, confirmed practically, by the canting clamour of the present age, for instrumental experimentation, and the science of "things" as opposed to words. It is, in short, evident that, for instance, the telescope, or a chemical retort, is a means of *inferring* an unknown fact—is a "middle-term" in an act of reasoning—of entirely the same purport with that of the syllogism. And it must now, we trust, be equally so, that the purely physical objects, *in* and *by* which men look for truth at this second epoch of philosophy, are, in reality, no more its seat than were their predecessors of the "verbal jargon." The jargon of "things," which still resounds from the analytic or Baconian school, is the objective term or extremity of the real world of *relations*, of which the Aristotelian logic had supplied the subjective; and between both of which equal, opposite, and illusory extremes the human intellect is brought to oscillate, through a third and final process, into the only

positive, though entirely abstract, plane and purview of truth and science.

This last procedure of general method is, we may remember, from parts to wholes. The instrument, now purely rational, is classification, co-ordination; the object, to repair the anarchy and petty individualism left in matter and in mind by the decompositions of its predecessor, to establish in empirical knowledges that grand conformity to *entire* nature which gives the scientific sanction of unity and harmony. Hence the happy propriety of its historical designation by the term *synthesis*, meaning a putting together the ascertained parts of a preconceived whole. The preceding stage, which was a taking asunder of the conceived whole into its unknown elements, has been pictured, with like felicity, by the name of *analysis*. Nor does the word *logic* describe less faithfully the primitive epoch of the reasoning process, as a putting together, for conception, the wholes of nature, by means of *words;* for if the denomination has been determined in this instance by the instrument, and not, as with its two successors, by the operation, the cause is obvious, in the extreme correctness of this infant stage of the procedure, when the abstract aspect was still merged deepest in the material and spontaneous medium. Another proof, by the way, that language must be tacitly taken in early ages, as a *representation* of the realities of nature; and by recognition of which obsolete fact we were above enabled to explain, as normal, the modern paradoxes that place truth and inference in predication and in syllogism.

Thus it appears, then, that the mental process described so variously and vaguely, by the names of reasoning, inference, induction, method, &c., is, in reality, the same action throughout; but that, in applying it, we view each object, from the smallest body to the entire universe, under three successive phases, or you may call it their dimensions, and which divide, of course, the aggregate result into so many distinct systems; that not only are these generic systems distinct in form as well as time, but are even independent of one another in the upward order, though dependant to the degree of inclusion in the descending: for the logical, regarding nature as a collection of individual wholes, confines its inference to the outward likeness, without a thought about their elements; the analytic, in the next place, proceeding on the wholes thus catalogued, directs its efforts to their several elements, without attention to recomposition; while this proper task of the synthetic or final system of induction must wait in abeyance until the two preceding have made successively their separate circuits, and thus supplied it there quisite *knowledge;* the one of aggregates, the other of elements, wherewith it

proceeds to the *re*-construction of the works of nature, which alone gives *science*. In short, the systems are but a threefold and *successively inverted* series, or superposition upon one another, of the same procedure in its cosmical range. Whence the practical conclusion, that they should each be kept apart, in books of logic, or rather method, whether theoretic or educational.

We had designed to detail more fully this new conception of the subject, in its capabilities of constitution as well as correction. But Mr. Bailey has drawn so largely on the application of the latter process, that our limits have been hardly pressed upon in striving fully to expose his jumble. The best, therefore, we can now do is, to refer the reader to the source itself from which the theory has been derived, and which is to be found in the chapter on "Method" in the VESTIGES OF CIVILIZATION. This part, we think it proper to say, is free, or nearly free, from the general irreligion of the book.

A single indication here, however, in addition, before we close. As the reasoning process assumes three progressive and complementary complications in its complete survey of the entire aggregate, and in each object of phenomenal nature; so, of course, the same triplicity should also have left its traces in the corresponding instruments of method. But these instruments are, we say, respectively, language, matter, and method proper—the latter being, again, a juxtaposition of the two preceding; and all three of which should thus exhibit a repetition of the generic forms, inductive, analytic, synthetic.

Quite accordingly we turn to language, and recognise them in its three elements, viz., denomination, predication, ratiocination; or the term, the proposition and the syllogism of logicians. For denomination is induction in its simplest stage of instinct—is, in fact, the "simple enumeration" which Bacon ignorantly stigmatized. Predication is plainly analysis, because a separation, a specification of some particular attribute, in a general term. And that the syllogism is synthetic is visibly manifest in the conclusion, which is its strictly characteristical addition to the previous stages, and so *combines* the *denomination* of the one with the *predication* of the other.

The thing is equally manifest in the Material tools of reasoning. Of these, the earliest, or the Inductive, are those employed in Observation, which is an inference or *bringing in* of mere facts, and may be instanced in the telescope and microscope. Another class are those resorted to where the obstruction to visibility is not, as previously, in the eye, but in the object, and thus removable but by mechanical or chemical decomposition—an end so clearly analytic,

as to have engrossed in fact the title, though no doubt but from its coarser prominence in this predicament: but the same predominance should give the process the special name of Instrumentation. A last description of these material implements or "middle terms" of the reasoning faculty are those devoted to recomposing or putting together the tattered elements which had resulted from the devastation of mere analysis; here the instrument of the process yields the point of prominence to the purpose, which consists in *trying* to produce a natural or artificial combination, and the special name is, quite accordingly, Experimentation: but of this procedure the generic character is, we thus perceive, Synthetic. In the properly synthetic system the analogous subdivision coincides, in order, with Deduction, Classification, and Method; the latter taking, by pre-eminence, the proper name of the reasoning process at the point of view where it evanesces into Science.

Thus spontaneously are we brought back, from this flying excursion round the world of Method, to what our author classes curiously in a supplement of supernumeraries, comprising, we may remember, Observation, Experiment, and Induction. These were to be treated, according to the title, "*in their relation to the reasoning process and to each other*,"—thus implying, of course, that, in the author's theory, they formed no parts of the process itself. Yet we ventured, in already reciting the passage in question, to predict, and not alone from a full experience of Mr. Bailey's inconsistency, but, moreover, from the necessities of the subject, that the contents would be often found in contradiction with the title. Accordingly, on the very next page, we read the following:—"Induction is not some process superadded to those here described (Observation and Experiment); but it is, in this instance, a combination of the two intellectual operations of observing and *inferring*, with the mechanical aid of experimental contrivances to enlarge their range, and for the purpose of deducing a general law." (P. 14.) Here, it will be seen, (if anything, indeed, be visible through such a jargon,) that Induction is made, "in this instance," whatever it may be in others, identical with inference, that is to say, with the reasoning process, only mixed, it is true, to boot, with observation. But it is to trifle with so grave a subject to stop to note the contradictions of one who plainly has no precise notions of any of the processes he so shuffles, although he gives us the foregoing specimen as the most orthodox British view upon the famous "Inductive process," from "Lord Bacon down to Dr. Brown."

Indeed, he is driven, at the close of the chapter, to make a frank confession of the confusion. After conning, as usual, the long cata-

logue of the Scotch metaphysicians, Mr. Bailey proceeds to avow, that the term Induction is employed in three different modes *at least:* "1. The investigation of facts preparatory to the formation of a general law; 2. The mere inferring of the general law from the facts brought together by such investigations; 3. The two preceding processes combined." (P. 120.) Of all this, we trust, the reader is now prepared to divine the moral. In this multitude of meanings and miscellaneousness of mixtures attributed to the process of Induction, he no doubt discerns a confirmation of the character above assigned it, as the fundamental, the universal form of the reasoning process; the others all, which alone are *methods*, being but mere modifications, resulting through a progressive series of correlative complications, from both the instruments and the *positions* of the human mind.

With these properly methodic processes, as we have classed and characterized them, a like peculiarly conclusive, because unconscious or forced concurrence, would be also found throughout the chapter, and, indeed, the entire book. We cite, by way of specimen, a single passage more: "Experiment (says the author) is usually placed in antithesis to Observation, as if the one excluded the other; but surely the intellectual act, termed observation, is just as much required for experiments, as it is for spontaneous events. Unless experiments are observed, they can clearly be of no use. It is equally true, if not equally clear, that the observation of either spontaneous or experimental phenomena can scarcely take place without reasoning; and if it could, would be of no scientific value," &c. (P. 113.) But *wherefore* this dependence of experiment upon observation, and of observation in turn upon reasoning, is what the author does not tell us. In truth, the reason has been first established by the logical theory above applied, and which classes Reasoning at the head of the scale, and Observation in advance of Experiment, and shows that these and all other methods, both the special and the systematic, must each effectually include the whole of its predecessors.

Constrained throughout this article, not alone by the multitude of our author's transgressions, but also by the interest of the subject and the urgency of an example, to write with uniform condemnation of the production of Mr. Bailey, we are quite happy to find a decent pretext for concluding it with one exception furnished by the closing passage of the book. The observations are comparatively sound and suggestive; the writing, too, gives a flattering sample of the author's general strain and style—a style already characterized as cold, cramped, callous; the sterile

style of a hybrid school between Scotch metaphysics and English empiricism.

"The progress of physical science may be looked upon *now* as secure, [as now secure.] In this department of knowledge, the human mind has succeeded in placing itself on the right track; and although some improvement may be effected in the exact expression of abstruse scientific principles, what chiefly remains to be done, is to go forward from the points already attained to the investigation of facts hitherto overlooked, or not yet brought to light, or not sufficiently examined with all the aid supplied by the exquisite instruments and subtle methods of calculation invented by modern ingenuity. The proper mode of proceeding is here insured by such illustrious examples of successful investigation, that the necessity of rules and formulas is almost superseded. [Mark the true Englishman, who will have 'rules and formulas superseded,' not by *principles*, but by *precedents*!] But in morals, metaphysics, theology, and politics, with all subjects belonging to social science not comprehended by these terms, and I may add in the science of medicine, a different aspect of affairs presents itself. Here there are innumerable gratuitous and baseless assumptions, received with entire faith as unquestionable and almost self-evident first principles, of the groundlessness of which no suspicion is entertained. [How should there, when received as unquestionable and self-evident?]

"These are often mixed with truths, and the various deductions from both being perpetually intermingled with the original data and with each other, the result is a chaos of opinions, from which, in moments of speculative despondency, it seems to a philosophic mind impossible for the human race to be extricated.

"The only method of extrication is for the inquirer to allow no facts, no propositions, no doctrines, no principles, or whatever else they may be called, to pass before him, on any question which he has undertaken to examine, without scrutinizing their character, and carefully investigating the evidence on which they rest, or are supposed to rest; and where there is no evidence at all, attempting (essaying) to trace the groundless assumptions to their origin in mal-observation, misapprehension, ignorance, falsehood, the love of fiction, or other causes.

"This course is, doubtless, opposed by a general and a reprehensible repugnance to review established doctrines, and by the mischievous prejudice, which has so long obstructed philosophical inquiry, that opinions are legitimate objects of moral approbation and censure, and that for the conclusions to which a man is brought in the free

exercise of his intellect, he may be justly subjected to moral condemnation.

"The destruction of this senseless and pernicious dogma, which subjects the thinking few to the despotism of the unthinking many, would sweep away one of the greatest impediments, not only to the progress of truth, but to the reciprocation of kind feelings and good deeds, to the peace of the individual, the family circle, and the community; in a word, to the happiness which is ready to flow upon the human race from a thousand sources, were it permitted to do so. It is not yet adequately perceived how much the predominance of speculative error costs the world."

Quite true. But the particular dogma specified as "senseless and pernicious,"—the responsibility of men for the conclusions of a free exercise of their intellect,—is, on the contrary, not an error at all. The error and oppression are in the *test*, not in the principle. It is not the right of thinking *freely* that, in reality, has been ever denied; it is the right of thinking *wrongly*. No one ever has been persecuted for discussion, but for *dissent;* only conclude with the multitude or other "powers that be," and you may canvass the entire universe, both temporal and spiritual. But as this standard has been usually wrong, of course the results have been wrongs, although perpetrated none the less in the name of right. So that the evils, all, denounced are due alone to the criterion. In fact, the "dogma" of responsibility for our opinions is unquestionable, and holds no less in science than in morals and theology. The laws of nature are the most relentless executioners of error—and not more really so, but only more palpably, in the material than the moral world.

On the other hand, it is the author's own dogma, of irresponsibility, that would be truly both "senseless and pernicious." For it would sanction (as we see it do, in fact, in the slang language of our politicians) the indisputable *right* of thinking, nay, of acting and feeling, *wrongly*. But happily, this profligate nonsense is but a transitive illusion, and is, moreover, indispensable to overthrow the false criteria. For illusion can be vanquished but by illusion. Pure truth and pure error are as invulnerable by each other as Force and Reason, in the famed apostrophe of Pascal. There must, in both cases, be a mixture, to bring the adversaries upon *common* ground; for homogeneity is the first condition of all descriptions of reciprocity.

Art. IV.—MERRITT CALDWELL.

1. *Christianity Tested by Eminent Men: Being Brief Sketches of Christian Biography.* By Merritt Caldwell, A. M. New-York: Lane & Scott. 1852.
2. *The Philosophy of Christian Perfection.* Philadelphia: Sorin & Ball. 18mo., pp. 159.
3. *Practical Manual of Elocution.* By Merritt Caldwell, A. M. Portland: Sanborn & Carter. Seventh edition, 1852.

It is not our purpose at present to give any critical examination of the works placed at the head of this article, but rather to present to our readers such a sketch of the author's life as we have been able to make up from his papers and from the reminiscences of his friends. The man, his character, and his position demand a fuller biography than the pages of this journal can afford; but as some years have elapsed since his death, and no steps, to our knowledge, have been taken towards such a work, we deem it due, not merely to the merits of the dead but to the welfare of the living, to give such humble portraiture of him as our opportunities of information and the limits afforded us in these pages will allow. It will fall naturally in our way, at the same time, to give brief notices of the writings above mentioned, as well as of others, published and unpublished, in the chronological order in which they were written.

Merritt Caldwell was the third son of William and Nancy Caldwell, of Hebron, (now Oxford,) Maine, and was born Nov. 29, 1806. His parents and grandparents were pious and exemplary members of the Methodist Episcopal Church. His mother, who is still living, is a woman of no ordinary cast of mind. She has a deep experience and an excellent knowledge in the things of God. This excellent woman made a strong impression in favour of the truth and loveliness of the Christian religion on the minds of her children. As the result of *her* faithfulness, mainly, it may be said that each of her four children, three sons and one daughter, was early the subject of powerful religious impressions. Comparatively early each one of the family became a subject of converting grace. Merritt was always serious and thoughtful from a child. To religious and sacred themes during all his after life his heart was peculiarly susceptible. It was a strong characteristic of his mind, as we shall afterwards see, to be jealous for the honour of Christ and our holy religion. Sometime in the year 1824, being then in the eighteenth year of his age, while a student at home, under the instruction of his brother, Zenas Cald-

well, A. B., when there was no special religious excitement in the community, he came into the liberty of the children of God. He very soon made a public profession of his faith, and united with the Methodist Episcopal Church.

The idea of doing good at once took possession of his mind, and was a prevailing, perhaps we may say, a powerful governing sentiment, through all his subsequent career. In the winter of 1824–5 he made his first essay in the business of teaching. After his school closed he gave himself with diligence to his studies, and in the following September, in the nineteenth year of his age, he entered the Sophomore Class of Bowdoin College.

Though at this time there was no Methodist Episcopal Church in Brunswick, yet it is sufficiently evident that Mr. Caldwell did not hesitate to profess himself openly both a Christian and a Methodist. He seems to have taken at once special interest in the Theological Society of the college, before which he read, in April following, an able and interesting paper on "Extemporaneous Sermons preferable, in general, to Written Sermons." Another essay written the following year on the Immortality of the Soul gives signs of the careful research, independent thought, and decided ability to grapple with difficult metaphysical subjects, for which he was distinguished in after life. While in college he applied himself with diligence to his studies, and sometimes when in feeble health. He was conscientious in the discharge of all his duties, maintained an honourable standing as a student, and was held in high esteem both by the professors and his college associates. It is very evident from his writings at this period that his mind took a new start. Having a fine relish for poetry and polite literature generally, he no doubt availed himself of the stores afforded by the college and other libraries to gratify this taste. But the great object of his pursuit was the acquisition of knowledge for the purpose of being useful to others as a teacher. In the winter of 1825–6 he again engaged in teaching a town school, in Minot, Maine.

In the year 1820 some benevolent and enterprising members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in Maine, conceived the project of establishing a literary institution, to be under the patronage and control of the Methodist Episcopal Church. This was one of the earliest efforts of our Church in the establishment of literary institutions, after the burning of Cokesbury College. In the spring of 1825 the institution, under the title of the Maine Wesleyan Seminary, went into successful operation. Mr. Zenas Caldwell, (the elder brother of Merritt,) who had graduated with distinguished credit at Bowdoin College, Sept., 1824. was called to be the

first principal. In October, 1826, we find the subject of this memoir engaged as a teacher in the same institution. After the winter vacation he again resumed his studies in college, and in September of the following year, 1827, again engaged as an instructor in this seminary. In July, 1828, he was elected principal in the place of his brother Zenas, who had been called away by death. In September following he graduated with honour and received his Bachelor's degree.

We now find Mr. Caldwell entering upon the great business of his life, as an instructor of the young. He deeply sympathized with the Church of his choice in its efforts for the establishment of education throughout its extended communion. But his interests and efforts were not confined to this branch of the Church. He sought earnestly for the diffusion and improvement of education in the community generally. By his zealous and judicious labours in this cause he soon became widely known and esteemed; and on the reorganization of Dickinson College in 1834, under the auspices of the Methodist Episcopal Church, he was looked to as a most fit candidate for the office of senior professor in that institution. He was accordingly elected to the Professorship of Mathematics in the summer of 1834, and entered upon the duties of his office on the 10th of September following.

But Mr. Caldwell, while Principal of the Maine Wesleyan Seminary, was not the teacher and educator only; as a metaphysician, a philanthropist and a Christian, his character also beautifully developed itself. An early tendency of his mind for metaphysical and theological studies led him at this, as well as at other stages of his life, to write much upon these and kindred subjects. His occasional addresses, while principal of the seminary, and several essays on "Human Depravity," "Christian Perfection," and "The Human Will," which are preserved, are specimens of great acuteness of reasoning, and of clearness, and sometimes of beauty of style. Mr. Caldwell also greatly interested himself in all the great benevolent enterprises of the day,—and especially those of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The Bible cause, the Mission cause, and particularly the cause of Temperance, engaged his strongest sympathies. Often was his voice raised for the furtherance of these noble institutions, and, according to his ability, he contributed of his substance for their support.

Another interesting fact ought not to be forgotten in this connexion. Surrounded as he was, by so many promising young men, and many of them looking forward to the ministry of the word as their future calling, his heart was greatly moved in their behalf, and he

sought by all the means in his power to advance them in those qualifications which might fit them for increased usefulness in after life. If any were destitute, his hand was freely open to supply their wants. If any were indiscreet or needed advice, in Mr. Caldwell they found a ready, wise, and faithful counsellor. Few men perhaps of his age, in this country, who are not clergymen, have educated or assisted in educating, so many for the sacred office as Mr. Caldwell. There is now a list before us of upwards of seventy clergymen of different religious denominations, most of whom are still living, who were under his instruction at the Maine Wesleyan Seminary. His influence upon the young men was in the highest degree salutary. Although not a minister himself, his views of the office were exceedingly elevated, and he sought by all his influence and labours to raise up an intelligent and godly ministry. For this purpose he recommended, above all things, the diligent study of the Holy Scriptures. Though, as he remarks in a letter to Dr. Fisk, on the subject of Biblical instruction in our schools and colleges, "I am inclined to the sentiment that a comparatively limited course only of Biblical study, or instruction, can be successfully introduced into any but our theological institutions," yet he was a strong advocate for the study of the Bible in every stage of the education of the young. This will appear from another extract from the same letter. "In my opinion," he remarks, "some plan of teaching the Scriptures should be entered upon as soon as the education of the child commences, and it should be continued to a greater or less extent till his education is completed. The reading and committing of select passages of Scripture should be introduced into our common schools just so far as it can be without sacrificing that respect that children should always be taught to show towards the *Holy Bible*. In schools of a higher character, but where classes can be arranged only for a few weeks or months, I think the weekly or semi-weekly examination of select portions of the New Testament, or of the historical part of the Old, should be strongly recommended. Among students of a more permanent character, either in our academies or colleges, a more systematic course can be advantageously adopted. The study of the historical, practical and prophetical parts as circumstances may seem to determine, may be pursued by the classes to as great an extent as the time allotted to it by the wisdom of the teachers will warrant; at the same time the use of the Greek and Hebrew Texts might, in my opinion, be introduced without detriment by those familiar with these languages."

We have already remarked that Mr. Caldwell was elected to the Professorship of Mathematics in Dickinson College, in the summer

of 1834, and entered upon his duties in the month of September following. Here, in some respects, a new field was opened before him, and one of great responsibility. The professors' chairs were for some time only partially filled. The President of the college, Rev. Dr. Durbin, was necessarily often absent in promoting the financial interests of the college. Of course the main burden of both instruction and government, at such times devolved upon Professor Caldwell. How ably, and how much to the satisfaction of the students, these duties were discharged, we hardly need state.

Among the young men in the lecture-room, or elsewhere, or among his brethren, the professors, he was always at home. No excitement or casualty ever made him forget himself. A manly dignity, a gentlemanly bearing, and an almost imperturbable composure, characterized him in all his intercourse with others. His masculine intellect, his firmness of purpose, his steady and unwavering adherence to principles and rules, and his kindness of heart taught the young men that they had a man to deal with whom they were bound both to respect and to love. With such qualities he could not be otherwise than successful, both as a professor and a college officer. And this was his character, as is abundantly verified by his associates during all the time of his connexion with the college. He was always successful, always respected and generally beloved by both officers and students during the entire thirteen years of his professorship.

He had not been long at Carlisle before the business and operations of the college began to assume an orderly and prosperous condition, and by his labours, with those of his able associates, Rev. Dr. Durbin and Professor Emory, a successful course of instruction was commenced. The classes rapidly increased from year to year, and there was evidently a growing respect for this ancient institution, both at home and abroad. Though for various reasons not necessary here to state, the operations of the institution had been entirely suspended before it came under the patronage of the Methodist Episcopal Church, yet in a few years it more than regained its former popularity, and took its stand among the first institutions of the country.

But while Professor Caldwell was assiduous in the performance of the duties of his office, his watchful eye was also abroad upon the great world, observing its movements and watching for opportunities to be serviceable to its best interests. He therefore seized upon the public press as the great organ through which *he* might be useful to his fellow-men. He had not even become settled in Carlisle before he commenced a series of communications for the Maine Wesleyan Journal, a paper at that time widely circulated in New-England, and especially in Maine, his native

State. His contributions to this paper were continued, from time to time, on various subjects of interest to the Church and philanthropist, for several years. His usual signature was "*Gleaner;*" and many, who had the privilege of reading this paper at that time, will recollect how eagerly these articles were perused, though the name of the writer was unknown. His able and judicious articles on the "*Means of Grace,*" published in this paper in the spring and summer of 1835, will be remembered by many as exceedingly timely and profitable to the Methodist Episcopal Church in New-England. He never shut himself in his cloister or student's cell, except to bring forth something valuable for the public weal. The general good, especially of the Church, the advancement of religion and learning among the people, and not personal profit or popularity, moved him to labour so much as he did through the public press. It ought to be mentioned here, that in 1835 he published a history of Dickinson College, in the American Quarterly Register, as he had done before of the Maine Wesleyan Seminary. These articles were distinguished by that extreme concern for accuracy which is noticeable in all his other productions.

In the year 1837 he became, more than ever, active in the promotion of the cause of temperance. He began to lecture and publish in favour of this great moral enterprise, and in every other way consistently with his duties as a professor in the college to awaken public attention to the terrible, growing evils of intemperance. He was evidently looked to as the tower of strength for this cause in the Cumberland Valley. The movement at this time was very unpopular; yet he persisted fearlessly, in exposing the enormities connected with rum drinking and the rum traffic. He hesitated not to attack this evil in high places. The polite and wealthy wine drinker, the judge and the legislator who violated temperance principles by their example or public acts, were sure to have the subject faithfully brought before them, and in such a way as to arrest their attention. His friends may have had their apprehensions that his zeal in this cause would work against his popularity; but so judicious and firm were his steps that he always gained ground and lost nothing, and lived long enough to see the glorious triumph of the cause. During this year, besides writing on various topics connected with education and religion, he also wrote and published a new conjugation of the English verb, and a new arrangement of English syntax. During the years 1838–9, he wrote his Sketches of Great Men. It consists of brief biographical accounts of distinguished Christian legislators, metaphysicians and poets, and some perhaps of other pursuits, to the number of about seventy.

His original design was to have carried the work much further. The principal object seems to have been to show that experimental Christianity has reached the greatest minds in the most elevated walks of human life. It forms an unanswerable argument for experimental religion. It is an argument from consciousness and testimony in the case of the ablest and best men of modern times.

During the winter of 1839 he went into an extensive investigation of the subject of "Sleep and Dreaming," the results of which were embodied in two lectures delivered in Carlisle. In the fall of this year he was exceedingly active in the borough of Carlisle and vicinity in promoting the cause of temperance. It was his custom to lecture once or twice a week, and often to ride out of town into the remote neighbourhoods to arouse the people to throw off the direful curse of intemperance. His labours in this way continued through the winter. During this time he never lost a single college recitation or lecture, always returning to the college after the evening's labour, or early next morning. In a letter to his friend, John Zug, Esq., dated December 23, 1840, he remarks, "Since the election has passed away, (referring to the presidential election of the preceding fall,) we have set ourselves to work to help the cause of temperance in other parts of the country, by visiting them, circulating papers,—and last, though not *least*, by getting command of a column or two of each of the papers of Carlisle for *temperance* purposes. If you read the papers of Carlisle you have noticed this part of our movement. Will you not help us out here? Write for the temperance department of our papers, or select,—sending directly to the editor, or sending the papers marked to me. I will attend to them. We may do much good in this way, and much good remains to be done in this cause."

These active labours led to frequent exposures, which finally resulted in a deep-seated affection of the lungs. His family and other friends became anxious, and he sent for his old friend and former physician, E. Clark, M. D., of Portland, Me. The doctor found him dangerously ill, having tuberculous cavities in the right lung. Copious hemorrhage occurred in the month of April, 1841. His attack was so very severe that his friends generally despaired of his ever entering again upon his duties in the college. But during the following summer, which was spent among his relatives in Maine, he was so far restored, by the blessing of God, as to be able partially to resume his duties at Carlisle in the following September, and fully in January. In July, 1841, he published an excellent article on *Eloquence*, especially pulpit eloquence and the cultivation of the voice, in the Methodist Quar-

terly Review. It contains an analysis of the celebrated work of Dr. James Rush on the philosophy of the human voice. It was probably written before the failure of his health, in the winter of 1840–1. It is an article of rare excellence; and, in connexion with the work that followed on Elocution, has done much to stimulate the young men of the Church to the cultivation of oratory. His health continued in some degree to improve, and he engaged again with his accustomed zeal in his literary pursuits.

His labours, however, were too great for his slender, and already broken constitution. It was often painfully evident to himself and friends that he was still the prey of lung-affections. But he continued to labour on, and set himself to work in preparing a text-book on Elocution, which was finally published in 1845, at Philadelphia. Though the market was already overflowing with text-books on this subject, yet the work has passed through several editions, and still is highly valued. In the year 1842 he became deeply interested in the discussion of a theory of Temptation, set forth by the Rev. Dr. Durbin in the Methodist Quarterly Review for October, 1841. This theory seemed to harmonize with his views of Scripture truth, and, as he thought, with every true system of Psychology; and as soon as Dr. Durbin's views were questioned, he at once came to the rescue of the theory—not so much because it was the theory of a friend, as because he conceived it to be the *true* view. It was also, perhaps, entered into with more interest, inasmuch as it is a question which has heretofore been but little disturbed by theologians, and especially by the theologians of our own Church. It is not our object in this paper to enter into any discussion on the theory, or to pronounce either for or against it; but simply to give some facts concerning the controversy, so far as may be necessary to a full understanding of his connexion with it. Certain it is that he was deeply interested in the subject. His earnest and able defence of the theory brought him into collision with several able and estimable brethren of the Church, who felt themselves bound to take a different view of the subject. Among these was the Rev. Abel Stevens, editor of Zion's Herald, who opposed the theory with distinguished ability and in excellent temper, in this Review. Prof. Caldwell replied, at least with equal ability, which brought out a rejoinder from the Rev. Mr. S. A short reply only to this rejoinder was permitted to be published in the same work. Prof. Caldwell, however, felt himself called upon to proceed in his investigations. The intimate connexion of the theory with the doctrine of Christian perfection, or entire sanctification in this life, gave it, in his mind, a transcendent importance. This doctrine was ever dear to his

heart, and everything which tended to illustrate and establish it, was treasured up in his mind. The result of his thoughts on this and kindred topics in theology, was published in 1847, in a work, entitled "Philosophy of Christian Perfection." Whatever may be thought of the doctrines of this work, there has been, so far as we have heard, but one opinion as to the ability displayed in it. For clear thinking, and accurate, forcible expression, it is a model. But as we intend to consider the work more at large when we come to treat of his writings, we will add no further remarks upon it in this place.

During the year 1843 much interest was taken in the discussion of the question of slavery by many ministers and members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, both North and South. He was not an inattentive observer of the events going forward on that subject. In a letter to the writer, dated March 19, 1843, he thus expressed himself:—"Do you read the True Wesleyan or Zion's Herald? Things are coming to a strange pass; we, at least. I can contemplate in the future but one of three things,—either slavery must be abolished in our Church throughout the United States; or we must separate into two General Conferences; or vast secessions will take place in New England—such as will amount to the destruction of the Church there. The right measures are not in progress to secure either of the former; the latter, therefore, with the present agency at work, must ensue. Whom have we, that can now mount the whirlwind, and with steady rein direct the storm? I know not the man."

The result has shown the correctness of Mr. Caldwell's judgment in the case; the General Conference of 1844 proved the truth of his prediction that there "would be two General Conferences." But he did not foresee all the grounds, nor perhaps the chief ground, which brought about this disastrous division in the Church. The fact that one of the bishops was deeply involved in slaveholding, was not generally known, until the session of the General Conference, about a year after, in May, 1844. While Professor Caldwell was decidedly anti-slavery in sentiment, he was also conservative in respect to the connexion of slavery with the Church. While he would destroy slavery, he would, if possible, preserve the peace and unity of the Church. He laboured for this more than a year before the General Conference of 1844, and wished to form such a conservative influence as might save the Church. But his hopes, as well as the hopes of thousands, were blasted by the course of the southern ultraists on the floor of the General Conference of 1844.

In the latter part of this year he published his "Manual of Elocu-

tion." Under date of December 15, he thus writes: "The object I have in view in preparing the book, is to furnish a more perfect system of preparatory discipline to the speaker, than is furnished by any other text-book now in the market. The advantages proposed by this training are, first, to make oratory, or rather the public efforts of the speaker, more effective than they are at present; and secondly, to give to the speaker such habits of intonation, and so to cultivate the vocal functions, as to make all his efforts at speaking, at least, *harmless* to himself, instead of producing, as they now so frequently do, disease of the vocal organs, which requires him to leave the field of labour just when he has learned to be useful in it, or else hurries him to a premature grave." He also wrote an article on elocution, which he considered supplementary to the one written and published in the Quarterly Review in 1841; as the first published treated on the voice, the latter was devoted to gesture and delivery in general, or what was called by the ancients, *action*. He maintains that excellence in delivery can be attained only by study and practice, and fortifies his position by the opinion of both ancient and modern writers and speakers. He closes up, animadverting strongly upon the views of Archbishop Whately on the subject. The subject is one of great practical importance, especially to public speakers and those designing to become such, and is discussed with his usual ability and discrimination.

In the latter part of this year public attention was called to the importance of closer union among Protestants in various parts of the world, by a series of powerful articles by Rev. J. Angell James, of Birmingham, England. They were copied by the religious papers of the country generally; and the favour of the Christian and Protestant public was extended towards the plan, one feature of which was a convention at London of individuals from the various Protestant Churches throughout the world. The project was deemed by Prof. C. as not only Christian and sublime, but feasible; and so most of the wise and excellent men of our country viewed it, both among the clergy and the laity. The unsettled state of his health led him to believe that a voyage to England and back might be beneficial, and he accordingly determined, in the spring of 1846, to visit London, and attend the Convention there, during the following summer. He was also appointed by the State Temperance Society of Pennsylvania a delegate to the World's Temperance Convention, which was to assemble in London at nearly the same time. At the end of the college year in July, in company with several delegates to London, he embarked at Boston on board a British steamer. The ship in which he sailed having become unseaworthy, in the judgment of

some, by running upon a rock in Halifax Bay, was left by a number of the passengers at Halifax. A majority, however, determined to go on, and Prof. C. was of the number. His health improved greatly during the voyage. Before attending the conferences in London, together with several other gentlemen from the United States, he travelled over England, Scotland and Ireland,—having visited most of the large cities within these kingdoms. After the adjournment of the conferences, in company with Rev. Dr. Emory, Rev. Dr. Peck, Rev. John B. Merwin, and some others, he visited France, Belgium, and Germany, and returned to the college in the month of November following, considerably improved in health, having been absent four months.

He at once resumed his duties in the college, and laboured during the year with his usual diligence and success. In the spring of 1847 he had a violent attack of pleurisy, which so weakened the powers of life as to induce a general development of tubercles. Again he visited his friends in Maine, as had been his custom in former years, and at the commencement of the college session, in September, was found as usual at his post in Carlisle, with health somewhat improved. He resumed all his duties; but it was not long before he was again acutely suffering from the progress of disease of the lungs. Afterwards a general derangement of the digestive functions, and finally ulcerations of the intestines and throat supervened, which continued to increase until death. He was still buoyed up with the hope, that it might please God to spare him and raise him up from this attack, as he had done from others in former years. He did not yet look upon his work as done. In March, he left Carlisle on a visit to his friend and brother-in-law, Dr. Clark, of Portland, Me., hoping that by the blessing of God he might be able to resume his duties again at the college in a few weeks. But, alas! it was too evident to his friends, that the fatal consumption had taken too strong a hold of his system ever again to be shaken off. The tuberculous ulceration of the throat continued to increase, and it was not long before the evidences of a speedy dissolution were clearly seen.

Though Professor Caldwell had always lived with a wise reference to eternity, he was now awakened to a more earnest inquiry, expressed by himself in the following phrases:—"Have I fully put on Christ?" "Am I fully ready to enter upon the joys of the Lord?" "I seem to have been living too exclusively by faith." He now panted after the fulness of love. He sought, he found, he felt and testified, that Jesus was the most precious, the loveliest among ten thousand. The name of Jesus was now almost constantly

upon his lips; it was in his silent breathings, and when he opened his mouth in praise: the name of Jesus was the first and the last. A fulness of love towards him took possession of his soul. For weeks before his death he shouted continually, "Glory to God! Glory to God in the highest! Glory to Jesus!"

Some of his conversations and sayings during the last week of his life, as they were noted down or reported by his friends, some one of whom was constantly near his bedside during this period of his earthly sojourn, appear to us worthy of preservation here; and we accordingly select from them such as most strikingly indicate the strength of his faith and the fulness of his hope.

May 30.—After inquiring the day of the month, he said, "I may live to see the summer—to see the earth spread over with green and covered with beauty. But I wonder when I shall again see decay. I reckon there is no decay in heaven. If there are green leaves there, they never fade. There shall be no death there. O God, sustain and save me!" On the next evening, just before retiring, while observing his feet, that had commenced swelling, he looked at Mrs. Caldwell with a smile, and said, "This is as strange to me as to you, yet it is pleasant to me;" and, after pausing a moment, he added, "What a change there will be with you when I am taken away! your cares and anxieties for me will all cease, and you will have a plenty of time — — — to be *sad*, if you will; —but you will not lie down upon your pillow and cry? Surely you will not mourn for me, when God has been so good to me all along, and will, I trust, sustain me till the end; and you will for *yourself*, surely you *will* trust such a God; and if you should visit the spot where I lie, you will not select a sad and mournful time—you will not go in the shade of evening or in the dark night. These are not fitting times to visit the grave of the Christian. Nor will you go there to weep; but you will go in the morning, in the bright sunshine, and when the birds are singing."

June 1.—He said, "One symptom after another assures me that I am approaching near my end. I am graciously saved from extreme sufferings. It may be I shall go down to death without them. But I think nothing of that. God knows what is best. I find an additional sweetness in the name of Jesus." He then repeated the verse,

"Jesus, the name that charms our fears," &c.,

and proceeded, "I have given my family so entirely to God, that I have no anxiety for them—no care that disturbs me by day or by night." Hearing the remark that the cares of earth would soon cease with us all, though they now press upon us for a little time: "O yes," said he,

"I would not exchange. I have not viewed it in that light before. O no! I would not exchange my condition with any of you. I am now wholly the Lord's, and he is mine! Glory to God! Praise the Lord!" He passed a very restless night, and was not able to rise on the morning of June 2d, as he had always done before. But he said, "It is all well; the sooner will these days be over, and I be at rest." He said to his mother, "I do not feel the inward man much renewed to-day." In the evening, after having a half-hour of sleep, his feelings cleared up, and, looking up to his mother, he said, "I *do* feel the inward man renewed somewhat to-day," and spoke of the love of the Saviour. On the next day, suffering great debility, he said, "I am thankful my work is done—I have nothing to do but to resign myself to God in my weakness. If I should lie down without strength to pray even, I should sleep in Jesus." On Sabbath morning, June 4, after a night and morning passed almost without sleep, the words, "The rougher the blast, the sooner 'tis past," were repeated by a friend. He replied, "This blast is not *very rough*, but it seems to be bearing me home! It is not *very rough*, but requires patience, and God gives that. It requires nothing of me—*God gives it*." This last phrase was repeated with an emphasis that indicated the most perfect reliance on God. Suffering great oppression and restlessness, he said, "I feel just like lying down and sleeping in Jesus. I shall sleep in Jesus. Jesus is my trust! Jesus is my trust! My end cannot be far off, and you cannot wish it prolonged; I cannot, nor can you," addressing Mrs. C. A little after, he said to his brother, when raising him up, "Doctor, I am very languid." "Yes," replied the doctor; "but as your outward man perisheth," &c. "O yes," he answered, "when my mind returns from its wanderings and fixes itself on Christ, then it rests." About 5 o'clock P. M., much more languid than ever before, and troubled for breath, he said to his wife, "Rosamond, I am getting very feeble. I may not be able to say anything more in particular to any one." She answered, "You have already said much, we cannot ask more." She asked him, "if he had anything in particular to say," to which he answered, "No! nothing. My mind and spirit rest on Christ, the Rock. If I am able (to say more,) well! if not, all is well!" In the evening he said to the doctor, "Faith is a great thing; it enables me to stand on the dividing line between the two worlds without trembling." On the next day he was very languid, and said but little. Tuesday, June 6, the day of his death, at one time he said to his mother: "Mother, I have no temptation to murmuring or impatience; but, on the contrary, I feel that heavenly breezes are passing over me." His mother said, "Glory to God!"

and continued, "I shouted Glory to God! when you were converted; but then I rejoiced with trembling; now I rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory; and can I but rejoice, when I see my son breathing his life out in the arms of Jesus, and melting away in the light of heaven?" Afterwards he said, "This is not death, *it is the consummation of life;* a little while, and it will be *eternal* life, *everlasting* life."

About two hours before his death, suddenly, and with an expression of anxiety, he said, "Mother, pray for me, that my faith may not fail—that I may not be overcome by temptation." Earnest supplication was made to God by his mother and friends, to which he responded most fervently. When the name of Jesus was mentioned, he repeated it again and again, saying, in the language of supplication, "Jesus is my trust." After prayer he said, "I seem to have lost sight of my landmarks." Still he wrestled in the name of Jesus. Prayer was continued till the song of victory burst forth from his lips, "Glory to God! I *shall* be *saved.* Glory to God! I shall live in heaven. Why was it that I was left? All was dark; and I began to fear that I should die a sad specimen of a Christian." His mother said, "It was permitted for the trial of your faith. But you will come forth as gold. God will not forsake his children." He replied with great emphasis, "But what if I had not been a Christian!" He raised his head, and waved his right hand, shouting in a subdued yet emphatic voice, "Glory to God! Glory to Jesus! *He* is my trust! He is my strength! Glory to Jesus! Mourn not for me; Jesus lives,—I shall live also! Glory to Jesus! He is my rock! Jesus! Jesus!" and repeated two lines, commencing with—

"Jesus, the name," &c.

"Jesus, my life! Jesus! Glory to Jesus!" Feebly grasping the hand of Mrs. C., he said, "Farewell, my dear wife. Glory to Jesus! Jesus, my *life!* Jesus, my *trust!* Jesus! Jesus!" Thus he fell asleep in Jesus, on the 6th of June, about 2 o'clock P. M., repeating that blessed name.

Such was the death of this excellent man,—such a death as every Christian would desire to die. The intelligence was received with profound sorrow throughout the Church in the Northern and Middle States, of which he had been a devoted member for more than twenty years. The friends of Dickinson College, in whose service Prof. C. had spent the flower and vigour of his life, especially had reason to lament their loss.

A funeral discourse was delivered at Portland by Rev. Gershom F. Cox, and also one by the pastor of the Methodist Episcopal

Church at Carlisle, Rev. B. H. Nadal, which was subsequently published.

It remains for us now to present the reader a brief account of Prof. Caldwell's writings, both published and unpublished.

1. The "Manual of Elocution." Any writer, professing to make a text-book on any branch of science, must necessarily begin with the elementary principles of that science. If there is a failure here, there must be a failure in constructing the very foundations of his work, and consequently also in its usefulness. Again, if, after a proper and full development of the principles of the science, there be a failure in presenting a sufficient number of examples for the illustration of those principles, such a work for learners must be considered altogether defective. In the science of Elocution, as in grammar, or arithmetic, or astronomy, there are certain elementary principles which must be presented and illustrated by a great variety of examples in order to be in the highest degree useful to the various classes of learners. Another principle important to be kept in mind is, that there must be no unnecessary commingling of one branch with another, but a strict adherence to the subject in hand. A treatise on Elocution should not be a treatise on grammar, or logic, or philosophy, though grammar, logic, and philosophy are important to be understood by the elocutionist and the orator. These principles strike us as among the most important, to be observed in the construction of text-books for our schools. A work on any branch of science constructed on these principles cannot fail with proper application on the part of the student to give him a full and definite knowledge of that branch.

Measuring Professor Caldwell's work on Elocution by this standard, we shall find that it fully meets every requisition. It commences with a careful analysis of the voice, together with an abundance of elementary exercises. The subject of articulation, time, stress, pitch, waves, force, quality, and melodies of the voice, are all admirably presented, and with a fulness sufficient for an understanding of the subject. After this we have a practical exemplification of these principles, in examples, calculated to show every variety of voice used in speech. The second great topic of Elocution is gesture. The author proceeds in this part of the subject as in the former, to discuss elementary principles, especially the elements of gesture. This done, he brings us to a chapter on the practical application of the principles discussed. He finishes the subject of gesture by the addition of some general precepts; and so far as our own experience and observation have enabled us to judge, this part of the work has been more satisfactory, and better adapted for the work of instruction, than any other within

our acquaintance; and we have used it with great advantage in the instruction of classes in elocution for several years. The work closes up with two very valuable chapters as an appendix—the first on the elocution adapted to the pulpit, and the second on that adapted to the stage.

Prof. Caldwell's second published work was the "*Philosophy of Christian Perfection.*" This book, the occasion of which we have briefly presented, professes to bring the principles of mental science to bear upon the doctrine of Christian Perfection, and to explain the nature of this doctrine in the light of well-ascertained principles of Psychology. The author, it must be observed, does not develop the doctrine solely from these principles; but first going to the Scriptures ascertains what they teach on this subject, and then confirms what they teach from philosophical principles. This certainly is a legitimate mode of procedure in respect to any doctrine of our holy religion,—first, to hear what revelation says, and then, what the voice of reason declares; and thus out of the mouth of these two witnesses every point may be established. In regard to this book, while we are free to admit that we do not approve of several things in it, and freely expressed our opinion to its lamented author while living, yet we are not ready to say, with some, that it must be summarily despatched and consigned to the shades, never more to see the light. It is a work of real merit: first, as to its literary execution; second, as to its brave independent thinking; and third, as to the clearness and ingenuity displayed in the conduct of the argument. Whatever there is of truth in the book, let it live; whatever of error, let it perish. This was the sentiment expressed by the excellent author on his dying bed. There was a solemn settled conviction in his mind that the main principles of his work were placed on solid foundations. The first position of the book important to be named is, that man's original perfection, or the perfection of our first parents, was essentially a moral perfection. The author explains himself by saying, that he uses the term "moral" in contradistinction from both *physical* and *mental*. We suppose the author would be understood to mean spiritual perfection in the primeval state of man, as well as one merely moral; inasmuch as he says, "We have concluded the 'likeness' and 'image' of God, in which our first parents were created, was irrespective of intellectual power, consisting only in righteousness and true holiness, and embracing only the knowledge requisite to the correct perception of moral truth." This was his view of the original state of man. His state after the fall is described in the following words: *First*, he is constitutionally destitute of the love of God, as a controlling principle of his nature. *Second*, as one

consequence of the absence of this regulating principle, he early finds his appetites and passions, and all the lower elements of his nature, clamorous of indulgence, and impatient of control. *Third*, from his connexion with a sinful world, he must, on reaching the years of discretion, find himself more or less under the influence of habits, whose tendency is to incline him to transgression and sin, and which will always bring him into sin until his heart be renewed through the grace of God and the power and agency of the Holy Spirit. Finally, it follows from all these considerations that even prior to the effects of voluntary sinful indulgence, his moral power is enfeebled by Adam's disobedience, and he has become subject to temptations and dangers, though not as we can perceive differing materially in their nature, yet more numerous and varied, than those which attach to man's original condition. This is the professor's view of man as fallen. We will now give his summary of his views of man as restored from the fall, through the atonement, and in the enjoyment of Christian perfection. *First.* In general terms there is implied in Christian perfection a complete restoration to the moral perfection of our first parents in the garden of Eden. *Secondly.* This perfection implies a perfect harmony of the action of the various principles of human nature, but the destruction or eradication of none of them. No new principle having been implanted in the human heart as the consequence of sin, there is nothing superfluous there. *Third.* It is implied that man thus restored would be subject to trials and temptations, the same in their general nature with those of our first parents, and only to such. *Fourth.* The re-establishment of the principle of perfect love in the heart must, of course, just so far as it is entire, restore the lost power to regulate and control the appetites and passions, to offer effective resistance to every assault, and to overcome every temptation. *Fifth.* A necessary and very important inference is, that as the restoration of this perfect love to the heart of the Christian does not secure him against trial, temptation and danger, so it does not give him any perfect security against possible or even actual transgression, nor in any way conflict with the idea of his subsequent recovery. *Sixth.* Such being the nature of "Christian perfection" or "entire sanctification," the evidence of its attainment must lie solely in the consciousness of the possessor, and in the all-pervading knowledge of the Supreme.

The above are the doctrines of the book. The remaining chapters are devoted to the refutation of various writers and theories on this subject: as for example, the Old School Presbyterian doctrine, that the entire sanctification of man's moral nature is not attainable in

this life, and the New School doctrine, that the entire sanctification of man's nature is attainable in this life, but never attained. The Oberlin divines also come in for a share of criticism, as do some Methodist writers who have expressed themselves differently on the subject of Adamic perfection, the continuance of the Adamic law, as our rule of life, and the nature of temptation. Some of the author's criticisms have been pronounced unnecessarily severe. But they are a true representation of the man. His course was, not to spare even friends if he considered them as standing in the way of truth. The objection to the work, that the author has made use of the principles of Mental Philosophy to illustrate and develop his subject, we look upon as altogether indefensible, and as having been well answered in a recent number of this Review.

We now proceed to give a brief account of such writings of Prof. Caldwell as have not yet been published in a permanent form.

Prof. Caldwell's labours in the cause of temperance were the results of a noble philanthropic Christian spirit. He doubtless never expected to gain any fame by labours of this kind, yet he devoted himself to them with great assiduity and with the purest philanthropy, and finally became almost a martyr to the cause. His labours were highly appreciated while living, and now that he is dead, his writings connected with this cause, we believe, will not be forgotten. They constitute no inconsiderable part of his valuable remains. They are mostly made up of addresses, some of which were published, and contributions to various temperance journals, discussing almost every topic which arose in the progress of this great cause during the first twenty years of its existence. He was frequently called upon by literary societies to deliver addresses before them. In these efforts he aimed to be useful rather than to be brilliant. They are characterized by great purity of diction, a calm dignity, a stern love of the truth, and a fearless exposure of error. The following are the titles and occasions of his principal addresses. 1. An address on "*Education*," before the Kennebeck County Association, in 1831. This was first delivered at Vassalboro', Maine. It is a clear and common-sense exhibition of the importance of training and instructing the youth of our country, to prepare them to discharge their duties properly as citizens. Its repetition was *twice* called for, and it was finally repeated at Waterville, Maine. 2. An address delivered before the associated alumni of Waterville College, July, 31, 1833. This address is marked by much judicious seasonable advice to the young scholar, both as its respects his literary, moral, and religious character. It shows how elevated was

the standard of the writer, and how his heart was engaged for the good of the world. 3. An address on the Errors of Education, a Baccalaureate, delivered before the trustees and students of Dickinson College, at the Commencement in 1835, and published in the Methodist Quarterly Review of 1836. 4. A lecture delivered before the Society of Equal Rights, March, 1836, on the "Science of the Human Mind." It is a delightful and most instructive performance. 5. A lecture delivered before the Cumberland County Lyceum at Shippensburg, and repeated by request at Carlisle, December 30, 1839, on the "Objects of Education." 6. Two lectures on "Sleep and Dreaming," delivered before the Equal Rights Association, February 19th and 26th, 1839. These lectures are very elaborately composed, and throw much light upon a very difficult subject. 7. A lecture delivered in the college chapel on "Health." Prof. Caldwell was a diligent student of this subject. Very many rules and advices are here laid down, which ought to be understood, especially by every student. 8. A Baccalaureate Address, being an answer to the question, "What are the true objects of a collegiate or liberal education?" delivered before the senior class of Dickinson College, July 13, 1843. This, in our judgment, is one of the best of Prof. Caldwell's orations. A copy was requested for publication. The request, however, was not granted. 9. Four lectures on the English Language. Prof. C. paid great attention to the subject of these lectures; it devolving upon him to give instruction upon this subject in the college. As we should have anticipated, these lectures were composed with very great care. The first two discuss the history of the foundation of the language, as it arose among the first inhabitants of Britain through the Celtic, Cimbric, Saxon, and Norman stages, till the time of Queen Anne. The third lecture presents a minute examination of the composition and structure of the language, by means of which he explains most of the irregularities found in its orthography and orthoepy. The fourth lecture presents an examination of the language in respect to strength or energy, to copiousness, flexibility, simplicity, harmony, and softness or delicacy; as these embrace the leading characteristics of language in general. 10. A lecture on the Temperance movement in its general bearing and influence on the interests of students at college and on the destiny of the scholar. This was one of his last public addresses, delivered before the professors and students of Dickinson College, in March, 1847. It is a solemn and earnest admonition to students and literary men to abstain from all intoxicating drinks.

It has been remarked above, that Prof. C. was a frequent con-

tributor to various public journals. He regarded writing for the newspaper press as a means of the greatest utility, and which every literary man and philanthropist ought to improve for the good of his generation. Many of his publications of this sort are of permanent value. They were written on a variety of topics, all, however, with the design of enlightening the public mind and subserving the public good. Some of those topics are,—Temperance, Common Schools, Education, Slavery, Phrenology, and Mesmerism.

Art. V.—THE GENEALOGIES OF CHRIST.

The great importance of the genealogical lists of our Saviour's ancestry, given in the first chapter of Matthew and the third chapter of Luke, arises from the fact, that in various passages of the Old Testament (e. g. Isa. xi, 1, 10; Jer. xxiii, 5; xxxiii, 15, &c.) it was predicted that the Messiah should be a lineal descendant of King David, so clearly as to leave no doubt, at his coming, as to his proper parentage, (Matt. xxii, 42.) If, therefore, it cannot be shown by an appeal to authentic records then existing, that Jesus Christ was literally and certainly "the son of David," whatever other claims he may have to our confidence or regard, still he cannot be the promised Saviour of the world. Any flaw in his title to the regal throne, would have been a fatal bar to his succession, in every Jewish mind; and the least suspicion cast upon his descent, would blast forever the hope of every Christian.

Essentially important as is this point, it is nevertheless a remarkable fact, well known to all who have devoted the slightest attention to the subject, that serious, and, indeed, very formidable difficulties arise, when we come to examine and compare the details of the two lists furnished by the Evangelists, for the express purpose of exhibiting this lineage. Discrepancies of the most palpable kind, both with each other and with the genealogical tables of the Old Testament, stand out at the first glance; and our perplexity is increased by finding, upon further research, that although the ingenuity and learning of commentators and critics have been lavished upon the points of disagreement from the earliest ages of the Christian Church, yet almost no two of them agree in their mode of reconcilement, and the explanations of all are more or less inconsistent and improbable in themselves, and fail to produce entire satisfaction. We do not, therefore, presume, that any light which we may be able to shed upon this *quæstio vexatissima*, will fully clear it up, or, perhaps, even lead

to a more definite adjustment: our reason for entering upon the investigation, is, that we cannot refrain from seeking some solution of so vital a topic, for our own sake; and our apology for offering it, is that by a free and candid discussion of its difficulties only, can the doubts of those be dissipated, who are not willing to take for granted the general conclusions. If we fail in our attempt, we hope at least to leave the subject no worse than we found it; and we may even then take refuge in the general argument, with which most are content, and in which all are safe, namely, that whatever difficulties *we* may find in these genealogies, those who lived in the times when they were written, and who had the best opportunity to test their correctness, whether friends or foes to Christianity, never expressed the least suspicion of their truth and accuracy.

We shall first give a synoptical view of the names as they stand in the several passages, according to the orthography of the original languages, the *Hebrew* Scriptures being referred to in the Old Testament, and not the *Septuagint*.

No.	Luke iii, 23–38. (Inverted.)	Matt. i, 2–17.	Gen. v, x, xi, and Ruth iv.	1 Chron. i, ii, iii.
1.	Adam	.....	Adam	Adam
2.	Seth	.....	Seth	Sheth
3.	Enos	.....	Enos	Enosh
4.	Cainan	.....	Cainan	Kenan
5.	Maleleel	.....	Mahalaleel	Mahalaleel
6.	Jared	.....	Jared	Jered
7.	Enoch	.....	Enoch	Henoch
8.	Mathusela	.....	Methuselah	Methuselah
9.	Lamech	.....	Lamech	Lamech
10.	Noe	.....	Noah	Noah
11.	Sem	.....	Shem	Shem
12.	Arphaxad	.....	Arphaxad	Arphaxad
13.	Cainan	.....	.....	.....
14.	Sala	.....	Salah	Shelah
15.	Eber	.....	Eber	Eber
16.	Phalec	.....	Peleg	Peleg
17.	Ragau	.....	Reu	Reu
18.	Sarouch	.....	Serug	Serug
19.	Nachor	.....	Nahor	Nahor
20.	Thara	.....	Terah	Terah
21.	Abraam	Abraam	Abram	Abra(ha)m
22.	Isaac	Isaac	.....	Isaac
23.	Jacob	Jacob	.....	Israel
24.	Joudas	Joudas	.....	Judah
25.	Phares	Phares	Pharez	Pharez
26.	Esrom	Esrom	Hezron	Hezron
27.	Aram	Aram	Ram	Ram

No.	Luke iii. 23–38. (Inverted.)	Matt. i. 9–17.	Gen. v. x. xi. and Ruth iv.	1 Chron. i. ii. iii.
28.	Aminadab	Aminadab	Amminadab	Amminadab
29.	Naason	Naason	Nahshon	Nahshon
30.	Salmon	Salmon	Salmon	Salma
31.	Booz	Booz	Boaz	Boaz
32.	Obed	Obed	Obed	Obed
33.	Jessai	Jessai	Jesse	Jesse
34.	David	David	David	David
35.	Nathan	Solomon	.....	Solomon
36.	Mattatha	Roboam	.....	Rehoboam
37.	Mainan	.....	.....	.....
38.	Melea	.....	.....	.....
39.	Eliakeim	Abia	.....	Abia
40.	Jonan	Asa	.....	Asa
41.	Joseph	Josaphat	.....	Jehoshaphat
42.	Jouda	Joram	.....	Joram
43.	Simeon	.....	.....	Ahaziah
44.	Levi	.....	.....	Joash
45.	Matthat	.....	.....	Amaziah
46.	Joreim	Ozias	.....	Azariah
47.	Eliezer	Jotham	.....	Jotham
48.	Jose	Achaz	.....	Ahaz
49.	Er	Ezekias	.....	Hezekiah
50.	Elmodam	Manasses	.....	Manasseh
51.	Cosam	Amon	.....	Amon
52.	Addi	Josias	.....	Josiah
53.	Melchi	.....	.....	Jehoiakim
54.	Neri	Jechonias	.....	Jeconiah
55.	Salathiel	Salathiel	.....	Salathiel & Pedaiah
56.	Zorobabel	Zorobabel	.....	Zerubbabel
57.	.....	.....	.....	Hananiah
58.	Rhesa	.....	.....	Pelatiah & Rephaiah
59.	Joanna	.....	.....	Arnan
60.	Joudas	Abioud	.....	Obadiah
61.	Joseph	Eliakeim	.....	Shechaniah
62.	Semei	.....	.....	Shemaiah
63.	Mattathias	.....	.....	.....
64.	Maath	.....	.....	.....
65.	Naggai	.....	.....	Neariah
66.	Esli	Azor	.....	Elioenai & Azrikam
67.	Naoum	.....	.....	Johannan & Anani
68.	Amos	.....	.....	.....
69.	Mattathias	Sadoc	.....	.....
70.	Joseph	Acheim	.....	.....

No.	Luke iii, 23–38. (Inverted.)	Matt. i, 2–17.	Gen. v, x, xi, and Ruth iv.	1 Chron. i, ii, iii.
71.	Janna	Eliond	.....	.....
72.	Melchi	Eleazar	.....	.....
73.	Levi	Matthan	.....	.....
74.	Matthat	Jacob	.....	.....
75.	Eli	.....	.....	.....
76.	Joseph	Joseph	.....	.....
77.	JESUS	JESUS	.....	.....

What we propose to do, is to examine the discrepancies between the names in these several lists, wherever the difference appears to be more than one of mere orthography. Other passages, especially in the Old Testament, will be noticed as they bear upon the names successively.*

No. 13. Here Luke inserts the name of Cainan, which he had also given at No. 4. Neither of the lists of the Hebrew Scriptures has the name in this place, but the Septuagint version has it in Gen. x, 24; and in chap. xi, 12–15 it even adds his age, "and Arphaxad lived one hundred and thirty-five years, and begot Cainan; and Arphaxad lived after he begot Cainan, three hundred years, and begot sons and daughters: and he died. And Cainan lived one hundred and thirty years, and begot Sala; and Cainan lived, after he begot Sala, three hundred and thirty years, and begot sons and daughters: and he died. And Sala lived one hundred and thirty years and begot Heber; and Sala lived after he begot Heber, three hundred and thirty years, and begot sons and daughters: and he died." In 1 Chron. i, however, the Septuagint does not mention the name of this Cainan at all, according to the best editions, (verses 11–16 and 18–23 being entirely omitted;) while those that do insert it, do so in such a confused and uncertain manner as to betray evident corruption, (verses 17, 18, "The sons of Sem: Ailam and Assour, and Arphaxad, and Loud, and Aram. And [the sons of Aram:] Ouz, and Oul, and Gether, and Mosoch. And Arphaxad [and Loud and Aram. Caina begot Cainan: and he] begot Sala," &c.) This is not the place to discuss the comparative authority of the Hebrew text and that of the Septuagint; in this instance at least, the Greek version is manifestly at fault; having evidently borrowed the *name* of Cainan from the antediluvian patriarch, and his *numbers* from those of his successor Salah, with which they precisely agree. Luke, of course, had nothing to do in this case but to copy the list

* Our readers may find it convenient to compare, as they go along, a recent work, (*A New Harmony and Exposition of the Gospels.* By JAMES STRONG, A. M. New-York: Carlton and Phillips,) which gives in two pages (16, 17) a parallel view of the *texts* in the gospels containing these genealogies, and a tabular view of the *results* arrived at in the following process of examination.

as he found it in the Septuagint, at that time current in all the synagogues (?) for popular use, without needing to go into any pedantic correction; he is, therefore, noways responsible for the interpolation.

No. 30. Rachab, mentioned here by Matthew, (ver. 5,) was evidently the wife of Salmon and mother of Boaz, just as Ruth in the latter part of the verse was the wife of Boaz and mother of Obed. But in that case, she cannot have been, as generally supposed, the "harlot" of Jericho by that name (Josh. ii); for that would give an interval of over *three centuries* between her and the time of David, whereas the lists all agree in furnishing but *four generations* with which to fill it. Nor is it likely that this coincidence was intended by the name; for the Jews held, traditionally, that the heroine of Jericho married Joshua himself, and became the ancestress of eight prophets, among whom they do not reckon David; who the Rahab of Matthew was, therefore, or why her name is inserted, it is impossible to guess.

No. 35. Here Luke's and Matthew's lists divide, the former, who wrote for the special benefit of the Gentiles, taking the *natural* descent through Nathan, the ninth of David's nineteen legitimate sons (1 Chron. iii, 1–9), while the latter, writing principally for the use of Jews, traces it through the *regal* line from *Solomon*, David's tenth son and successor. The true branches unite in Salathiel, (No. 55,) and the lineage is thus confirmed.

No. 36. The name of Mattatha does not occur in the Old Testament. The same is true of Nos. 38–41, 44–52, 63 and 64, in Luke's list, and of all below No. 67 (exclusive) in both lists.

Nos. 37 and 38. These generations we think of questionable authenticity, because they would unduly protract the interval between Nos. 35 and 42; the names given at these latter numbers respectively in the two lists, being contemporary, as we shall see, whereas between them Luke gives six names, and Matthew (as in the Old Testament) only four. The suspected names, however, occur in all the MSS. and editions, and if interpolations at all, are doubtless attributable to the family records which Luke merely transcribed.

No. 43. We here find the name of Ahaziah omitted by Matthew, as are also those of the succeeding kings, Joash and Amaziah, at the following numbers. Some have supposed that this was done in order to show a detestation of the memory of these wicked kings —a mode of ignominy to which the Jews sometimes resorted in their public records; but in that case, why were not the names of other kings, as great or even greater monsters of crime and tyranny, also thrown out? We are rather disposed to attribute the omission to some *accidental* imperfection of the popular Jewish list which

Matthew seems to have followed; for both the Hebrew and the Greek Scriptures have these names in their proper place, (1 Chron. iii, 11, 12; compare 2 Chron. xxii, 1, 11; xxv. 1, 27.)

In 2 Chron. xxiii, 1, we find mentioned one "Maaseiah, the son of Adaiah," as one of "the captains of hundreds," during the interregnum that succeeded the violent death of Ahaziah, and that he was one of those appointed to guard the young prince Joash from the murderous tyranny of the queen dowager Athaliah. This Maaseiah, we think it not unlikely, may have been the same with Simeon of this number, (the names being somewhat similar, or perhaps two names of the same individual,) or at least a brother of his; for they were very nearly contemporary, (whether we compare the generations in an ascending or descending order from fixed points,) they were both persons of rank and apparently of princely connexions, and their fathers' names, Adaiah and Juda, present more than accidental points of resemblance, considering that they are translations from different languages.

No. 53. Here Matthew omits the name of Jehoiakim; but it is supplied in certain MSS. and versions, which read thus, "And Josias begot Jehoiakeim, and Jehoiakeim begot Jechonias and his brethren, about the time they were carried away to Babylon." Most critics explain the omission as in Nos. 43–45, and reject the insertion of the name in this text, as an interpolation designed to patch up the defect. To us, however, the matter appears differently:—In the first place, it cannot be denied that the external authorities for the emended reading are at least respectable, if not decidedly weighty, and the fact of their existence makes a wide difference in the treatment of this difficulty from those of Nos. 43–45, where all the readings are unanimous. In the second place, it is also undeniable that a name is here omitted, and as the correction supplies the proper name, and at once remedies the error, there is a strong presumption that it was so written. But, thirdly, the omission not only makes Matthew guilty of an *inaccuracy*, by not saying enough, but also of a *contradiction*, in what he has said; for he sums up the list by saying, that from Abraham to David, thence to the captivity, and thence to Christ, are each fourteen generations; whereas, upon an actual enumeration of his own names, we find but forty-one generations in all. Whether, therefore, we reckon the last term in each of the three series as included, and the first of the latter two excluded, (which is the most natural and correct mode,) or both terms as inclusive, or both as exclusive, there will in every case be more or less than fourteen, in some one of the periods or other; as the following trial will demonstrate:—

First term included.

1. Abraham	1. David	1. Jeconiah
2. Isaac	2. Solomon	2. Salathiel
3. Jacob	3. Rehoboam	3. Zerubabel
4. Judah	4. Abijah	4. Abiud
5. Phares	5. Asa	5. Eliakim
6. Esrom	6. Jehoshaphat	6. Azor
7. Aram	7. Jehoram	7. Sadok
8. Aminadab	8. Uzziah	8. Achim
9. Naason	9. Jotham	9. Eliud
10. Salmon	10. Ahaz	10. Eleazar
11. Boaz	11. Hezekiah	11. Matthan
12. Obed	12. Manasseh	12. Jacob
13. Jesse	13. Amon	13. Joseph
	14. Josiah	14. Jesus.

Last term included.

1. Abraham	1. Solomon	1. Salathiel
2. Isaac	2. Rehoboam	2. Zerubabel
3. Jacob	3. Abijah	3. Abiud
4. Judah	4. Asa	4. Eliakim
5. Phares	5. Jehoshaphat	5. Azor
6. Esrom	6. Jehoram	6. Sadok
7. Aram	7. Uzziah	7. Achim
8. Aminadab	8. Jotham	8. Eliud
9. Naason	9. Ahaz	9. Eleazar
10. Salmon	10. Hezekiah	10. Matthan
11. Boaz	11. Manasseh	11. Jacob
12. Obed	12. Amon	12. Joseph
13. Jesse	13. Josiah	13. Jesus.
14. David	14. Jeconiah	

Both terms included.

1. Abraham	1. *David*	1. *Jeconiah*
2. Isaac	2. Solomon	2. Salathiel
3. Jacob	3. Rehoboam	3. Zerubabel
4. Judah	4. Abijah	4. Abiud
5. Phares	5. Asa	5. Eliakim
6. Esrom	6. Jehoshaphat	6. Azor
7. Aram	7. Jehoram	7. Sadok
8. Aminadab	8. Uzziah	8. Achim
9. Naason	9. Jotham	9. Eliud
10. Salmon	10. Ahaz	10. Eleazar
11. Boaz	11. Hezekiah	11. Matthan
12. Obed	12. Manasseh	12. Jacob
13. Jesse	13. Amon	13. Joseph
14. David	14. Josiah	14. Jesus.
	15. Jeconiah	

In short, the only way to "*make twice-two five*" in this case, is to repeat one of the terms in one of the series, and in none of the rest; in other words, to make a single name the representative of two generations! This is accordingly done by most interpreters, and they are only puzzled to decide, whether David or Jeconiah shall be entitled to that honour. A wag might suggest, as a relief in this dilemma, that, as the *Babylonian Captivity* is mentioned in the list as a doubling point, this name might be conveniently pressed into service, by way of "splitting the difference," and the troublesome blank would be neatly filled at once.* But, seriously, this counting one name twice, in order to eke out a required number, is a mere quibble, unworthy the resort of candid critics: better frankly avow

° Indeed, Dr. Robinson (Notes to his Harmony, § 13) does very nearly this thing, by repeating the name of David, and justifying his computation thus, "It is obvious that the first division begins with Abraham, and ends with David. But does the second begin with David, or with Solomon? Assuredly with the former; because, just as the first begins *ἀπὸ Ἀβραάμ*, so the second also is said to begin *ἀπὸ Δαυίδ*. The first extends *ἕως Δαυίδ*, and includes him; the second extends *ἕως τῆς μετοικεσίας*, i. e. TO AN EPOCH AND NOT TO A PERSON; and, therefore, the persons who are mentioned as coeval with this epoch (*ἐπὶ τῆς μετοικεσίας*, ver. 11), are not reckoned before it. After the epoch the enumeration begins again with Jechoniah, and ends with Jesus." On the contrary, as the second division extends quite down to the epoch, (*ἕως τῆς μετοικεσίας*, ver. 17,) it ought to include every name mentioned before that epoch, and which continued under it, (*ἐπὶ*, v. 11;) and this with even better reason, than that the third division should monopolize a name which does not properly belong to it, (*μετά*, v. 12,) except by repetition. In fact, this nice distinction involves after all a *non sequitur*, and leaves the difficulty still in every unsophisticated mind. If Jeconiah had been "coeval with the epoch" of the deportation, he certainly might have been "reckoned before it," with fully as much propriety as after it, and the instance of David would have suggested a more correct and uniform mode of disposing of his name, by *repeating* it in like manner. But farther, Matthew, on referring to the list which he had just written, would have found that he had actually given this name *before* that epoch (verse 11), and he only mentions it afterward (v. 12) in order to connect the two divisions; if, therefore, he wished to make out a fair common-sense ratio of the length of the several series, rather than a fanciful correspondence in their numbers, he could not have totally excluded Jeconiah from the second series. Still farther, Matthew says that in each of these periods there were *fourteen generations*, not merely that the number of *names* might be made to tally, although he evidently throws out of the account the three generations, Nos. 43–45; and every attempt to make any epoch or event a dividing point, must savour of the absurdity of calling it a generation. In short, no good reason can ever be given why Jeconiah's name should not be repeated just as much as David's. Naturalness and consistency require *three times fourteen bona fide generations* in the entire list, represented consecutively by the names enumerated by Matthew, and no person, from a mere perusal of the account itself, would think of looking for anything else than forty-two actual names in direct descent from father to son; this, we claim, Matthew did mean to give,

an inexplicable error at once, than thus insult the inquirer with a computation which would be admitted in the settlement of no ordinary account to the value of a shilling. We, however, do not feel shut up to any such necessity in this case; we accept the improved reading, both on account of fair external, and its overwhelming internal, evidence, because there is not only good ground to believe that it is what Matthew *did* say, but it is also clear that it is what he *meant* to say,—and the whole list comes out naturally, thus:

As emended.

1. Abraham	1. Solomon	1. Jeconiah
2. Isaac	2. Rehoboam	2. Salathiel
3. Jacob	3. Abijah	3. Zerubabel
4. Judah	4. Asa	4. Abiud
5. Phares	5. Jehoshaphat	5. Eliakim
6. Esrom	6. Jehoram	6. Azor
7. Aram	7. Uzziah	7. Sadok
8. Aminadab	8. Jotham	8. Achim
9. Naason	9. Ahaz	9. Eliud
10. Salmon	10. Hezekiah	10. Eleazar
11. Boaz	11. Manasseh	11. Matthan
12. Obed	12. Amon	12. Jacob
13. Jesse	13. Josiah	13. Joseph
14. David	14. *Jehoiakim*	14. Jesus.

Whether Matthew himself counted up the names, in order to verify this coincidence in the numbers of the respective series, or merely made the statement as a matter of popular remark, is itself doubtful: if the former, he could hardly have been himself satisfied with any of the ingenious expedients of modern critics; and if the latter, we may throw the whole responsibility of the error upon the computation then in vogue.

Another difficulty connected with this No., arises from the addition by Matthew, (v. 11,) after the name of Jeconiah, of the words,

without being responsible, however, for any substitutions of equivalent names in the public authorities from which he cited.

It is true, that by the computation we have adopted, Jeconiah is, after all, placed in the third division; but then his name is not repeated, nor is that of David, so that uniformity is preserved; and, moreover, as the introduction of the captivity among the generations in that emphatic manner, is not our hypothesis, we are at liberty to count his name on either side of that event. The true reason why that epoch is referred to in the enumeration of verse 17 is, not to avoid the reduplication of a name, but because it was a better marked crisis in the history of the nation than was the comparatively obscure name of Jeconiah, and thus corresponded better with the notable names of Abraham, David, and Jesus, the other boundaries of the several series.

"*and his brethren*," implying that Jehoiakim had at least more than one son. Now, in the genealogies of 1 Chron. iii, we find (at v. 16, 17) only this statement, "And the sons of Jehoiakim: Jeconiah his son, Zedekiah his son. And the sons of Jeconiah," &c. This nearly all interpreters (who have noticed the passage at all) have regarded as denying that Jeconiah had any brothers; but we do not think this by any means a warrantable inference. For, in the first place, this whole passage is too obscure and incoherent to admit any very clear or satisfactory explanation, as any one may see by a mere perusal, and as will presently more fully appear: nor are there any various readings to assist in restoring the meaning; the Septuagint also closely following the Hebrew text. But, in the next place, the passage itself gives evidence of more than one son of Jehoiakim: for, besides setting out to give his "sons," it actually enumerates as two of them Jeconiah and Zedekiah. Now it will not do to interpret the words, "Zedekiah his son," as meaning that Zedekiah was Jeconiah's son; for the very next verse sets out afresh to give Jeconiah's sons, and actually enumerates them, while the name of Zedekiah nowhere appears among them. Jeconiah and Zedekiah, therefore, were both sons of Jehoiakim, and, in the addition "his son," the pronoun in both cases refers to the same person. This Zedekiah must have been a different one from Mattaniah, the third son of Josiah, and the brother of Jehoiakim, whom the king of Babylon placed on the throne, changing his name to Zedekiah, after the deposition of Jeconiah, (1 Chron. iii, 15; 2 Kings xxiv, 17; Jer. xxvii, 1;) and in 2 Chron. xxxvi, 10, the two seem to have become confounded, unless we may there interpret, "Zedekiah his [Jeconiah's] *brother*" to mean his relative, namely uncle. Lastly, the silence as to any other brother of Jeconiah, does not prove that he had no more than one; for the list in 1 Chron. iii, is by no means a complete record of the various families. And even if there were but this one brother, we think the fact would meet the requirements of Matthew's language, "Jechoniah and his brethren, about the time they were carried away to Babylon;" the Evangelist's whole object in this addition being to allude to the transmigration which the entire house then experienced, as affecting the fortunes of the Messianic stock: and we know that Jeconiah's whole family, including his mother, (and therefore no doubt his brothers also,) were carried into captivity with him, (2 Kings xxiv, 12, 14, 15.)

No. 55. Is the *Salathiel* in each of the lists here the same person? We take the affirmative most decidedly, notwithstanding the objections of great names; and for the following reasons: In the first place, there is a very strong presumption of identity

from the names being the same; and this is not only the case with Salathiel, but also with his son Zerubbabel, where all the lists exhibit the same name. These persons, also, must have been contemporary, as the mere juxtaposition of the lists sufficiently indicates for general purposes. Now, although instances are brought, on the other side, of different persons of the same name elsewhere in genealogical and other lists, there cannot be found anywhere *two consecutive names*, severally contemporary with the same two in another such list, that do not belong to the same individuals. Such a coincidence is almost impossible, and not to be supposed without positive proof. In the second place, then, what proof is offered to show their non-identity? none but speculative objections and minor difficulties. The consideration of these will be the best mode of discussing whatever relates to this No.

Salathiel being the lineal son of Jeconiah, according to Matthew, could not also have been the direct son of Neri in Luke; why then should Luke, who so carefully traces back the natural descent from Jesus to Adam, here abandon the true regal line, for some lineage of inferior dignity and authenticity? Now it might be sufficient to answer, that Luke is as good evidence of direct descent from Neri, as Matthew is from Jeconiah, or that these two names may have belonged to the same person; but we admit that Jeconiah was Salathiel's proper father. The only other evidence of this is the language of 1 Chron. iii, 17, "And the sons of Jeconiah: Assir, Salathiel his son," &c. This is another instance of the obscurity of this passage before noted. As it now reads, we should take *Assir* to be Jeconiah's only son, and Salathiel his grandson; which, so far from deciding between Matthew and Luke in this case, would involve them both in equal and additional difficulty. A better mode of interpretation, and one more congenial with the style of enumeration throughout this chapter, would be to make Assir a son of Jeconiah, along with Salathiel and the rest in the following verse, applying the words "his son" as in verse 16. A third mode is to regard *Assir*, אַסִּיר = אָסִיר, literally *a prisoner*, as merely an epithet of Jeconiah, added on account of his peculiar affliction in the captivity. This will agree very well with the manner in which Matthew introduces his name as an exile. One of these latter modes of interpretation must be employed; for the chronicler sets out with proposing to give us the *sons* of Jeconiah, and not merely *one* son, Assir.

On the other hand, we claim that Salathiel was still lineally descended from Neri, and that Luke merely takes the maternal and private line, (as best agreed with his purpose,) instead of the paternal and royal one. The theory by which we reconcile these apparent

contradictions, is by assuming that Neri was the *grandfather* of Salathiel, through the wife of Jeconiah. In Jeremiah xxii, 12, is mentioned one "Baruch the son of Neriah the son of Maaseiah," as a contemporary of the prophet, in the tenth year of Zedekiah, who succeeded Jeconiah during the captivity. The time, names and rank of all the parties so well agree, that we are disposed to identify this Neriah with the Neri in Luke, and his father, Maaseiah, *with* Melchi preceding him. This latter may also not improbably have been the same with "Maaseiah, the governor of the city," in *the time* of Josiah the father of this Zedekiah, 2 Chron. xxxiv, 8. In Jer. li, 59, we have probably the same persons mentioned; another *member* of the family being called "Seraiah the son of Neriah, the son of Maaseiah." Now it is traditionally believed by the Jews *that* Salathiel's mother was named *Susannah*, and that Jeconiah married her in his captivity; and, as this Neriah was an elderly person of distinction at that very time, he may well have been her father. This will easily and naturally reconcile the whole lineage, and her name, of course, would be superseded in the public records by those of her husband and father. We are aware that there is much uncertainty about this, but it arises from the nature of the case, *and* some such relationship, it is admitted on all hands, must have existed at this point. The only question, therefore, is, what supposition *is* the most simple, and agrees best with all the circumstances and probabilities known: the one we offer is at least more credible *than* that all these coincidences of names, dates and relations (with others soon to be presented,) are merely *accidental* and relate to individuals totally unconnected.

No. 56. The identity of the names Zerubbabel in the three lists, has been assumed above: the subject will bear a fuller investigation. It appears, however, from the statements in 1 Chron. iii, 17–19, that Zerubbabel was not the son directly of Salathiel, but of his brother Pedaiah; from which we conclude that Salathiel dying without heir, his brother Pedaiah took his wife, and "raised up as seed to his brother" Zerubbabel, according to the Levirate law, Deut. xxv, 5. Hence, in the list in the Chronicles, the children of Jeconiah's *third* son, only are given, because through them the family was continued. This mode of descent is confirmed by

No. 57, which will be more conveniently considered, under

No. 58. The only two names that correspond here are Rhesa in Luke, and Rephaiah in Chronicles. But between Rephaiah and Zerubbabel, we have, in 1 Chron. iii, 19–21, a confused list of descent, which it is very difficult to disentangle: "And the sons of Zerubbabel: Meshullam and Hananiah, and Shelomith their sister: and Hashubah,

and Ohel, and Berechiah, and Hasadiah, Jushab-hesed, five. And the sons of Hananiah; Pelatiah and Jesaiah: the sons of Rephaiah," &c. Now in this series, there are several difficulties, which we will consider in order.

(1) There are given at least six, and apparently seven, sons of Zerubbabel, besides one daughter; whereas at the close they are all reckoned as making *five*. This may be plausibly explained by understanding the five names that follow that of the daughter, to be those counted at the close as Zerubbabel's proper heirs; and assigning the two that precede her, as the legal representatives of his brother's family, on account of the Levirate marriage.

(2) The line next proceeds, not through Zerubbabel's eldest, but through his second son, Hananiah: this may naturally be explained by the death of the first-born without issue.

(3) The chief difficulty arises from the mention of but two sons of Hananiah, neither of whom is Rephaiah, through whom the descent next runs. Nor can our translators be charged with falsely rendering the Hebrew text: for although they have properly followed those copies which read at the beginning of verse 21, וּבְנֵי־, "and [the] *sons* of" Hananiah, etc., instead of the common text which has וּבֶן־, "and [the] *son* of;" yet they have retained in the intermediate clauses the undisputed בְּנֵי, "[*the*] sons of," rather than read בְּנוֹ, "*his* son," as the Septuagint apparently chose to do, from its translating, "And [the] sons (*καὶ υἱοὶ*) of Anania, Phalettia and Josia his son (*υἱὸς αὐτοῦ*), Rhapal his son," etc. Under these circumstances we can see no mode of unravelling the web of descent, except by regarding Rephaiah as another son of Hananiah, through whom the family was continued, as often before, by default of issue from the first-born Pelatiah. Even if we adopt the (construction rather than) translation of the Septuagint, Jesaiah will still be a son of Hananiah, by the same process of explanation as was applied to verse 16; but Rephaiah will then be the son of the former, rather than of his brother. Our own conclusion is somewhat corroborated by the similar position of

No. 59. The list in Chronicles proceeds, "the sons of Rephaiah, the sons of Arnan, the sons of Obadiah, the sons of Shechaniah"—a series that almost defies elucidation. We are compelled to suppose with the Seventy, that these are meant as sons in the direct line as they stand. If so, the name of Joanna in Luke will agree not ill with that of Arnan.

No. 60. Here the Abiud of Matthew corresponds so nearly with Obadiah in the Chronicles, that we may readily identify them; and this affords some confirmation of the position that the three lists are

all along in this part the same. The name Judah, given by Luke, is not so different as to forbid all idea of identity with the two others.

No. 61. In this generation the three lists give us, Joseph, Eliakim, Shecheniah—names that can only be harmonized by the supposition that they were different appellations of the same individual. To resort to a Levirate marriage with brothers, through whom the line should return afterward, is not advisable on so slight grounds.

No. 62. Here the names of Semei and Shemaiah agree so well, that they at once identify themselves. Matthew, however, appears to have omitted this generation altogether.

Nos. 63 and 64. As Luke alone gives the names of Mattathiah and Maath here, we are inclined to suspect that they had crept into the public records from Nos. 69 and 74, or else from Nos. 36 and 45; the whole six names in fact being but variations of the same Hebrew name מַתִּתְיָה, *i. q.* Ματθαῖος. If so, in

No. 65, we may easily identify the Naggai of Luke with the Neariah of the Chronicles: as Matthew omits the name altogether, there may have been some peculiar relationship between Eliakim and Azor, Nos. 61 and 66. The list in the Chronicles, however, needs some elucidation: it reads thus (1 Chron. iii, 22), "And the sons of Shechaniah; Shemaiah: and the sons of Shemaiah; Hattush and Igeal, and Bariah, and Neariah, and Shaphat, six." The difficulty here is twofold: after setting out to give the *sons* of Schechaniah, it gives only *one*, Shemaiah; and in enumerating the sons of the latter, we find only *five*, instead of *six*. The Hebrew text affords no relief; and the Septuagint merely avoids the plural in speaking of the heir of Shechaniah, but leaves the rest of the verse in the same condition. The only explanation of which we can think, of a statement too palpably contradictory to have been intended in any other sense, is to include the five sons of Shemaiah with himself, as the six descendants ("sons" in the general sense) of Shechaniah: this will obviate both parts of the difficulty at once. The line then proceeds through Neariah (verse 23) as heir, instead of either of the three older brothers: hence his name appears in Luke.

No. 66. The list in Chronicles (verse 23) here gives us as "the sons of Neariah: Elioenai, and Hezekiah, and Azrikam, three:" the first of which names is readily recognised in the Esli of Luke, and the third in the Azor of Matthew. From this point, accordingly, the lists of the two Evangelists diverge, until they unite again in Jesus; carrying down the descent through these different brothers' families.

No. 67. Here the genealogy in the Chronicles gives us (verse 24) the names of "the sons of Elioenai; Hodaiah, and Eliashib, and

Pelaiah, and Akkub, and Johanan, and Dalaiah, and Anani, seven:" of which the names of the fifth and the seventh, Johanan and Anani, nearly correspond with the Nahum of Luke; most likely the former. By counting upward from the names of Matthat and Jacob, (No. 74,) who, as we shall see, there is reason to believe were nearly contemporary, we find the interval between that and the present No., longer by two generations in Luke than in Matthew; from which we may conjecture that the latter has omitted two unknown names, unless the ages in one family may be supposed to have averaged much more before marriage, than in the other. As the list in the Chronicles ends here, bringing down the lineage some *nine* generations after Zerubbabel, under whom the Jews returned from the Babylonian captivity, that is, to about B. C. 280, we have only the surprisingly short period of about *two centuries and a half* preceding Christ's immediate parentage, during which his whole descent is not vouched for by the sacred archives of the Jewish nation!

Nos. 75 and 76. Luke does not mean to say that Joseph was the son of Eli, any more than that Jesus was the real son of Joseph; on the contrary, he only inserts Joseph as the nominal male link in the succession: ὢν (ὡς ἐνομίζετο) υἱὸς Ἰωσήφ, τοῦ Ἡλί. Eli was, therefore, *Mary's* father; and Luke, writing to the Gentiles, adheres to the natural line. According to early Christian tradition, Mary's parents were named Joachin and Anna; but the contemporary Jewish writers also state that her father was named Eli: we may, therefore, conclude, that he was known by both these names. Her mother, Anna, again, is said to have been the daughter of one Matthan, perhaps Christ's maternal great-grandfather, (No. 73.) Various other relationships are spoken of or involved in the New Testament and other ancient authorities, which it would be interesting here to trace out, did space and pertinency allow: they may be seen presented in a tabular form at page 672 of the October number of this journal for 1851.

Matthew, on the other hand, who wrote for Jews, follows the legal mode of reckoning descent, and he gives *Joseph's* real father, Jacob: Ἰακὼβ δὲ ἐγέννησε τὸν Ἰωσὴφ τὸν ἄνδρα Μαρίας, ἐξ ἧς ἐγεννήθη Ἰησοῦς ὁ λεγόμενος Χριστός. Several circumstances render it likely that Joseph was much older than Mary: early traditions all assume it; his known character implies it; (Matt. i, 19;) the reasons that might be adduced to show that she was not his first wife, (compare John xix, 25,) presume it; and the probability that his death long preceded her's, (see John xix, 27,) justifies it. If so, he would be more nearly contemporary with Eli as to age—a circumstance not uncommon in Oriental marriages.

Art. VI.—JACOB ABBOTT'S YOUNG CHRISTIAN SERIES.

The Young Christian Series: comprising The Young Christian; The Corner-Stone; The Way to do Good. By Jacob Abbott. Very greatly improved and enlarged, with numerous engravings. In 3 volumes, 12mo. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1852.

The disgust and repugnance of many educated minds to religious truth, is proverbial; and its reality is conceded by many who most deeply regret it. Who reads a doctrinal or a practical treatise as a matter of personal gratification? Who sits down to a volume of sermons without feeling he has a *task* in hand, whose irksomeness is only mitigated—not removed—by the embellishments of fine writing and the excitements of intellectual strength? Doubtless very much of this feeling arises from a source still deeper than that which gives direction to taste—from the secret enmity of the heart to the substance of the truth of God. Considered in its merely æsthetic and literary character, no work in the whole circle of letters (Shakspeare not excepted) has so much to commend it to the critical student and man of taste, as the Bible; but because it is also most intensely religious, it disgusts where otherwise it would please. No doubt, also, the prevailing disrelish for the current religious literature may be charged to this cause, quite as much as to any infelicity of style in which it is clothed. This, however, instead of excusing any from making efforts to accommodate religious instruction to men's mental tastes, renders such efforts the more necessary. The design of such teaching is not merely to leave men no excuse for continuing in ignorance and sin, but to persuade them to come to the light, and to cause them to become in love with piety. And if they naturally turn away from the truth, there is the greater necessity that they should be allured to it; if the essence of the doctrines of the gospel is distasteful, until by receiving it the heart is assimilated to it, it is highly important that its salutary truths should be arrayed in the most pleasing attire compatible with its simplicity and practical efficiency.

We have been led into this train of thought by a reperusal of the series of works named at the head of this article. Of the general character and design of these books, and their relation to our observations, the reader has no need to be informed. They have been now for a long period, according to the age of books, before the public, and have secured a wide circulation, so that we may presume that most of those who shall read these pages are already familiar with them. In our remarks, therefore, we shall treat of

them, not as if to condense their substance into a brief article, but, by discussing their plan, matter, and style, at once to afford an agreeable exercise, and to awaken a more lively appreciation of their excellence.

The author of these volumes, Rev. Jacob Abbott, a clergyman by profession, has been, by occupation, a school-teacher, and at the same time an amateur author. Possessing great fecundity in book-making, he has within a few years produced an amazing amount of reading matter; and probably no other writer in this country has so many readers, or is doing so much to form the taste and character, as well as to inform the intellect, of the rising generation. Besides a large number of less substantial productions, the "Rollo" books; the series of biographies, amounting to nearly twenty volumes, the "Young Christian Series," and the "Franconia Stories," still incomplete, and the "Adventures of Marco Paul," present a mass of useful and attractive reading seldom equalled in the works of any one man.

As a writer, Mr. Abbott has a style and method, which, without any special claim to originality, are justly and independently his own. With less ability to arouse deep feelings than many others possess, and, indeed, less gifted with dramatic power than his kinsman, the biographer of Napoleon, he is still far from being a feeble writer, or one wanting the power to awaken and impel the soul to action. His readers are seldom lifted out of themselves and made the playthings of the author's fancy. His imagery and descriptions are not of the kind that produce a mirage in the mind, and seem to realize what is known to be only imaginary. Earthquakes and tornadoes, cataracts and whirlwinds, thunder and lightning, are not the instruments with which he operates. His is a gentler genius. He leads those who submit to his guidance "through green pastures and by the still waters." The current of his discourse is not a swelling and turbid stream, but a mountain rill, that now glides over glittering pebbles, and then plunges into some dark morass; that here leaps in babbling cascades down some declivity, and there meanders between embowered banks and among the abodes of men. Simplicity rather than force distinguishes his style, and beauty rather than sublimity is the emotion that is awakened by his writings, while a pleasing naturalness gives a lasting charm to the whole.

The fitness of such a style, for books designed especially for the young, is manifest. While on the one hand the humdrum style of the formal teacher should be carefully eschewed, it is equally important to avoid the opposite extreme—the florid, impassioned, and impulsive manner of the novelist. The mental excitement pro-

duced by such a style may be very agreeable—and if not so at first, use will soon beget a taste for it—but its consequences must be uniformly and intensely evil. It indeed quickens the intellect, awakens the imagination, and develops the sensibilities; but this whole development is forced, and, consequently, unhealthy. As in the physical system, so in the mental, and especially in the moral, food rather than stimulus is requisite to growth and healthy activity. Strong excitants do indeed produce great immediate effects; but they are necessarily followed by corresponding reaction into lassitude and debility, requiring in turn yet higher stimulants, to be followed by deeper depressions, till mental disease and permanent imbecility supervene. There is excitement in Mr. Abbott's books, especially the narratives, but not of that intense kind that enfeebles by its reaction. Its effects on the mind are like those of the gambols of childhood upon the body; the weariness it produces leads to increased desires and enlarged powers to do and to enjoy.

In the series immediately under consideration, Mr. Abbott openly assumes the grave and responsible position of a religious teacher; and, of course, to please is only a secondary purpose. But though secondary, it is nevertheless highly important to his chief design. His lessons, however excellent intrinsically, can be practically valuable only as they are read with such a degree of interest as can bring the heart into contact with their instructions. His experience as a teacher probably aided him in this matter, as it had taught him the difference between formal statements of truth and the impressing of that truth upon the heart, or even lodging it in the memory. It is a question of some practical interest, and one that may well engage the attention of those who are charged with such affairs, whether a few years devoted to teaching may not be reckoned among the best kinds of preparatives for the higher responsibilities of the gospel ministry. It is lamentably true, that through the want of such practical knowledge and *tact*, many a well-stored mind is like a sealed fountain—affluent in its possessions, but practically valueless. It is not so however with Mr. Abbott, who has certainly found out the way to engage the attention of his readers, so that he is able both to enlighten the understanding and to rectify the spirits of those with whom he holds communion.

His social position, as the conductor of a private seminary, whose success must depend upon the favour of its patrons, would naturally incline him to avoid in his daily instructions, and thus by degrees to sever from his associations, those speculative questions upon which good men are divided, and as to which people may entertain the

most opposite opinions, without compromising their Christian characters. A conscientious teacher of youth whose purpose is not to build up a Church, nor to propagate a religious dogma, but to educate the minds committed to his charge, in religion as well as natural truth, and to discipline them to do right as well as to act becomingly, will aim chiefly to inculcate those great truths that lie at the foundation of religion and morality, and from a proper consideration of these to deduce such lessons of practical duty as will commend themselves to every enlightened conscience. To this course he is bound by the nature of his office; and while thus occupied, he will come to view many of the questions that divide the Christian world with comparative indifference.

We believe, therefore, that we are justified in ascribing to Mr. Abbott's position the happy exemption from theological exactness that distinguishes his books. We call this a happy exemption, not because we are indifferent to the smallest point of Christian doctrine, if, indeed, such a system can be properly said to have any small points, but because we believe that were the whole class of topics whose substance or essential forms are disputed among evangelical Christians, wholly separated from our creeds and instructions, the symmetry of gospel truth would not be marred by the excision. But, in ascribing this freedom to our author, we would not be understood to say that he does not clearly indicate his own theological pedigree. His emancipation from the leading strings that guided his infantile and youthful footsteps, is only partial; a mere novice in such matters may confidently say to him, "Thy speech bewrayeth thee." Still, we must say, that to any but a theological partisan, his writings will not be found objectionable in this particular. His doctrinal system—for such a system he has—is Christian and catholic, rather than sectarian. His modes of statement are indeed more nearly conformed to a theological school to which we claim no particular affinity, than to our own, and yet we can cordially recommend his volumes to our own young people, and believe that any Christian parent may confidingly place them in the hands of his children, and expect that great good will result from the perusal of them.

The three volumes here brought together under a common title, are thus associated, not as a single work, but rather as a continuous series. Each is complete in itself, and has no special reference to the others, except as the same theme is the common subject of all of them, and the minor points in each are arranged according to the progressive development of the subject. As to the mode of discussion, the author himself remarks:—

"In the treatment of the various topics discussed in these volumes, the author has made it his aim to divest the subject of religion of its scholastic garb, and to present it in all plainness and simplicity, and in a manner adapted to the intellectual wants of common readers, the great fundamental principles of truth and duty."—*Preface.*

In this endeavour, it must be granted, he has succeeded beyond most that have attempted the same thing, as is sufficiently evinced by the favour with which these volumes have been received, both in this country and abroad.

The title of the first of these volumes, which also designates the whole series, though sufficiently appropriate, is liable to a misconstruction. That volume especially, and the whole series generally, are designed for the use and instruction of "young Christians;" but it is not necessarily the case, though such is generally the fact, that young Christians are also young persons. Here, again, the author shall be permitted to state his case:—

"The work is intended, not for children, nor exclusively for the young, but for all who are first commencing a religious life, whatever their years may be. Since, however, it proves in fact that such beginners are seldom found among those who have passed beyond the early periods of life, the author has kept in mind the wants and the mental characteristics of youth, rather than those of maturity, in the form in which he has presented the truths brought to view, and in the narratives and dialogues with which he has attempted to illustrate them."—*Preface.*

To write books for children, and still more for adults of uncultivated minds, is among the most difficult of literary labours. This is especially the case when the subject treated of is really great and elevated; for since it is not possible to bring such subjects down to the small capacities of the parties intended to be benefitted, it becomes necessary to elevate them to the level of the subjects discussed. This important work, which at best is performed slowly and with much difficulty, can be effected only by presenting the subject in its utmost simplicity, accompanied with such illustrative facts as tend to awaken the imagination and move the sensibilities, till the more tardy intellect can be brought up to the same elevation. Aware of all this, our author, for the most part, avoids formal argumentation; and when, as sometimes he must, he assumes the didactic style, he hides his precepts in illustrations, or embellishes them with narratives. By such means he allures the fancy and pleases the imagination, as well as elucidates the sober truths that otherwise would seem dull or even repulsive. By this method he is also enabled to hold the attention of the youthful or the undisciplined mind, while he inculcates the great doctrines of Christianity, and commends them to the hearts and consciences of his readers.

As to the theology of the books, we again quote the author's own statement, as both just and felicitous:—

"In respect to the theology of the work, it takes everywhere for granted, that salvation for the human soul is to be obtained through repentance for past sins, and through faith and trust in the merits and atonement of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Its main design, however, is to enforce the practice, and not to discuss the theory, of religion. Its object is simply to explain and illustrate Christian *duty*, exhibiting this duty, however, as based on those great fundamental principles of faith, in which all evangelical Christians concur."—*Preface.*

These statements present with sufficient fulness the general character and design of the volumes that make up the "Young Christian Series;" a special notice of each volume, separately, may also aid in forming a proper estimate of the whole.

I. *The Young Christian.*

The author's secondary title to this volume very fitly and happily describes its design and character: "A Familiar Illustration of the Principles of Christian Duty." To answer to such a title one would not expect a metaphysical disquisition on the elements of ethical philosophy, nor yet a long array of didactic precepts; but rather, as is here to be found, a skilful mingling of sober truths with attractive illustrations, divested of all magisterial severity, and embellished with the flowers of rhetoric. The theme is unquestionably a severe one; so much so, that a plain statement of its chief points would present to those for whom the book is especially designed, a formidable array of most uninviting topics. Take the subjects of the several chapters, and stripping them of their drapery, let them stand out in their naked simplicity, and who would think of reading the matter thus introduced, except as a painful duty? Here we have the *nature of sin* discussed, and, in connexion with this, the efficacy of *confession* to heal the wounded conscience; a most fitting subject for a sermon, but who would read it in that form? Nor is there anything in the statements and teachings of our author on this subject that may not be learned from any plain treatise on practical theology, or an ordinary sermon upon the same topics. The manner and the accompanying illustrations are alone the special excellences. Let these things be presented to uncultivated minds, whether of children or adults, in either an argumentative or a didactic form, and probably both their truth and importance will be conceded, but neither will be *realized.* But when, as in the ministrations of the Saviour, and as in these volumes, we have the most abstruse doctrines brought to the understanding by

means of tangible illustrations, the most undisciplined mind readily grasps the abstract truth, and feels its impelling force.

As a specimen of the writer's method of stating practical conclusions at the end of a course of illustrated argumentation, we give the following, which is also worthy of being often reproduced, on account of the valuable practical suggestion that it conveys. He is treating of the immediate duty of repentance:—

"I do not find that the Bible requires anything *previous* to repentance. It does not say that we must be miserable first, either for a week, or a day, or an hour. I never heard any minister urge upon his hearers the duty of suffering anguish of mind, and all the horrors of remorse, a single moment in order to prepare the soul for Christ. It is doubtless true that persons do often *suffer*, and are perhaps led by it in the end to fly to the refuge. *But they ought to have fled to the refuge without this suffering in the beginning.* The truth is, 'God commands all men everywhere to repent.' It is a notorious fact that they will not comply. When the duty of humbly confessing their sins to God is clearly brought before them, there is often so great a desire to continue in sin, that a very painful struggle continues for some time. Now this struggle is all our own fault—it is something that *we add* altogether—God does not require it."—*Y. C.*, p. 30.

This specimen exhibits both the peculiar excellence of our author's method, and also his greatest incidental defect. The directness of his manner of coming at a matter is admirable; and his way of breaking through the cobwebs of sophistry to arraign the individual conscience, is doubtless as expedient as it is just. The defect of which we complain is the want of properly declaring the agency of the Holy Spirit in the work of repentance. God indeed "commands all men everywhere to repent;" and what he thus commands is of course a universal duty. But it is a duty that we can perform only as we receive help from God. It is doubtless true that with the command to repent is also the provision of the needed grace; but the gracious nature of the strength by which sin is forsaken and duty performed by us, certainly ought not to be for a moment overlooked. This manner of considering the subject has probably modified the author's manner of charging upon the individual the *fault* of his own mental sufferings of remorse and anxiety. It is granted that these are not integral parts of repentance, nor its inseparable accompaniments; and yet we would hesitate to say, without qualification, that they are "all our own *fault*," or, that they are always faults at all. It is only as they are led by the Spirit that men come to see their need of the salvation to which they approach by repentance. If the remedy is found as soon as the need of it is ascertained there is no occasion for anxious fears and forebodings of future perdition; but if (as is the case sometimes) the discovery of the guilt of sin precedes, by a somewhat protracted interval, the apprehension by

faith of the way of salvation, that interval must be one of painful anxiety. And so far from this being a fault in the awakened penitent, it is a necessary result of the work already effected in him by the quickening Spirit, and an evidence of its genuineness thus far. This painful suspense is indeed seldom of long continuance, except through some fault of the penitent himself, though not necessarily a sinful one. The faith by which we "have peace with God" is a divine gift, as well as the light by which we see our need of repentance and forgiveness of sins.

Remarks very similar in character may be applied to the second chapter, in which an attempt is made to illustrate the doctrine of mediation. As a statement of the Scriptural doctrine of *atonement*, it is wholly defective, though that of *mediation* is very happily presented and explained. It is but just to remark that the whole subject of atonement is considered at length in the second volume of this series, and, therefore, its omission here is the less remarkable. To the extent that the author designs to proceed at this point, his illustrations and doctrinal statements possess much of the characteristic excellence of these volumes.

Among the chief excellences of this volume are to be reckoned the direct and pungent appeals that it makes to the individual conscience, inciting to present efforts rather than delaying to consider motives and reasons when action alone is required. Of this character are the influences intended to be exerted by the fourth and fifth chapters; the former showing the fearful consequences of neglecting religious duty when opportunities offer and circumstances require it, and the latter exhibiting the ruinous effects of delaying to perform what is already confessed to be both wholly right and infinitely important. These chapters belong, not to the "young Christian," but rather to that large and most interesting class of young persons who are living among the influences of religion, and are at once convinced of its truth, and impressed with a sense of the greatness of its interests—who are indeed almost, but still not altogether, persuaded to be Christians. The danger of this position is not appreciated by those who occupy it; and yet that it is peculiarly dangerous, must be painfully evident to all who consider it. The story of the unhappy Louisa, we may readily believe, is a plain relation of facts; and, were it only a supposed case, it is so truthful as to demand the most earnest attention of all who are in like manner sinning against their own souls. So, under the head of the "almost Christian," the subterfuges and self-deceptions of the heart are faithfully detected and exposed. Few young persons of this class ever resolve to reject religion; but what they could not be per-

suaded purposely and forever to abandon, they consent to delay, till procrastination effects all the evil that the worst purposes could have done. Foremost among the causes of neglect of religion in youth, and abandonment of all purpose of it in later years, is this pernicious spirit of delay. But there is a deeper and more stubborn cause lying back of this, though often concealed from those upon whom it is operating most effectually. The sacrifices that piety demands are esteemed too great; the love of the world silently but fatally restrains the heart of youth from the paths of piety. Many a young man has come to the Saviour asking what he must do to be saved, and has gone away sorrowful because of the required sacrifice. The difficulties of religion lie at its beginning; while the pleasures of sin are first, and its bitter fruits at the end. Hence young persons, with whom the love of pleasure is strong and impulsive, are drawn away from duty to gain the present joy. To this love of the world must be added the still more effectual influence of the fear of the world. Young persons almost universally lack decision and independence of character. It is also but too true, that almost "every one is surrounded by a circle of influences which is hostile to piety." Against this influence very many have not the requisite determination to obey the dictates of their own consciences, or even to follow their own secret inclinations. These are the obstacles that must be overcome—the crosses that must be endured by all who would be Christ's disciples. The faithful and forcible exhibition of these things by our author, cannot fail to do good wherever they are seriously considered.

Passing from these considerations, which relate to matters that precede the beginning of a Christian life, we are brought next to those which pertain to that state itself. It is granted that there are difficulties of faith as well as of practice, and generally these difficulties are greatest in minds most accustomed to think, and to ask reasons for all that is considered. Among the very first things to be learned, by all who would entertain right notions of things, is the truth that all human knowledge is limited, and on every side are barriers to thought, beyond which it cannot proceed. This remark applies alike to natural and religious knowledge—to science as well as to faith. It is, therefore, hardly necessary to reckon those inexplicable mysteries of our being and of creation among the difficulties of religion, since they are equally opposed to both faith and belief; or rather, as they lie beyond the circle of human investigation, the well-taught mind will consent to leave them as they are, and seek to occupy itself with things more tangible and intelligible. We may, therefore, pass over such subjects as the being of God,

the existence of creation, the notions of time and space,—which our author reckons among the difficulties of religion,—as having no proper relevancy to the subject, and presenting few, if any, real difficulties to the minds of young Christians.

Perhaps, also, we should not very greatly err in disposing, in the same manner, of the question of the existence of suffering in the world. It is, indeed, a question hard to be solved; but we greatly doubt whether it often presents any considerable practical difficulty in the way of serious-minded persons seeking to please God and enjoy his favour. These are philosophical questions, with which men may perplex or amuse themselves according to their tempers, and with which Christians may, but need not, distract their minds, if they choose to forsake the clear light of revealed truth, to follow the flickering taper of philosophy, vainly obtruding into things that belong not to it.

Another of the difficulties named by our author, cannot be so easily disposed of—the co-existence of the divine prescience and human accountability, which is only a portion of the more general subject of divine sovereignty and human freedom. This is an old question, and one that has puzzled the most powerful and acute minds that have attempted to solve it. Milton makes it a theme of discussion among the fallen angels, as specially adapted to their case, both by its crabbedness and its impiety; and probably many an earnest inquirer after salvation has experienced the same difficulties, opposing his progress and distracting his spirit with inexplicable doubts. Perhaps no circumstances of mind are sufficient wholly to obviate these difficulties; and yet we strongly incline to believe, that most of this evil has been prepared by the unskilfulness of the teachers of religious doctrines. Had creeds and catechisms been silent as to theories too deep for finite intellects, and had not philosophical speculations been commingled with the verities of faith, the simple minds of youth and of the uneducated masses would not have been, in so great a degree, sophisticated and confounded with questions that do not pertain to the substance of Christianity. The Scriptures teach us two highly important truths as to this subject—the absolute sovereignty of God, and the real freedom of man. Both of these we readily assent to; but, if we choose to do so, we may bewilder ourselves in questions as to the danger of collision between them; or, we may wisely conclude that infinite Wisdom understands the matter better than we do, and infinite Power can so direct all things as to maintain the harmony of the universe, and the integrity of the realm of Jehovah. Our author seems to have had some suspicion that the difficulty of this case

was rather created than inherent, and so anticipates, in part, our answer to it:—

"I know that some of my readers will think that I make the difficulty greater than it is. They will think that they can see much to lighten it, and will perhaps deny some of my assumptions. Of such an one I would simply ask, were he before me—after having heard all he should have to say on the subject—'Can you, after all, honestly say that you understand, *clearly understand*, how man can be fully accountable, and yet his heart be as much under divine control as you suppose it is?' Every honest man will acknowledge that he is often, in his thoughts on this subject, lost in perplexity, and forced to admit the narrow limit of the human powers."

The difficulty of the case, if one attempts to solve it, is granted; but it is the attempt to say *how* the thing can be, and not the fact that it *is*, that causes the difficulty. And is it indeed so hard to "admit the narrow limit of the human powers," since this seems after all to be the occasion of all the perplexity in the case? On matters of this kind, one is compelled to speak from personal experience; and it is very possible that the writer of these pages has felt less of these difficulties than has the author whose works he is reviewing and commending to the favour of the Christian public. A happy exemption during the period of life in which his mental character was formed, from these bewildering questions—

> "Of Providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,
> Fix'd fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute,"

may have saved him from the difficulties that others experience, and so rendered him less fit to pity and to aid those who are thus perplexed, than others who have been less favoured in their own experience. The author's final conclusion of this chapter of difficulties, is, after all, worth more than volumes of speculations: "An humble, docile spirit will disarm every theoretical difficulty of its power to perplex us, or to disturb our peace." Here, then, we may rest securely.

Nearly a hundred pages of this volume are devoted to the "Evidences of Christianity." The necessity of fortifying the minds of young Christians against the cavils and objections of unbelievers, will not be denied; but it is quite possible that an unskilful advocate may, in such a case, betray the cause he would defend. We generally depend too little upon the overwhelming weight of Christian evidences that pervades and controls our Christian communities. It is less required of us to convince than to persuade; and even when a seeming scepticism is encountered, it is generally much more of the heart than of the understanding. The appeals of Christianity to all men are uniformly clothed with

authority. Belief of its truth is itself a duty, no less directly obligatory than the consecration of the heart and the obedience of the active powers. The sin of speculative infidelity is generally a result of depravity of heart and viciousness of manners, and its surest remedy is the removal of its cause. It is vain to attempt to dry up this stream unless the fountain can also be staunched; and when this is done, the other will follow of course.

We do not, however, object to all attempts at suggesting the evidences of our faith, even in elementary religious teaching; but we must insist that in no case shall the truth of Christianity be treated, even in argument, as a debatable question. The reality of the faith in which we stand, must be constantly assumed, and then, from this fixed point, the outposts of the system may be incidentally strengthened. The method here indicated is that generally adopted by our author. The credibility of the Christian revelation is never mooted by him; and in adducing the evidences on which this system of truth rests, greater reliance is placed on those obvious phenomena that display the present vital energy of Christianity, than on the historical and philosophical evidences that generally make up the great amount of formal treatises on this subject. The great Author of our system of faith has sent it forth among men depending chiefly on its own active demonstrations of power for its credibility in the world. Men do not gather figs from thorns, nor grapes from brambles; and since Christianity is constantly producing good fruits, we are justified in every unprejudiced mind in assuming that it is both genuine and excellent.

The other chapters of this volume, devoted severally to the study of the Bible, the Sabbath, trial and discipline, personal improvement, and the conclusion, we must pass over without special notice. They partake generally of the character of the whole work. Especially is the final chapter one of very great value, as it contains a warm and earnest appeal to the reader in favour of that earnestness and decision in matters of religion, without which all instructions and helps must be useless.

Before dismissing this volume from our notice, a further passing remark must be indulged. It is not pretended that the "Young Christian" contains more or better religious instruction than may be found in very many other treatises. Its special excellence is not its *matter*, but its *manner*. The Pilgrim's Progress is not intrinsically more valuable as a system of religious truth, than many of the thousands of books on the same general subject that have been born but to die unknown, since that work was issued. Its special worth is its method; and so of this. Not only is the "Young Christian"

attractive, so as to secure a reading; it is genial in its spirit, and will as surely take hold of the affections as it will please the fancy. It is at once a wholly safe manual of instruction, and also a most certain excitant to religious thought and action. We most heartily wish that it could be in the hands of every young person in the land.

II. *The Corner-Stone.*

The second volume of the series, entitled "The Corner-Stone," is designed to be "a familiar illustration of the principles of Christian truth." According to the author's own statement—

> "Its aim is simply to present, in a plain and very practical manner, a view of some of the great fundamental truths of revealed religion, on which the superstructure of Christian character necessarily reposes. The character and history of Jesus Christ, considered as the corner-stone of the Christian faith, form the main subjects of the volume; and the principles of faith which are brought to view, are presented to the reader as they are seen in the Scriptures, centering in him."—*Preface.*

The most remarkable feature of the work thus indicated, as presented in the volume before us, is the practical character of its teachings, and the warmth and earnestness with which the claims of the truth inculcated are pressed upon the conscience. It too often happens that Christian motives are divorced from theological discussions, and truth is made ineffective by addressing itself exclusively to the intellect. Such indeed was not the case with the teachings of the apostles. With them the "goodness of God," as shown in the great work of redemption by Christ, was held and set forth as a chief motive to repentance. The practical conclusion from all the great doctrinal truths discussed and proved in that greatest of theological theses—the epistle to the Romans—is an exhortation "by the mercies of God" to entire consecration to his service. There is no doubt that a just exhibition of the grace of God in Christ—which is only another name for the doctrines of Christianity—is the most certainly efficacious method of demonstrating both the disease of sin and its remedy, and at the same time of persuading men to accept the proffered grace.

The nature of the theme of discussion for this volume necessarily elevates the style and mode of address above that observed in the former number of the series. The author, indeed, seems at times to forget that he is writing for "young Christians," and so to give "strong meat" instead of "milk." We have already intimated that this is a subject that cannot be brought down to the level of minds that will not think. The mind must be prepared to receive great truths, if it is to be instructed in "the truth

as it is in Jesus." It is, indeed, the business of the religious instructor so to impart the lessons of Christianity that the expanding understanding shall gradually come up to their elevation. And we are quite ready to accord very full praise to Mr. Abbott for the correctness of his views as to this matter, and the successfulness of his efforts to accomplish this necessary, but difficult duty. To have produced a system of theology not only free from the terms and expressions of polemical divinity, but equally free from the form and style of disputations, is an achievement as difficult as it is desirable; and so to present the doctrines of such a system as to make in each case a direct appeal "to every man's conscience in the sight of God," is among the highest aims of "a good minister."

The defect in certain doctrinal statements noticed in our remarks on the former volume, is fully made up in this. This is professedly a doctrinal treatise; but the stern truths of divine theology are most skilfully decked and half concealed in the accompanying illustrations. As the liberators of ancient Athens wrapped the sword in wreaths of myrtle, by which the fatal steel was concealed, but not blunted, so, here, the sword of the Spirit is wrapped in garlands and decked with flowers, but its temper is not debased, nor its powers of execution diminished. We read these doctrinal statements and illustrations, and find nothing new in their substance and composition. But the thoughts and opinions which had gained the assent of the understanding and were laid up in the memory, are now pictured in the fancy, and realized to the imagination, and made to take hold upon the heart. The dimness of a dull intellection is replaced by the vivid perceptions of a soul awakened to the reality of religious truths and doctrines. On account of this property and tendency of the "Corner-Stone," it deserves to be read and re-read, as a means of awakening the soul, or keeping it awake, to the things that belong to salvation.

To these commendations, which apply to the work as a whole, and are most sincerely and heartily given, justice to all parties requires that we make certain incidental exceptions. The tendency somewhat manifested in the former volume, to look into unrevealed mysteries, and to be perplexed with subjects that lie outside of Christian revelation, is still more fully developed in this; and, unhappily, disquisitions and speculations on these points are intimately commingled with the exhibitions of essential gospel truths. Speculations of this kind may be pernicious in their tendencies, without being either irreverent in their manner or untrue in their determinations. Indeed, many mental discussions of the deep things of Divine Providence may be truly valuable to such as are able to use

them to advantage; but most pernicious in their influence upon untaught minds. Among these inscrutable things is that controlling providence by which even sinful actions are sometimes overruled for good. It may be granted that such, to our imperfect apprehensions, seems to be the case; and yet speculations on this subject too often tend to palliate the crime rather than to glorify God; and, therefore, the discussion of them is to be avoided in most cases, and whenever introduced most carefully guarded. We strongly doubt the propriety of inviting "young Christians" to speculate upon such questions, and of affirming to them that "good is often done by the *commission* and punishment of crime." Having been invited into the field of speculation, the untaught mind will most certainly proceed a little farther, and argue somewhat thus: "If sin is thus made to glorify God, is it not reasonable to presume that God is himself the efficient cause of that which thus promotes his glory? And if some sins thus manifestly serve his purposes, is it not probable that in ways beyond our knowledge all sins are thus overruled? And if God is the author of what we call sin, and if he employs it and its agents as the instruments of his will, is it not probable that the criminality of sin is much more apparent than real? May we not hope that the worst of his creatures, after serving him in the commission of those very sins by which he glorifies himself, will at length be received back into his favour? as a spy returned from the camp of the enemy is received with favour, although he had long ranged himself under a hostile banner, and actually fought against his rightful prince?" We acknowledge the sophistry of this kind of speculations, but is it probable that those "who are first commencing a religious life" would perceive its sophistry, or fail to be greatly perplexed, if not actually turned out of the way by it? The unlearned and unskilful will quite soon enough thrust themselves upon these difficult and perplexing mysteries; and, therefore, they should be warned against their dangers, rather than invited too soon to incur them.

Another, though less serious exception, may be made to the view given of the nature and design of punishment. We do not complain of this as positively incorrect, but rather as really defective,—a part of the truth being presented as the whole. This matter is thus concisely expressed by the author himself:—

> "The objects of law and penalty are to hold up to the community distinctly the nature and the effects of sin,—to make a strong moral impression against it, and thus to erect a barrier which shall prevent its extension."—P. 161.

And in another place, thus,—

"The design of God in connecting such severe and lasting sufferings with sin, is *not resentment against the* SINNER, but a calm and benevolent interest in the general good. He wishes no one to suffer, and has accordingly formed a plan by which he can accomplish more perfectly, in another way, what would naturally have been accomplished by the inflexible execution of the law. By this means the way is open for our forgiveness, if we are penitent for our sins."—P. 180.

We readily grant the truth of all that is here stated positively; it is to what is not said, and to what is said negatively, that we object. We cannot say what is the precise notion that is intended to be expressed by the word "resentment" in this extract; but taking that word in its proper sense, and explaining it by Scriptural synonyms, our author's disclaimer seems to contradict such Scriptural statements as, "God is *angry* with the wicked every day." "The *wrath* of God abideth on him" [that believeth not.] "*Vengeance* is *mine*; I will *repay*, saith the Lord." Can there be *anger*, *wrath*, *vengeance*, and *retribution* for sin, and all these called into exercise upon the sinner, and yet in all the sufferings thus caused, no "resentment" against the sinner? The theory of atonement thus developed, though sustained by high authority, is nevertheless a most defective one. According to this theory, the atonement is no more than an expedient, adopted by God to escape a difficulty, forced upon him by circumstances, in the way of the accomplishment of a favourite purpose. It rests the demands for satisfaction for sin, not in the absolute holiness of the Divine Person, but in the exigences of government. To us, at least, this seems like very *low* orthodoxy. It leaves out of the account God's moral character, and ignores the solemn truth that God, in his own person, hates sin, and is offended with the sinner. It abandons the whole notion of proper expiation, and reduces the work of substitution indicated in the gospel to a mere semblance. It, indeed, allows that Christ suffered *for* us, that is, *on account of* us, but denies that his sufferings were instead of ours,—or that in any proper sense he "bore our sins in his own body on the tree." This inadequate view of the nature of atonement necessarily modifies and diminishes the notion of sin. It is no longer an offence against the Divine Person, but an infraction of the "order of the universe." God might, indeed, pass it by, if it were "*safe*" for him to do so; and atonement itself is valuable only as it is known and considered by rational moral agents, and only on account of its moral influences! We have not so learned Christ! The modes of stating the truths and doctrines of Christianity employed by inspired men are widely different from this. The language of conscious guilt and godly penitence, is, "Against *thee*, thee *only* have I sinned,"—and not in the euphonious dialect

of this school, "I have sinned against thy government, and violated the order of the universe." This, we repeat, though not heresy, is something less than "the whole counsel of God."

We make these exceptions to our general approval of the volume under review, as a simple act of justice to the work itself, as well as to our readers and ourselves. We indulge in no blind panegyric; and while we feel impelled to recommend the volume, we must not be understood as endorsing every point of doctrine it contains; though, for a few defects, we will not cast so valuable a possession aside. It is a book that we love to peruse and reperuse, and as often as we do so, we find the heart warmed and the understanding quickened. Let young Christians read it; for it contains the milk of the gospel. Let the fathers read it; it will strengthen their hands, and elevate their faith in God. Let the Sabbath-school teacher read it; it will give him new interest in his work, and new qualifications for performing it. Let ministers of the gospel read it; it will cause them to feel the greatness of the work committed to their hands, and, at the same time, teach them the most direct and certain way to the hearts of their people.

III. *The Way to do Good.*

The third of the volumes under review, entitled as above, with the secondary title, "The Christian Character Matured," is designed to serve as an incentive and directory to religious activity and beneficence—or, in the language of the author himself, "to present a practical view of a life of Christian usefulness."

The opening chapter is in the form of a narrative,—"The story of Alonzo,"—and aims to set forth the moral and religious history of a youth growing up among Christian influences, and vibrating between the control of sinful propensities and the authority of conscience, till at length, and after many sad lapses into gross sins of the heart, notwithstanding a fair exterior perpetually and very carefully maintained, he is brought by grace to rejoice in the gift of a present salvation. The narrative is a highly truthful exhibition of what is continually going forward in the hearts of thousands of the best portion of the young people of the land; and a judicious exhibition of these things cannot fail to do good. The account has nothing of startling interest about it, and to the careless reader it may seem especially destitute of even the interest of novelty. But these properties are its real excellences: this is holding the mirror up to nature, or, like the work of the photographist, copying nature in all its living realities,—its details, as well as its generalities;

its discords, as well as its harmonies. It is often found difficult to bring a dignified and serious subject among the familiar affairs of every-day life, and not degrade it by the association. There is, indeed, no inevitable necessity for this; but the ability thus to familiarize the most weighty truths without at all degrading them, is a rare talent. And this, we think, Mr. Abbott has done with admirable success. We heartily wish that this "story of Alonzo" could be read and considered by the millions of youths in our country, whose mental exercises and conflicts it more or less accurately portrays,—believing that, instead of degrading the subject of experimental religion, such an exhibition would quicken their sensibilities to a more adequate appreciation of the subject, and give much useful practical instruction as to the way of duty in such cases. Here the awakened sinner may find the answer to the all-important question, now rising unasked in his heart, and bursting involuntarily from his lips,—"What must I do to be saved?" The deceitfulness of sin, and the deceivableness of the heart,—the struggling, but yielding power of conscience vainly opposing itself to a flood of sinful inclinations,—the tyrannous dominion of sin, and the utter helplessness of the soul as to procuring its emancipation, and taking hold upon the salvation of the gospel, are all clearly and forcibly taught. To give the appropriate instructions to one thus inquiring for the path of life, is among the most important duties of the pastoral office, (though not exclusively the work of those who are set apart to that office,) and it requires care in its execution, lest the smoking flax be quenched, or the bruised reed broken. Each practical instructor, too, in such cases, will have his own specially favourite modes and agencies among those that may be used, upon which he will lay more stress than others do. Theological systems will also modify the modes of treating such cases; sometimes leading to unskilfulness in the use of the gospel remedies, and sometimes to the "healing of the hurt of the daughter of my people slightly." Of this latter, Mr. Abbott is not guilty,—with him the conversion of the soul is the sole method of obtaining peace with God, and this is a real tranformation, "a new creation." As to the other, we must speak less confidently. Certain of his metaphysical positions are at least questionable, and these lead him to certain cognate doctrinal errors, and suggest wrong courses of treatment for the spiritual malady. We would have been better pleased with Alonzo's pastor, had he spent more time in praying with and for the young inquirer, if not less in discussing doctrinal truths, however important. Nothing else is so directly effectual in bringing the awakened penitent to the light and peace of indwelling religious life, as earnest and impor-

tunate prayer; no other exercise is so valuable to him that is burdened in spirit with guilt and fears of perdition.

It was certainly a happy thought to begin a volume on doing good, with practical instructions how to become good, so as to be in some measure adapted to the work designed to be effected. The work of faith is the first of good works; it is only after he is converted himself, that any man is prepared to strengthen his brethren. Hence the fitness of the arrangement adopted by our author,—though, to a careless observer, it may seem to be faulty. Having thus fixed the starting point of a life of beneficence, the further process in the development of the subject is all plain and natural. The character of the *motives* that give rise to good works, is seen to require to be carefully observed; a thoughtful regard to *ourselves*, even in things generally deemed of little importance, is shown to be essential to either usefulness or happiness; the difficulties, dangers, and evil consequences of mere almsgiving, is so truthfully exhibited, as to convince the least credulous that without some other remedy, poverty and suffering can never be effectually alleviated. By this process we are led to that form of doing good that aims to renovate the heart and rectify the life of its objects. All acts of beneficence that stop short of this,—that do not aim at the promotion of personal piety,—are necessarily superficial and ineffective. The only way to do real permanent good, is to promote genuine goodness in the hearts and characters of those whom we would benefit. The preparation for this work, then, becomes a matter of primary importance, and one that appeals directly to the individual. Personal piety is begotten rather than created in men's hearts; and sympathy, rather than reason, is the agency through which this work is effected.

A deep and wonderful philosophy underlies this whole subject. The operation of social influences is among the most remarkable phenomena of human affairs; and it carries with it the most tremendous consequences. We are perpetually inclosed in a tissue of invisible, but almost resistless influences. While acting, as they suppose, from the sole dictates of their own will, men are, to a very great degree, controlled by extraneous influences that mingle with their own original impulses, and modify their whole course of action. Around every individual is an atmosphere of hidden power, that tends, with all the force of his character, to assimilate the hearts and wills of others to his own. This influence is ever active, and operates through all the *media* of social intercourse. It flashes in silence from the sparkling eye; it laughs upon the cheek; it frowns forbiddance from the contracted eyebrows; it sheds contempt from the curled lips, and beams, with hope-inspiring kindness, from the

illuminated countenance. And more effectually still, because more secretly, it gives to every one a certain powerful, but unrecognised influence over the actions, the words, the thoughts, and even the very characters of all about him. As a consequence of this power, no one can live for himself alone; nor can the influence that he exerts among men differ from his own life and character. The only effectual preparation for the work of doing good, is to become baptised into the spirit of that work. How well and beautifully all this is shown by our author, will be properly appreciated by none but those who read for themselves.

Having attained to the point just indicated, the further subjects of discussion occur naturally. No novel processes by which "to do good," are indicated. To one thus prepared, the promotion of *public morals*, the duties of the *Church*, the care of the *sick* and of *children*, the giving of *instruction*, and the right use of *property*, all become ways and means of doing good. These ways are, in some degree, accessible to almost every one; so that, wherever there is found a heart to do good, the opportunity will not be wanting.

But we must not conclude because personal piety is an essential preparation to a life of usefulness, that when this is attained, we may trust to its spontaneous impulses, and "do good" only as our hearts incline us to it. The piety requisite is itself much more a settled habit of the spirit and life of the individual, than a series of emotions and passionate impulses. The conscience, the judgment, the understanding, as well as the feelings, must be called into action, and required to perform their appropriate functions. To adopt the language of the author: "Piety, if it exist at all, must exist generally as a calm and steady principle of action ..... Religion is, to say the least, quite as active a principle, when it leads a man to his work in the cause of God, as when, in his retirement, it swells his heart with spiritual joys ..... Neither [of these phases of religion] can exist in a genuine state without some measure of the other. It is, however, undoubtedly the former which is the great test of Christian character."—Pp. 158, 159.

The fruits of piety are to be valued by us, not only because of the good they do to others; they are especially to be considered by us as means to the attainment of further blessing and increase of spiritual life. We should do good from the good impulses of our renewed hearts; we should do good in obedience to the dictates of an enlightened conscience; we should do good from a sense of duty, and also as an invaluable privilege. As motives to do good, the praise of God, the welfare of our fellow-men, and our own personal religious interests, combine and harmonize in the most perfect unity.

A few general observations and incidental criticisms must close our protracted and desultory essay. Among the minor excellences of these volumes may be classed the simplicity and purity of the style in which they are written. An easy naturalness is everywhere manifest, while the words are well chosen, and the sentences properly constructed, and each of the several volumes arranged with proper regard to unity and proper subordination of parts. A few New-England provincialisms may be met with in the volumes, but the violations of propriety in this way are neither frequent nor flagrant. One little phrase that is often found in the works of some very respectable writers, like cockle among wheat, may occasionally be met with here. The natural history of that class of phrases would constitute an interesting study for some ingenious mind; and a just elucidation of the whole subject would be a valuable service rendered to the great commonwealth of letters. Of all this gipsy-race of phrases, "as it were" holds the bad pre-eminence; and it seems to be about the most difficult to eradicate. One is at a loss to say what it means; and yet it has a meaning. It seems to serve a very useful purpose, when either the writer does not know his own meaning, or would cast dust into the reader's eyes. Its effect on a sentence full of good, strong common sense, is perfectly paralytical. No matter what a concentration of meaning may have been compressed into an array of words, only place "as it were" along side, and it means nothing.

It is proper to state in conclusion, a fact that has been constantly before us, though we have neglected to mention it,—that these works have been carefully and thoroughly revised by the author for this edition; and so much amended, as to entitle him to a new copy-right. In this form, therefore, they embody his latest and maturest thoughts, expressed as his experience and the increased facility of much practice best enables him to do it. As to their mechanical execution, it is enough to say that they are in the publishers' best style; the paper, type, and execution, are all highly praiseworthy. The engravings, of which there are about a hundred, are handsomely-executed wood-cuts, for the most part illustrating some of the scenes of the various narratives with which the works abound. These add to the attractiveness of the books, and are not without their directly-favourable influence in the formation of the youthful character. The three volumes together make a handsome little collection, and contain a valuable system of practical divinity—theology made easy; and whoever possesses and uses them with a heart to be profited, will soon learn to esteem them for their matter more than for their dress.

ART. VII.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) AMONG the recent Sunday-school issues of the Methodist Episcopal Church, (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 200 Mulberry-street,) are the following, namely, "*Volcanoes: their History, Phenomena, and Causes,*" (18mo., pp. 231,) a very well-prepared digest of the existing information on the subject. The "*Class of A-Thousand-and-One,*" (18mo., pp. 92,) records the interesting experience of a teacher in a large Sunday school for poor children in London. The "*Mighty Deep,*" (18mo., pp. 88,) explains and illustrates many of the most marvellous phenomena of the ocean. "*William Theophilus,*" (18mo., pp. 152,) is a simple and pleasing record of the life of one of the most venerable ministers of the Methodist Episcopal Church, who now, at over fourscore, still survives to "fight his battles o'er again," and to rejoice in the prosperity of the Church of his early choice. "*A Will and a Way,*" (18mo., pp. 88,) is an interesting temperance story, in verse, by Mrs. M. H. Maxwell. "*Margaret Browning,*" (18mo., pp. 147,) is a gem of a story, illustrating the blessedness of trust in God amid the deepest adversities. We read it through at a sitting. "*Traits and Legends of Shetland,*" (18mo., pp. 78,) gives an interesting account of the habits, privations, and pleasures of the Shetlanders, and of Dr. Clarke's labours in their behalf. The "*Local Preacher,*" (18mo., pp. 135,) is a narrative of some incidents in the life of a Methodist local preacher in one of the French West-India islands.

(2.) "*The Widow's Souvenir,* by A. C. ROSE," (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 32mo., pp. 128,) presents, in a very appropriate and attractive style, the principal consolations and encouragements afforded by the gospel to the bereaved ones indicated in the title of the book. It is beautifully got up, and is a most appropriate "gift-book for widows."

(3.) "*The Eclectic German Reader,* by W. H. WOODBURY," (New-York: Leavitt & Allen; 12mo., pp. 280.) This work, for whose excellence the name of the compiler is a sufficient guarantee, contains choice selections from the best German writers, with copious references to the author's grammatical works, and a complete vocabulary. It is one of the best German Readers, if not the very best, now extant.

(4.) AMONG the many excellent enterprises which Dr. KIDDER has projected and carried through as Sunday-school editor, none has pleased us more than his proposed series of "Lives of the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church." The first of the series is now before us: "*The Life of Bishop M'Kendree,* by BENJAMIN ST. JAMES FRY," (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 18mo., pp. 197.) The author apologizes for the scantiness of his sketch, on the ground of want of material; but he has certainly used what he could get to good advantage, and has produced a very satisfactory memorial, for so brief a

one, of the excellent bishop. It abounds in accounts of the wonderful labours and perils incident to such work as a Methodist bishop's on the American frontier, and is interesting also for the light it throws upon the progress of Methodism in the early part of the present century. We trust this little book will find its way into every Methodist family.

(5.) PUTNAM'S "Semi-monthly Library" continues to appear with praiseworthy punctuality. Numbers XII. and XIII. are "*Roughing it in the Bush*, by Mrs. MOODIE;" an account of the emigration and settlement in Canada of an English family of the better class, in which the trials, perils and adventures to which such a family would necessarily be exposed in a new country, are told with much humour and in a glowing and attractive style.—Number XIV. is "*Stray Leaves from an Arctic Journal*, by Lieutenant S. OSBORN," who spent eighteen months in the Polar Regions, in search of Sir John Franklin's expedition, in the years 1850 and 1851. The interest of these arctic voyages is unfailing; and Lieutenant Osborn tells his story admirably.—Number XV. is "*Home and Social Philosophy*," second series: an interesting series of extracts from Dickens's "Household Words."

(6.) BOHN'S *Standard Library* is certainly conducted with a great deal of good sense as well as liberality. The latest issue is "*Butler's Analogy and Sermons*," (12mo., pp. 545.) This is a new edition, with analytical introductions, explanatory notes, and an index, prepared by a member of the University of Oxford. Did we not know that Messrs. Harpers have in press a new edition of the Analogy, with an analysis far superior to any yet prepared on either side of the water, we should recommend this as the *standard* edition of that immortal work. As it is, the *Sermons* alone, in the English edition, cost more than the Analogy, Sermons, Analysis, and all, are afforded for in this edition. The last issue of the *Classical Library* is "*The Comedies of Plautus, literally translated*, by H. F. RILEY, of Cambridge, (Volume I.) Another volume will complete the translation. The version is not only literal, but spirited to a degree generally found only in free translations. All of Bohn's series can be had of Bangs, Brother & Co., New-York.

(7.) WE have before spoken of the merits of SHAW'S "*Outlines of English Literature*," (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea; 12mo., pp. 489,) and are now glad to notice a new edition, with a sketch of "American Literature," by H. T. Tuckerman, Esq. In its present shape the work will be still more acceptable than before, both for school use and for general readers.

(8.) TWO additional volumes of "*Marco Paul's Travels*, by JACOB ABBOTT," (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 1852,) have appeared to gladden the eyes and hearts of the young folk. They continue, through Maine and Vermont, the pleasant recital of travel begun and broken off in the second volume with the Erie Canal. This series combines instruction with amusement better than any juvenile works of the time—*except* others of Mr. Abbott's own.

(9.) "*Bishop Butler's Analogy of Religion, with an Analysis left unfinished by the late Rev.* R. EMORY, D. D., *completed by Rev.* G. R. CROOKS." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 368.) We regret that we have not room properly to characterize this book. But we can say, in one sentence, that it is the *best* edition of Butler that has ever appeared in Europe or America. No analysis that has yet been given approaches in point of fulness and logical accuracy that of Dr. Emory and Mr. Crooks. The biography, condensed as it is, is yet the best extant. The Index is itself a species of alphabetical analysis. We are very sure that all professors in theological seminaries and colleges who may examine this edition, will at once cause their pupils to purchase it instead of any other; and for private study, it will be even still more desirable.

(10.) "*Meyer's Universum,*" (New-York: H. J. Meyer,) appears punctually according to promise. Part II. contains views of the Royal Exchange, London: of the famous city of Constantine, Africa, (the ancient Cirta:) of the palace and gardens of St. Cloud: and of the harbour of New-York. Part III. has sketches of the Walhalla, or Hall of Heroes, erected by Ludwig of Bavaria, near Ratisbon: of Richmond Park: of the Temple of the Sun at Baalbec: and of Street Scenery in Constantinople. Part IV. contains the Cathedral of Strasburg: Tell's Chapel, (near Kussnacht in Switzerland:) the Palace of the Legion of Honour in Paris: the Ruins of Etawah in Bengal, (India.) The cheapness of the work (twenty-five cents a number) is remarkable.

(11.) "*Mysteries: or, Glimpses of the Supernatural,* by C. W. ELLIOTT." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 273.) This book is full of affectations of style, of method, and even of typography. Yet it is not without good sense and shrewdness, and will do good in these days, when so many sober people are taking leave of their senses, and the days of witchcraft, if not of chaos, are come again. It gives pretty full accounts of the Salem witchcraft, of the Cock-Lane ghost, and last, but not least, the Rochester rappings, and their successors throughout the country. Mr. Elliott gives no quarter to these absurdities and impostures.

(12.) "*A Buckeye Abroad,* by SAMUEL J. COX." (New-York: G. P. Putnam; 12mo., pp. 444.) This writer shows in every page of his book, the characteristics of the Western American. In spite of bad grammar, he writes with a quick vigour that carries the reader along with him. Few *educated* Englishmen could write as lively and attractive a book of travels as this comparatively uncultivated man of Ohio.

(13.) "*Cottage Residences,* by A. J. DOWNING." (New-York: John Wiley, 1852; 8vo., pp. 215.) The author of this book (alas! that we have to speak of him and his doings in the past tense) did more in the last ten years of his life-time, to cultivate the taste of the American people in domestic and rural architecture, than had been done before since the establishment of the republic. The marks of his refining influence may be seen almost everywhere in the

Northern and Middle States. The work before us contains a series of designs for rural cottages and cottage villas, and for their gardens and grounds, adapted to North America. It has passed to a fourth edition, and will, we hope, go through many more. To all our readers who may intend to build, or who, living (happily) away from the brick and mortar miseries of the city, desire to surround their abodes with beauty, and so to make home attractive, we commend this book as worth more than its weight in gold.

(14.) ANDREW S. NORTON is the most conservative and scriptural of the race of Unitarian writers produced by New-England. He has done good service in vindicating the historical character of Christianity against all forms of infidelity. A number of his fugitive writings have been recently collected into a volume, under the title of "*Tracts Concerning Christianity*," (Cambridge: John Bartlett; 8vo., pp. 392,) which is worth the careful perusal of theological students —especially the four concluding essays on "Calvinism," the "Latest Form of Infidelity," the modern "German School of Infidelity," and "Objections to Historical Christianity."

(15.) "*Missions in the Tonga and Feejee Islands*, by Rev. WALTER LAWRY." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1852; 12mo., pp. 499.) This book is made up from the journals of the author, who is the General Superintendent of the Wesleyan Society's Missions in New Zealand, and Visitor of the Missions in the Friendly and Feejee Islands. Its most interesting portion (though all is full of interest) is that which relates to the Feejee Islands. The record of missionary success among the *cannibals* of that group, is one of the most remarkable triumphs of Christianity which the history of the Church affords. The work gives the most complete view now extant of the present state of the groups of islands to which it refers. Indeed, almost all the substantial knowledge we possess of their climate, inhabitants, &c., is derived from this and other missionary sources. The map is the most perfect one yet published, having been corrected by Captain Back, who combines his own observations with those of Captain Wilkes, of the American Expedition. Apart from the new knowledge it offers, this book abounds in incident of a kind to make it attractive, especially to young persons.

(16.) "*An Olio of Domestic Verses*, by EMILY JUDSON," (New-York: L. Colby & Co.; 12mo., pp. 235,) contains a number of pieces of a higher order of poetic merit than any of the previous effusions of the same author.

(17.) "*Scenes and Thoughts in Europe*, by GEORGE H. CALVERT, Second Series," (New-York: G. P. Putnam; 12mo., pp. 185,) is a book made up of selections from a practised traveller's note-book. The writer believes that "the formulas of Fourier are the vehicle wherein the high ideal of Christ's teachings is to descend to the earth and become the reality of daily life." So far as the book touches social topics, this is its teaching.

(18.) "*The Mother at Home*, by J. S. C. ABBOTT," (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 18mo., pp. 303,) is a new edition, greatly enlarged and improved, of a work which found on its first issue a large circle of readers, and did a great deal of good. It aims to illustrate the principles of maternal duty in a familiar way, and cannot fail to be useful to any family in which it is well-studied and its precepts observed.

(19.) WE find upon our table two small tracts, than which, in our judgment, no more important publications—none more vital to the interests of Methodism—have ever been issued by the Book Concern. They are the "*Catechisms of the Methodist Episcopal Church, No.* 1 *and No.* 2." These Catechisms have been prepared by *order of the General Conference*, and are now the standard Catechisms of the Church. The manuscript was prepared by Dr. Kidder, and then submitted to a most capable committee, consisting of Bishop Hedding, Dr. Bangs, Dr. Olin, and Dr. Holdich, whose certificate of approval is appended to the preface. It was then submitted for examination to the General Conference held in Boston, May, 1852, and referred to a select committee, consisting of the Rev. E. Bowen, the Rev. G. Webber, and the Rev. John H. Power, who carefully examined the work, and reported in its favour. The Conference adopted the report, and also incorporated into the Discipline a rule which cannot be too often repeated, requiring the *preachers to catechise the children publicly in the Sunday school and at special meetings appointed for that purpose.* If this rule be faithfully obeyed throughout our Church, a new era will have dawned upon Methodism. In no one thing have we been more deficient than in the training of the children of the Church; and the chief excuse for this—namely, that we had no suitable catechisms—is now no longer valid. The two before us are, in our judgment, the *best* catechisms for the instruction of young children now extant in the Christian Church. We do not speak at random: our judgment is made up after a careful personal examination of all, or nearly all, the existing catechisms of the Churches of Europe and America. Let the good work be commenced at once in every school, in every family. Let every preacher, and every member, *old and young*, commit Catechism No. 1 to memory—and the next generation of Methodists will be differently trained from the present with regard to the doctrines of the Church. The whole Catechism can be recited over in fifteen or twenty minutes; and a few weeks drilling in the family and in the school will make all familiar with it. Let portions of it be recited at *family worship*, until parents, children, servants, and all, have it graven upon the memory. When this is done, one great step towards securing the *permanency* of Methodism will have been taken.

(20.) "*The Doctrines and Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church.*" (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1852; 32mo., pp. 232.) The changes made in the Discipline by order of the General Conference of 1852, are of two classes—first, changes in the form of the work; and secondly, changes in its matter. Those of the former class are such as we think every lover of our

laws must approve, as the modifications made are all intended to make the book more perspicuous, and to facilitate its use. Many topics, even after the valuable re-arrangement of 1848, remained out of their proper places in the book; these, with very few exceptions, are now properly arranged and adjusted. References are made from one part of the Discipline to others, where the same subject is treated or alluded to. The headings of the chapters and sections have also been, in several instances, decidedly improved. The Index is also full and accurate. The most important changes in the *matter* of the Discipline will be found in the chapter on the Instruction of Children, (pp. 85, 86;) in that on Churches and Church Property, (pp. 169, 170;) in that on Support and Supplies, (pp. 178, 187;) and in that on Missions, (page 190.)

(21.) THE "*Methodist Almanac*" for 1853, is the best of the series yet issued, in point of fulness of matter, excellence of arrangement, and abundance of illustration.

(22.) MESSRS. BANGS, BROTHER & Co. have sent us several additional volumes of Bohn's Libraries. "*Memorials of Christian Life in the Early and Middle Ages*, by DR. A. NEANDER," (12mo., pp. 538,) is a translation, by J. E. Ryland, of Neander's "Denkwürdigkeiten," a part of which has already been presented to the American public in Carlton & Phillips's beautiful edition of "*Light in Dark Places.*" The second volume of "*Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of America, during the years* 1799–1804, by A. VON HUMBOLDT," (12mo., pp. 521,) will be welcome to all collectors of *good* library-books. Yonge's translation of "*Cicero's Orations*" has reached the third volume, containing fourteen of the orations. We find, also, the second volume (but not the first) of "*The Literary Works of Sir Joshua Reynolds*," (12mo., pp. 490,) a new and improved edition, with a memoir of the author, and remarks on his professional character, by Henry W. Beecher.

(23.) "*The History of the United States of America*, by RICHARD HILDRETH," Vol. VI. (Harper & Brothers, 1852; 8vo., pp. 739.) This volume completes Mr. Hildreth's plan, as it carries the history down to 1821, at which point—after the Missouri discussion—the politics of *to-day* begin. We have largely examined in these pages the previous volumes of this History, and see little reason in the final volume to change the opinions before expressed. The merits and defects of the author remain the same; indeed, he is not a man to lose the one or to mend the other: a sort of stereotyped man, we think. His History containing, as it does, the only consecutive record of American annals in portable form, is indispensable to every well-furnished library.

(24.) "*The Institutes of Algebra*, by G. B. DOCHARTY, LL. D., *Professor of Mathematics in the New-York Free Academy.*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 275.) Knowing, as we do, Professor Docharty's ability to treat mathematical subjects with skill and clearness, we are glad to

learn that he has commenced the preparation of a Course of Mathematics, for the use of schools, academies, and colleges. The first fruit of this design appears in the work before us, which contains a judicious selection of the portions of Algebra necessary for the collegiate course, and which *can* be taught in that course. Most of the text-books err on this point: giving, on some topics, masses of matter, valuable indeed, but yet absolutely useless *in the course*, because they can form no part of it. It may be said that this is no disadvantage, as such omitted portions may be useful to the student apart from, and after, his college course. But we have had experience enough in teaching, to discover that omissions from the text-book always have a bad effect upon the generality of students, and that they find a conscious gratification in mastering the *whole* of a text-book. Professor Docharty presents the topics of Algebra in a natural order, and with great clearness of statement throughout. We commend his book to the careful examination of teachers.

(25.) "*Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, with English Notes, critical and explanatory*, by CHARLES ANTHON, LL. D." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 398.) The text of this edition is founded on those of Kühner and Tischer, amended, however, "throughout in accordance with the suggestions of the best philologists." Tischer's Notes have also been taken as a basis for the notes in this edition. We are glad to see the book. A good *working* edition of the Disputations for school and college classes, has been long needed, and this will precisely fill the gap.

ART. VIII.—LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Theological.

EUROPEAN.

A VERY interesting line of inquiry is suggested by the title, "*Die Apostelgeschichte: oder der Entwickelungsgang der Kirche von Jerusalem bis Rom.* von M. BAUMGARTEN. 1 Theil, von Jerusalem *bis Antiochia.*" (Halle, 1852; pp. 308.) The book is, in fact, a commentary upon the Acts of the Apostles, attempting a historical development of the Church of Christ, as treated in that book. This first part extends the commentary to the end of the twelfth chapter, and divides that portion of the Acts into two parts: I. The Church among the Jews; II. The Church in transition from the Jews to the Heathen.

WE mentioned in a former number, that a firm in Edinburgh had commenced the publication of a piratical Quarterly, made up mostly of articles from American journals, entitled the "*Foreign Evangelical Review.*" We notice that its August number contains no less than three articles taken from our own pages.

A GREAT change has come over the English Reviews with regard to Methodism. The time is not far remote when Wesley or Methodism were only named to be sneered at; now, hardly an issue of any journal reaches us without some criticism,—friendly or otherwise, but always serious, as becomes topics of the weightiest import. In an article in the British Quarterly for August, on the "Christian Ministry to come," we find the following:—

"Methodism was evidently a reaction against the influence and authority of the high-and-dry people in the Established Church. It seized on the orthodox doctrines, but it did so that they might be made to produce their proper spiritual fruit. The nation had seen enough of a

barren orthodoxy; the time in which its uses and value should be made evident had now arrived. These doctrines are the truth, said our orthodox Churchman; be ye therefore christened, confirmed, come to the communion, and, above all, be ye obedient to magistrates and ministers, or it will not be well with you. These doctrines are the truth, said our orthodox Methodist, therefore ye must be born again. Our Methodist friend is right; and far be it from us to take exception to the warm-hearted energy with which he insists on being so regarded. Given the orthodoxy avowed by both, the consequent teaching of the Methodist is immensely the more rational. It sets forth a result befitting the expenditure—an end worthy of the means. If orthodoxy be true, the religion of orthodoxy should be a grave matter. It may be allied with ritualism, it may give its sanction to everything favourable to social order, but its purpose must embrace results of a much higher import, results eminently spiritual, or there is no wise relation between the cost which it incurs for the sake of the religious, and the religious as realized.

"Our praise of Methodism, however, must have its limitations. We honour it most sincerely, as compared with its unmeaning, proud, and heartless antagonism in the condition of our Established Church at that time. But Methodism, in its turn, errs in many respects, both in the way of excess and of defect. We admire its spiritual purpose, its zeal, its courage, its many labours, its frequent spirit of self-sacrifice. With the substance of its teaching, moreover, we are in cordial agreement. But, in our judgment, that substance wants discrimination, wants enlargement, and wants, not unfrequently, something very different as regards the mode of presentation. It seizes on truth, but it is on truth in its strong characteristics, not in any of its finer modifications. It is in too much haste to do its work, to allow of its being detained by inquiry about the points in which the things that differ may still be alike, or about the degree in which rules may be softened by exceptions, of one truth by another. What it does it must do as at a stroke, or not at all.

"The Methodist element, with all its good and its not good, soon diffused itself freely through other religious bodies. The pulpits both of the Established Church and of the Nonconformists came very perceptibly under its influence. The preaching of dissenters needed this new impulse scarcely less than the preaching of Churchmen. But in neither of these connexions did the gain come without evil. The imperfections and aberrations of Methodism came along with its better qualities. Clergymen from the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, and Nonconformist ministers from the academies of Dissent, went largely with the stream, and the danger came to be, lest the more instructive kind of preaching, which had been sadly wanting in life, should give place to a kind of preaching which, while possessing life, would be sadly wanting in instruction. We feel bound to say also, that the evil to be feared in this form, did in great part come."

Among the new works in theology and kindred subjects, recently announced in Great Britain, are the following:—

The Lands of the Messiah, Mahomet, and the Pope, as visited in 1851. By John Alton, D. D., Minister of Dolphinton. 1 vol., 8vo.; with map:—An Apology for Wesley and Methodism. In Reply to the Misrepresentations of Isaac Taylor, the North British Review, the Scottish Congregational Magazine, &c. By the Rev. R. M. Macbrair, M. A.:—Heroes of the Bible; or, Sketches of Scripture Characters. By Rev. W. S. Edwards. 1 vol., 8vo.:—Memorials of Early Christianity; presenting, in a graphic, compact, and popular form some of the memorable events of Early Ecclesiastical History. By the Rev. J. G. Miall, author of "Footsteps of our Forefathers." Post 8vo.:—Modern Romanism. By B. B. Woodward, B. A. 8vo.:—Memoirs of the Lives of Robert Haldane of Airthrey, and of his brother James Alexander Haldane; comprising notices of many of the most eminent men, and the most remarkable religious movements, from the close of the last century to the present time. By Alexander Haldane, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister. 8vo.:—Journal of a Tour in Ceylon and India, undertaken at the Request of the Baptist Missionary Society in company with the Rev. J. Leechman, M. A. By Joshua Russell. Post 8vo.:—An Analogy of the Old and New Testaments, systematically classified: Whereby the dispersed Rays of Gospel Truth are concentrated into Chapters. With the Prophecies of the Messiah's Kingdom: the Alpha and the Omega. By T. Whowell. 2 vols., 4to.:—History of the Council of Trent, from the French of L. F. Bungener, with the Author's last Corrections and Additions, communicated to the Translator. 8vo.:—Popery in the Full Corn, the Ear, and the Blade; or, the Doctrine of Baptism in the Popish, Episcopalian, and Congregational Churches. With a Defence of the Calvinistic or Presbyterian view:—The Light of Prophecy; being an attempt to trace out thereby the Coming Judgments

and the Promised Glory. By Thomas Lumisden Strange:—Sermons on National Subjects, preached in a Village Church, by Charles Kingsley, (author of Alton Locke,) 8vo.:—Christophaneia: the Doctrine of the Manifestation of the Son of God under the Economy of the Old Testament. By Rev. G. B. Kidd. 1 vol. 8vo.:—Notes and Reflections on the Epistle to the Romans, (Calvinistic,) by A. Pridham:—Isaiah and the Prophets: The Second Volume of the Evening Series of Daily Bible Illustrations; being Original Readings for a Year on Subjects from Sacred History, Biography, Geography, Antiquities, and Theology. By John Kitto, D. D.

Classical and Miscellaneous.

EUROPEAN.

We have received the second volume of Auguste Comte's "*Système de Politique Positive*," (8vo., pp. 578.) It applies the Positive Philosophy to the highest problems of society, as the following statement of the contents will show:—*Chap.* I. Théorie générale de la Religion, ou théorie positive de l'unité humaine. *Chap.* II. Appréciation sociologique du problème humain; ou théorie positive de la propriété matérielle. *Chap.* III. Théorie positive de la famille humaine. *Chap.* IV. Théorie positive du langage humain. *Chap.* V. Théorie positive de l'organisme social. *Chap.* VI. Théorie positive de l'existence sociale, systématisée par le sacerdoce. *Chap.* VII. Théorie positive des limites générales de variation propres à l'ordre humain. A copious preface treats largely of Comte's personal affairs—with regard to which he seems to have lost all dignity of feeling. Regarding himself as the apostle of the final religion of humanity, he deems it quite becoming that his "material" support should depend upon the voluntary contributions of his supporters. Deprived as he has been, of his office in the Polytechnic School, he finds himself, at fifty-four, penniless—and with "a great and incomparable mission" to fulfil. Counting upon ten years of "full cerebral vigour," he promises to devote them entirely to the completion of his task—the construction "of the true religion." The first part of that task was accomplished, he thinks, in his *Philosophie Positive*, which demonstrated the *intellectual* superiority of Positivism: the second part is now accomplishing in the *Politique Positive*, which is to demonstrate its *moral* superiority. And in the triumph of Positivism, Auguste Comte is to be the sacerdotal, as well as the intellectual regenerator of humanity. As such, he thinks it quite reasonable, nay, the most reasonable of all things, that "humanity" should pay his expenses on the way. All this is very vulgar—very unworthy of a philosopher. A *private* subscription for M. Comte's support would have been quite consistent with his dignity; but this public begging is intolerable. But Comte's pretensions as a "priest" only afford another proof of the folly of infidelity. The prefaces of these two volumes absolutely overflow with absurdities and vulgarisms. The "true religion of humanity" begins, to say the least of it, most inauspiciously. The fanatical and, at the same time, ludicrous aspects of M. Comte's *religious* enterprise, will save many from falling into that gulf of infidelity towards which his intellectual superiority might have led them. Hereafter, Christianity has little to fear from Comte. The preface to this volume speaks of the reviews of the *Positive Philosophy* which have appeared in our pages in the following terms: "L'une des principales revues trimestrielles vient d'y publier, en janvier et avril derniers, une mémorable appréciation de mon ouvrage fondamentale par un digne antagoniste. Son noble langage, sans dissimuler aucune dissidence, forme un heureux contraste avec celui de nos psycologues ou idéologues, et même avec la froideur personelle de mes adherents trop abstraits." M. Comte also appends a letter to the editor of this journal, in which he speaks as follows of the clergy of this country: "De tous les clergés qu' engendra la décomposition, d'abord spontanée, puis systematique, du monothéisme occidental, celui des Etats-Unis me semble, en général, être aujourd'hui le seul qui posside un véritable pouvoir spirituel, c'est-à-dire une autorité, à la fois mentale et morale, toujours résultée de l'assentiment volontaire d'un public affranchi de toute contrainte materielle. Si son efficacité sociale ne devient pas plus décisive pour la réorganization moderne, je n'impute cette insuffisance ni à ses ministres,

ni même à sa population, mais surtout à l'irrevocable impuissance d'une religion radicalement incapable d'embrasser le véritable ensemble de l'existence qu'elle doit systématiser, même en s'y bornant à la vie individuelle, réellement inséparable de la vie collective."

"*Das Classische Alterthum in der Gegenwart: eine Geschichtliche Betrachtung*, von Dr. William Herbert," (Leipsig: Teubner, 1852; 8vo., pp. 224,) treats of the relations of classical antiquity to the literature and history of modern Germany. According to the writer, a new infusion of the true classical spirit is necessary to save the German mind from the excesses into which modern schools have led and are leading it.

"*Untersuchungen über das kosmische System des Platon: Sendschreiben an A. Von Humboldt von* August Böckh," (Berlin: 1852; 8vo., pp. 152,) is a letter from Böckh to von Humboldt, full of learning and acuteness, called forth by some remarks in Gruppe's "Kosmische System der Griechen," and designed to show that Plato did *not* recognize or teach the diurnal rotation of the earth.

We have received a copy of "*Die Tyrannie in ihren beiden Perioden bei den alten Griechen, dargestellt nach Ursachen, Verlauf und Wirkungen*, von H. G. Plass," (Bremen: 1852; pp. 785.)

Mr. F. W. Newman has turned to a field of letters in which he will do more good and reap more laurels than in theology. His "*Regal Rome*" (London, 1852) is intended as an introduction to Roman history, treating the ante-historical period of the history, into which Niebuhr's keen intuitive faculty has penetrated so deeply. Mr. Newman's later turn of mind is even more sceptical than Niebuhr's—but his vivid imagination and ready flow of language give him great advantage in constructing out of Niebuhr's criticisms (for his so-called history is little else) a picture of ancient Rome. The book is divided into three parts, namely, Part I., Alban Rome: under which he treats of Latium, the Latin language, and of Rome before Numa. Part II., Sabine Rome: treating of the Sabines and their institutions, and of the Sabino-Roman dynasty. Part III., Etrusco-Latin Rome, which gives the origin of the Etruscans and their civilization, and carries the history to the end of Tarquinius Superbus.

Charles Knight (London) announces a new Encyclopædia, under the title of "*The Imperial Cyclopædia*," to be published in *two divisions* and *one sub-division*, each having its own alphabetical arrangement, and forming, in fact, cyclopædias of distinct departments of knowledge, which may be subscribed for as separate works. The *one division* comprehends all those subjects which form the exclusive contents of the earlier encyclopædias, (such as the folio editions of Chambers,) which were designated as dictionaries of arts and sciences. The subjects of geography, history, and biography, did not enter into their plan. These subjects will be comprised in a *second* division. The one division, by a large generalization, may be called scientific, the other, literary. Division I.: The Cyclopædia of Sciences and Arts, to be completed in thirty-six parts, and in nine volumes, at the subscription price of three shillings and sixpence each for the parts, and fifteen shillings for the volumes. Division II., The Cyclopædia of Geography, History, Biography, etc., to be completed in thirty-six parts, forming nine volumes, at the subscription price of three shillings and sixpence each for the parts, and fifteen shillings for the volumes. Sub-division: The Cyclopædia of the British Empire, to be completed in two volumes, illustrated with numerous steel engravings and maps.

A fourth volume of Ross's Travels among the Isles of Greece, has appeared under the title of "*Reisen nach Kos, Halikarnassos, Rhodos, und der Insel Cypern*, von Ludwig Ross." (Halle: 1852; 8vo., pp. 216.) Ross's observations throw much light upon the classical geography of the regions he describes.

"*Wurzelforschungen*, von Paul Boetticher, (Halle: 1852; 8vo., pp. 48,) will be welcome to those (and to those only) who study deepest in comparative philology. It contains a series of acute observations upon, and illustrations of, the relations between the Coptic and the Semitic languages, and between both these and the Indo-Germanic family.

Among the books in classical and general literature, recently announced in Great Britain, are the following:—

Autobiography of William Jerdan; with his Literary, Political, and Social Reminiscences and Correspondence, during the last Forty Years. 2d volume, with Por-

trait of George Canning, and View of Gloucester Lodge. Post 8vo.:—The Celt, the Roman, and the Saxon. A History of the Early Inhabitants of Britain, down to the Conversion of the Anglo-Saxons to Christianity. By Thomas Wright, Esq. M.A., F.S.A. With numerous illustrations. Post 8vo.:—Specimens of old Indian Poetry. Translated from the original Sanskrit into English verse, by Ralph T. H. Griffith, M.A., M. R. A. S., and Boden Sanskrit Scholar in the University of Oxford. Post 8vo.

ART. IX.—RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

ENGLAND.

The one hundred and ninth Annual Conference of the Wesleyan Ministers in England, commenced its session in Sheffield on Wednesday, July 28, 1852. The Preparatory Committees, so called, by which great part of the financial business of the Conference is, in effect, transacted, had been in session several days before. The reports of the doings of these committees show that the unhappy dissensions which have continued to agitate the society during the past year, and the actual secession of a large number of members, have embarrassed the connexional finances to a very painful extent; still the failure of supplies in some quarters has called forth unusual liberality, amounting even to sacrifice, in others.

The Kingswood and Woodhouse Grove School Committee report the internal condition of the schools to be excellent, but at the same time regret that, owing to the present circumstances of the Connexion, the school fund is considerably in arrears; whilst, owing principally to the failure of the general collection two years ago, and partly to the old Kingswood premises having sold for far less than their estimated worth, the New Kingswood Building Fund is heavily in debt.

The information laid before the Committee on the Contingent Fund was certainly most distressing. Not a few circuits have been most painfully crippled. Several ministers have been reduced to the verge of starvation. At the same time, the unrepining fortitude with which such trials have been borne by the ministers, and the noble efforts which have been made by the people, especially in the poorest circuits, are such as to call for the highest admiration. Many were the cases of extreme distress which, for want of funds, it was found impossible to relieve, or only possible to relieve most inadequately. Nevertheless, the receipts on behalf of the contingent fund, during the past year, from the yearly collection, have exceeded those of the former year by four hundred and sixty-one pounds. The demands upon the fund, however, during the two past years, and the allotted grants for the present year, have so much exceeded those of ordinary years, that *the fund is or will be in debt, on the whole, to the amount of something like six thousand pounds.*

The report of the Chapel Fund and Chapel Building Committee was very encouraging. Notwithstanding the depression of the year, the total cost of the erections and enlargements effected during the past year, has been £42,884. The total number of erections or enlargements reported to the committee during the year, is eighty-six.

The report of the Book Committee showed a healthy and active progress. The Tract department, especially, has been pushed energetically. During the past year something like a Million and a Quarter of Wesleyan Tracts have been put into circulation, of the general excellence of which it is needless to speak. A series of effective Anti-Popish Tracts has been published, as specially called for by the character of the time. The committee suggest the publication of a new monthly, better adapted to the wants of the masses than the Wesleyan Methodist Magazine; and, along with this, a Monthly or Quarterly Review, for the more cultivated classes. They are "following in the footsteps" of the American Book Concern.

The Education Committee is now only second in importance to the Mission Committee. The report of the *Normal School at Westminster* showed a debtor side of £35,882 5*s.* 2*d.*, and a creditor side of £32,682 16*s.* 3*d.*, leaving a balance on the wrong side of £3,199 8*s.* 11*d.* This Normal School is one of the greatest achievements of Wesleyan Methodism. It occupies

an acre and three quarters of land in the very heart of Westminster, where land is prodigiously expensive, but, at the same time, where a population is afforded of all the most in need of such instruction as the schools connected with the Normal Institution are intended to bestow. The School department of the Institution comprises five schools, an infant, a junior, a senior, an industrial (girls') school, and a mixed or model village school, with twelve class-rooms, affording altogether the means of instruction for two thousand three hundred and thirty-three children, and with ample and well-fitted play-grounds. The Collegiate department contains accommodation for lodging, boarding, and training one hundred students—including, of course, lecture-hall, and library, as well as dining-room, kitchen, dormitories, (one for each student,) &c. In addition, the institution includes committee-room, principal's house, two masters' houses, gate-keeper's lodge, and lofty and substantial walls inclosing the whole, and effectually shutting out the degrading associations of the wretched district in which the institution is situated. This noble institution is the largest, the most substantial, and the most complete and beautiful building in Methodism.

In the MISSION COMMITTEE it was agreed that the time had arrived for the establishment of separate Conferences in France and in Australia. It was determined also to open a Mission in CHINA, and three missionaries will appear on the next minutes as labouring in that vast field. The debate in the Conference on this measure showed great ignorance of the missionary operations of the American Methodist Episcopal Churches in China. Dr. Alder, for instance, (who, of all men, would be supposed to know such points accurately,) stated that "the American Methodist Episcopal Church was adopting plans to promulgate the gospel in China!"

The CONFERENCE, as we have said, commenced its sessions on the 28th of July. There were seven vacancies in the Legal Hundred: one by death, and six from superannuation. They were filled by the succession (by seniority and election) of the Rev. Messrs. Henry V. Olver, James Methley, James Jones, 1st, Charles Hawthorn, Henry Ranson, Henry Davis, and James Rosser.

The Rev. JOHN SCOTT was elected President, and Rev. JOHN FARRAR Secretary. Mr. Scott is a man of plain but substantial parts, and of great energy of character. Notwithstanding the steadiness with which he has resisted the recent proposals for reform, he is regarded, at least by the conservative party, as "among the most liberally-disposed" of the ministers.

A committee, representing two thousand Wesleyan Methodists, known as "Moderates" in the recent party nomenclature, requested permission to present to the Conference a paper known as the "Birmingham Declaration," asking for certain ecclesiastical changes. The Conference sent a respectful reply, but refused the permission desired. *We* cannot see the justice or even the policy of such a procedure—but England is not America.

Thirty-five candidates for the ministry were accepted from the English circuits: and twenty from foreign stations, among whom were *six Fejees converts*. Twenty-seven preachers had died during the year.

Nine preachers, who had taken part in the recent agitations, were dropped; either by the acceptance of their resignations, or by expulsion. The number of members lost during the year we have seen stated at twenty thousand: but this, we think, must be an exaggeration.

Perhaps the most important action of the Conference was that upon the report of the Memorial Committee. Several measures, supposed to be *progressive*, and tending somewhat to liberalize the system, were adopted, namely: 1. A definition of the Quarterly Conference, and of the persons to compose it. 2. A set of regulations concerning memorials to the Conference, giving somewhat greater latitude than has heretofore been allowed in that matter. 3. A provision in lieu of the Minor District Meeting, for certain extraordinary cases. 4. A new law for the punishment of inveighing against the doctrine and discipline of the Church, or sowing dissensions in the societies. 5. A declaratory statement as to the rule for the trial of trustees. 6. A rule so singular in its provisions, that we quote it at full length:—

"*Resolved, unanimously*, That a member refusing to pay the usual contributions to the society, (except on the plea of poverty,) is thereby disqualified for membership; and that when such refusal shall have been persisted in by any member for three months, such person should be deemed to have excluded himself, without the necessity of any formal expulsion."

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